Ex Libris
Duquesne University:

Francis P. Ward

THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

Duquesne University
of the Holy Ghost.
Pittsburgh, Pa.

VOLUME III.

CONTAINING THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS ON RELIGION

DETROIT:
THORNDIKE NOURSE, PUBLISHER.
1883.

Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by
HENRY F. BROWNSON,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C.

CONTENTS.

	Page.
Natural and Supernatural,	1
Morell's Philosophy of Religion,	18
The Mercersburg Theology, Article I.,	50
" " " Article II.,	90
Newman on the True Basis of Theology,	117
Philosophical Studies on Christianity,	151
Philosophy and Catholicity,	180
Collard on Reason and Faith,	205
Limits of Religious Thought,	230
Harmony of Faith and Reason,	257
Christ the Spirit,	272
Rome or Reason,	298
Rome and the World,	324
Nature and Grace,	350
Argyll's Reign of Law,	375
An Imaginary Contradiction,	391
Free Religion,	407
Emerson's Prose Works,	424
Union with the Church,	438
Beecherism and its Tendencies,	460
Baring-Gould on Christianity,	484
What is the Need of Revelation?	509
Religion and Science,	519
Synthetic Theology,	536
Faith and Reason—Revelation and Science,	565

JAN 28 '29
2543

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2010 with funding from
Lyrasis Members and Sloan Foundation

http://www.archive.org/details/workscollectedar03henr

NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL.

REMARKS ON A LETTER FROM A PROTESTANT MINISTER.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1847.]

The writer of the following Letter is a minister of the *Christian* denomination,—a Protestant sect which originated in this country between forty and fifty years ago, with Elias Smith and Abner Jones, in New England, and two or three others at the West and South, whose names we forget. They deny the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation, but seem inclined to admit the doctrine of Redemption, and in this last respect differ from the Unitarians, with whom, however, they maintain friendly relations. The Letter was not intended for publication, but, as we have no leisure to reply to it in a private communication, and as it opens a subject on which Unitarians and so-called Liberal Christians generally appear to want clear and distinct views, we trust the writer will pardon the liberty we take of inserting and replying to it in the pages of our *Review*. With the writer himself we have but a slight acquaintance. He has called on us once or twice, and we have been led to think very favorably of his natural ability and disposition. He has evidently received only a limited education, and his mind appears to be undisciplined; but he has great intellectual activity, and is candid and ingenuous. We believe him, when he says his aim is at truth, and we have no doubt but he is prepared to follow his convictions, whithersoever they may lead him. May Almighty God, through his great mercy, grant him the unspeakable happiness of finding the truth as it is in Jesus!

"My Dear Sir—I have frequently thought of our conversation at your house the other day, in which I was much pleased and interested. I have looked at the subject-matter of your propositions more analytically than I then did. . . . . .

"I think that an important point was lost sight of,—that is, the point of contact between the natural and the supernatural, which must exist, let the mediums and teachers of the supernatural be what and as many or as few as they may. This is an important point; and the *capacity* of the natural to apprehend, to contain, and to realize the supernatural is another. On these all the difficulties turn.

"One of your propositions was, 'Salvation belongs to the supernatural.' It is beyond the range of nature. 'The knowledge and the power by which we understand and experience salvation are also supernatural.' This was substantially another. And without going over the whole ground of your other propositions, I understand the main thing at which all aimed was, that with our human powers we cannot get at the supernatural, we cannot know nor obey the supernatural. Now I bespeak your patience while I give some of my reflections.

"I take two things for granted. 1. Human beings have no other than human faculties. 2. Man cannot, under any circumstances, receive that for which he has not a *receptive capacity*. On these, men of reason will not quarrel.

"Well, in salvation there are at least three things, distinct: the subject, the object, and the instrumentality; or, the Saviour, the saved, and the instrumental action by which the Saviour acts upon the saved. Now the Saviour is supernatural, the means by which he acts on the object are supernatural, but the saved is not supernatural; and prior to salvation the Saviour and the saved are apart, at a distance from each other. Also, in salvation there must be a contact between the saving cause or causes and man, or, in other words, a contact between the natural and the supernatural, which you believe as well as I.

"Now, if the saved is the natural, on what principle is salvation possible? Only on the principle, that the natural may receive, may know, and do the supernatural. If the natural may not know the supernatural, then salvation is impossible. To say that the power to receive the supernatural must be given by the supernatural is only to repeat the same difficulty; for the supposed power to receive, if given, must be itself received, which, if supernatural, would be again impossible. The fact, that salvation has ever occurred in any one case, is infallible proof that in human nature are powers which can realize the supernatural.

"Now, I affirm, that, if the supernatural exists in human language, man by the use of his own powers can get at it. If it is accessible by any means, the individual man can get at it.

"In nature we see the supernatural flowing into the natural, into the ultimates and particles of all things. God is supernatural. He is not nature, and nature is not he; yet he pervades all things; he is omnipresent *in* nature. Here, then, is a living proof that the *unthinking, unintelligent* natural receives and contains its measure of the supernatural. But this is not the fact I am upon.

"Now, man has what nature beneath him has not,—a soul; and I argue that it has powers like the Eternal Mind, to the extent that the Eternal Mind may be understood. 1. From the fact, that the thought and love, by nature displayed, we unconsciously recognize as being like (in nature) our own. 2. From the fact, that man can know God only through kindred powers. Why could not Newton's dog know Newton? Because he had not the kindred powers, and without those powers could

not know his master. Nor can we, any more than Newton's dog, know the God who made us, without natural and kindred powers. Did any man, in the Church or out, ever know God? If so, this position is proven. Man may know the supernatural, if he has kindred powers.

"Now, if man by nature cannot know the supernatural when it lies before him, then he cannot know it at all. For he must either know the supernatural by natural means or by supernatural. If by natural, my view is sustained. If by supernatural, he must understand his means or he cannot use them. If he gets at salvation supernaturally, then he gets at the supernatural by his own powers, using them as a means. How may I understand Jesus and all inspired minds? They, you say, utter the supernatural. I grant it. But how am I to get at it, if I cannot by my own powers understand the supernatural? Can the Church remove the difficulty? What she gives must also be either natural or supernatural, for these contain all true teachings in the universe. If she gives me the natural, it is what I had before. If she gives the supernatural, by which to aid me, I cannot understand her without giving demonstrative proof of my ability to know the supernatural. If the Church gets at the supernatural, she faces the same difficulties. If individual man has no powers by which to understand the supernatural, neither has man in the aggregate; for in one man lie all the faculties found in all men. The more I think, the more I believe that any man may, with an honest heart, come to God and know his will. If man alone cannot, neither can a million. But I must close. I have given these remarks, that you may see the turn my thoughts have taken. I think the above is logical. But my mind is open to any argument you may think proper to give. Please show me any essential flaw in the reasoning I have adopted. I aim at truth, as I believe that you do. I may fail in seeing; but when I see, I will never dodge logical sequences, let them be what they may. I am, dear Sir, very truly yours."

The Letter gives but a confused statement of the ground we assumed in the conversation to which it refers. The minister undertook to demonstrate that the church is unnecessary and useless. To this end he contended, 1. Natural reason is competent of itself to decide, from their intrinsic character, what are, and what are not, doctrines of revelation. 2. When once the means of salvation are ascertained, the church cannot be needed; and, 3. These means can be ascertained as well without the church as with it; because the church is only an aggregate of individuals, and has no faculty for discovering and determining them not possessed by each individual himself.

We replied, 1. Whether the church, as an aggregate of individuals, does or does not possess faculties for determining the means of salvation, not possessed by each individual

himself, has nothing to do with the question. The faculty of the church to teach does not depend on the fact that the whole is wiser than a part, or that men taken collectively are wiser than men taken individually; but on the fact that she has the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost. This assistance we predicate of her as a whole, in her organic capacity, as a corporate individual, because it is only in that capacity our Lord has promised it to her. The ground of our belief of the church is, not the numbers aggregated,—although that is much, when the question turns on the value of a purely human authority,—but the promise of our Lord to be always supernaturally present with the church, leading her into all truth, and enabling her to teach infallibly whatsoever he has commanded her. The question is not, whether one man be or be not equal to many men or all men, as a teacher; but simply, whether our Lord has commissioned the church to teach, and promised her infallible assistance in teaching. If he has, she, as teacher, must of course be preferred to the individual, to whom no such assistance is promised.

2. The conclusion, that, after the means of salvation are ascertained, the church cannot be needed, is premature. Salvation belongs to the supernatural order, and natural reason cannot determine what are the necessary means of gaining it. The means, as well as the end itself, can be known only by supernatural revelation; and till we are supernaturally informed as to what they are, we cannot say whether, after ascertaining them, the church will or will not be needed. For aught we can say beforehand, these means may be communion with the church and the graces received only by a faithful attendance on her ministries and the reception of her sacraments.

3. The assumption, that natural reason is competent to decide, from the intrinsic character of a doctrine, whether it be a revealed doctrine or not, is unauthorized. Revealed doctrines, as to their intrinsic truth, pertain to the supernatural order, and therefore lie out of the range of reason. Natural reason can judge only of matters which lie within the order of nature, and therefore cannot judge of the intrinsic truth of what transcends that order. The fact of revelation is also a supernatural fact, and requires a supernatural witness. Reason of itself cannot say what God will reveal, whether what is alleged to be revealed is revealed or not, or whether it is true or false. It can only determine

whether an alleged revealed doctrine does or does not contradict a principle of reason. If it does, it may reject it as false; if it does not, it by its own light can neither affirm nor deny it. To contend otherwise would be to contend that natural reason can exceed the ability of natural reason, which is a contradiction in terms.

The minister replied by denying, 1. That the truths revealed pertain to the supernatural order; and, 2. By contending that salvation lies within the order of nature. But he soon abandoned these positions, and agreed that both pertained to the supernatural order. The conversation then turned on the question of salvation. We contended, that, since salvation belongs to the supernatural order, it cannot be determined by reason alone whether there be such a thing as salvation; if there be, what it is, or what are the means of attaining it; and, therefore, that these three points, if known at all, must be known supernaturally, and all we can know of them is what, and only what, is supernaturally taught us. This, at first, he denied, but finally conceded, and it was agreed, that to salvation supernatural instruction or knowledge is necessary. But salvation, it was agreed, involves not only an end to be known, but an end to be gained, and therefore, if assumed at all, requires action as well as knowledge,—something to be done as well as to be known. But salvation belongs, as an end, or object to be gained, wholly to the supernatural order. Then the action by which it is to be gained must be supernatural; since no natural act can, in the nature of things, attain to a supernatural end. The act cannot go out of its own order. If it is purely natural, it is restricted to the order of nature. But the end to be reached by the act is in the supernatural order; consequently the act, if it is to reach its end, must be supernatural. But a supernatural act requires a supernatural actor, or power to act. Consequently, to salvation it is necessary, as appears from reason itself, that we have, 1. supernatural knowledge to disclose the end and the means; and, 2. supernatural power or ability to act in reference to that end.

The minister, without expressly denying the necessity of supernatural power, contended that knowledge of the end and means is itself the ability to gain the end; that the knowledge is the supernatural revelation contained in the Scriptures, interpreted by each one for himself; and therefore whoever has the Scriptures, studies them diligently,

and understands them according to the best of his ability, has all the knowledge and power necessary to his salvation.

To this we replied, 1. In the natural order, knowledge of the means and end is not necessarily the ability to gain the end, and that it is so in the supernatural order cannot be affirmed on the authority of reason, and can be affirmed on no authority but that of positive revelation; 2. That the Scriptures contain a supernatural revelation, that they are to be interpreted by each one for himself, that whoever studies them diligently and understands them according to the best of his ability has all the knowledge and power requisite to salvation, are all matters which lie out of the province of reason, and can be affirmed or denied only on the authority of revelation itself. Till you have determined that you have a revelation, and have settled the question as to what it is and what it teaches, you are not at liberty to assume any one of these points.

The minister answered, that he was authorized to assume them by the authority of the Scriptures themselves.

We added, that this is begging the question; and, moreover, 1. As a matter of fact, the Scriptures do not assert either that the knowledge is the power, or that they are to be privately interpreted; 2. Private interpretation can be proved from them only by private interpretation; which, as it is merely proving the same by the same, is very bad logic; 3. The Scriptures, till proved to be the word of God by a supernatural authority, are themselves no supernatural authority for saying they contain a supernatural revelation. Without the church, you are obliged to take them on, and interpret them by, a merely human authority; and when so taken and interpreted, they are only a human authority; for their divine inspiration is a fact which lies out of the province of reason, and can be affirmed only by a supernatural authority.

On this last point our conversation was continued, but broke off before it was fully settled. The minister, however, after strenuous efforts to maintain the contrary, finally conceded that he had no authority but natural reason on which to assert the inspiration of the Scriptures, and that their inspiration was a supernatural fact, of which reason was not in itself a competent judge,—thus to our understanding, though it seems not to his, conceding the whole matter in dispute.

Such is the substance of the conversation to which the

letter refers. Salvation, it was mutually agreed, is eternal life, and belongs wholly to the supernatural order; and our argument was, then it must be unattainable without a supernatural knowledge and a supernatural ability, because man naturally cannot know the supernatural, or perform a supernatural act. The minister saw very clearly, that, if he conceded these points, we should by one or two moves more compel him either to give up salvation, or to admit the necessity of the church as the supernatural teacher, and of the assistance of grace as the supernatural power; and then, perhaps, of the sacraments, as the channels of grace. In his letter he undertakes to escape the difficulty by proving that man must have the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, or else not be receptive of supernatural assistance, either in knowing or doing. His argument rests on the assumption, that the capacity to receive is the ability to do. Reduced to form, it is,—Whatever man has the natural capacity to receive he must have the natural ability to know and do. But he has the natural capacity to receive the supernatural, or else no supernatural assistance—without supposing an infinite series of supernatural assistances, which is absurd—could ever be granted him. Therefore, he must have the natural ability to know and do the supernatural.

"Human beings," he says, "have no other than human faculties, and man cannot, under any circumstances, receive that for which he has not a receptive capacity." But he must receive the supernatural or not be saved. "In salvation there are at least three things distinct,—the subject, the object, and the instrumentality; or, the Saviour, the saved, and the instrumental action of the Saviour on the saved." This is not correctly expressed. The saved, or one to be saved, is the subject, the salvation is the object, and the instrumentality is the means the Saviour furnishes the subject for gaining the object, and is, properly speaking, himself, who is at once the salvation and its medium. Thus corrected, the minister's sense is, the salvation and the Saviour are both supernatural, but the subject is natural, and, prior to salvation, is at a distance from the Saviour. The two cannot be brought together, and the subject be saved, without the supernatural being brought into contact with the natural, and acting upon it. Therefore,—"Salvation is possible only on condition that the natural may *receive*, may *know* and *do*, the supernatural." It is clear from this that the minister assumes that the natural capacity

to be assisted by the supernatural is the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, which implies that the capacity to receive is identically the ability to do.

But this is not sound philosophy. The simple receptive capacity is very distinguishable from the ability to know and do. A man may have the capacity to receive a thousand pounds with which to pay his honest debts, and yet, before receiving them, no ability to pay a single cent. A man undertakes to raise a weight which exceeds his ability, and asks you to help him. "No, my good man. You either have the capacity to receive assistance, or you have not. If you have not, I cannot assist you; if you have, you have the ability to do, without my assistance, all you can do with it, and therefore do not need it." The poor man, we apprehend, would respect your philosophy as little as your neighborly feeling.

The minister's argument sins, in the first instance, by a bad major; in the second instance, by a conclusion too broad for the premises. All he establishes in his premises is, that the supernatural must come in contact with, and act upon, the natural; from which all he is entitled to conclude is simply the capacity of the natural to be affected or acted upon by the supernatural. The capacity to receive an action is not, as we have seen, precisely the ability to perform an action; there is a difference between striking and being struck. Consequently, from the capacity of the natural to be affected or acted upon by the supernatural, it cannot be logically concluded that the natural has the ability, without the supernatural, to know and do the supernatural. That the natural has the capacity to receive the action, or to be acted upon by the supernatural, we grant, if the reception be taken passively, not actively. The active reception of the supernatural is itself supernatural, and the ability to receive it actively is included in the *donum* or supernatural gift,—is part of the supernatural assistance itself. The minister must prove, in order to prove any thing to his purpose, that the supernatural cannot reach the natural, unless there be, on the part of the natural, prior to its reception, the ability to recognize it as supernatural, and to receive it by a supernatural act, which he cannot prove, and which the nature of the case does not necessitate; since all that is requisite on the part of the natural, in order to render man capable of being supernaturally assisted, is the naked capacity to be acted on by grace. The moment the grace

reaches him, it becomes itself immediately, by its own virtue, a supernatural assistance, and the first act of the subject under it may by its means be a supernatural act. The grace thus received, if not resisted, not only becomes a supernatural assistance to the subject, but may enlarge his capacity to receive more and more grace.

If "salvation has ever occurred in any one case, it is infallible proof that in human nature are powers that can realize the supernatural." Not at all. It only proves that man has powers which may be supernaturally elevated to the plane of the supernatural. To be able to *realize* the supernatural, if the phrase has any meaning, is one thing; to be capable of being supernaturalized, or of receiving supernatural assistance, is another thing. To be the subject of supernatural assistance requires, as we have seen, only the naked capacity in the natural to be affected by the supernatural; to *realize* the supernatural requires the ability to perform a supernatural act. The reasoning of the minister proceeds on the supposition that Almighty God himself cannot elevate man above the natural order, and, indeed, can raise him to nothing to which he has not the natural ability to raise himself. Is it thus we are to set bounds to Omnipotence?

"If the supernatural exists in human language, man can by the use of his own natural powers get at it." That is, if the supernatural exist in the natural, or, in other words, if the supernatural be natural, man, by the use of his own natural powers, can get at it. Possibly; and yet even of that we are not quite certain. The whole of nature has not yet been explored, and she contains secrets that man, by the use of his natural powers alone, to say the least, cannot *easily* "get at." But perhaps we mistake the thought of the minister. Perhaps he means, that, if the supernatural is expressed in human language, so far as it is so expressed, we by our natural powers can apprehend it; if so, we have no objections to offer. All revealed propositions are, as propositions, or as proposed for our belief, apprehensible by our natural powers. But this is not the question. Are they in fact *revealed* propositions? Are they *true?* These are questions which we can answer only as supernaturally taught. Perhaps, again, the minister means to say, that the supernatural revelation, if made through the medium of the Holy Scriptures, or if recorded in them, can be ascertained by the simple exercise of our reason. This, if true, would

by no means meet the whole difficulty; for not the *hearers*, but the *doers*, of the word are blest, and by our own strength alone we cannot do what the word requires, as is evident from the fact that the work to be done is supernatural. But it is not true, as is evinced by the doubts and perplexities of commentators, and the multiplicity of contradictory doctrines deduced from the Scriptures by those who take them as their sole rule of faith. Protestants have been at work for three hundred years to "get at" the sense of Scripture, and their disagreement among themselves proves that they have not as yet succeeded; and there is no great rashness in asserting, that, if they have not been able in three hundred years to succeed, they never will. Three hundred years are long enough for an experiment, and any experiment that has been faithfully tried for that length of time, without success, may be set down as a total failure. Moreover, even if one by his natural powers could ascertain all the doctrines contained in the Scriptures, it would not help him; he would have nothing supernatural in them, unless he had a supernatural authority on which to assert their inspiration.

"If it is accessible by any means, the individual man can get at it." The design of the minister in this it to say, that, if the church can get at the supernatural, the individual may. He wishes to establish it as a fact, that the church has no powers but those which she derives from her individual members. His notion is, that the church is a mere collection of individuals, and that the individuals are the same whether out of the church or in it. This is the notion of all Liberal Christians, so far as our knowledge extends, and proves them to be ignorant of the mere alphabet of our holy religion. The church derives nothing from individuals; but they derive every thing from her. Her powers are from God, are supernatural, and it is only through union with her that individuals are supernatually born; for she is the Mother of all the faithful. Because through her men may get at the supernatural, it does not follow that they can without her. "If the supernatural is accessible by any means, the individual man may get at it." Granted, if he adopt the *proper* means, —not if he neglect them, and take improper means. The supernatural, through grace, is accessible to all men, but only in the way God has prepared. If we scorn that way, and seek to get at it by a way of our own, we shall not find it accessible.

"In nature we see the supernatural flowing into the natural, into the ultimates and particles of all things. God is supernatural. He is not nature, and nature is not he; yet he pervades all things,—is omnipresent in nature." Our Protestant minister does not appear to understand what is meant by *supernatural*. His supernatural does not transcend the order of nature. God, as manifested in or by nature, though distinct from nature as the cause from the effect, is still in the order of nature; for, thus manifested, he is simply the God of nature, or nature's God. Supernatural is that order which transcends the order of nature, and it is only as author of an order above the order of nature, that is, the order of grace, and as manifested in it, that God is supernatural in the theological sense of the term. This appears to be a fact which has escaped the minister's attention, and the singular confusion of his statements and reasonings results from his not having duly considered it. The simple truth is, he has no conception of the supernatural, or at best does not admit it at all in the sense we understand it, as it were easy to infer from his attempt to prove that it lies within the range of our natural faculties. We may dismiss, then, to his private meditations what he says about the capacity of unthinking and unintelligent nature to receive the supernatural.

"Man has powers like the eternal Mind, to the extent to which the eternal Mind may be known." Natural powers to the extent to which the eternal Mind may be *naturally* known, we grant; to the extent to which the eternal Mind may be *supernaturally* known, we do not grant, for it is the point in dispute. "Man can know God only through kindred powers." Kindred powers are powers of the same order. The proposition of the minister, then, is, that the subject knowing and object known must be of the same order. This is precisely what we maintain, if restricted to the ascending scale. The higher order may know the lower, but the lower cannot know the higher. Then, since the natural and supernatural are different orders, the supernatural above the natural, it follows the natural cannot know the supernatural, which is what we allege. "Why could not Newton's dog know Newton? Because he had not the kindred powers." Newton's dog very likely did know his master, and could know him, so far as Newton came within the order of the dog's nature. But he did not know Newton in the sense in which he transcended that

order, and could not for the reason assigned, namely,—"he had not the kindred powers," was not himself of the same order as Newton. This is what we say. No one can know naturally above the order of his nature, and therefore no one can know naturally the supernatural. But will the minister deny that Almighty God, if he had chosen, could, by a special act of his power, have so elevated the dog's powers as to have enabled him to know his master in the full sense in which one man may know another? To do so implies no contradiction. Then, God could have done it. Then, Newton's dog, according to the general argument of the minister, had the natural ability to know his master!

"Nor can we, any more than Newton's dog, know the God who made us, without natural and kindred powers." The conclusion contains more than is contained in the premises. The premises contain *kindred* powers only, not *natural* and kindred. We, no more than Newton's dog, can know the God who made us, without kindred powers, that is, powers of the same order, we grant; without *natural* and kindred powers we cannot know him *naturally*, we also grant; cannot know him *supernaturally*, we deny; for our natural powers may be made of the same order by being supernaturalized.

"Did any man in or out of the church ever know God? If so, this position is proven." What position? If any man has ever known God, the position that God may be known is proven, but not that God *as supernatural* may be known by our *natural* powers. The reasoning of the minister himself proves the reverse. Man can know God only so far as he has kindred powers, or so far as he is like God. He can, then, know God, by virtue of his natural likeness to God, only to the extent of that natural likeness. That natural likeness *is* natural, therefore in the order of nature; and therefore by it man can know God only in the order of nature. But man can know God only to the extent of his likeness to God. Then, to know God as supernatural, he must have a supernatural likeness to God. Then, either God as supernatural cannot be known, or man's natural likeness to God may be supernaturally elevated. The minister, then, must either admit the necessity of the supernatural elevation of our powers, or else deny the possibility of knowing the supernatural.

"Man may know the supernatural, if he have kindred powers." Unquestionably. But from the fact that man has a natural likeness to God, and may by his natural pow-

ers know God in the order of nature, we cannot conclude that he has a natural likeness to him as supernatural, and may know him in the supernatural order. We have, if you will, kindred powers in the natural order; but natural powers can be kindred only to the natural. Since the minister says we can know only by virtue of kindred powers, it follows that we can know the supernatural only by supernatural powers; for only the supernatural is kindred to the supernatural. The minister, therefore, refutes himself, and assigns an unanswerable reason against the natural ability of man either to know or to do the supernatural. His mistake, however, is not in his logic, but in his premises, in his notion of the supernatural. If he had understood what we mean by supernatural, he would either have admitted our positions at once, or denied the supernatural altogether.

"If man cannot by nature know the supernatural, when it lies before him, then he cannot know it at all." This conclusion follows only from the false assumption, that the capacity to be supernaturally assisted is the natural ability to know the supernatural. This assumption, after what we have said, cannot be insisted upon. Setting this aside, the true conclusion is, if man's nature cannot be supernaturally elevated to the level of the supernatural order, then he cannot know the supernatural, which we grant. That he can be so elevated implies no contradiction; and we know God, who is omnipotent, can so elevate him, if he chooses. What is meant by the supernatural lying before us we do not know. The natural lies before us; but the supernatural, so long as we are in the natural order only, does not. If all that is intended be, that we, by our natural powers, can apprehend the propositions of the supernatural revelation, when placed before our minds, we do not object; but even if we could not so apprehend them, we should not concede that we could not apprehend them at all; for nothing hinders God from elevating us supernaturally to their apprehension, if he pleases.

"For he must know the supernatural either by natural means or by supernatural. If by natural, my view is sustained. If by supernatural, he must understand his means, or he cannot use them." If by natural means, his view is sustained, we grant. But the supernatural cannot be known by natural means, as we have proved, even from his own principles. Therefore his view is not and cannot be sus-

tained. If by supernatural means, he must understand his means, or he cannot use them. Conceded. *Quid inde?* Then he must understand them by his natural powers? This does not appear. For aught that appears, the supernatural means may bring with them the supernatural ability to understand them. The minister, had he succeeded in proving that to be receptive of supernatural assistance necessarily involves the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, would have been entitled to this conclusion; but this he did not succeed in proving, and cannot prove, as we have shown. Moreover, by the very supposition, the means are supernatural, and the minister makes understanding of the means a part of the means. Then the understanding itself must be supernatural. *Implicat in terminis*, to say the understanding as a means is natural, when the means is assumed to be supernatural.

"If man gets at salvation supernaturally, then he gets at it by his own powers, using the supernatural as a means." By his own powers supernaturalized *transeat;* by his own powers unelevated by the supernatural, we deny it, for reasons already assigned. The minister forgets, that, in his analysis of salvation, commented on some pages back, he has assumed that the supernatural acts on the natural. In that analysis he undertakes to show that the supernatural must come in contact with and act upon the natural, as the necessary condition of salvation. He now reasons on the supposition, that the natural must come in contact with and act upon the supernatural, that the supernatural is merely passive matter, on and with which the natural is to operate. This is not what we have been taught. Grace is not passive, but active, and acts on us before we act with it. The first act towards salvation is an act of grace. It is not we who get at the supernatural, but it which gets at us. The Saviour comes to seek and to save the sinner. Grace seeks us, finds us, reaches us where we are, and, the instant it reaches us, is the power of God within us to will and to do whatever he requires of us. It is the means of salvation, and of apprehending and using, as we are taught them, all the means requisite to salvation. We are not helped to the means by what we do prior to grace, or without it; for no works contribute to salvation but those which grace operates within us, and we perform through grace. The minister would get rid of his difficulty, if he would bear in mind that the supernatural is given us, not obtained by us.

"How may I understand Jesus and all inspired minds? They utter, you say, the supernatural; I grant it. But how am I to get at it, if I cannot by my own powers understand the supernatural?" What our Lord says in person or by inspired organs is the Christian revelation. The minister's question is, how is he to get at this, if he cannot understand the supernatural by his own powers. If, by getting at this, he means apprehending it when properly proposed, he can get at it with his own powers; but in so doing, he does not by his own powers understand the supernatural; for Christian doctrines, humanly apprehended, are, *quoad nos*, only human doctrines. To get at them, in the sense required for divine faith, requires the supernatural elevation of our faculties by the grace of faith. God can, if he chooses, so elevate them. Consequently, it is not impossible to get at the revelation without being able by our own powers to understand the supernatural.

"Can the church remove the difficulty?" The difficulty the minister imagines, we have shown, does not exist. That difficulty is, that the capacity to receive the supernatural implies the ability to know and do the supernatural. Therefore, if you deny the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, you deny the capacity to receive supernatural assistance. This must apply also to the church. If, then, you deny to the individual the power to understand the supernatural, you deny the ability of the church to help him. She either gives us the natural or supernatural. If the natural only, she gives us only what we already have. If the supernatural, she encounters the same difficulty, for she can give it only on condition that we are able to understand the supernatural; which you deny. But we have seen that it does not require the previous ability, without supernatural assistance, to understand the supernatural. Consequently this difficulty vanishes. It is idle to pretend that God cannot elevate us by grace above our natural capacity and ability. The minister professes to believe in supernatural inspiration. The inspired must have had the natural capacity to be inspired, or else they could not have been inspired; but had they, therefore, the natural ability to know without the grace of inspiration all that God by inspiration revealed through them? And could not God possibly inspire them to reveal truths which transcended the reach of their natural ability? If he could not, will the minister tell us wherein the matter of revelation, or the mysteries of

faith, differ from the matter of human philosophy? If he admits that God ever inspired any man to reveal what could not have been reached by the human intellect unassisted, he yields the whole question.

The only difficulty there is in the case the church can remove, if she be what she professes to be. If she has received the deposit of faith, if she is commissioned and supernaturally assisted to keep and faithfully propose it, she can remove the only real difficulty there is to be removed; for we know then that what she proposes for the word of God is his word, and therefore infallibly true. And here is the only open question, the only question proposed to our natural powers. Has Almighty God instituted the church, and authorized her to teach in his name? If you postpone the question as to what is taught, till you dispose of the question, Who or what is the teacher? your difficulties will soon vanish. This, too, is the only reasonable course. The church comes to us as an ambassador from God, and if she comes from him, she comes with credentials, and we should examine her credentials before examining her message. If her credentials are satisfactory, if they prove that God has sent her, then we know that her message is from God, and that we are bound to receive it, be it what it may. If her credentials are such as to prove beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt that she is from God, reason requires us to believe her message, however unpalatable we may find it, unintelligible, or apparently unreasonable; for we can have no higher reason for declaring her message unreasonable than we have for believing her from God, and nothing is more reasonable than to believe God. If you seek, you will find her credentials all that your reason can ask. You will find them accrediting her beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt, as the ambassador of God, sent to treat with you in his name. Then, whatever she proposes in his name is infallibly true. Then, after this, you have only to listen, as a child to his mother, to her instructions, and she will tell you what else you want, and how you may get it, and render you all needed assistance.

We agree with the minister, that "any man with an honest heart may come to God," but only in God's way, and as God draws him. "No man can come unto me except the Father draw him." But if we refuse to come in God's way, if we will not suffer him to draw us, we shall not find him, though he is not far from every one of us. The min-

ister greatly misconceives the Catholic doctrine, if he supposes it renders the approach to God more difficult. The contrary is the fact; and, according to it, it is every one's own fault if he remain at a distance from God. The church is provided expressly to bring him to God, to afford him that precise help he needs to enable him to come to God. Hence her glory, and the tender love we have for her.

We have touched upon all the points in the letter which have struck us as important. The minister must be on his guard against impatience and hasty conclusions, rely on God rather than on himself, and be willing to pause and let God speak. We are all more ready to instruct the Almighty than we are to let him instruct us; and no people in general use reason more unreasonably than they who declaim the most vehemently for the use of reason. Nothing is more reasonable than to believe God on his word, or unreasonable than to distrust the teaching of one he has commissioned to teach in his name. We should beg of God to give us true docility, a childlike willingness to follow him, to believe what he says, and then sit down calmly, patiently, and with all our powers to inquire if he has commissioned any one to speak to us in his name. He may have done so; and if he has, that is the one to whom we must listen. And he has done so. The Blessed God has not left himself without a witness on the earth. We own that it seems almost too good to believe; but nothing is too good for our God to do. Men disbelieve the church, in reality, because they have but low notions of his goodness, because they do not believe him good enough to provide so liberally for our darkness and our weakness. How should they, when they have no conceptions of the kingdom of grace, none of the supernatural? O, if they could once rise above nature, and catch but the feeblest glimpse of the glory of God as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ, they would never again distrust his goodness, or believe any thing too good for him to do! He is better than we can think, has provided more liberally for us than we have ever dared wish, or been able to conceive. O God, who would not love thee, that but beheld thy love and mercy, of which the church, after all, in this earthly state, is but a feeble manifestation? Thy love is too great for us; it overpowers here on the way; what will it be when we get home, and behold thee face to face, as thou art in thyself?

MORELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1850.]

Mr. Morell is, we believe, a Scotchman, and a minister of the Scottish kirk. He first made himself known to our community by a *History of Modern Philosophy*, written from the eclectic point of view, and which we have heard spoken of as a very clever performance. Some views advanced in that work touching the mutual relations of religion and philosophy were supposed to favor modern rationalism, and the volume before us has been written to develop them, and to show that they are defensible on psychological principles. The volume has attracted no little attention among British and American Protestants, and though it contains nothing new or striking to one familiar with the later developments of Protestantism on the continent of Europe, or even in our own country, and though it is written in a dry, hard style, without much regard to idiomatic grace or propriety, we have read it with a good deal of interest, and, considering the source whence it emanates, we cannot help regarding it as a remarkable production.

Mr. Morell belongs to the progressive party among Protestants, the party that labors to continue the work of the reformers of the sixteenth century, and carry it on to its legitimate termination. He retains, indeed, many traces of his Presbyterian and Evangelical breeding, but he departs widely from the formal teachings of his sect, and appears to be fully aware that the formal or scholastic theology of the elder Protestant teachers is without vitality, is, indeed an anomaly in Protestantism, and at best superfluous in the Protestant economy of life. He seems, also, to be convinced that religion itself cannot be maintained on the ground ordinarily assumed by Protestant theologians, and that, if they continue to retain the rule of private judgment, they must either reject all religion, or else exclude from religion, as unessential, whatever transcends private reason. Determined, or apparently determined, to retain that rule at all hazards, he adopts the latter alternative, and labors with all

* *The Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. Morell, A. M. New York: 1849.

his learning, energy, and power of analysis, to prove that religion originates in and is determined by an element of our nature; that, in all that is essential to it, it comes within the scope of individual reason, and that it is as philosophically explicable and verifiable as any other psychological fact that passes under our observation. In this he is, unquestionably, faithful to the Protestant spirit, and deserves great credit for his courage and consisteney. But although he in this strikes a mortal blow at all dogmatic Protestantism, and, in reality, resolves modern Evangelicalism into mere sentimentalism, which is all very well, he goes, perhaps, further than he intends, and certainly further than we can go with him. We cannot bring all religion within the scope of private reason, without excluding as unessential all that is supernatural, and therefore not without excluding all that is peculiarly and distinctively Christian. Mr. Morell, then, whatever his intentions, really rejects the Christian religion itself, and is even a more dangerous enemy to it than he would be if he confessedly arranged himself on the side of its open and avowed enemies. However conclusive his work may be against his own sect, we cannot, therefore, commend it, for even Presbyterianism is better than total apostasy,—than absolute incredulity.

The very title Mr. Morell gives his work, *The Philosophy of Religion*, proves that he is either consciously hostile to religion, or totally ignorant of its real nature. There is and can be no philosophy of religion. Religion must be regarded either as natural religion or as revealed religion. As natural, since philosophy is simply natural theology, it and philosophy are identically one and the same thing, and it is as absurd to talk of the philosophy of religion as of the philosophy of philosophy. As revealed, religion is above philosophy, not accountable to it, nor explicable on its principles. A philosophy of religion is conceivable only on the supposition that religion is below philosophy; a special discipline, like physics or æsthetics, under philosophy, deriving its principles from it, and bound to apply them according to its commands. The author sees this, and therefore attempts to relegate religion to a single department of human nature, and to confine it to a single class of human emotions. But this is manifestly false and absurd; for religion, if any thing at all, is no special discipline, but the queen of all disciplines, giving the law to all special disciplines, and receiving it from none.

The author does not lack ability and industry, and we cheerfully concede him considerable philosophical aptitude; but, with all his pretensions, he is no real philosopher. He is misled by the psychological method of modern philosophy, and mistakes philosophy no less than Christianity. He is a mere psychologist, or rather psychologue, and gives us as the result of his painful philosophizing only miserable psychologism, which, we need not tell our readers, is as far removed from philosophy as any thing well can be. Taking the human soul, or, in modern language, the facts of consciousness, for its point of departure, and the Cartesian doubt for its method, psychologism necessarily, as we have heretofore shown, results on the one hand in sensism,* and on the other in pantheism, both of which, in their turn, necessarily result in Pyrrhonism and nullism or nihilism. That Mr. Morell is a mere psychologue, even in religion as well as in philosophy, is evident enough from the very design of his book, and is proved by the following extract from his opening chapter:

"Whatever may be the religion proper to man, its real nature, and its possible intensity, must depend upon the constitution of the human mind. If the human faculties were of a lower order than they really are, it is obvious that our religious consciousness could never reach the standard to which it now rightly aspires. The reason of this becomes manifest, when we consider, that under such circumstances the real objects of religious worship could not be in the same sense accessible to us; and that, as a natural consequence of this, the emotions arising from their contemplation must be proportionally modified and diminished. If, on the other hand, we possessed a combination of faculties of an order superior to those which the human mind now enjoys, then our enlarged powers of thought and feeling, and the widened range of our actual experience, would naturally elevate our whole religious being, when once awakened, to a proportionally higher degree of development. Accordingly, since the whole aspect of our religious experiences must depend upon the natural capacities with which we have been endowed, our first object in discussing the *phi'osophy of religion* must be to make some inquiry into the powers and faculties of the human mind.....

"By this process of analysis we find at length that the central point of our consciousness—that which makes each man what he is in distinction

* We venture to introduce *sensism* from the scholastic Latin *sensismus*, or the Italian *il sensismo*, as more appropriate than the French *sensualisme*, which, though the more ordinary term, has, in English, a practical rather than a speculative sense. *Psychologism* and *psychologue* we use in a bad, and *psychology* and *psychologist* in a good sense, agreeably to the practice of some recent writers in our language.

from every other man—that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind, apart from its regulative laws and formal processes—is *the will*. Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently, and for ourselves. If this spontaneity be withdrawn, our life sinks down at once into a mere link in that mighty chain of cause and effect by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time. Without will man would flow back from the elevation he now assumes, to the level of impersonal nature,—in a word, we should then be *things*, and not *men* at all. Spontaneity, personality, will, self,—these, then, and all similar words, express as nearly as possible the *essential nature or principle* of the human mind. We do not say, indeed, that we can comprehend the very essence of the soul itself, *apart* from all its determinations; but that, by deep reflection upon our inmost consciousness, we can comprehend the essence of the soul in connection with its operations; that we can trace it through all its changes as a *power* or pure activity; and that in this spontaneous activity alone our real personality consists. If, therefore, in our subsequent classification of the faculties of the mind, little appears to be said about the will, it must be remembered that we assume the activity it denotes as the essential basis of our whole mental being, and suppose it consequently to *underlie* all our mental operations .. ....

"Between the intellectual and the emotional activity, however, there always subsists a direct correspondency. Just on the same principle as we saw that a higher development of our whole intellectual capacity would imply a possibly higher development of the religious nature; so also in every succeeding stage to which the consciousness, intellectually speaking, attains, there is always associated with such an advancement a proportionally higher order of emotion. Our intellectual and our emotional life, in fact, run parallel with one another, and develop themselves correlatively; so that we may draw out a table of the successive stages of human consciousness in the following manner:—

MIND
commencing in
MERE FEELING (undeveloped unity
evinces a
TWOFOLD ACTIVITY.

	I. *Intellectual.*		II. *Emotional.*
1st Stage.	The Sensational consciousness	(to which correspond)	The Instincts.
2d Stage.	The Perceptive consciousness	"	Animal Passions.
3d Stage.	The Logical consciousness	"	Relational Emotions.
4th Stage.	The Intuitional consciousness	"	Æsthetic, moral, and religious Emotions.

meeting in

FAITH—(highest or developed unity)." —pp. 35-38.

This extract, to the intelligent reader, proves not only the psychological character of the work, but that its psychology, even as psychology, is defective and false. That such would be its character was to be expected from the author's method. M. Cousin holds that it is possible to rise by psychological analysis to ontology, or the science of being, but this the author, in what he says of the "intuitional consciousness," very properly rejects; yet he does not seem aware that psychology no more than ontology can be psychologically constructed. To be of the least value, our psychology, as well as our ontology, must be ontologically derived; for, as we shall have occasion before we close to repeat, it is the object that determines the subject, never the subject that determines the object. All evidence is objective, must be in the object instead of the subject, or knowledge is impossible, and all real certainty out of the question. To suppose, as Mr. Morell does, that the subject determines the object, and that the object must vary as varies the subject, or as varies the intellect that apprehends it, is to deny all objective certainty, to make the object the creature of the subject, and to reduce all existence for us to the soul and its subjective affections; which is to deny the soul itself, for none of its faculties actually exist without their appropriate objects. If man could exist and operate, save in relation with his appropriate object independent of himself, or if he were his own adequate object, that is, adequate to a single act, he would be pure act, and therefore not man, but God, who is termed pure act, because he is in himself his own adequate object. But as man is not pure act, is not God, he can actually exist only in relation with his object, and then not at all if that object is removed, or does not itself exist.

It is the folly of modern philosophers to suppose that we are capable of independent action, and can know dependent beings without knowing that on which they depend, or the creative being from whom they derive their being. Only that which *is* can be an object of knowledge, and what *is* only from and by another, since it is not in and of itself, cannot in and of itself be intelligible. Hence that which is only from, by, and in another, is intelligible only mediately through the intelligibility of that from, by, and in which it is, or has its being. As the human soul is only by virtue of the divine creative act, and as that act is only from God as real being, and therefore cognizable only in the cognition of God, it follows that the human soul itself is cognizable

only in the cognition of God, from whom, by whom, and in whom it is, or has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. Psychology, which is the science of the soul, is then possible only in ontology, which is the science of being, that is, the science of God. The science of God, or ontology, is learned from the Catechism, and whoever disdains to study that will never be able to attain to either an ontology or a psychology deserving the least reliance. He who does study it, and constructs his psychology in the light of the ontology it teaches, will fall into no gross psychological errors. Indeed, as a matter of fact, nearly all the errors which vitiate modern psychology originate in doubt of the ontology of the Catechism, and in the effort of philosophers to defend or justify that doubt; that is, philosophical errors are in general the result of a departure, and of the insane attempt to justify departure, from the faith. Philosophy, whenever regarded as an independent discipline, distinct from theology, and as capable of being constructed without revealed theology, or as any thing more than a collection of rules for the right use of reason in the service of theology, indicates a heterodox tendency, if not absolute incredulity.

But be this as it may; a single glance at Mr. Morell's psychological table is sufficient to show, that, whether psychology is or is not attainable psychologically, his psychology is not worthy of our acceptance. He mutilates human nature, and misrepresents the faculties which he recognizes. The will he resolves into the general activity of the soul, and makes it equally underlie all our mental operations. He acknowledges only two faculties, the intellectual and the emotional; and thus necessarily reduces all our mental operations to cognitions and emotions. Man is, then, simply a being that knows and feels, and therefore differs only in degree from any of the animal tribes; for they all know and feel to some extent at least. But by what authority does the author exclude volitions? When one wills to do or not to do a thing, to resist or to follow inclination, to obey or to disobey God, is the mental fact simply an emotion or a cognition? A child knows better. The difference between cognition and emotion is not greater or more evident than the difference between either of them and volition, and the fact of volition is as certain as that we know or feel.

The author, doubtless, fancies that he recognizes volitions,

because he professes to recognize the will; but he does not recognize the will as a distinct faculty, or as the principle of a distinct class of mental facts. He resolves it, as we have seen, into the general activity of the soul, and gives it only the intellectual and the emotional modes of action. He must, then, either deny all voluntary activity, or else assert that all activity is voluntary. We have just shown that he cannot do the former; is he prepared to assert the latter,—that all our sensations, perceptions, intuitions, instincts, and animal passions are volitions, and therefore acts for which we are morally responsible, even though we have not deliberately excited or assented to them? This were, indeed, to go the full length of Calvinism. Calvinism, we are aware, confounds will with the simple power to act, and freedom with liberty *a coactione*. Hence it declares the simple motions of concupiscence to be sins, not only the effects of original sin, and inclining to sin, but sins themselves, for which we may be brought into judgment, even when actually resisted. It makes all instinctive and indeliberate actions, not proceeding from grace, mortal sins, and allows no distinction between what we do deliberately, and what we do indeliberately and unintentionally. This is the real doctrine of Jonathan Edwards's famous *Treatise on the Affections*, and it makes sanctity consist in having no internal struggles, and diminishes our merit just in proportion to the internal obstacles we have to overcome, or spiritual conflicts to maintain. But this is manifestly false as well as horrible. We are responsible only for what we do voluntarily; and only that act is voluntary which it depends on the will to do or not to do. Nothing is more absurd than to term an act which we cannot but do a voluntary act; and nothing is more certain than that our cognitions and emotions do not always depend on our will,—are not always subject to our control. They not unfrequently come and go unbidden, in spite of our most strenuous efforts to the contrary. How often do we grieve at the intrusion of unwelcome thoughts, and at emotions which we would, but cannot, suppress? Who that knows any thing of the spiritual life, who that has attempted to live in thought, word, and deed a pure and holy life, needs to be told that not a few of his thoughts and emotions are indeliberate and involuntary, and occur in spite of his firmest resolutions, and most unremitting vigilance in guarding the avenues of his

mind and heart? Who needs to be told that the Christian's life is an unceasing warfare?

But our objections to Mr. Morell's psychology do not end here. Leaving by the way, for the moment, what he says of the emotional side of his table, we assure him that we cannot accept the intellectual side without important modifications. The mind, according to the author, begins in mere feeling, and passes successively through four degrees or stages of development; namely, the sensational, the perceptional, the logical, and the intuitional. In sensation, the sensitive subject and sensible object are confounded; the soul seizes, indeed, the sensible object, but does not distinguish itself from the object, or external cause of its sensitive affection. In perception, the soul apprehends the sensible object, and apprehends it as external and distinct from both the apprehension and the subject apprehending. In logic, or reflection, the soul generalizes, or applies its own abstract forms to the objects which it has perceived. That is, by perception we learn sensible objects, and by logic apply to them the abstract forms, or, as Kant would say, the *categories*, of the understanding. But our knowledge is not limited to our sensible intuitions and the subjective forms of the logical understanding. Above the logical understanding, which adds nothing to the matter or "content" of knowledge, is the intuitional consciousness, in which the soul apprehends another and a higher order of truth,—supersensible, necessary, and absolute truth, —pure being, or God himself. This the author explains in the following passage.

"The mathematical sciences, for example, have as their essential foundation the pure conceptions of space and number; or, if they be of the mechanical order, the conceptions of power and motion. Moral science, again, is based upon the fundamental notions of good and evil; æsthetical science upon that of beauty; theological science upon the conception of the absolute,—of God. Now, these primary elements of all the sciences can never be communicated and never *learned* exegetically. Unless we have a direct consciousness of them, they must ever remain a deep mystery to us,—just as no description could ever give to a blind man the notion of color, or to a man who has no organ of taste the idea of bitter or salt. We do not deny but that means may be employed to *awaken* the consciousness to these ideas, but still they can never be known by definition,—never communicated by words to any man who has not already felt them in his own inward experience. Here, then, we have the actual material of all scientific truth, and that material, it is

evident, must be *presentative*, coming to us by the immediate operation of our intuitional consciousness."—pp. 69, 70.

There is little here, in the sense of the author, to which we do not object; but we restrict our comments to his doctrine of intuition. By the "intuitional consciousness" it is clear that he means the *reason* of Jacobi, Coleridge, and Gioberti, who very unreasonably distinguish reason as a faculty from understanding. It is the *Vernunft* distinguished from the *Verstand* and *Empfindungs-vermögen* of the Germans, and is held to be a power or faculty of the soul to apprehend immediately supersensible truth,—in our terminology, the intelligible as distinguished from the sensible, the Idea, in the language of Plato, which, as we have shown, is identically God as *Ens reale et necessarium*. But to this we object,—1. That it supposes the order of truth intuitively revealed comes to the mind only in the fourth stage of its development, instead of the first; and 2. That it makes intuition a faculty of the soul, and asserts for man the natural subjective power to see God.

1. The solidity of the first objection we have heretofore established by showing that the order of knowledge must follow the order of being, since what is not can be no object of knowledge, and where there is no object there can be no fact of knowledge. That is to say, we cannot know without knowing somewhat, and cannot know somewhat unless somewhat is,—no very startling proposition, we should suppose, and very much like a truism. The intuition of God, then, if the order of knowledge follows the order of being, must precede all knowledge of existences, because existences are from God, and subsequent to him, and because without him our existence is not, is nothing, and one term of a relation always connotes the other. To affirm ourselves as simple being, as *ens reale*, is to affirm a falsehood, for *ens reale* is God, and we are not God. To affirm ourselves as existence, taking the word, as we must if we distinguish it from real being, in its strict etymological sense, (from *ex stare*,) is to affirm that we are from God, and are only as we are in him, by virtue of his creative act, and therefore is to distinguish ourselves from him, and to assert our dependence on him and relation to him as his creatures; which is impossible, unless we know that he is, and has created us. Perception, in Mr. Morell's sense, cannot precede intuition of the intelligible, for it is only by virtue of intuition of the intelligible, that the sensible is perceptible, or

any thing to us but a mere sensitive affection or mode of the soul itself. Nor can the logical operation described, but, by the way, inaccurately described, precede intuition; for logic cannot operate without *data*, and without the intuition of the intelligible it can have no *data*, that is, can have no principles, no premises; for no man a little versed in philosophy can seriously maintain that the categories are mere subjective forms of the understanding. The error of the author grows out of his confounding the order of intuition with the order of reflection. Intuition follows the order of being, and presents us the ontological order as it really is, independent of us, as it is revealed by God himself, and taught us in the Catechism, and therefore presents being before existence, the Creator before creatures, because such is the real order. Reflection, which is rethinking, reverses this order, begins where intuition leaves off, and leaves off where intuition begins. It takes the creature from intuition, and by analysis rises to the reflex cognition of God. It is the neglect to distinguish between these two orders of knowledge, and fixing attention mainly on the fact of reflection, undistinguished from intuition, that so wofully misleads our modern philosophers, and renders obscure and doubtful what in itself is clear and certain.

2. We ourselves, indeed, hold that God reveals himself intuitively to us, but we do not admit that intuition is a faculty, nor that we have the natural, inherent power to see God. The distinction between reason and understanding, contended for by Kant, Jacobi, Coleridge, Gioberti, and others, is imaginary; for to know is always one and the same fact, and demands, on the side of the subject, only one and the same faculty. To suppose that we must have one power by which to know sensible objects, and another by which to know God, is as superfluous as to suppose that we need one voice with which to sing the praises of our Redeemer, and another with which to sing the praises of a conquering hero. All the facts of knowledge have not, indeed, the same conditions, nor the same objects, but, as facts of knowledge, they all depend, by the very force of the word, on the same cognitive principle. Can there be a cognition which is not cognition, which is more or less than cognition?—or knowledge that is intellectual, but not rational,—rational, but not intellectual? Can there be a man that understands but does not know, or knows but does not understand? There is, and can be,

only one cognitive faculty. Intuition is simply a mental fact, not a mental faculty, or power of the soul.

But we do not admit that we have the inherent power to behold God intuitively. In the first place, what is intuitively revealed to us of God is not his *quidditas*, is not *what* God is, but simply that he is; that is, he is made known to us simply as QUI EST, he who is, and who creates existences. In the second place, this cognition of God, although intuitive, is not by virtue of our own inherent intellectual force or created light; for till God is present to the mind as its intelligible object, it has no intellectual activity. Prior to the intuition of God, the intellect is not constituted, is not actual intellect, is at best only *intellectus in potentia*. It is only the moment when God presents himself as the *creative*, intelligible, object, that the intellect is objectively formed,—is *intellectus in actu*. The power or activity that reveals and affirms God is his, not ours, and the revelation or affirmation of himself as intelligible object is only the completion of that creative act, which, from nothing, creates us, not only existences, but *intellectual* existences. As it is only by virtue of the intimate presence and immanence of God as *ens reale*, *mediante* his creative act, that we are existences, or continue to exist, so it is only by the intimate presence and immanence of God as the intelligible, *mediante* the same act, that we are and continue to be *intellectual* existences; for it is only in him that we live, move, and are, or are able to perform any function whatever. It is not, then, we who by our power behold God, but he who, by his own agency, makes himself known to us; and our intuitive apprehension of the fact that he is, is by virtue of an act as truly an act of divine revelation as is the revelation of the Christian mysteries themselves, differing from that only in the respect that it reveals what, when revealed, is evident *per se*, whereas that reveals what, when revealed is evident only *per alia*. This distinction between the two revelations, we remark by the way, is important; for if we neglect it, we shall attempt, either, with De la Mennais, to base science on faith, or, with the rationalists, to reduce faith to science.

Intuition, we have said, is a fact, not a faculty, and we use it simply in contradistinction to discursion or ratiocination. First principles are never discursively obtained, for the mind must have them before it can operate discursively. They must be known, or else discursion is valueless; for con-

clusions drawn from unknown premises are as conclusions drawn from no premises at all. *De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio.* They must, then, be given intuitively. Now God is the first principle of all science as of all existence, and therefore must be known as the indispensable condition of all science, and therefore intuitively known. This is all we mean by saying that our knowledge that God is, and is the creator of existences, is intuitive. But do we not suppose him the *passive* object of our intuition; we are ourselves rather the passive recipients of his own revelation and affirmation of himself. We are the spectators, and he is the actor. We assert that he must be known in this way, because, unless he is, the fact of knowledge in any order is, not merely inexplicable, but absolutely inconceivable.

Now Mr. Morell's doctrine of intuition of God is widely different from this. He supposes that prior to the intuition the intellectual faculty is formed and already in active operation, and therefore that there may be knowledge, science, without recognition of God. He supposes, also, that we have a *vis intuitiva* adequate to the immediate apprehension of God, without his active revelation of himself. He makes no account of the very important fact, that in actual cognition the object must concur actively no less than the subject. He places the intelligibility, not in the object, but in the intellect itself, which is the radical principle of all scepticism. If the intelligibility is in the intellect, in the subject, nothing is intelligible *per se;* then nothing is evident *per se*, and then all evidence is purely subjective. Then we can have only subjective certainty, which is sufficient neither for science nor faith. Here is the fatal error of Cartesianism, which has plunged the whole modern philosophical world into real, if not formal, scepticism. Descartes placed the evidence in the subject, that is, in our own conceptions, and consequently denied to himself all possible means of objective verification; for he retained only his conceptions with which to verify his conceptions, and conception can never be more evident than conception. If his conceptions were called in question, he had no remedy; for the conceptions he might be disposed to allege in support of the conceptions questioned, could themselves be questioned in turn, and thus on *ad infinitum.*

It is this grave error of placing the evidence in the subject, the intelligibility in the intellect, instead of the object, that has embarrassed all modern philosophers, and led to

those interminable and fruitless discussions as to the objective validity of our conceptions, whether there be or be not an external reality corresponding to the internal conception, or *idea*. It is also this that creates the grand difficulty we have in proving to liberal Protestants that they ought to assent to the divinely instituted authority of the church. "Private judgment has, no doubt," say they, "its inconveniences, and is, unquestionably, no adequate rule of faith. It gives rise to as many different doctrines as there are doctors, and leaves all things floating and uncertain. But what is the remedy? You propose authority. Very good. But what is the authority for your authority? That must be taken either on the authority of private judgment or on none. The real sense, too, of its teachings and definitions, inasmuch as they are addressed to the individual, can be determined for the individual only by his private judgment, and will be in his mind only what he judges it to be. Words themselves mean to the mind only what it interprets them to mean. So, after all, if you by authority diminish in some degree the external manifestation of the evils of private judgment, you do not in the least remove them. At bottom, under authority, there is all the diversity that there is elsewhere." No scientific reply to this is possible, if you place the evidence in the conception, the intelligibility in the subject, instead of the object. The real answer is in showing that this reasoning proceeds on a false assumption, because the object concurs as actively as the subject in the production of a fact of knowledge, and the intellect never does and never can act, save in concurrence with an object intelligible and evident *per se*, and therefore never does and never can know any thing which is not immediately or mediately objectively intelligible. The object is not intelligible because we know it, but we know it because it is intelligible.

According to Mr. Morell's doctrine, as we understand it, man has the inherent power to see God, and in the fact of intuition God is intelligible to us, not by his own act, not by virtue of his own intelligibility, but by virtue of our created light. It is, then, we who, by our intellect, make him intelligible to us, not he who makes himself intelligible to our intellect by his own intelligibility. What we assert is, that God by his own creative act places the intellectual power with which he endows us in relation with his own being as its intelligible object, as the object intelligible *per se*, and as the light by and in which our intellect sees and knows all

that it does see and know. According to this view, man can no more be intellectual without the intimate presence and immanence of God as intelligible object, than he can simply exist without the intimate presence and immanence of God as creator. Mr. Morell overlooks this important fact. He supposes that, in the natural order at least, our intellect is complete in itself, and sufficient for itself. In other words, that God has created us, given us certain powers, and constituted us capable of acting, within a given sphere, independently. He does not seem to be aware that in this he virtually adopts the old Epicurean philosophy, which supposes that, God having made us, we can now, as the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole would say, "go ahead on our own hook." If this were so, we might sing,—

> "Let the gods go to sleep up above us,—
> We know there is no god for this earth, boys."

But we cannot so far separate man, either in his existence or his intellect, from his Maker; we cannot conceive him in any respect capable of performing a single independent action. It is by the immanent presence of God that he denies God, and by the immanent light of God that he blasphemes God. In him we live, and move, and are, and in the natural order, no more than in the supernatural, are we any thing, or can we do or know any thing, without him. Our intellect is not the intellect of pure being, but the intellect of a dependent being, of a created existence, which is nothing save by virtue of the immanence of the creative act, any more than our volition is something independent of our willing. Suppose our intellect capable of an independent act, of one fact of knowledge, the sole product of its own inherent power, and you suppose it the intellect, not of man, but of God. The human intellect as the intellect of a creature can, in the very nature of the case, know only what is made intelligible to it by a light not its own; that is to say, a created intellect is simply the faculty to be taught, or to receive, actively, what the Creator chooses, immediately or mediately, to communicate to it, and the primal sin of man is in aspiring to know independently, to know as God knows, in and of himself, without a teacher.

We have dwelt thus long on this point, because we have wished to distinguish the ontological intuition, which we hold in common with the fathers and great doctors of the church, from the psychological and transcendental doctrine sometimes confounded with it, that the intelligibility of the

object is in the intellect, and that our intellectual power is adequate to the intuition or direct and immediate vision of God, which implies that man may, if he chooses, enjoy the beatific vision even in this life. In the beatific vision the blessed see God as he is in himself, but in this life we cannot so see him. Here we see him, as to what he is in himself, only through a glass darkly, as in an enigma. All we can see here is that he is, and is creative. This is all that is evident to us *per se,* and this we see only because he so far reveals and affirms himself to us. All beyond, not logically deducible from this, that we believe of him, we know only by his supernatural revelation, coeval and parallel with the intuitive. The one revelation is, in reality, as old as the other, and, indeed, they are two revelations only in regard to us;—in regard to God they are one and the same, and made by virtue of one and the same divine act. In regard to us, they are distinguishable, and should always be distinguished, but never separated. The object of faith is God as superintelligible,—the object of philosophy is God as intelligible; the matter of faith is what is contained in the supernatural revelation,—the matter of philosophy is what is contained in the intuitive revelation, or what is evident *per se;* but the two form, in reality, only one whole, and neither is complete in fact without the other; for the root of the intelligible is in the superintelligible, and the supernatural presupposes the natural.

The error of philosophers in all ages has been in not rightly understanding the fact we here state, and in attempting to separate philosophy, or natural theology, from supernatural theology, and to erect it into a distinct and independent discipline. In our times their effort is, not only to erect it into a distinct and independent discipline, but to make it the mistress and judge of faith, forgetting that the supernatural is above the natural, the superintelligible above the intelligible, and therefore that faith, not science, is sovereign. Philosophy is only the handmaid of faith, and has no right to aspire even to freedom, or to act save as bid. A right use of reason is essential, and the right use of reason in theological and religious matters is all that the philosopher can aspire to. This he should aspire to; but even this he can attain to only under the infallible direction of the society to which God has committed his supernatural revelation. In other words, we need and can have no independent system of philosophy; and natural theology can escape

error, and be worthy of our reliance, only as subjected to the supervision of supernatural or Catholic theology; for it is only by virtue of orthodoxy in faith that we can preserve orthodoxy in science, and it would not be difficult to prove that all modern scientific heterodoxy has grown out of the religious heterodoxy professed by the reformers of the sixteenth century. Descartes only gave to Luther's heresy its philosophy, as Rousseau afterwards gave it its politics.

Thus much we have judged it proper to say of philosophy in general, and of Mr. Morell's philosophy, or rather psychologism, in particular. We proceed now to consider the author's application of philosophy to the explanation of religion, or rather, to the explanation of the facts of religious experience. We do Mr. Morell, in the outset, the justice to say, that he disclaims being a rationalist. A rationalist he defines to be one who places religion in the logical faculty as its subject. The logical faculty deals not with the matter but with the forms of knowledge, which are merely forms of the subjective understanding. These forms are abstract, without "content," and have no objective validity. To place religion in them is to make it a mere formal thing, a dry, dead abstraction, destitute of all objective truth. Such, according to him, is rationalism, and, indeed, all scholastic theology, or logical statement of doctrine; in which he agrees precisely with our countryman, Dr. Bushnell. We of course do not accept this definition either of rationalism or of the logical faculty. Logic deals, indeed, only with the forms of knowledge, but these forms are real, exist *in re*, not merely *in mente*. But let this pass. We agree that Mr. Morell is not a rationalist, and must tell our Puseyite friends of *The Christian Remembrancer*, that they are wrong in maintaining that he is. But he is generically a humanist, and specifically a sentimentalist.

We have seen that Mr. Morell's psychological table has two sides, the intellectual and the emotional, which run parallel with each other in their respective stages of development. The intellectual side we have already considered. On the emotional side we find, placed in the order of their development, instinct, animal passion, relational emotion, and æsthetic, moral, and religious emotions. Now on this emotional side of human nature, that is, the inferior or sensitive soul, the author places religion as in its subject, which, after Jacobi and Schleiermacher, he defines to be "the absolute feeling of dependence, and of a conscious relation-

ship to God, originating immediately from it." This is not rationalism, but it is something far below it. Rationalism errs in denying all truth not intrinsically evident, or evident *per se*, that is, in rejecting the Christian mysteries outright, or attempting to explain away their supernatural sense by treating them as symbols of truth or facts of the natural order. This last we see in Pierre Leroux, really one of the profoundest thinkers, as well as the most perverse, that we are acquainted with among the enemies of our holy religion. He does not, like ordinary unbelievers, regard Christianity as a fiction and her mysteries as falsehoods. He maintains that Christianity is true, and that all her mysteries cover great ontological facts or truths, but facts or truths of the primitive creation, not of the new or supernatural creation. Here is his error, and a no vulgar error it is. But Mr. Morell falls far below him, degrades religion from the rational nature altogether, to grovel in concupiscence, or mere sensitive affection, differing only in degree from instinct and animal passion. We let him speak for himself.

"Inferring, then, from the foregoing considerations, that religion cannot be a form of pure intellection, we proceed to inquire next, *Whether it can consist essentially in action?* The superficial and degrading idea, that religion consists in the mere external performance of certain duties, can hardly merit the serious attention of any reflective mind. No outward actions can possibly answer to the most feeble notion we possess of real piety; for we invariably look beneath the outward phenomena to the spiritual life within, before we pronounce upon the religious attributes of any agent whatever. And if we take the term action in an inward and spiritual sense, yet it only presents to us the aspect of a blind and indeterminate *energy*, until it is regulated and directed by some specific purpose or feeling. Action, then, *as action*, cannot be religious; it only becomes so when we show that it springs from a *religious* impulse or emotion. The measure of our mere activity, whether external or internal, can never be the measure of our religious intensity; it is activity *in some particular form* which alone can determine it. The essence of religion, accordingly, cannot consist in the activity itself, for that is indifferent to the question; but in the peculiar element, whatever that may be, which influences our activity so as to direct it towards the Infinite and the Divine. Now it is an almost universally acknowledged axiom in psychology, that the *principles of action* (those which give aim and direction to all our energies) are the feelings or emotions, which on that account have been frequently called the *active*, in opposition to the intellectual powers. We may conclude, therefore, even by the rules of

the disjunctive syllogism, that the essence of religion belongs to that class of phenomena which we term *emotional*.

"This conclusion, we find upon due consideration, is borne out by the very same kind of reasoning by which the other cases were rejected. Neither intelligence nor activity, viewed alone, can become the measure of our religion; but there are certain forms of emotion which can readily become so. If, for example, we could find some determined form of emotion, which causes all our thoughts, desires, actions,—in a word, our whole interior and exterior life,—to tend upwards towards God as their great centre and source, we should have little hesitation in saying that such an emotion would precisely measure the true religious intensity of our being, and little hesitation in fixing *there* the central point, the veritable essence, of religion itself.

"The most able and earnest thinkers of modern times, who have attempted to solve the problem now before us, have in fact almost universally considered the essential element of religion to consist in some of the infinite developments of feeling. We shall adduce *two* of them as examples. Jacobi, who was one of the first to see the full worth and signification of *feeling* in the domain of philosophy, defines religion to be 'a faith, resting upon feeling, in the reality of the supersensual and ideal.' The other author to whom we refer is Schleiermacher, than whom no man has ever pursued with greater penetration of mind and earnestness of spirit the pathway of a Divine philosophy; and he places the essence of religion in the *absolute feeling of dependence*, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it. All our former considerations, accordingly, as well as the great weight of authority amongst the best analysts, lead us to place the primitive and essential element of religion in the region of human emotion."—pp. 88, 89.

"These considerations give us a safe clew to the solution of the problem we have now before us,—to determine, namely, the precise mode of feeling in which religion essentially consists. Let us recapitulate the steps and draw the conclusions. Every state of consciousness involves in it the opposition of subject and object: in the emotions, the predominance of the subject gives a sense of freedom, the predominance of the object a sense of dependence. On the side of freedom, our feelings cannot reach the infinite, for the subject, *self*, is always circumscribed. On the side of dependence, however, we *can* reach the sphere of infinity; for the moment our consciousness attains that elevation in which our finite self becomes nothing in the presence of infinity, eternity, and omnipotence, the accompanying state of emotion is one which involves an absolute object; '*and such an emotion must be equivalent to a sense of Deity.*' Hence we infer that the essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the absolute feeling of dependence,—a feeling which implies nothing abject, but, on the contrary, a high and hallowed sense of our being inseparably related to Deity; of our being *parts* of his great

plan; of our being held up in his vast embrace; of our being formed for some specific destiny, which, even amidst the subordinate and finite pursuits of life, must ever be kept in view as the goal of our whole being.

"In describing this absolute sense of dependence, as containing the essential element of religion, we do not mean that this *alone*, without the coöperation of the other faculties, would give rise to the religious *life*. To do this there must be intelligence; there must be activity; there must be, in short, all the other elements of human nature. But what we mean is this,—that the sense of dependence *accompanying* all our mental operations gives them the peculiar hue of piety. Thinking alone cannot be religious; but thinking accompanied by a sense of dependence on the infinite reason is *religious thought*. Activity alone cannot be religious; but activity carried on under a sense of absolute dependence upon infinite *power* is religious action. In a word, it is this peculiar mode of feeling pervading all our powers, faculties, and inward phenomena, which gives them a religious character; so that we may correctly say, that the *essence* of religion lies exactly here."—pp. 93, 94.

These extracts show clearly enough that we do Mr. Morell no injustice in saying that he makes religion originate in the emotional side of our nature, and its essence consist in sentiment, or sensible emotion. The emotional element is distinguished clearly, as we learn from the author's psychological table, from the intellectual element, and the will, we have seen, is the soul itself, in its essence, the *vis agendi*, underlying alike intellect and emotion. So the particular emotion in question cannot be regarded as an affection of the will, in the sense of our theologians, therefore not as an affection of the rational soul at all; otherwise the author would be obliged to identify it with cognition, from which he expressly distinguishes it. Nothing, then, remains but sensible emotion, or affection of the inferior or sensitive soul. This is evident, again, from the fact, that the author makes the emotional element, which, according to him, is the seat of religion, the seat of instinct and of *animal* passion. This is what, when reviewing Mr. Parker, we showed is the fact with all transcendentalists. This emotional nature is what is commonly called the inferior soul, sometimes the sensitive soul, the animal soul, and is termed by St. Paul the *flesh*, in distinction from the *spirit*, —the *carnal mind*, not subject to the law of God,—concupiscence, which the Holy Council of Trent declares remains after baptism to be combated. Mr. Morell, perhaps, little thinks, that in making this the seat of religion, and the very essence of religion to consist in one of its affections, he vir-

tually raises the flesh above the spirit, and sense above reason,—the very thing Satan is perpetually tempting us to do, and against which the Christian is obliged to struggle as long as he lives, and against which, without grace, he must struggle in vain. There can be no doubt that this nineteenth century is the age of progress, and has already advanced far enough to warrant us in applying to it the words of the holy prophet,—"Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter. Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes, and prudent in your own conceits.—Isaiah v. 20, 21.

There is another doctrine in these extracts worth remarking, namely, that the character of an action is determined by the feeling or emotion with which, or from which, it is done; or, what is the same thing, that "the aim and direction of our energies" are given by our feelings and emotions, instead of being given by reason and free will, as we had supposed should be the case. This doctrine would have made some of our old moralists stare not a little. The character of an action is determined by its motive, or by the end for which it is performed, and we had supposed it a censure rather than a commendation to say that a man's activity receives its "aim and direction" from his feelings and emotions. These are blind, and activity, the author himself says, is blind, and therefore true wisdom consists in the blind leading the blind! Has the author forgotten that, "if the blind lead the blind, they shall both fall into the ditch"? Does he not see that his whole doctrine puts reason and will to the service of the feelings and emotions, and makes their proper position that of mere instruments or slaves of the passions? Does he mean this? We know not; but if his words are a true index to his sense, he certainly does mean it, and intends to teach the doctrine of Charles Fourier, that the passions are the governing power, and that intellect and will are merely instrumental faculties, to be employed in the service of the passions, having no office but to do their bidding; that is, man is in his normal state only when he is the slave of his passions; for passion is only feeling intensified, or emotion prolonged!

Mr. Morell's definition of religion, borrowed from Jacobi and Schleiermacher, is a real curiosity. "The essence of religion is the absolute feeling of dependence, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it."

Why does the author add the epithet *absolute* to feeling? Can feeling be more or less than feeling? Are there feelings which are feelings only *secundum quid*, feelings which are not absolutely feelings, but only relatively feelings? What is the meaning of "feeling of dependence"? Does dependence feel? The phrase must mean, either that dependence is the subject of the feeling, or that feeling is an obscure perception of dependence, and therefore of that on which we depend; for relation is unintelligible without intuition of the terms related, since without the terms it is nothing. The author cannot mean the former, and the latter contradicts his own doctrine; for feeling, as a perception, however obscure, is an intellectual operation, and the author would imply by it that the essence of religion is in cognition, in which he says it is not. But the essence of religion is not in the absolute feeling of dependence alone, but also in the absolute feeling "of a conscious relationship to God." What is the sense of absolute feeling of a conscious relationship? Feeling, distinguished from intellection, perception, or intuition, is purely subjective, and has and can have no object. It may have an external cause, but it is the intellectual, not the emotional element, that takes cognizance of it. *Feeling of relationship.* What is the difference between the feeling of *relationship* and the feeling of *dependence?* Is not dependence a relationship, and the dependence in question precisely our relationship to God? How can the two feelings then be two? Again, the absolute feeling of a conscious relationship to God is said to originate immediately from the absolute feeling of dependence. How can one absolute feeling originate from another, or how can a feeling be derived and yet be absolute? "The absolute feeling of a *conscious* relationship." Is the relationship conscious, or are we conscious of it? The latter we presume is meant. But *to be conscious* is to know, is an intellectual act, and a *conscious* relationship must mean a *known* relationship. What is the meaning of the absolute feeling of a *known* relationship, originating immediately from the absolute feeling of dependence? Or what is the meaning of *feeling of* consciousness? We may be conscious of a feeling, that is, know that we feel so and so, but *to feel* that we know this or that is something we do not understand. We do not feel that we know; but if we know, we know we know. A feeling of conscious relationship can mean no more nor less than that we are conscious of it.

The absolute feeling of dependence, the author elsewhere says, is equivalent to a sense of the Deity, that is, to an obscure perception of God, for *sense*, as here used, means obscure perception, and is an intellectual, not an emotional fact. The author says the essence of religion is not in the intellect; but his definition, if rendered intelligible, necessarily asserts that it is; for the only intelligible meaning of his definition is, The essence of religion is in the feeble or obscure perception of God, and of our absolute dependence on him. But this is, we take it, precisely what the author means to deny, in denying that religion is any form of knowing, and asserting that it is essentially emotion. Really, Mr. Morell, as well as Plato, becomes inconsistent and puerile the moment he breaks from the traditions of the fathers.

Mr. Morell's real inquiry, as we understand it, is, What is the peculiar psychological principle of religion, regarded, not as doctrine, but as a virtue? He considers religion on its subjective side, as a simple fact or phenomenon of human experience, and wishes to determine, psychologically, what it is generically and differentially, what constitutes a fact or phenomenon of experience religious, and distinguishes it from every fact or phenomenon that is not religious. If he had not been misled by his psychologism, he would have known beforehand that this is not psychologically determinable, for, as we have already remarked, the faculties of the soul are not themselves psychologically determinable. They are all ontologically determined, that is, characterized by their respective objects. Religion, as a purely psychological fact, does not exist, is not conceivable, as the author himself, if he understands himself, implies in his very definition; for he includes in his definition cognition of the object,—"conscious relationship to God." The essential and distinctive character of religion is derived from its object, and its psychological principle is determinable only in the determination of its ontological principle; for, till it is known what it is that religion requires of us, we cannot know what special faculty of the soul must be exercised in order to fulfil its requisitions.

Here is the fact that our neologists, reared under Evangelical influences, overlook; and hence, in spite of their talents, learning, and industry, their failure to attain to any thing solid or valuable. Evangelicalism, a species of pretended illuminism, is itself nothing, at bottom, but mere

psychologism, and proceeds always on the supposition, that the subject determines the object,—that the object, or objective truth, is to be concluded from the conception, the internal sentiment, or affection. We need not be surprised, then, that Jacobi, Fries, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Parker, Bushnell, Morell, and others, who have outgrown the earlier Protestant dogmatics, should follow the psychological method in religion, as well as in philosophy. These men have discovered, what all their brethren are beginning to discover, that the earlier reformers, by asserting that man lost his spiritual faculties in the Fall, virtually denied grace, which they professed to extol, by leaving no subject of grace, and that, in order to be the subject of grace, man must retain his spiritual faculties; they have also discovered that the sensist philosophy, so rife in the last century and the beginning of the present, really denied all knowledge by denying all cognitive subject, and that in order to be instructed, and instructed to some end, man must have the inherent power to receive and use instruction. Thus far they have done well. But they conclude, from the necessity of asserting the spiritual faculties in order to assert man as the subject of grace, that these faculties suffice without grace, and thus run into pure Pelagianism, the very error of denying grace they intended to escape. They conclude, also, that the power to receive and use instruction suffices without instruction, and that, to possess such power, man must have in himself the germs of all truth, needing only external influences for their development. They thus make all knowledge purely subjective, which is virtual scepticism, and reach, by another route, the very error of the sensists, which they proposed to avoid. They wished to get rid of the Protestant dogmas and the sensist philosophy, which made man nothing, and to substitute for them a doctrine which should make man count for something; but, misled by their psychologism, they have seen no way to do it, but by making man count for every thing; and in making him count for every thing, they make him, in their turn, count for nothing, and fall into pure nullism.

Unaware of the conclusions which an enlightened and vigorous logic must draw from their premises, and taking it for granted that all religion, faith, science, and truth are in the soul, needing only to be developed, brought out, they proceed by way of psychological analysis to detect and determine the peculiarly religious phenomena, and from

them to determine their peculiar psychological principle, or, in other words, to determine what must be religion by determining what is its psychological subject. Yet we should suppose that a moment's reflection would suffice to show them that nothing can be more unscientific than their method. How are you to know what are religious phenomena, if you know not their principle? and how are you to know their subjective, if you know not their objective principle? Suppose you find, by analysis, that we have cognitions, volitions, emotions, and various classes of emotions, how are you to decide in which of these is the subjective characteristic of religion? You may *say* it is in this or that,—is not in cognition, and is in emotion; but how do you know that what you say is true? Is religion something independent of man, or is it nothing? If nothing, what is the use of your inquiry? Man is man, and religion is the same, whatever the conclusions you may draw, or in whatever class of psychological facts you may place it or not place it. If something, how, unless you know what that something is, determine its psychological principle? If you know not what religion requires you to know, to do, or to feel, how are you to be sure that you do not mistake its psychological seat? Nothing, then, can be more evident, than that it is religion as object that must determine for us the psychological principle of religion; and if Mr. Morell and others prove to be right in the account they give, it can only be by a happy accident.

Religion as a virtue cannot differ essentially from virtue in general. Virtue is not a cognition, nor an emotion, but an act, and, as the word itself indicates, a human act, that is, an act performed by the human person. The human person is all in the rational nature, for person is, by its very definition, "an individual substance of a rational nature." Virtue is, then, a rational act, and therefore cannot have its seat in the emotional element, for that element is irrational, is the animal as distinguished from the rational nature, as Mr. Morell himself must concede, since he distinguishes it from the intellectual element, and makes it the seat of "animal passion." This is conclusive against the sentimentalists or emotionalists. The rational nature has two faculties or modes of activity, understanding and will, or free will. Rational nature must be intellective, and its characteristic as activity is to act *propter finem*,—not simply *ad finem*, which is common to all animal nature, but *propter finem*,

that is, in view and for the sake of an end,—and therefore it must be free activity, or free will. As understanding, it presents the end and the motives for seeking it; as free will, it elects, wills the end, or rejects it. To virtue both faculties are necessary, the understanding to present the end and its motives, and the will to elect it; but as the act is specially in the act of election, the virtue is placed primarily in the will, and no act is virtuous except it is an act of free will. Hence, when we inquire whether a man is virtuous or vicious, we look always to his will, and seek not what he has done externally, but the will with which he has done it, and we pronounce him virtuous or vicious according as that proves to have been virtuous or vicious. The act, as the subject of the predicate virtue or vice, as praiseworthy or blameworthy, is purely an act of the will, and hence moral theologians throw out of the account all except the internal act. Thus they speak of acts of faith, of hope, of charity, of contrition, which are pure internal acts, and may be performed any time, and as often as one chooses. The virtue of religion partakes of this general character of virtue, and is always an act of free will, done in view and for sake of an end, as is and must be every act of free will.

But we have not yet the distinctive character of virtue,—have not yet found that which makes an act virtuous, and distinguishes it from all other acts. Virtue is an act of free will, a voluntary act for an end intellectually apprehended. But not all voluntary acts for an end, or acts of free will, are virtues; for every sin is an act of free will, a voluntary act, done for the sake of an end intellectually apprehended; and therefore, by psychological analysis, do our best, we can make no valid distinction between virtue and its opposite. Hence it is, that psychologism results usually, and, with not a few of its cultivators, avowedly, in the denial of all distinction between virtue and vice, as well as between truth and falsehood. To determine the distinctive mark of virtue, we must look beyond the subject to the object; for the character of the act is determined by the end for which it is done, and the end for which an act must be done in order to be virtue can be determined only as we are taught, mediately or immediately, by our creator. According to Christianity, and even philosophy or reason itself, man can no more exist without a final than without a first cause, and nullity can no more be his end than his beginning. No created existence can be its own finality, or the final cause

of any thing, and therefore the final cause of all existences is and must be God. God is the origin and end of creation. The irrational portion of creation tends to him by its intrinsic and necessary laws; the rational portion are required to seek him voluntarily, as their freely chosen end. If they do, they gain the end for which they were made, and find their supreme good, the supreme good itself; if they do not voluntarily, if they voluntarily refuse to do it, their action bears them from God, that is, away from their supreme good, away from all good, into unmitigated darkness and evil, which is hell; for men create their own hell, and damn themselves. The end we are to seek is our final cause, and hence the end we must seek in order to be virtuous is God. A virtuous act is therefore an act of free will, done for the sake of God as its end; or, more simply, virtue is voluntary obedience to the will of God because it is his will, or the voluntary compliance with his commands because his commands.

The virtue of religion is distinguishable from other virtues only by the fact that God is the immediate object to which it is directed. All virtues are acts done for God as the end, or ultimate end; but some are directed to God immediately, and others immediately to ourselves, or to our neighbour. The immediate object of morality, as distinguished from religion, is the preservation of our own life and health, the proper care of our families, the assistance of the needy, the preservation of society, the promotion of social and political well-being, &c. But these acts, whatever they may be, and however conducive they may be to the welfare of ourselves or our neighbour, are virtuous only in so far as they are done for God's sake, with the intention, explicit or implicit, of fulfilling his commands, because his. If we preserve our life and our health only for our own sake, our act is selfish, not virtuous; if for the sake of being serviceable to our neighbour, or to our country, it is benevolent, or patriotic, but still not virtuous; and our act rises to virtue only when we do it because God commands us to do it. There must be always reference to God as the ultimate end of the act, —the intention of doing his will, because his will. This, too, must be the case in those acts which are specially religious, done immediately for the honor and glory of God. If we perform the external duties of worship, but not for the sake of God, our act wants the essential character of virtue; for God is always the ultimate end of all virtuous

acting. This granted, whatever distinction we may for convenience' sake make between religion and the other virtues, or between religion and morality, no real distinction between them exists, and we should always bear in mind that the specific acts of religion, such as prayer, praise, thanksgiving, private or public worship, assistance at the Holy Sacrifice, partaking of the sacraments, are an integral part of morality, or general ethics,—as truly so as succouring the needy, practising temperance, fortitude, and prudence, and giving to our neighbour his dues. No man is moral except he fulfils the law of God, and to fulfil that law is to keep all its precepts, whether they are made known to us through natural reason, or by supernatural revelation. He who refuses to believe the mysteries which God has revealed, if we rightly consider the matter, is, to say the least, as immoral as he who picks his neighbor's pocket, or violates any of the precepts of justice. We insist on this, because there is in our days a tendency to institute a divorce between religion and morality, and it is important to show wherein the two are identical, rather than wherein they are distinct. No divorce between them is admissible or conceivable. An immoral religious man, or an irreligious moral man, is a contradiction in terms. Morality is nothing but the practical application of theology, or of religious dogmatical teaching. Religion, as doctrine, is the supreme law, and conformity to it in practice is morality, or religion as virtue. In practice all virtue is religious, and all religion is virtue, though no act is religious or virtuous, in the full Christian sense, unless done from divine grace, which elevates the actor above the natural order, and places him on the plane of a supernatural destiny.

We are saying nothing new ; we are only repeating, in our own imperfect way, what all Christian moralists have uniformly taught from the beginning. But the view we present is precisely that which offends Mr. Morell and his fellow-neologists. It is precisely to get rid of the conclusion to which we come, that they psychologize, and seek a new definition of religion. They have been brought up in modern Evangelicalism, and find themselves unable or unwilling to believe the Evangelical theology, and they wish to be free to reject it without forfeiting their religious character. They confound the theology of their sect or sects with Christian theology, and therefore, for the same reason and on the same condition, wish to be free to reject

all theology, or doctrines addressed to the understanding. Their real aim is to secure all the freedom of denial claimed by unbelievers, and at the same time not forfeit their Christian character in the estimation of their co-religionists, and perhaps in their own, for it is not improbable that they are as unwilling to think themselves unbelievers as they are to be thought so by others. They therefore, after the example of the early Protestant reformers, confound free will with liberty *a coactione*, define it as the general activity of the soul, or the soul itself, the *vis agendi*, and represent it as underlying all the mental operations. As nobody of any note thinks of making religion a mere cognition, or supposing that the mere hearers and not the doers of the law are religious, they place the essence of religion in emotion, feeling, or sentiment; for, after understanding and free will, there is no other psychological element in which they can place it. Placed in emotion, which is purely subjective, a mere sensitive affection, which demands no distinct cognition of the object, and no exercise of the understanding in regard to objective truth, they feel themselves able to assert that they have, providing they have the sentiment, all that is essentially and distinctively religious, whatever the intellectual doctrines they believe or disbelieve. Hence Schleiermacher, in his *Reden über die Religion*, resolves the church into general society, and religious worship into the kind feelings of pleasant conversation of friends casually meeting of an evening at a neighbour's house; and maintains that belief in the personality of God anb the personal immortality of the soul is by no means essential to true and acceptable religion. Dr. Bushnell, our own countryman, if he follows out the principles he adopts, must go as far. M. Cousin reproaches the pantheist Spinoza with being too devout, too much absorbed in the thought of God. We have heard some of our Protestant friends term the poet Shelley, who ostentatiously wrote Ἄθεος, Atheist, after his name, one of the most devout worshippers God ever had on earth. And we have known others go so far as to call the pagan Goethe a second Messiah, and to praise his lascivious *Wahlverwandtschaften* as eminently pious, and admirably adapted to spiritual edification. And, indeed, there is an unmistakable tendency among the most eminent of modern Protestant authors to rehabilitate all the ancient pagan superstitions, not excepting disgusting fetichism, and to place them, as religion, on a level with Christianity. Intellectually considered, these

superstitions may have been very defective, and, no doubt, bear witness to a low state of culture, and the rudeness of the tribes or nations that professed them; but as religion, as evincing the activity of true and acceptable religious feeling, they were to their adherents all that Christianity is to us. The negro worshipping his Mumbo Jumbo is as truly worshipping God, as the Christian saint offering up the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, or prostrating himself in devout prayer before the altar of the Almighty. Not only do our Protestant authors, philosophers in their own estimation, divorce religion from morality, but they also divorce it from knowledge, and suppose a man may be truly religious who is ignorant of every article in the creed, and breaks every precept of the decalogue,—making it necessary for us to defend against them, not only the orthodox faith, but even ordinary intelligence and morality, the very elements of civilization.

But, after all, these neologists do not quite succeed in their attempt. Mr. Morell, as much as he wars against intellect or understanding,—the logical understanding, as he calls it,—finds himself obliged, as the indispensable condition of religion, to assert intuition of God, as its object, and he can frame no definition of religion that excludes cognition. He cannot, for a moment, maintain his pretence, that the activity of the emotions is the will, for nothing is more certain than that emotions are neither voluntary nor rational, and that we are, morally or religiously speaking, no further interested in them than we deliberately excite or assent to them. Man is not to be regarded as one simple nature, but, so to speak, as two natures united in one person, the rational and the animal. The rational acts *propter finem*, and therefore rationally from free will; the animal acts *ad finem*, according to its own intrinsic necessity, as does all animal nature. It is only on the supposition of these two natures in one person, that we can explain the fact of temptation, or that internal struggle between reason and passion, judgment and inclination, which, since the Fall, rends the bosom of every man. Not otherwise is the language of St. Paul, in the seventh chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, susceptible of an intelligent meaning, or is there sense in the often-quoted words of the heathen poet,—

"Video meliora, proboque:
Deteriora sequor."

To place religion in the animal nature, though our author does it virtually, is too gross a violation of common sense

for any one with his eyes open. Then it must be placed in the rational nature. Then all religious action is for God as final cause, and then it is necessary to know God, as the end, and also the means of attaining unto him or gaining our end. To know our end we must know our origin, for our final cause is unintelligible without a knowledge of our first cause. Here is all theology, for theology is nothing else than the knowledge of our origin and end, and of the means of gaining our end. It is idle, then, for a man to fight against theology, or to pretend that knowledge is not requisite to religion,—not only to its perfection, but even to its existence. It is a hard case that we, benighted Papists, who are accused of maintaining that ignorance is the mother of devotion, should have to defend the common cause of intelligence against the philosophers who claim to be the great lights of the age. Perhaps by light they mean darkness, and suppose that forgetting is acquiring knowledge.

The difficulty our Protestants feel arises, not from the necessity of theology, or doctrinal instruction, to the religious character, but from the false theology taught by their sects, and which they mistake for Christian theology. We are not surprised that Protestants rebel against Protestant instruction, or regard Protestant theology as a let and hindrance, at best as superfluous; for it really is an anomaly in Protestantism, and has no relation to the general economy of Protestant life. The Christian doctrines which Protestants profess to retain and incorporate into their theologies are really incredible and absurd when taken as Protestant doctrines, severed from the body of truth to which they belong, and on private judgment or private interpretation. This is a point of great importance, and one which cannot be too often insisted upon. We find Protestants professing certain doctrines which they have retained from us, and we are apt, at first sight, to suppose that these doctrines mean for them what they mean for us, and are as credible when they profess them as when we profess them; or, if we do not so suppose, Protestants themselves do, especially those Protestants who admit to themselves that they are unable to believe these doctrines. But the fact is, that the Christian mysteries professedly held by Protestants are not really the mysteries we believe; for they are taken as isolated doctrines, and differ as much from ours as a branch severed from the trunk, withered and dead, differs from a branch

united to the trunk, living and bearing its fruit. On Protestant principles, they serve no purpose in the economy of religious life, they have no connection with Protestant notions of sanctity, are destitute of that beauty and grandeur which pertain to them when seen in their proper place as parts of an organic whole, which rests on a solid and adequate foundation. With us they receive a practical meaning by virtue of their relation to other truths which we hold, but which Protestants reject, and are credible because asserted on a sufficient authority. With Protestants no peculiarly Christian truth has any practical meaning, or is supported by any authority sufficient for a revealed doctrine. Hence it is that in the bosom of every Protestant sect we see always a party protesting against the nominally Christian doctrines retained by the sect, as relics of Popery, denouncing them as anomalies, inconsistent with Protestantism, and calling upon the sect to clear them away. This is as it should be, and we see not how an intelligent Protestant, not wishing to profess to believe what he does not and cannot, as a Protestant, believe, can do otherwise. To be called upon to believe a mass of doctrines which have no practical connection with life, throw no light on our duties, and furnish no motives to their performance, is an affront to good sense; and we wonder not that so many are found to resist, and labor either to reject or to explain them away.

But, if these intelligent and consistent Protestants—consistent, we say, for they are consistent as Protestants—could be persuaded to look at the Christian doctrines in their unity and integrity, as an organic and living whole, as held by those who have been commissioned to keep and teach them, they would at once see that all their objections are misplaced and puerile. They would then see that he who wars against the understanding, or doctrines addressed to it, is too unreasonable to be called a madman. We grant the doctrines they reject are incredible as Protestant doctrines, but nothing is more credible as Catholic doctrines, because as Catholic doctrines they are in their place, and receive their true significance.

There is much more in Mr. Morell's book on which we might remark, especially his application of his philosophy to the explanation of inspiration and the Christian mysteries; but we have said enough to show that his doctrine is fundamentally false, and hostile to the very conception of religion, and it is not necessary to pursue and refute it in

detail. The whole book affords us only a melancholy instance of the impotence of great abilities and respectable scholarship to construct, without the aid of that scientific and theological tradition which has come down to us from Adam, any thing deserving the name of a moral or a religious code. The greatest ability, the most creative genius, and the most varied and profound erudition, operating outside of the traditional wisdom of the race, can produce nothing that can abide for a moment the test of enlightened criticism. Man out of unity is weak and helpless, and can originate nothing but puerility and absurdity. The reason of this is, that man has not the source of knowledge and wisdom in himself, and is nothing save as he is taught and educated by his Maker. Pride may revolt at this, and men, puffed up by a vain philosophy which only darkens the understanding and perverts the heart, may revolt and blaspheme, but the experience of six thousand years proves that it is true.

Our Maker has never deserted us, and has always been near us to instruct us, if we would but sit down at his feet and listen. Some he has always instructed, and always have those who chose to learn been brought to the knowledge of his will, and informed with his truth. The great body of true doctrine, revealed and natural, has been from the beginning within the reach of all men, is incorporated into the speech of all nations, and preserved in its unity, purity, and integrity in the infallible speech of the church. There we may learn it, and if we learn it not there, we shall learn it nowhere, and be as heterodox in philosophy as in theology. We have neither to create nor to invent truth; we have only to consent to be taught it. What fools we must be to refuse to learn! What greater fools we must be to suppose that all who have preceded us have been fools, that science and wisdom were born only with us, and that our minds are the first on which truth has ever dawned! There were brave men before Agamemnon, and wise men before Schleiermacher and Morell. The race has not lived six thousand years without a moral or religious code, or with one that now needs to be reversed. Let our philosophers reflect on this, and know that they can reverse the wisdom transmitted us only by putting evil for good, folly for wisdom, and darkness for light. It has been only to arrive at this moral, and to enforce it by a striking example, that we have introduced Mr. Morell's work, and called our readers

to its false and immoral teachings and speculations. Such works are instructive, and teach us wisdom as the Spartans taught their sons temperance, by exhibiting the disgusting spectacle of the drunken Helots. From the folly and impiety of even the distinguished among Protestants, let us learn to love our church still more, and still more humbly adore the grace that permits us to call ourselves her children.

THE MERCERSBURG THEOLOGY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1850.]

ARTICLE 1.

This is a periodical recently established by "the Alumni of Marshall College," Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, as the organ of what is called "the Mercersburg system" of theology, and is conducted with spirit, learning, and ability. Its writers are strong men, apparently in earnest, and they present Protestantism in as plausible a form as it admits, and give it the most respectable vindication that it receives in our language. Whoever would see Protestantism in its least irreligious form, and learn the best that can be said in its favor, will do well to study the pages of this new review. Its modes of thought and expression are, perhaps, a little German, but its pages are rarely dull or uninstructive.

We call the attention of our readers more especially to the number for January last, which contains a long and elaborate article on ourselves, designed to set aside our arguments for the church, and to vindicate Protestantism, as the writer understands it, from our attacks. The article is ably written, in a tone and manner as acceptable as rare in those who write against us or our church. The writer is a Protestant, but no vulgar Protestant; he is a gentleman and a scholar, and makes as near an approach to being a Christian as is to be expected from one who opposes the Christian church. He aims to be fair and candid, and has evidently done his best to state our arguments correctly, and to urge only grave and solid matter against them. It is refreshing to meet such an opponent, and we are sorry to add, that he is almost the only direct opponent we have ever had that we did not feel it a sort of degradation to meet. He is one we can respect, and whom we should dread to encounter, if we had no advantage in our cause to make amends for our own personal inferiority.

The reviewer very frankly concedes, in the outset, that, as against popular Protestantism, taking private judgment,

The Mercersburg Review: devoted to Theology, Literature, and Science. Mercersburg, Pa. 1849–1850.

with or without the Bible, for its rule of faith, our arguments for the church are conclusive, and that there is no answer to be given to them. He concedes, moreover, that the Protestantism which we have attacked, whether under the special form of high church or low church, Presbyterianism or Methodism, and which has nothing to reply to us but cant and sophistry, is and long has been the dominant form of Protestantism, and the only form that has been set forth prominently as the rival or the antagonist of Rome. We have, then, he must further concede, the right to regard this in the judgment of Protestants themselves, as genuine Protestantism, and therefore as its more solid and defensible form. If, as he concedes, we have refuted this, we may conclude *a fortiori* against those minor and less solid forms, that have never been able to make themselves generally acknowledged by Protestants themselves. As the reviewer contends that the church is true against no religion, and all religions but the Protestant, he must concede, then, that we have, by his own concessions, the right to conclude its absolute truth.

But, without insisting on this, we remark that the reviewer contends that there is a higher doctrine than either prevailing Protestantism or Catholicity, and against which our reasoning is not, in his judgment, conclusive. If we had known this doctrine, or been in a condition to appreciate it, we should not, he thinks, in rejecting Unitarianism, have swung to the opposite extreme of Romanism. We were right, he says, in renouncing rationalism, but we have gone to as great an extreme, though a less dangerous one, in going to Rome. Our fault lies in abandoning private judgment for authority, instead of seeking and finding a doctrine which reconciles them, and preserves them both. But with all respect to our learned and philosophical critic, we were not, if we understand his doctrine, ignorant of it, but were detained by it a considerable time outside of the church. It is in substance, though not in all its details, the doctrine we sketched in the last number of the *Boston Quarterly Review*, in refuting Mr. Parker's notion of the church; which we developed at some length in *The Christian World*, during the winter of 1842–43; and which we established our present *Review* expressly to explain, propagate, and defend.

The attempt to reconcile private liberty and public authority did not escape us. This reconciliation in a supposed

higher doctrine than either Catholicity or Protestantism was the precise problem with which we were engaged for the ten or twelve years next preceding our conversion. The attempt to get a satisfactory solution of this problem is the key to all our writings and sermonizing during that long period, and no greater mistake can be committed than to suppose, that, even when we were a Unitarian, we accepted in theory, however closely we may have followed it in practice, the Protestant rule of private judgment. We never, after 1832, and before that we were too young to be of any account, adopted individualism, but uniformly opposed it, and contended, as our published writings bear witness, for a catholic authority both in church and state, although we erred grievously as to its seat and constitution. Indeed, if there is a single problem that we have studied with any degree of thoroughness, it is this very problem which our Mercersburg friend accuses us of having neglected, namely, the reconciliation of the so-called rights of the individual mind with legitimate public authority. At no period after we began to be known as a Unitarian were we any more prepared to give up authority than we were to give up liberty; or when, if it should appear that we could not retain both, and that one or the other must be sacrificed, we would not have sacrificed liberty rather than authority. It shows no little want of acquaintance with our personal history, and a gross misapprehension of our published writings, to assert that we went in our conversion from extreme rationalism to Catholicity, or from extreme individualism to authority. We went to the church from a theory which was invented to retain them both, and to reconcile them systematically and really one with the other.

We may not have exhausted all possible theories for the reconciliation of liberty and authority,—in the reviewer's language, "the liberty of the individual subject with the binding force of the universal object,"—but we were not ignorant of "the new religious principle and theory" which he proposes, and which he says "the case demanded for its solution." If we understand him, he advances little that cannot be found, in substance, in our own publications prior to our conversion, and, if we did not know that the theory had been advocated by several eminent German authors, and that it was entertained by him, in part at least, at as early a day as by ourselves, we should be half tempted to suspect him of having plagiarized it from our own writings.

Of course, we are far from pretending that we set it forth with the systematic fulness and consistency, or with the philosophic depth of thought, the various learning, and the clearness and vigor of expression, with which he does, for in these respects we readily confess our inferiority; but we did set it forth in its principles, and in what he has said we have found nothing that has taken us by surprise, or with which we do not seem to ourselves to have been tolerably familiar. Whether true or false, adequate or inadequate, we are greatly deceived if the theory has not once been ours, and if we have abandoned it, we must still be treated with some leniency, since the reviewer winds up his article against us, by virtually conceding, with a candor that does him honor, that, after all, it is rather a statement than a solution of the difficulty.

As the reviewer concedes that we are right against popular Protestantism, the question between him and us is not a question between us and Protestantism in general, but between us and his specific form of Protestantism, and if that specific form turns out to be untenable, he must accept our church as the church of God. The ground he takes is, either our church or his form of Protestantism, and therefore, if his form be refuted, so far as he is concerned, we are free to conclude the truth of our church against every form of Protestantism, nay, the absolute validity of her titles against every claimant. If he is wrong, we must be right. Whether we prove him wrong by direct evidence of the truth of our church, or by direct evidence of the falsity of his own, can, therefore, make no difference, for in either case the truth of our church is concluded. The latter is the more proper method of conducting the argument; for the church is the prior occupant, and must be presumed true until the contrary is made to appear. If the reviewer's doctrine is removed, ours remains, and he has, therefore, no possible means of disproving our doctrine but by proving his own; and, as the presumption is on our side, his failure to prove his own is, so far as we are concerned, its disproof. Moreover, he must prove his doctrine, not in what it has in common with ours, for, since we precede him, that is our own; but in that which is peculiar to it, which distinguishes it from Catholic doctrine, and makes it a doctrine opposed to it. Has he done this? If he has not, he has done nothing to his purpose, and we stand where we should have stood if he had not undertaken to allege any thing against us.

The reviewer concedes authority and asserts private liberty in matters of religious faith; for his aim is to accept both, and to reconcile them one with the other. His theory, then, is eclectic, and intended to embrace and reconcile "the liberty of the individual subject with the binding force of the universal object," which, he says, are, on the Catholic system, antagonists, and mutually destructive one of the other. He proposes to do this, not by a shallow and absurd syncretism, which, after the manner of Anglicanism, accepts both in their mutual exclusiveness, and follows arbitrarily first one and then the other, playing off authority against those who accuse it of believing too much, and liberty against those who accuse it of believing too little; but, by dissolving both in "a new religious principle and theory," higher and broader than either taken separately.

The theory by which he proposes to do this, simply stated, is, in its generative principles, that Christianity is a new and a higher life in the world, and that this new life is literally "God entering into human nature," or the Word made flesh and dwelling among us, full of grace and truth. In an article on *The Relation of Church and State* (November, 1849, p. 576), he says, the *ideal* of the Christian Church is "a higher order of divine life in the world, which, in its developments, takes to itself a body from the elements of humanity. The principle of this new life is the Lord Jesus Christ, the incarnate Saviour, who is very God and very man in one person, and in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. In him the human and divine natures are united as they never were before. The union is deep, mysterious, vital. The growth of the church is the development of Christ's life in the world." Again (July, 1849, pp. 314, 315), he says, the confession of Peter, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," utters, in the most immediate and direct way, the fact of Christianity, the new order of life it has brought into the world, as apprehended in its most general character in the person of Christ. The object so apprehended, and thus at once brought to utterance, is no doctrine or report simply concerning Christ, but the glorious reality of the Incarnation itself, as exhibited in him under an historical and enduring form. Christianity resolves itself ultimately into this mystery. It has its principle and root in Christ's person. . . . . The Word reveals itself, not by outward oracle or prophecy, but by becoming *flesh;* he is

the living comprehension of the truth he proclaims, the actual world of grace which he unfolds and makes known. . . . . The new creation, which is at the same time the end and completion of the old, starts from the mystery of his person. The Incarnation is the deepest and most comprehensive fact in the economy of the world. Jesus Christ authenticates himself, and all truth and reality besides, or rather, all truth and reality are such only by the relation in which they stand to him as their great centre and ground. In him are hid thus all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. He is the absolute revelation of God in the world. . . . . As all this he is primarily no object of intellection, but can be apprehended only by faith; and in this form he constitutes the sum and substance of Christianity, as it lives in the consciousness of the Church, and finds its expression in the Creed."

It is clear, we think, from this, that the reviewer's theory is, that the new creation, the Christian order, Christianity, is throughout Christ himself, the "Word made flesh,"—not Christ as the universe is God *mediante* his creative act, or act creating, sustaining, and governing it, but Christ himself, identically in his own substance and person,—and is indistinguishable in its substance from him. Thus he says (*Ibid.*, p. 316),—"The new creation grows forth actually from the mystery of Christ's person, being from first to last the *evolution* or development simply of capabilities, relations, and powers, that are treasured up in him from the beginning." And again (January, 1850, p. 4),—"The Lord is perpetually born anew in the hearts of believers; his life is reproduced in their life; and their formation into his image involves an inward adunation also into the very *substance* of his mediatorial person. . . . . Christ and his people are joined together in a *common* life, which starts from him as its source, and is carried over to them by real *organic* derivation," and is in them "an actual participation in his living substance. . . . . The union between Christ and his people actually inserts them spiritually into the substance of his life. They are a new creation in Christ Jesus, not a new creation out of him, and beyond him, by *the fiat of Omnipotence*, bearing some resemblance to him in a different sphere, but a new creation whose original seat and fountain is Christ's own person, and which conveys over to them, accordingly, with true reproductive force, the vitality which belongs to it [Christ's person] in this form."

These passages, and many more like them might be adduced, seem to be conclusive that our Mercersburg friend holds and teaches that the new creation is indistinguishably the Incarnate God; and that we are Christians, are introduced into the Christian order, only by being literally, organically, physically, adunated into his living substance. How this theory is supposed to solve the difficulty as to liberty and authority, it is not difficult to understand. "The mystery of the Incarnation," says the reviewer (July, 1849, p. 323), "as it stands before us in the person of Christ, includes two sides, which must both enter steadily into our faith to make it complete. We must apprehend, in the first place, the presence of a truly divine life in the fact, the entrance of God into the world as he had not been in it before; in the second place, this life must be admitted under a true human form, and in such relation to the previous constitution of the world, that it shall not violate its order, but be felt rather to fall in with it organically, and complete its sense." Christ is the object, and affirms himself immediately to the apprehension of faith; he, affirming or authenticating himself immediately in the act of faith, is authority, and constitutes "the binding force of the universal object." But as he affirms himself under a human form only, in the way of human thought and will, as the complement, in some sort, of the natural order of the world, he recognizes the activity of the individual subject; and as he propounds nothing to the mind, imposes nothing upon it, but simply generates faith in and through it by its own activity, the freedom of the individual is preserved, in the same way that it is preserved in the operations of interior grace.

Whether this be or be not a real solution of the difficulty will, perhaps, appear as we proceed; for the moment we ask the attention of our readers to the assumptions it makes; namely, Christ, Christianity, or the Christian order always affirms or authenticates himself from within the believer, and always under a strictly human form. These two assumptions are fundamental in the theory proposed, underlie all the reviewer's reasoning against us, and give to it whatever of pertinency and force it may have. That reasoning, as far as we comprehend it, is,—1. That, by maintaining that Christianity is the supernatural object of faith, and as such is extrinsic to the soul, and credible only by means of an extrinsic authority to propound it, we deny the activity of the soul in its reception, and therefore violate

the rights of the mind, or the liberty of the individual subject; 2. That, by asserting that faith is elicitable only by means of an external authority sufficiently accredited to reason, we make faith a conclusion of logic, fall into sheer rationalism, and lose the supernatural, and therefore authority, or "the binding force of the universal object"; and, 3. That making Christianity an external object, propoundable by an external authority to reason, as something to be believed or done, we deny that it always presents itself in a true and proper human form, we exclude all human activity in its elaboration or growth, foreclose development, and therefore deny history to be a continuous revelation of God's mind and will, the evolution or realization of the capabilities, revelations, and powers treasured up in the Incarnate God, or God preparing his Incarnation, and actually becoming incarnate. This reasoning, though that of no vulgar mind, cannot strike the Catholic as of much force against his church; but all will agree that it is valuable as illustrating and determining the theory of the author; and it proves clearly enough, that, if it be not true that Christ affirms himself always from within, and only from within, and always and only under a proper human form, that theory cannot be sustained.

The reviewer professes to object, not to the assertion of Christianity as an object of faith, but simply to its assertion as an *outward* object propoundable from without; nor does he avowedly object to authority, as such, but to that authority which is extrinsic, operating on the mind and commanding it, instead of operating from the mind, in the way of its own intelligence and will. To Christianity and authority, as he understands us to assert them, he objects that they violate the rights of the mind, and operate only in a mechanical way, and by magic. Christianity, according to us, he says, "is taken as a revelation of supernatural truth, which men are to receive as something wholly out of themselves, that is brought near them for their use in a purely outward way. As it has its source and seat beyond their proper nature altogether, so it cannot be allowed to find in this any rule or measure whatever for its apprehension. It must be taken as a matter of mere authority. The relation between the receptivity of faith on the one side, and of the propounded truth on the other,.... is held to be in no sense inward and living, but mechanical only and juxtapositional, the one remaining always on the outside of the other."

(January, 1850, pp. 53, 54.) Again:—"As a supernatural constitution, it [Christianity] must not conform to the order of nature. It must be neither organic, nor historical, nor *human* in its higher sphere, but one long monotony rather of mere outward law and authority, superseding the natural order of the world, and contradicting it, from age to age, to the end of time. The Roman system carries in itself thus a constant tendency to resolve the whole force of Christianity into magic, and to fall into the snare of the *opus operatum* in its bad sense." (*Ibid.*, p. 62.)

What the reviewer here objects to our doctrine is, in substance,—1. That it places Christianity, as supernatural object of faith, out of the subject; 2. That it places the supernatural wholly above the sphere of the natural; and, 3. That it makes faith the mediate, instead of the immediate, apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. These objections throw light on his own doctrine, and prove that he either has no right to bring them, or holds the exact contrary; namely,—1. The supernatural object of faith is in the subject, not out of it; 2. The supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural; and, 3. Faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. That he does so hold is evident, not only from the fact, that he objects to us for holding the contrary, but from the general tenor of all the articles in his journal bearing on the subject; although he certainly asserts, sometimes, doctrines which contradict these, owing to the fact we shall hereafter point out, of confounding subject with object, and object with subject.

The reviewer identifies, as we have seen, Christ and Christianity, and regards the whole Christian order, the new creation, as the Incarnate God, or Word made flesh. He places this order in the believer; it is God entering into human nature as he was not in it before, the insertion of a new principle of life in our life, in the very constitution of our nature; and hence "Christianity, so far as it prevails, is the actual elevation of our general life into a higher sphere of existence." Christ is not an outward teacher, or model, as the Unitarians vainly imagine, but an inward principle, from which all flows forth as from its fontal spring. "If Christ be no *principle* of life for humanity, if he be not, in truth, the power of a new creation in its constitution, it follows necessarily that it needs nothing of the sort for its redemption. This is at once Pelagianism." (January, 1850, p. 11.)

It must not be supposed that our reviewer is merely endeavoring to prove that Christ must be in us, by his gracious operations moving and assisting us to believe and love him as out of us and before us, as the object and final cause of our faith and love; for this is Catholic doctrine, the very doctrine he is professedly warring against. Hence he objects to our doctrine, which makes the object of faith, as object, extrinsic, that "the general law of our nature is, that mind must fulfil its mission, not by following blindly a mere outward force of any sort, but by the activity of its own intelligence and will. . . . . It must move in the light that springs from itself, by a power it continually generates within." This law, he contends, must hold good in the Christian order as well as in the natural. "Christianity claims to be the perfection of man's life; this, in its ordinary constitution, unfolds itself by its own self-movement in the way of thought and will; but just here all this is superseded by another law altogether; the supernatural comes in as the outward complement of the natural, in such sort as to make the force of this last null and void in all that pertains to its higher sphere." (January, 1850, p. 56.) Hence he tells us that "all revelation, as distinguished from magic, implies the self-exhibition of God, in a real way, through the medium of the world in its natural form. To a certain extent, we have such a revelation in the material universe. The outward creation is the symbol, mirror, shrine, and sacrament of God's presence and glory as a supernatural fact in the most actual way. The word of prophecy and inspiration is the gradual coming forth of eternal truth into time, in a like real way, through the medium of human thought and speech; a process which completes itself finally, in the full domiciliation, we may say, of the Infinite Word itself in the life of the world by Jesus Christ." (*Ibid.*, p. 65.) Christian faith, what we call Christian doctrine, is not something propounded to the reason of man, but is the outbirth of the new life placed by the Incarnation in men, the expression or utterance, by believers, of the life that is in them, and which they live by having the great realities of faith in their own conscious life through organic union with the person of Christ. In treating of the Apostles' Creed, the reviewer says,—"The Creed is no work of mere outward *authority*, *imposed* on the Church by Christ or his Apostles. It would help its credit in the eyes of some, no doubt, if it could be considered in this view. Their idea

of Christianity is such as involves, prevailingly, the notion of a given, fixed scheme of things, *to be believed and done*, propounded for the use of man, on the authority of Heaven, in a purely mechanical and outward way." (May, 1849, p. 201.) But all this is false. The Creed "was not exhibited as a formulary imposed by outward authority, nor as the result of any process of reflection. It presented itself to the world, simply as the firm affirmation, on the part of the Church, of what Christianity was in her living consciousness in the way of direct and immediate fact. . . . . It has its very being in the element and sphere of faith; and holds there in the character of a direct and spontaneous witness, with the mouth, to the great central realities of faith as they are immediately felt in the heart. . . . . It is the product of the early Christian life." (*Ibid.*, pp. 214, 215.) "No man can be said to have composed it; it is no work of bishops or synods; it must be taken rather as the grand epos of Christianity itself, the spontaneous poem of its own life, unfolded in fit word and expression from the inmost consciousness of the universal Church." (*Ibid.*, p. 217.) So faith springs from the life of believers, not the life of believers from faith!

We might multiply citations to the same purport without end, but these suffice to show that the reviewer's theory is, that Christianity, as supernatural object, as the living truth, in some way inserts itself in the believer, and is in the believing subject, operating in the act of faith from the subject's own centre, in the way of his own thought and will, and therefore, in regard to the act of faith, is not object, but subject, in the same sense, and on the same principle, that auxiliary grace is subject. In denying, then, that the object of faith is extrinsic, or out of the subject, and contending that it is in the subject, acting in the direction of the soul's own action, and coalescing with it, he denies the object itself; for whatever is objective is out of the subject, and whatever is in the subject is subjective. He, then, loses the act of faith itself; for the creditive subject can elicit the act only in concurrence with the credible object. He also fails to solve his problem, for he cannot deny the object, and still assert its binding force.

The reviewer admits no proper supernatural, as is evident from the fact that he objects to us for making it transcend the natural, and from the fact that he holds that we have an original natural capacity for the direct and immediate appre-

hension of it. He confounds the supernatural with the supersensible, and understands by it nothing but the intelligible or *noetic* world as distinguished from the sensible, the *noumenon* as distinguished from the *phenomenon* of Kant. He objects to the way in which we oppose faith to reason, that is, distinguish faith from reason. "Its opposition," he says, "is properly to sense, and to nature as known by sense; to reason only in so far as taken for the understanding in relation to such knowledge. Faith is the capacity of perceiving the invisible and supernatural,.... which as such does not lie on the outside of reason,.... but opens to view rather a higher form of.... its own proper life. It requires, of a truth, in our present circumstances, a supernatural *influence* to call faith into exercise;.... there must be for this purpose a new life by the spirit of Christ; but all this forms at best but the proper *education* or *drawing out* of the true sense of man's life as it stood before." (Jan., 1850, p. 67.) "Faith stands just in the apprehension of invisible things in their true and proper reality. The direct and immediate communication of our nature with this higher world, in virtue of its original capacity for such purpose, the state or activity in which this communication holds, is itself precisely what we understand by faith." "Our nature is formed for such direct communication with the world of spirit; carries in itself an original capacity for transcending the world of sense, in the immediate apprehension of a higher order of existence, and can never be complete without its active development." (May, 1849, p. 209 and p. 208.)

Here it is undeniable that no reality is allowed to be held in faith that transcends the original capacity of our nature, and that nothing above the intelligible world is apprehended. This is not supernatural, for it is a contradiction in terms to say the supernatural does not transcend the capacity of the natural. Undoubtedly, we have a natural faculty of apprehending the supersensible. Certainly, the human mind, as naturally constituted, is not confined, as Locke maintains, to the knowledge derived from sensation and reflection. There is for us an intelligible world above the sensible, and it is only by virtue of this intelligible world that the sensible itself becomes intelligible, or is for us any thing more than a mode or affection of our own sensitive subject. In this intelligible world, the being, though not the essence, of God, is apprehended, and the invisible things of God from the

creation, or foundation, of the world, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood, that is, known, *intellecta*, by the things that are made; and therefore the very heathen were inexcusable for lapsing into idolatry; but all this lies in the order of nature, the primitive creation, and is included in God's revelation of himself as the intelligible. The supernatural is above this, above the whole order of the natural universe, regarded either in its first cause or in its final cause, and is God's revelation of himself as superintelligible, as the author of the new creation, the order of grace, not promised in the order of nature, not included in its original plan, nor necessary to complete it in its own order. The new creation presupposes the old, and grace presupposes nature, and as both proceed from the same Creator, there must of course be a congruity between them, for God can never be in contradiction with himself; but the new creation is strictly supernatural, and therefore in a sphere outside of reason and infinitely above it. We have no natural power to apprehend either what it is, or that it is; and we know absolutely nothing of it, except what is communicated to us, not from within, but from above, by God himself. This is the supernatural in the sense of Catholic theology, and we must be elevated to its order, before we rise above mere natural religion. The reviewer, by confounding it with the supersensible, shows that he only follows in the wake of American and German transcendentalists, and remains, with all his lofty pretensions, in a sphere below the lowest distinctively Christian sphere of thought.

The reviewer, it is well to notice, by the way, restricts expressly all the supernatural he recognizes to a simple *influence* which calls faith into exercise, and this influence he supposes to be necessary only in our present circumstances. The power is in us by nature, and nothing is needed but to render it active. So the new and higher principle, which, we have seen, is Christ himself, God entering into the world as he was never in it before, the new creation, the whole Christian order, is, then, at most, simply prevenient grace, revealing nothing, teaching nothing, commanding nothing, doing nothing, but simply exciting one of our dormant powers to activity! Here are great words, and a tremendous preparation for comparatively a small affair. Really our Mercersburg friend must have been napping when he invented this part of his doctrine. But

let him not be too much depressed. Homer sometimes nods, as Horace says, and human inventions are frequently dreams.

That the reviewer understands by faith the immediate, not simply the mediate, apprehension of the matter believed, is evident from the passages just cited to prove that he confounds the supernatural with the supersensible, for in them he defines it to be the direct and immediate communication with the realities it holds; and if he did not so understand it, his objection to us, that we make it mediate only, would be irrelevant and absurd. What we maintain is, that, in matters of faith, as distinguished from matters of knowledge or science, the objective truth, though extrinsically evident, is intrinsically inevident, and therefore, in itself considered, is no immediate object of intellectual apprehension. This we had supposed follows from the nature of faith, which, by its very definition, is assent to a proposition on testimony, or the authority of another, and from the fact, which every Christian at least must acknowledge, that mysteries are credible. But it is precisely the intrinsic inevidence of the revealed truth, and the necessity of receiving it on authority, or of any motives of assent which the mind does not draw from immediate contemplation of it, that we understand our Mercersburg theologian to deny. Our doctrine, he says, "carries with it a wrong conception of the nature and power of faith. . . . . It goes on the assumption that the supernatural, with which faith has to do, is so sundered from the natural as to admit of no approach or apprehension from that side; that truth in such form is *inevident* for the mind wholly, in its own nature, and without force of reason *intrinsically* to engage its assent; that the mind is moved to such assent, ... not by any motives either in itself or in the object set before it, but by something extrinsic to both,—the weight of an intermediate authority, which is felt to be fully valid as a ground of certainty, without regard to the nature of what is thus taken on trust, one way or another. 'In belief,' says Mr. Brownson, 'I must go out of myself, and also out of the object, for my motives of assent.' Subjective and objective come to no union whatever. The gulf between them is sprung only by means of outward *testimony*. The case requires, indeed, divine testimony. Still it is always as something between the subject and object, in a purely separate and external way." (Jan., 1850, pp. 66, 67.) Even

divine testimony is not to be credited, it seems, according to our German Reformed doctor, till we have examined what it testifies to, and satisfied ourselves by our own light that it is true, and worthy to be believed. "It will not do," he says, "in the face of such a fact as the *Incarnation*, to say that the realities with which faith has to do, in distinction from reason, are wholly without light or evidence for this last, in their own nature, and as such to be taken on the mere authority of God, ascertained in some other way; in such sense that a man might be supposed to be infallibly sure, first, that he has this authority to go upon, and so be prepared to accept any and every proposition as true, on the strength of it, with equal readiness and ease." (*Ibid.*, p. 64.) "Faith stands in rational correspondence with its contents, ... makes the mind in some measure actually in their sphere, ... touches its object as truly as sense," (*Ibid.*, p. 67,) and "is led by motives of assent in its object, and not simply by motives drawn from some other quarter; in other words, the authority of God moving it is not on the outside of the object, but comes to view in and by the object bearing its proper seals." (*Ibid.*, p. 70.) There is no need of further extracts, for these prove clearly that the reviewer rejects as faith the apprehension of truth through the medium of testimony, even that of God himself, and will not allow the object to be credible, unless the mind immediately perceives its truth. Hence he censures us for maintaining that we must take the word from the speaker, not the speaker from the word, and holds (*Ibid.*, p. 68) that Christ's miracles do not accredit him, but he accredits them. Clearly, then, he holds faith to be, in some way, the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed, especially since, in a passage we shall cite again soon, for another purpose, he asserts that "faith without truth for its contents can no more be in exercise or existence, than natural vision can be where light is wanting." But such immediate apprehension of truth is intuition, knowledge, not faith. So it follows that the reviewer's new principle and theory of religious life, which he says we needed when we left rationalism to spare us the labor of going to Rome, lose the object of faith by resolving it into subject, the supernatural revelation by resolving it into the supersensible, and faith itself by resolving it into knowledge or intuition; that is, since he recognizes the supernatural at all only as an exciting influence,—a mere stimulus,—if even so

much, his system is substantially the very rationalism he applauds us for having rejected.

It is easy enough for us, who have had personal experience of the reviewer's theory, and who have the light of Catholic theology to guide us, to comprehend his difficulties, and to see the source of his errors. He does not clearly understand that things must have an outside as well as an inside, and that he cannot deny their outside without also denying their inside. It is always well to try to get at the "inmost" heart of things, but it is necessary, that, in the effort to do so, we do not destroy the life of things themselves. We are far from believing that our Mercersburg doctor intends to deny all faith objectively considered, but he is confused by his German pantheism, or rather, Oriental doctrine of emanation, and his mystical philosophy, exaggerated by his Calvanistic training. He intends to acknowledge both subject and object, but he does not appear to see clearly that they are necessarily the one outside of the other, that subject stands opposed to object, and object to subject, that the subject is the human soul, and that object, if object at all, is something distinct from the soul, out of the soul, and independent of it. The subject, indeed, cannot act, or exist even, independently of its object, for it is not God,—who alone is from and by himself, or is his own object,—but the object can and does exist without the subject.

Hence the object is always authoritative, and all evidence is objective; and we beg leave here to correct one of our assertions, made in 1845, cited by the reviewer, but not used or objected to by him, that in the fact of intuition the evidence is in the subject. This, though true enough in relation to the purpose for which we asserted it, is, nevertheless, not strictly accurate. All we there meant to assert was, that in intuition the assent is immediate, not discursive, as in demonstrative science, nor by the mediation of another, as in faith; but the language naturally bears a Cartesian sense, to which we object. The evidence is never in the subject, but is always objective, as we have shown in the foregoing article. The subject never affirms the object, but the object is always affirmed, either *per se* or *per alia*, to the subject. In knowledge it affirms itself, is evident, or intelligible *per se*; in faith it is inevident *per se*, and is affirmed only by a witness to whom it is not so inevident, but evident. Hence, as in the case of Christianity, when it is supernatural, it can be affirmed only by a supernatural

witness; for to none but a supernatural witness can the supernatural be evident or intelligible by itself.

But the reviewer either denies or misapprehends all this, and makes the subject and object mutually dependent one on the other, or rather, following Fichte, regards the object as the product of the subject. "The word lives," he says, "and is the word truly, only by faith." (May, 1849, p. 209.) "The existence of truth is objective, and in such view, of course, universal and independent of all private thought and will; but as thus objective, it must be at the same time subjective, must enter into particular thought and will, in order to be *real*. As object merely, without subject, it becomes a pure abstraction. Mere single mind can never be, in and of itself, the measure of either truth or right; it must be ruled, and so bound by the objective, or authority of the general. On the other hand, the general as such, mere law or object, is no such measure either, in and of itself; to be so, it must take concrete form in the life of the world, which resolves itself at last into the thinking and willing of single minds." (Jan., 1850, pp. 56, 57.)

It is difficult to conceive greater confusion of thought than we find here, or to compress more, or more fundamental, error into the same number of words. The writer says, indeed, that "the existence of truth is objective," but he resolves it as objective into the general, and distinguishes it from the particular, and therefore, though he seems not to be aware of it, denies the existence of particular, concrete objects. Only the general is objective; then particulars are subjective. Man exists, indeed, independent of our private thought and will, but men exist only as we think and will them! But the object without subject is unreal, a pure abstraction. A pure abstraction is a nullity; then existence can be predicated of nullity. This equals Hegel's assertion of the identity in the last analysis of *das Seyn* and *das Nicht-seyn*, of *to be* and *not to be*, *being* and *not-being*. This cannot be said. Consequently, if the objective is a pure abstraction, the truth that is said to be objective is no objective reality at all. Then all reality is subjective,—which is simply Kantism as developed by Fichte, that is, pure autotheism. By resolving the object, which, we must remember, is Christ, God Incarnate, into the general, and denying it to be authoritative, or the measure of truth and right, till it "takes concrete form in the life of the world, which

resolves itself at last into the thinking and willing of single minds," he makes God himself dependent on the thinking and willing of these minds for his reality, his very being, and implies that if it were not for them there would be no God. He thus denies God, or, what is the same thing, resolves him into infinite void, mere abstract possibility, seeking to become *plenum*, full, or real in the life of the world,—pure Buddhism. But abstract possibility, infinite void, is a nullity, and can do nothing, neither create the world nor realize itself in its life. Then there is no world, and if there is no world, and God is a nullity, nothing is or exists,—pure nullism, or nihilism, to which, we have shown over and over again, all Protestantism, whatever its form, has an invincible tendency.

The reviewer, we doubt not, intends to be a true Christian believer, and fails to see that these consequences follow necessarily from his principles; but he must permit us to suggest that he is misled by modern philosophy, which teaches that God is real being only in that he is creator and actually creates *ad extra*, as well as by his Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, which he wishes to be able to understand in a real inward sense, not in a purely forensic sense, as is the case with Protestants generally. He misconceives the language of St. Paul (Heb. xi. 1), *Est fides sperandarum substantia rerum*, and interprets it to mean, not that faith is the substance of things hoped for, that is, beatitude, because in the order of their acquisition it is their inchoation, or beginning, as the principles of a science are said, and very properly, to be its substance, because that from which all in the science follows, but that it substantiates them, renders them real, or gives them substance, in the sense in which the word is taken in the category of substance. But this is absurd. The Apostle declares faith to be "the substance of things *hoped* for," *sperandarum substantia rerum*, not of things already possessed; yet, as faith is possessed by the believer, if it were their substantiality, they would be things already possessed, and not things hoped for. What is hoped for by the Christian is beatitude, that is, the possession of God as the supreme good. To say that our faith is the substance of this, or gives to it its substance, is to say, either that our faith is God, or that it makes God, creates the sovereign good; neither of which can be said. We applaud the reviewer for his wish to get rid of the Protestant doctrine

of forensic justification, which is only a sham justification, and no real justification at all; but we cannot applaud him for attempting to do it, either by asserting for us beatitude in this life, or by assuming that we are, or that we make, our own final cause.

Following modern philosophy, which teaches that God is real only in that he is creator, the reviewer can assert that God lives, is living God, only by asserting that he lives in the life of the world, that is, as he explains it, "in the thinking and willing of single minds." His system seems to us to be based on the supposition, that God comes to reality only in the life of the universe, and that the universe, whether natural or supernatural, is simply the evolution or development, that is, realization, of the abstract potentialities or possibilities of the divine nature. The two orders completed are the realized or completed God. Thus he says, "The new creation grows forth actually from the mystery of Christ's person, being from first to last the evolution or development simply of the capabilities, relations, and powers treasured up in him from the beginning." (July, 1849, p. 316.) If the new, then the old, or there would be no congruity between the two orders, on which the reviewer so strenuously insists. Hence the significance and sacredness of history. It is God's realization of his own potentiality, in space and time, or his *coming* to reality. It is, then, the manifested God, and whoso censures it is a blasphemer. Assuming that it starts from the incarnation, either as preparatory to it or as realizing it, and flows on since the incarnation, under the forms of the Roman church, down to the sixteenth century, and thence on through the reformers and the central life of Protestant nations down to our times, he condemns as unhistorical, and as real blasphemers of God, all who denounce the Catholic church prior to the reformers, and also all who defend it since. Such seems to us to be the reviewer's theory, and our readers will see at once that it is, substantially, the very theory we refuted in our critical examination, of Wm. H. Channing's Discourse on *The Christian Church and Social Reform*. It is decidedly pantheistic, at best nothing but an imperfect reproduction of the old Oriental doctrine of emanation, which teaches that the universe is evolved from God, or flows forth from him, not as the effect from the cause, but as the stream from the fountain.

The error, under a theological point of view, lies in mak-

ing faith the substantiality, or substantialization, of the things hoped for, instead of their first principle in the order of attainment; and, under a philosophical point of view, in conceiving God, primarily, not as *Ens reale*, or real being, but as *Ens in genere*, or mere abstract possibility. If our Mercersburg friend had understood clearly that divine truth, or the faith as object, however much it may, by being believed, impart to the believer, is itself, as divine reality, always the same, whether believed or unbelieved, and that God is absolutely real, most pure act in himself, as real, and as complete, without the universe as with it, and that, while it is absolutely dependent on him, he in no sense depends on it, he would have seen that his doctrine, that the truth as objective must at the same time be subjective in order to be real, is the grossest absurdity, to use a mild term, into which the human mind can fall.

Will the reviewer reply, that we misunderstand his language, and hold him responsible for principles which he repudiates? It is barely possible. It is barely possible that he does not intend to deny the reality of truth, considered in itself, when unbelieved, but merely that it is real as a fact of our life, that is, real to us. This would seem to follow from his assertion, that "faith does not create truth," and that "the existence of truth is objective." Much that he says is easily explained, and easily explained only, on the supposition that all he means to assert is, that truth, when not believed, though not a pure abstraction considered in itself, is a mere abstraction in regard to our actual life, and, as to us, is as if it were not. But this is only saying, in other words, that the truth when unbelieved is not believed, and when separate from us is not united to us. We cannot persuade ourselves that so able and learned a man could have supposed it necessary to assert, much less to go into an elaborate argument to prove, so obvious a truism. His labor, on this supposition, at least so far as Catholics are concerned, would have been "much ado about nothing." That the truth is not real as a fact of our life when not believed; that in the act of believing, the creditive subject and credible object are, in some way, brought into direct contact, and the assent in the last instance is immediate; that, in believing, the mind takes hold of the object, appropriates it, is united to it as the true, in like manner as in charity it is united to it as the good; and that, in believing and appropriating it, the mind is active, not passive, are facts that

we have never expressly or by implication denied, or dreamed of denying. Besides, we are unable to reconcile this view of the reviewer's meaning with his theory of development and of history, which is undeniably pantheistic; with his assertion, that faith is the primitive form in which divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men, that the relation between faith and truth is that between form and its contents, and that the truth is no doctrine received by believers, but a fact uttered or expressed by them; with his denial of Christianity as a supernatural revelation of truth, or doctrine, extrinsically propoundable to the mind; or, in fine, with his censure of us for allowing the human mind no activity in elaborating Christianity, in forming what we believe, and in constituting or enacting the law we are to obey. These all imply something more than the simple truism we have pointed out, if the reviewer were, as he is not, a man to deal in mere truisms.

"The theory of Mr. Brownson," he says, "requires us to assume that in the highest form of religion, that which is reached in Christianity, the human mind ceases to be directly active in the accomplishment of that which is *brought to pass in its favor*. . . . . The difficulty is, that no activity is allowed it in the *realization* of Christianity itself." (Jan., 1850, p. 56.) He objects that, according to us, "Christianity is taken to be of force for the world only under an abstract form; an outwardly supernatural revelation, transcending the whole order of our common life, and not needing nor allowing the activity of man himself, as an intelligent and free subject, to be the medium of its presence and power." (*Ibid.*, p. 57.) "Certainly the theory before us is ready to say, the law must be obeyed freely, by the option and choice of the obeying subject; but this requires no *autonomy* of the subject in the *constitution of the law*, no voice in its legislation; all the case demands or allows is, that, on grounds wholly extrinsic to its constitution, the subject be rationally persuaded that obedience is wise and right." (*Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59.) There is here a confusion of thought, a vagueness of expression, that perplexes us; but it is clear, that, whatever be the writer's precise meaning, he certainly means this much, that man ought to have a hand in forming the truth believed, and a voice in constituting the law he is to obey. "Freedom is more, a great deal, than any such outward consent to the authority of law. It is life *in* the law [that is, activity in constituting it], the very form in

which it comes to its revelation in the moral world. Place law as an objective force on the outside of the intelligence and will of those who are to be its subjects, and at once you convert it into an abstract nothing. This is the natural extreme of Romanism." (*Ibid.*) It would seem to be evident enough from this, that the reviewer means literally that the truth as objective must at the same time be subjective in order to be in any sense real, and that, when he says the object without subject is a pure abstraction, he means that it is an abstraction in every sense, not merely an abstraction as to our subjective life. This follows from the two fundamental assumptions on which his whole theory rests, namely, that Christ always affirms or authenticates himself from within, and always under a human form. Thus he says,—"The relation between perception and object is of the most inward and necessary character. It is the relation which holds between contents and form. Faith is the form in which divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men." (May, 1849, p. 208.) Faith is subjective, for the reviewer calls it sometimes an original capacity of our nature, and sometimes "an inward form or habit" of the soul. The contents, without form, are simply the *materia informis* of the schoolmen, mere potential existence; consequently truth becomes *materia formata*, or real existence, only by virtue of the formative power of faith, that is, of the subject. This proves clearly that the reviewer holds the truth, when not believed, when not formed by the human mind, to be in fact a pure abstraction, a simple abstract possibility; for it is the form that gives reality, or renders the possible actual. Consequently, the author's theory must be what we have supposed it, and lead, as we have shown, to nullism. It is the object that gives the form or species, and to contend that it is the subject is simply making man, if creation is supposed, the creator, and God the creature,—that is, man makes God, and not God man!

The reviewer seems to us, not only to confound natural and supernatural, running the one alternately into the other, but to overlook the distinction between first cause and final cause, and to forget that God alone is both first cause and final cause of all things. The universe presents us two cycles,—the one the procession of existences by way of creation, not emanation, from God as first cause; and the other, the return of existences, without absorption in him, to God as their final cause, or ultimate end. God has made all

things for himself; that is, as first cause he makes all things for himself as final cause; that is, again, he makes all things as creator for himself as the *summum bonum*, or sovereign good. In the first cycle, whether in the new creation or the old, the supernatural order or the natural, God alone is active; for he creates all things out of nothing by himself alone, by the sole word of his power, and the assumption of human nature by the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity forms no exception, because the Incarnation is remedial, and the share or merit of the human nature of Christ as an instrument in our redemption is due solely to the *gratia unionis*, or grace of union, as it is called, which is God himself. To claim for man or for any creature any activity, direct or indirect, in this first cycle, either in the procession of nature or in the procession of grace, would be to convert the creature into creator,—if not at once formally to supplant God, at least, to give him a rival, companion, or assistant, which is little better, and in the last analysis comes to the same thing. Hence all creatures owe their entire existence to God, and to God alone; and hence, too, in the new creation, we can do absolutely nothing towards our salvation without divine grace moving and assisting us. The reviewer sins against this truth, when he censures us for excluding human activity from all share in forming, developing, or realizing Christianity as the new creature, and contends that the new creation subsists only in a human form, and has reality only in our intelligence and will.

In the second cycle, or return of existences, God stands as the terminus *ad quem*, as in the first cycle or procession of existences he stands as the terminus *a quo*. Nullity can no more be final cause than it can be first cause, and the creature can no more be or create the one than the other; for the final cause must, logically speaking, precede in the mind of the creator the act of creation. The intellect must present the end before the will can command it, for the will, taken distinctly, is a blind faculty, and cannot act in reference to an end not apprehended, and an end that is not, cannot be apprehended. God is in himself the sovereign good, and therefore eternally the sovereign good in itself; therefore the sovereign good is no creature, no creation; and to suppose it a creature would deny God as creator, by denying to him the sovereign good for which to create. The first cause and the final are then both increate,

eternal, self-subsisting, and self-sufficing. In regard to the production of either, the creature has and can have no activity. The reviewer sins against this undeniable truth, when he censures us for allowing man no autonomy, no right, collectively or individually, to be governed only by his own will, no voice in constituting the law to which he is to be subject. Nothing can be worse than this, for it supposes the law is created, and in part at least by man himself. But this cannot be. The law is not created at all; it is eternal, and, as a rule, has its seat, not in the creative will of God as such, not precisely in God regarded as first cause, but in God as final cause, that is, in God as the sovereign good, and is promulgated and enforced by God as supreme ruler, because he always rules as he creates, in accordance with and for himself as the sovereign good. The law is not only eternal, but immutable, and God himself cannot change it; for he cannot change his own immutable nature which is it. To suppose God creates it, is to suppose that he creates himself; to suppose that man creates it, is to suppose that man creates God; and to assert man's autonomy, or right to be governed only by his own will, is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the sovereign good. Does the reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists? Is he an Antinomian? We cannot believe it. Then God is himself man's law, and then man is morally bound to will what God wills, that is, to love what God loves, that is to say, God himself, as supreme good, and has no right to will or to love as his ultimate end any thing else. How, then, pretend that man is his own legislator, his own lawgiver? As well might you say, man is his own maker, that man is God, nay, that man is God's maker. No laws that are not transcripts of the divine law, the eternal and immutable law, which is God himself, have any of the essential characteristics of law.

It follows from this, that, as God is both our first cause and our final cause, he is also our law, and therefore in regard to our origin, our end, and the law by which we proceed from God, and by which we are to return to him, we have no voice, no will, no activity. All here is either God himself, or the work of his infinite, eternal, and immutable goodness and love. To claim activity in regard to our origin is the fundamental error of Pelagianism,—to claim it

in regard either to our end or to the law is at once Pelagianism and Antinomianism,—and in both cases is to fall into that sin of pride for which the angels lost their first estate, and our first parents were expelled from paradise. The reviewer, we fear, has suffered himself to be seduced by the flattering words of the serpent, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," and, in the unconscious pride of his heart, refuses to obey a law which comes to him from God, or one which he has had no voice in enacting.

This premised, it follows that the activity of the creature, whether we speak of the natural order or the supernatural, is confined to the second cycle of the universe, of the *cosmos*, and all its rightful activity consists in seeking, according to the law, and by the means and conditions imposed, or granted, by the divinity, to return, without absorption in him, to union with God as ultimate end or supreme good. All creatures in their several degrees, and according to their respective natures, tend, mediately or immediately, to this end, the rational immediately, the irrational mediately in the rational, for the irrational is for the rational creation. Hence to man is given full dominion under God over the lower world, and he may lawfully appropriate it to his use. The rational creation is subject in its return to a moral law, and therefore must return voluntarily, from choice, that is, love. Here in this second cycle of creation, its return to God as ultimate end, or supreme good, is the sole sphere of man's activity, and it consists in voluntary obedience to the law of God, in concurring or coöperating with the divine grace moving and assisting him to fulfil it, that is, to return to his union with God as his supreme good, and as the supreme good in itself.

Christianity, in its largest sense, is the entire supernatural order, the supernatural *cosmos*, or new creation, and supposes God as creator and end, therefore the first cause, the final cause, and the law of the Christian. But it presupposes the natural or primitive order, according to the well-known maxim, *gratia præsupponit naturam.* It is not nature, is not necessary to complete nature, as nature, but it is for nature, a new creation in its favor, proceeding from the superintelligible and ineffable love and goodness of God, as infinitely transcending the love and goodness in nature, and therefore apprehensible only as it is supernaturally revealed, and even then only as a mystery, that is, only as truth or reality intrinsically inevident, and only extrinsically evident

to us; that is, again, evident to us only through the medium of God as the intelligible, distinguishable as to us from God as superintelligible, but who in himself is indistinguishably both. Hence the reviewer's objection, that the natural and supernatural, if constituting two distinct spheres, can never coalesce or come to real inward union, unless he understands by union identity, has no foundation, for they are linked together in the unity of God and the simplicity of the divine act regarded in its terminus *a quo*. The natural creation proceeds from the essence of God, for in God there is no distinction between essence and being, but it does not, so to speak, exhaust or reveal that infinite essence. In other words, in the natural order God is not as to his essence evident *per se*, though the fact that he is and creates is thus evident. As the intelligible has its root in the superintelligible, so God can, as superintelligible, extrinsically evidence to it, and through it, what he is as to his infinite essence. The medium is adequate thus far, because, *ex parte Dei*, the intelligible and the superintelligible are identical, and because on our part, in receiving the revelation of God as the intelligible, we receive also the certification of the fact that he is also, as to us, superintelligible, that he must be in his essence infinitely more than appears to us, or that he infinitely surpasses our comprehension, as we assert in asserting, as we do by natural reason, his incomprehensibility. Hence all Christians assert that the possibility of a supernatural revelation, and therefore of a supernatural order or new creation, is provable by the light of nature; that it is possible for God, if he has created such an order, to reveal the fact, and the character, the laws, elements, contents, demands, of that order to us, as an object of faith; and also that it is possible for the revelation to be so accredited as his, that we shall be bound in reason to believe it.

The reviewer, we presume, is not prepared precisely to deny this, for he professes to believe in divine revelation; but he denies that the revelation is any doctrine or report concerning God, holds that God is himself his own revelation, asserts that his revelation is his mere self-exhibition, and that faith is simply the expression by the believer of what is immediately apprehended of him. Hence he denies that the Christian revelation is any thing that can be proposed to the believer. But this, if he examines it, he will see is the denial of divine revelation, and of the new creation itself. He makes, as we have seen, Christ, that is, God

himself, not the author of the new creation, but the new creation itself. This is what we showed in the outset. Consequently, he admits no supernatural *created* order, and hence we have found him resolving the supernatural into the natural. If there is no created supernatural order, then no such order can be revealed, and then no revelation of supernatural truth can be made or propounded for our belief. But Christ is the new creation no more than he is the primitive creation, and if he is declared to be identically the one, then he must be the other, which is pure pantheism, into which we have already seen the reviewer's system logically resolves itself. He starts with a false assumption, that Christ is the new creation, and that the new creation consists precisely in his assumption of human nature. Christ is God, and is the new creation, as he is the old, only *mediante actu creativo*, only in that he creates it; and though it is nothing without him, he is all without it that he is with it. Either there is a new creation or there is not; either there is a supernatural order, or there is not. If there is not, it is idle to talk about Christianity, for its very existence is denied. If there is, although we can know by the revelation of God to us as the intelligible, that is, by the light of natural reason, that a new creation is possible, yet that there is a new creation in fact, and if so, what it is, we can know only as God himself supernaturally informs us. Clearly, then, there are matters—namely, the things hoped for, and the means and conditions of attaining them—distinguishable from God, if we suppose the fact of a new creation, and matters which are not revealed by the simple self-exhibition of God, for God is a free creator, and his act *ad extra* is always a free act, an act of the divine free will, and therefore they are contained in him only as the effect is contained in the cause, not as the consequence is contained in the principle, since this last would make him necessary cause, and thus assert pantheism. He must, in order to reveal them to us, reveal himself, or, in the language preferred by the reviewer, exhibit himself as their first cause and their final cause, which implies a specific or formal revelation of them. If, then, the reviewer does not elect to insist on the pantheism, and therefore the nullism, which he asserts, without being aware, we presume, that he does assert it, and if he does not choose to deny the fact of the Christian order altogether, he must admit the supernatural order as a created order, a new creation, as distinct, as

such, from God as is the natural creation itself: and then he must concede the possibility and need of a supernatural revelation of what it is, and of what God himself is as its first and last cause. Then he must retract his reasoning against us, and concede that Christianity is supernatural truth supernaturally revealed to us, and by its very revelation propounded *ab extra* to us as an object of faith.

But even restricting the new creation, as the reviewer improperly does, to the fact of the incarnation or assumption of our nature by the Word, this conclusion must still be conceded. This fact takes place in time,—is a fact, therefore, distinguishable from God himself; it is also a fact quite out of the order of nature, and therefore in itself above our natural intelligence. That it is a fact can be known to us only as it is supernaturally revealed. The simple exhibition by the Word of himself in the world, is not the authentication of himself as God having assumed human nature, for by simply beholding Jesus, men did not know, and could not know, that he was God, as is evident of itself, and also from the answer of our Lord to Peter. Peter confessed him to be "Christ, the Son of the living God"; and Jesus answered, *Beatus es Simon Bar-Jona: quia caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi, sed Pater meus, qui in cœlis est.* (St. Matt. xvi. 17.) What Peter immediately believed was not that the person before him was Christ the Son of the living God, but God himself revealing and asserting it, and asserting it *ab extra*, too, as distinguished from Peter's own thought and will. Otherwise it would not have been true that flesh and blood did not reveal it to him. Doubtless it was revealed by immediate inspiration, but inspiration is not exspiration,—is a breathing in from without, not a breathing out from within. In no way could Peter, or could any of the disciples, know that Christ was God, the "Word made flesh," but through a supernatural revelation of the fact,—by God himself supernaturally proposing the fact to their minds, and infallibly assuring them that he who thus proposes it is God. If we must say this of those who were inspired to reveal truth, then *a fortiori* of those who were not so inspired.

But passing by those whom our Lord personally instructed through the medium of speech, or whom he chose to instruct by direct and immediate inspiration, what are we to say of those who were to believe in him through *their* word? *Non pro eis autem rogo tantum, sed et pro eis qui credituri*

sunt per verbum eorum in me. (St. John xvii. 20.) How were these to believe Christ through the word of his apostles, if there is no Christian truth to be extrinsically propounded and accredited? Certain it is some have not believed, certain it is that some are not believers, and certain it is, also, that all who are believers have once been unbelievers. Do believers believe nothing? Is there, or is there not, supernatural truth revealed by God, which all are commanded to believe? There must be, according to the reviewer's own doctrine, that the assumption by the Word of our nature is a new, therefore a supernatural, creation. How is this fact to be believed by those who are not believers, if it is not propounded or proposed to them? "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How, then, shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how can they preach unless they be sent?.... Faith, then, cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ,"—*ergo fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi.* (Rom. x. 13–17.) These are St. Paul's words, not ours; and if the reviewer refuses to yield to their authority as divine inspiration, we trust it will not be too much to ask him either to yield to their logic or to refute it.

Indeed, the reviewer is, after all, unable to avoid contradicting himself, and asserting, even while denying, the Christian order as something to be extrinsically propounded for belief. His *Review* itself is established as the organ of the so-called Mercersburg system of theology, and it is certainly intended to propound, propagate, and defend that system,—a system which he, at least, it is fair to suppose, identifies with Christian truth. What is he doing in writing against us, but attempting to prove that our doctrine is not Christian doctrine, and that his is? Are we rash in supposing that he holds that he has a revealed truth of some sort, which we do not accept, but which he wishes to induce us to accept? Or shall we say that he regards the matters involved in the controversy between us, not as revealed truths, but as mere human opinions? We cannot do him the wrong to adopt this latter supposition. He must, then, assume that he has some revealed truth which we have not, and which he is really proposing to us, in an outward way, and thus is doing the very thing which he contends cannot be done.

The reviewer, in fact, asserts, in principle, the very things which, in his reasoning against us, he so severely censures. Discussing the *Rule of Faith* (July, 1849, p. 371), he says,—"Taking these facts together, and summing up their import, we shall find that the Christian religion lays down the combined *testimony* of the Word and the church, past, present, and to come, to all fundamental articles and essential ordinances as the only rule of faith. To these all men are *bound*, on pain of eternal exclusion from all the privileges and blessings of the church, here and hereafter, to yield hearty faith and support; and, with reference to all things not so *defined* by them, all men are left to the upright exercise of their own judgment, enlightened by a faithful use of all the means of knowledge within their reach." We do not accept this as a correct statement of the rule of faith, but it contains every principle objected to in us, and is, if it is any rule at all, as stringent as any thing we have contended for. It is outward, for the Word and the church are external to the believer, and it is authoritative, for it defines what is or is not a fundamental article, or an essential ordinance, and allows private judgment only in the matters not defined. What more does the Catholic contend for?

But, asserting the authority of the church to define what are fundamental articles and essential ordinances, and leaving the individual free only in matters not defined, and binding him even there by the moral law, it is plain the reviewer fails to obtain a solution of the problem with which he starts; that is, to reconcile liberty and authority. Indeed, he seems to be fully aware of this fact. Thus he says.—"To preserve due harmony between freedom and authority is an exceedingly difficult problem in any sphere. But it seems to be more so in the church than in the family and the state. *That She, holy and catholic, is possessed of divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, admits of no question;* that this authority may be grossly abused to the destruction of individual liberty, is also clear. That the individual has rights to be sacredly respected, and may exercise his private judgment in stout resistance to the abuse of power, we are not disposed to deny; but, on the other hand, the lawless setting up of particular private judgment in defiance of the universal church is manifestly schismatic and sectarian." (September, 1849, p. 515.)

It is clear from this, that the reviewer conceives liberty and authority only as opposed one to the other, and, conse-

quently, has not been able to dissolve and recombine them in a new and higher principle. Aside from this, the extract we have just made is something of a curiosity in its way, and has evidently proceeded from a frank, honest-hearted man. The writer asserts not only the authority, but the *divine* authority, of the church, in the strongest and most unqualified terms. "That she, holy and catholic, is possessed of divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, admits of no question." That is positive and universal, and corresponds to what our Lord said,—"He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me." (St. Luke, x. 16.) "That this authority may be grossly abused to the destruction of individual liberty is also clear." But, with the reviewer's leave, that cannot be. The authority is divine, and we do not understand how divine authority, that is, God's authority, can be abused. If, as the reviewer asserts, the Church possesses divine authority, it is God who teaches and commands in and through her. How is it possible, then, for her to abuse her authority? His word is pledged that she shall not abuse it, and can you have a better guaranty than that? Can God's word fail? Can God abuse his authority? To assert that the authority of the Church is divine, is to assert that it cannot be abused by her,—is to offer the highest guaranty the individual can possibly have, that his rights will be sacredly respected; for he has no rights but those which God has given him, and God never contradicts himself. We are vehemently inclined to believe that our rights have far more security in the justice and love of God, than they have, or can have, in our own private judgment; and we do not find it very humiliating to acknowledge that we are far more likely to have the truth when we rely on the judgment of God than when we rely on our own. No; it will not do, after you have conceded that the Church possesses divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, to contend that she can abuse her authority. You must either deny her divine authority, or concede that for her to abuse her authority is impossible.

The objection on which the reviewer seems to place his principal reliance is, that, if we conceive the supernatural as wholly out of the sphere of the natural, no authority can mediate between them, and bring the two into real union. The objection is specious, but will not bear examination;

for it implies that a supernatural revelation of supernatural truth is impossible, which we have already shown is not true, in showing that the intelligible and superintelligible in God are identical, and that, in knowing God as the intelligible, we know, not, indeed, what he is as superintelligible, but that he is superintelligible, that is, infinitely above, in his essence, both our comprehension and our apprehension. That the supernatural cannot be so evidenced to the natural, that the natural shall apprehend or believe it supernaturally, we concede; but that it cannot be so evidenced as to be apprehended, or believed, with what is called human faith, as distinguished from divine faith, we deny, for reasons just assigned. To apprehend the supernatural as supernatural, or to believe it with supernatural faith, *ex parte subjecti*, the subject must, no doubt, be supernaturally elevated by the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, which places the creditive subject, as to the form of his act, on the plane of the credible object. But, if this be so, the reviewer asks, in substance, why faith cannot be elicited without, as well as with, the authority of the Church propounding the object? We answer,—1. Because the act of faith is not elicited or elicitable without the credible object, and the gift of faith does not propose the credible object; it only prepares, by supernaturally elevating it, the natural creditive subject to believe it supernaturally when it is proposed. 2. Because the authority of the Church proposing, though extrinsic in part, to the *material* object of faith, is yet included, integrally, in the credible object, as the *formal* object of faith, and must, therefore, itself be believed in believing it. And, 3. Because *gratia præsupponit naturam*, and though the act of faith demands more than natural reason to be elicited, it yet cannot be elicited without natural reason, and therefore not without such authority as is *in se* satisfactory to natural reason. The will can do nothing in the work of sanctification without grace, and yet grace does nothing without the concurrence of the will; and hence we address to the will the motives naturally fitted to move it. It is the same with reason as intellect. It can do nothing in the order of supernatural faith without the appropriate grace; but as the grace, in turn, does nothing without the intellect, we address to intellect the motives naturally fitted to convince it. Without such motives, motives proper to convince reason as reason, the grace of faith would supersede reason, the super-

natural would dispense with the natural, and faith would be no reasonable act, but mere illuminism or enthusiasm, and piety mere fanaticism. If the reviewer had penetrated a little deeper into the principle of his objection, he would have seen that he was really objecting to our doctrine, not that it does, as he asserts, but that it does not, "supersede the natural order of the world, and contradict it, from age to age, to the end of time."

But the reviewer contends, further, that if we demand for eliciting faith infallible authority, infallibly accredited to reason, we make faith a conclusion of logic, and fall into rationalism. This objection seems to us to be urged without due consideration. Rationalism is not the assertion of the legitimacy or sufficiency of reason in its proper sphere, but the assertion of the sufficiency of reason in all spheres, and the denial of the necessity and the fact of grace. Rationalism is developed Pelagianism. We do not assert it, for we deny the sufficiency of reason without grace, and acknowledge its sufficiency only when it acts from grace, and in concurrence with it. To call this rationalism or Pelagianism is to fall into the opposite heresy of Calvinism, which denies all exercise of reason, and loses the natural, as Pelagianism loses the supernatural; or which, in losing the natural, loses also the supernatural,—decidedly the more destructive heresy of the two. The only way of avoiding both extremes, and of reconciling faith and reason, authority and liberty, is to accept the maxim of our theologians, that grace presupposes nature, and therefore, in effecting our faith and sanctity, while reason does, and can do, nothing without grace moving, elevating, and assisting it, grace itself does nothing, save in concurrence with reason, that is, reason as both intellect and will. It is singular enough that the reviewer should object in us to the very principle he himself needs, is striving after, and actually condemns us for *not* holding!

If the reviewer clearly apprehended the principle expressed in the maxim, Grace presupposes nature, of which he catches now and then a faint glimmer through the darkness of his Calvinistic mysticism, and which, not understanding much of Catholic theology, he supposes we deny, he would see that the problem, which he contends needs a higher than the Catholic principle for its solution, is solved by this very Catholic principle itself, and can be effectually solved only in the Catholic church, for she alone, at the same time that

she is the medium of the grace, presents the motives of credibility satisfactory to reason. Out of the church you can have only reason without faith, or faith without reason. Thus the whole Protestant world alternates eternally, as every one knows, between Pelagianism and Calvinism, rationalism and illuminism, fanaticism and impiety, despotism and licentiousness. The reviewer, in principle does the same. When he objects that we, in placing the supernatural above the sphere of natural reason, deny natural reason itself and wrong the individual mind, and when, in opposition, he asserts faith as a natural capacity, and that we are naturally able to apprehend immediately the supernatural, he assumes and maintains the radical principle of rationalism, or Pelagianism. When, on the other hand, he objects that faith in the supernatural, elicited on a supernatural authority, accredited by motives satisfactory or convincing to natural reason, divine grace moving and assisting the reason to elicit it, is rationalism, he asserts the radical principle of Calvinistic illuminism, or, as it is now called, *Evangelicalism*, and on the Continent of Europe, ordinarily, Methodism ; and, to be consistent, he must assert irresistible grace, and, if he does not choose to be a Universalist, particular unconditional election and reprobation,—mere vulgar Calvinism, which, as the reviewer must be aware, is the denial of the natural, of reason and will, and the assertion of man's absolute passivity in conversion and sanctification ; thus making justification purely forensic, and giving the one justified a *carte blanche* to live as he lists after justification, with absolute impunity. Here are the two extremes, Calvinism and rationalism, not rationalism and Catholicity, as the reviewer erroneously alleges, for Catholicity saves both terms, the natural and the supernatural, by the principle, *gratia præsupponit naturam.*

The reviewer, notwithstanding the many grievous errors which flow logically from his principles, has done well in protesting against sham, and in demanding reality. He also has really some dim and indistinct view of the principle he needs in order to solve his problem ; but he misapprehends that principle, as we ourselves did before knowing Catholic theology. He seeks this principle in the mystery of the Incarnation. Unquestionably, the Incarnation has given to the world the principle of a higher life than the life of the natural order, whether sensible or intelligible ; but it has not, properly speaking, inserted a new principle into the consti-

tution of human nature as such. The reviewer misapprehends this sacred mystery. It was not the introduction into human nature of any principle that it had not from the first. The "Word was made flesh," not in the sense that God was converted into man, or that man assumed God, but in the sense that the divine nature assumed the human. Strictly speaking, God did *not* enter into human nature in a new sense, or in any sense in which he was not always in it; he simply took human nature up to himself; but they remained each *secundum rationem suam* as distinct after the assumption as they were before. There was in the Incarnation no conversion or transformation of nature, whether human or divine; there was no intermingling or confusion of the two natures; for there remained and remain for ever in Christ two distinct natures, two natural operations, and two natural wills in one person. To deny this, is to fall into the Eutychian and monothelite heresies, which the reviewer's school, both at home and abroad, we are sorry to add, seem to us strongly inclined to revive. Indeed, these heresies underlie not a few of the errors of our age.

It is also a great mistake to suppose, as the reviewer does, that our Lord came to complete the natural, or as the complement of human nature in its own order; for the human nature our Lord assumed was not incomplete; it was perfect human nature, since he is perfect God and perfect man, and the human nature he assumed was man's nature as it was before as well as since, the Incarnation. He came not as the complement of the natural as natural, otherwise the Christian order would not be an order of grace, or a new creation; but he came as the complement of the supernatural, to complete the order of grace, instituted as early as man's fall,—to consummate the realities promised to our first parents and to the patriarchs, and which were prefigured in the institutions of the old law, so that life might be had, and had more abundantly; that is, he came to make real the life hitherto held only by promise, and to render grace more easy and abundant. That grace is more abundant, and its means facilitated and multiplied, under the new law is most true; but this does not imply the creation of a new principle in our nature, for the *ens supernaturale* is given us only *in patria*, and grace remains always a *habitus*, or an *auxilium*, enabling us to do what without it we could not do, but continuing always distinguishable from our nature, changing the form of its activity, indeed, but never transforming the

nature itself; for it may be resisted by the will and wholly lost, and our nature remain physically what it was before. The inamissibility of grace is a heresy; but if grace transformed our nature it would be inamissible, without the destruction of our nature itself. As in the Incarnation there is no conversion, mixture, or confusion of the two natures, so is there no intermingling or interfusion of nature and grace, in such sense as to form a new nature; and hence what we do in grace, it is not we that do, but the grace that is in us; and therefore it is that our acts performed from grace, by its aid, and in concurrence with it, are estimated, not by the nature which is assisted, but by the grace that assists, and rewarded accordingly, for, in rewarding us, as St. Augustine says, God simply crowns his own gifts. Overlooking this fact, the reviewer loses his new principle by converting it into a natural principle, and regarding it, not as a supernatural habit or aid, but as a mere completion of the original sketch or design of man's natural constitution.

The reviewer also misconceives the real character of our Lord's intimate presence and immanence in the new creation. Certainly, the Christian, as such, is inseparable from Christ, and we most firmly hold, as Catholic doctrine, that Christ must be in us as well as out of us; for we can do nothing, absolutely nothing, without him, as he himself says, "Without mē, ye can do nothing." But Christ is both the first cause and the final cause of the new creation. As first cause he is in us, creating in us the power to believe and love him as final cause, or to believe what he teaches and to do what he commands, and to believe and do it for his sake. It is the same Christ who is in us that is out of us, and before us; but the same Christ in diverse respects, as God as Creator of the universe is considered in a diverse respect from God as its final cause, or the end for which he creates it. In the former, he is the first cause of all things; in the latter, he is the final cause, or end, of all things. The distinction is valid *quoad nos*, for to us there is necessarily a distinction between God as loving, and God as the object he loves. Christ as final cause, or end, is before us, not as an end gained, but as an end to be gained; and as first cause he is in us, moving us to him as before us, and assisting us to reach him. Thus it is not only he whom we believe, but it is he by whom and for whom we believe. Thus the act of faith is defined to be *credere Deo*, *credere Deum*, *credere in Deum*.

In charity, it is Christ by whom we love, whom we love, and for whom we love. All this we certainly hold, and have clearly expressed or implied, whenever we have had any occasion to touch the subject, and if the reviewer means this, and only this, he has unwittingly opposed to us our own doctrine.

But this is not the doctrine the reviewer advances, although it is undoubtedly the truth he is striving after, and of which he catches, now and then, a dim and confused view. He evidently gives the Incarnation a pantheistic interpretation, and none of his objections to us are pertinent, if he simply understands our Lord to be in us, but distinct from us,—in us, not as a new principle in our natural constitution, but simply by his gracious operations. He is present in every Christian, personally present, present and immanent in his substance, in his divine essence, but only as he is present and immanent in the natural order, that is, *mediante* his creative act. His presence and immanence in human nature, in any stricter sense, implies an identity of the human and divine, which cannot for a moment be conceded in the supernatural any more than in the natural order. We are *united* to him as first cause of grace in us, and through grace, as its final cause; but we are not made one with him in the sense of identity with him, nor are we *deified*. As led by the Holy Ghost, we are truly sons of God, but sons by adoption, not natural sons of God, as is Christ our Lord, who is not only the first, but the *only*, begotten Son of God.

The reviewer's theory of history has so often been discussed in our pages, that we have no occasion to discuss it again, and as applicable to Christian doctrine, we disposed of it in our reviews of Mr. Newman's Essay, and replies to *The Dublin Review*. The theory, even as contained in Mr. Newman's Essay, is pantheistic, and flows from the assumption that man co-operates with God in the work of creation, or rather, that creation itself is an emanation of God, a development, evolution, or realization of God. We cannot concede this, nor are we prepared to pronounce all history sacred and divine. We do not believe in the modern historical optimism, whether propounded in the dry abstractions of Hegel, or the brilliant eloquence of Cousin and our friend the reviewer. We believe there is sin in the world, and that history records crimes, events which have not been approved by God, and which are no indications of what he wills men should believe and do. We shall not do

truth or common sense the gross dishonor of supposing it necessary to prove this. The reviewer thinks that we are very unhistorical, and ridiculous even, in not seeing the hand of God in Protestantism, and in venturing to regard it as the work of the devil. "Unless we choose," he says, "to give up all faith in history as the revelation of God's mind and will, we must bow before this great fact of three hundred years with earnest reverence, and admit that it has a meaning for the kingdom of God in some way worthy of its vast proportions." (Jan. 1850, p. 44.) That God will overrule the Protestant movement for good and cause it to redound to the glory of his Spouse, the *Roman* Catholic church, whom he loves, and whom he has purchased with his own blood, we do not doubt; but that Protestantism has any thing good in itself, even the reviewer cannot seriously expect us to believe, for he immediately adds,—"Suppose the worst even, in the case, that Protestantism is destined to prove a failure, still it would be in the highest degree unphilosophical and irrational to deny its significance, at least in this point of view, as the medium of transition for the Church to a better and brighter state, that could not have been reached without such a period of inward contradiction going before." A sensible man, having much inward respect for Protestantism, would hardly allow us to make a supposition so much to its discredit. Are the works of God destined to prove failures? And are we to suppose that God's church needs mending, or that, if it does, he cannot mend it without taking it to pieces, and leaving the whole world for three hundred years and more without any church, without any religion, without law or order, without faith, without hope, without charity, to worry and devour one another as dogs,—to live like swine, and die like beasts? How know we that God did not make his church perfect at first? Certainly, if the principles we have established in the course of this article deserve any consideration, man is no church-builder, or church-reformer, and his proper sphere of activity lies in believing what God's church teaches, and in doing what she commands, and the only development that can be asserted is growth in the understanding and appropriation of the truth, and in the practice of Christian perfection, by single minds and wills, or individual believers. It is ours to perfect ourselves by the church, not to perfect her by us.

Then, as to the magnitude of Protestantism, we are not

much impressed by it. We have had too near a view of it for it to loom up very large in our eyes. It is far inferior in the magnitude of its results to the sin of our first parents; it is not so great an event as the lapse of nearly the whole ancient world into idolatry; it is not greater than Brahminism, than Buddhism, or than Arianism, and it dwindles into insignificance before Mahometanism,—all manifestly of the devil. Why, then, not Protestantism also? Wherefore pronounce them the work of the devil, and it, on account of its magnitude alone, the work of God? Protestantism is nothing but what it is in individual minds and hearts, and we see nothing unphilosophical or irrational, taking into the account the depravity of human nature, or men's proneness to evil, in supposing that so considerable a number of persons as there are Protestants should fall into error and sin, leave God to follow their own foolish pride, vicious appetites and propensities, corrupt passions and sentiments. Its influence on modern civilization has not been such as to command our respect. It has everywhere been deleterious, tending to draw off the mind and heart from God, to fix the affections on the low and transitory, the material and the sensual, to corrupt morals, to dry up the springs of spiritual life, and to prepare the way for the return to barbarism. Whatever advance modern civilization has made, has been made in spite of it, by virtue of principles and influences drawn from Catholicity. Indeed, the most severe condemnation of Protestantism is to assert the necessity of divinizing all history in order to be able to divinize it, or to take it out of the category of the works of our great Enemy.

There are some other points of minor importance, as made by the reviewer, on which we would comment if our space permitted, and we were not already fatigued; but we have said enough, if it is understood, to prove that the reviewer has not made out his case, has not established a theory that meets the difficulties he acknowledges; and we are therefore entitled to conclude our church against him. In what we have said, we have aimed to treat him with respect, and we certainly do respect him as a man, a scholar, and a writer. He is nearer the truth in his spirit than in his words; he has generous impulses towards something better than vulgar Protestantism, and we trust in God that he will persevere till he finds it. If what we have said, although strongly put, more strongly than may be pleasing to him, enables him to understand better his own doctrine

in its relation to ours, and to form a more correct judgment of Catholic theology, we shall have done him and many others no mean service. At any rate, if he choose to rejoin, he will hardly fail to see the points he must make and defend, what he must prove and disprove, in order to feel that he can have any hope of salvation, without abandoning his theory, not for another of man's concoction, but for the glorious old Catholic church, which, though assailed continually by the folly of men and the rage of devils, stands firm as ever upon the Rock on which her Lord has founded her.

ARTICLE II.

In his number for May, the Mercersburg reviewer attempts to defend his doctrine from the charges we preferred against it in our *Review* for April last. He asserts that the pantheistic consequences we drew from his premises are not warranted, and repeats his main objection to what he improperly, and in very bad taste, terms *Romanism*, that is, Catholicity.

We expected as much; for we did not flatter ourselves that he would at once submit to the church, and we did not doubt his sincere intention to be a Christian, which, of course, he could not be, if his doctrine involved the consequences we alleged. But the simple denial of those consequences is not enough; he must show that he can so interpret his doctrine as to escape them, and that, when he so interprets it, he is able to distinguish it from, and oppose it to, Catholic faith and theology. He himself, in his January number, reduced the whole controversy between the church and all classes of her opponents to the question between her and his specific form of Protestantism, and virtually conceded, that, if his specific form of Protestantism is untenable, her claims as the infallible church of God, out of which there is no salvation, must be admitted. Since the presumption is always in favor of the church, as prior occupant, his business was to prove his doctrine, and to prove it, not only in so far as coincident with hers, but in so far as distinguished from and opposed to hers. If he has not done this, he has done nothing to his purpose, and we are free, by his own concession, to conclude the church against him.

In our reply to the reviewer, as our readers will remember, we analyzed his doctrine, and found that it teaches,

among other things,—1. The supernatural object of faith is in the subject, not out of it; 2. The supernatural does not *wholly* transcend the natural; and, 3. Faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. If he holds these principles, we contended,—1. He necessarily denies the object of faith, for whatever is in the subject, not out of it, is subject, not object, and therefore he denies faith itself; for where there is no object to be believed, there can be no act of believing. 2. He denies the proper supernatural, and therefore Christianity as a supernatural revelation, and then Christianity itself; for it is a contradiction in terms to call that supernatural which does not wholly transcend the sphere of the natural. And 3. He denies faith itself, again, by confounding faith with science; for the immediate apprehension of the truth of the object or intrinsic truth of a proposition is knowledge, not faith. The three principles, or rather the first two, for he is silent as to the last, the reviewer reaffirms in his answer; but he denies the consequences we drew from them. He might, as it seems to us, just as well deny that two and two are four.

The reasoning by which the reviewer attempts to escape these fatal consequences is to us not very clear, or easy to comprehend. The author has apparently a great aversion to clear, distinct, and definite statements, and follows a species of logic which is more convenient than conclusive, and which allows him to conclude any proposition he chooses, if he only contrives to assert somewhere, on some subject, something which is not false. But we shall do our best to understand him, and to reply fairly and pertinently to his real thought.

The first charge against the reviewer is, that, by placing the object in the subject, and denying it to be real, save as concreted "in the thinking and willing of single minds," as he expresses himself, he denies the object itself, because if in the subject, it is not object at all. To this he replies, "We still say, however, that there is no truth or law *in the world of mind* under a purely objective form." (May, 1850, p. 317.) *In the world of mind*, that is, in private thought and will, as existing in them, agreed; but that is a mere truism, and not the question. The question is, Do you, or do you not, admit any purely objective reality, any object really existing, *a parte rei*, independent of *our* thinking and willing? "Intelligence and will are needed to make room for such existence,

and to bring it actually to pass." (*Ibid.*) Room for its existence "in the world of mind," that is, in intelligence and will, certainly; for that is a truism again, but not *ad rem*. Are human intelligence and will needed to make room for the existence of truth, as reality, as something existing *in re?* "Truth exists, as truth, only by being known. Blot out all knowledge, all consciousness, all thought, and you blot out all truth at the same time. Intelligence is the light in which it reveals itself, the very form in which it becomes *real*." (*Ibid.*) Real as a fact of intelligence? Agreed, again; but that is not to the purpose, and is also a mere truism, for it is only saying that what is not known is not known. But does truth as an objective reality exist only by being known, or has it no existence *a parte rei*, till it is a fact of human intelligence? Your meaning, if meaning you have, or if you are saying any thing to the purpose, is, that it does not so exist. Then you concede that you hold the principle, that the object is in the subject, not out of it; therefore is subject, not object, as we have alleged. Pray, tell us, then, if truth is unreal, a pure abstraction, while unknown, how it can be an object of knowledge at all, or how there can be an act of knowledge where there is no cognizable or intelligible object; that is, how there can be any truth at all.

"God is at once object and subject, in the most universal sense. He is the absolute union of both." (p. 318.) You must mean by this either that God is at once the *human* subject—the only subject in question—and its object; or that he is, in regard to himself, at once subject and object, that is, the adequate object of his own intellect. If you mean the former, you are a pantheist; if the latter, it is true, but not to the purpose. By subject in this controversy, the reviewer very well knows, unless he is wholly ignorant of modern philosophy, is meant the human soul, the thinking and willing subject we ourselves are, and by object, that which is distinguished from it. Subject and object in God are identical, for he is *actus purissimus*, most pure act. But because they are identical in him, do you say therefore they are identical in us? Whence does this follow? Are we God, and like him the adequate object of our own intellect? "And so, then, in the constitution of the universe under God, object and subject can never fall absolutely asunder, but are required always to go together as joint factors in the determination of all proper *reality* in the world." (*Ibid.*)

If this is at all to the purpose, it asserts that, in like manner as subject and object are one in God, so are they in us. This confirms our assertion that the reviewer places the object in the subject, or identifies them. But if so, then we are God, and the reviewer unwittingly reasserts the very autotheism he disclaims,—evident also from the further fact that he makes all the "proper reality in the world" the result of the joint operations of subject and object. But here is another difficulty. Reality is the result of their action as joint factors. Then they, regarded in themselves, are not real; then they are mere abstractions, mere possibilities; then they are incapable of action, and nothing can result from them; then there can be no reality, and nullism, which we before charged upon the reviewer's doctrine, follows as a necessary consequence. Will the reviewer explain to us how his reasoning obviates the consequences we have before drawn from his premises?

But the reviewer adds, that he does not mean to understand his doctrine in such sense as to subordinate truth and law to the power of individual thought and will, as though truth and law might be considered the product of men themselves. Pray, then, what is the meaning of all you have been saying, and of your objection to us, that we place the object out of the subject, and hold it to be independent of us? "Men make neither truth nor law." Indeed! And yet you accuse us of heresy, because we hold truth exists *a parte rei*, and is proposed objectively to our apprehension, and because we do not recognize man's autonomy in constituting the law which he is morally bound to obey! Have you not said that "truth exists, as truth," that is, as a reality, "only by being known"? Have you not said that "the law is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects,"—that "mind thus by its very constitution is required to be *autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of the law itself*,"—and that "only as the law is willed, freely embraced, affirmed, constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, *so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act* virtually and deed, can there be any . . . . . morality or religion"? (p. 316.) Here is what you say, and nothing you say inconsist nt with this can be entertained. If you choose to contradict yourself, that is not our business.

"Men," says the reviewer, "make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute *necessity* beyond their will, and

underlie the very order from which they spring. But still truth and law *actualize* themselves in the world, become concrete, and thus *real* for men, only as they are incorporated with their life and pass over in this way from a purely objective character to a character which is at the same time subjective and individual." (*Ibid.*) Concede all this, which is no more than every autotheist or pantheist says, it amounts to nothing. The reviewer supposes it is possible to assert an objective world independent of our thinking and willing, and yet to maintain that this objective world, considered apart from our thinking and willing, is only a pure abstraction, and is real only as we think and will it, or, what is the same thing, as it is concreted "in the thinking and willing of single minds." But such an objective world is no real world at all,—has no existence *a parte rei*, and is at best only a mode or affection of the subject; for we never cease to repeat to him,—and we wish we could induce him to take notice of what we say,—that a pure abstraction is a sheer nullity. The reviewer is misled by his German metaphysics, which teach him that the form of the object in both the intellectual world and the moral is supplied by the subject. He understands well enough, what we were not aware any body denied, that, in order to a fact of human life, subject and object must in some way come together,—that there must be a real mediation between them; but he supposes—and here is his primal error—that the mediation must come from the side of the subject, and not from the side of the object, and hence he concludes, that, if the object be conceived as out of the subject and independent of it, existing really, or *a parte rei*, there can be no real mediation between them,—that they can never come really together; for the subject obviously can never go out of itself. But to assume either that the form of the object is supplied by the subject, or that it is the subject that mediates between the subject and object, is the denial of all reality out of the subject, or distinguishable from it, and the assertion of pure autotheism, pantheism, or nullism, whichever term you choose. The true solution of the difficulty is not to be found in Cartesianism or Kantism, either as modified, on the one hand, by Fichte, or, on the other, by Schelling and Hegel. The form of the object is itself objective, and the principle that mediates between subject and object is not the intelligence of the subject, but the intelligibility of the object. We see intellectually the object, because it is *a*

parte rei, and because it is intelligible, not *by* us, but *to* us. Let the reviewer understand this, and he will be surprised at the doctrine he has been contending for.

But we have not done with this part of the subject yet. From the reviewer's doctrine with regard to subject and object we drew the inference that his general doctrine is pantheistic. We never supposed for a moment that he regarded himself as a pantheist, but we felt certain that his whole scheme was pantheistic at bottom, as is all modern German thought, no matter of what philosophical or Protestant school. The reviewer says he is no pantheist, and formally disavows the pantheistic consequences we charged upon him. This is all very well, but pantheism seems to us to lurk in the very phraseology in which he disavows it. Thus, in a passage we have just quoted:—"Men make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute *necessity* beyond their will, and *underlie* the whole order of existence from which they spring." Here the assertion is not that these have a real existence beyond the human will, but simply a *necessity*. This *necessity* of truth and law is perhaps extra-human, but the truth and law themselves are not; for we are told immediately that "they actualize themselves in the world, become concrete, and thus real for men," only as they become "subjective and individual." They actualize themselves, and become real. This can only mean that the necessity develops or pushes itself out in individual thinking and willing as truth and law, which is a purely pantheistic conception, or, if you please, atheistic, resolving God into necessity, and making him operate, not as free will, but as necessary law or force.

We are aware that the reviewer denies this, and asserts that God is distinct from the world, and its free cause; but every pantheist says as much, and the reviewer's conception of freedom is the Calvinistic conception,—what he calls "free necessity,"—that is to say, no proper freedom at all. The freedom with which God causes creation is only the freedom with which he causes his own being. "God," he says (p. 314), "is the free cause of his own being; and much more then of all his works." The *a fortiori* is inadmissible, unless there is a parity between the sense in which God is the free cause of his own being, and that in which he is the free cause of his works. He is the free cause, or the cause at all, of his own being, only in the sense that he depends for his being on nothing beyond himself, exterior to, or

distinguishable from himself, and therefore is the free cause of the universe only in the sense that nothing distinguishable from himself impels, compels, or moves him to produce it. But as in reality he is not the cause of his own being, since he is necessary being, and therefore uncaused, so the universe is uncaused, and springs forth necessarily from the inherent necessity of the divine nature, which we need not tell the reviewer is pure Spinozism.

The reviewer tells us he is no pantheist, but to prove that his doctrine in pantheistic, or worse, we need only examine "the dualism or abstract deism" which he condemns as the error immediately opposed to the error of pantheism. The essence of pantheism is in the denial of the contingency of the universe, or its proper creation, and in the assertion of the substantial identity of God and the world. The error opposed to the error of pantheism, says the reviewer, is abstract deism. Well, what, according to him, is this abstract deism?

"Abstract deism," he says, "as distinguished from the true *theism* of Christianity, it is hardly necessary to say, is not in and of itself an exclusion absolutely of God from the world. It prides itself rather in being an acknowledgment of God, under the character of the great first cause and end of all things. In this view, however, he is taken to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life. His relation to the world is that of a mechanician to a machine. It is the product of his mind and hand; it works according to his will; it goes forward under the superintendence of his eye; while he remains himself, whether near at hand or afar off, wholly on the outside of it, abstract and independent altogether as another order of being."—p. 311.

Now let us examine this, and see what he must maintain who denies it. It takes God "to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life." But do you deny that God is out of the world, beyond, over, and above it? Then you deny the extra-mundane divinity, which is itself pantheism, if not atheism; and how, if not out, beyond, over, and above the world, do you distinguish him, as to his substance, from the world? "In no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life." You cannot say this, because you have begun by conceding that abstract deism does not assert the absolute exclusion of God from the world; then it can hold, and does hold, him to be in some sense immanent in it. "It is the product of his mind and hand." Do you

deny this? Then you deny creation. "It works according to his will." Deny this, and you deny that God is the supreme governor of the universe. "It goes forward under the superintendence of his eye." Do you maintain that it is not so? Then you reject divine providence. "While he remains himself wholly on the outside of it." This is ambiguous, and may mean *outside* under the relation of space, or *outside* in the sense of *distinction from*. In the former sense, the assertion is gratuitous; no theologian holds God to be outside of the world in that sense, for every one holds that he dwells, not in space, but in immensity. Do you deny that he is outside of the world in the second sense, *outside* inasmuch as he is distinguished from it? Then you identify him with it. "Abstract and independent altogether." *Abstract* we will pass over, for none but men of the author's school hold God, as distinguished from the world, as a pure abstraction. Do you deny, then, that God is "independent altogether" of the world? If you do, you make him dependent on it, and deny his independent existence, and therefore deny him to be God. "As another order of being." God is increate, and the world is created; he is necessary, and it is contingent. Do not necessary and contingent, increate and created, constitute two orders? Do they not belong to two distinct categories? Deny it, assert that God and the world belong to the same category, to the same order, and you identify them, and make a formal confession of pantheism. Now, supposing the reviewer to write with any definite notions of what he writes, he does make all the denials we here enumerate, and then, unless we assume that of contraries both may be true, he undeniably maintains atheistic, pantheistic, and nullistic doctrines, whether he knows it or not.

We accused the reviewer of giving a pantheistic interpretation to the mystery of the Holy Incarnation. In reference to this he says,—"Christ, we are told, is the author of the new creation, but no part of it in his own person; just as he is the old creation, only *mediante actu creativo*, by the act of creating it, [we said, *in* that he creates it,] and in no more intimate way. To make him the real fountain of Christianity itself, is gravely represented as a full identification of his life with that of his people, and runs, we are told, into palpable pantheism." (p. 309.) The reviewer disdains minute accuracy, and takes the liberty to reproduce our statements, not as we made them, but as best suits his own

convenience. We admit that, in one sense, Christ is identically Christianity; but not when Christianity is taken as the new *creation*, or *created* supernatural order. Christ is then it only *mediante* his creative act. What we objected to was the assertion, that Christ not merely begets or creates the Christian life in his people, but is identically the substance of that life itself. It was the assumption of this identity of substance that we pronounced pantheistic, and that assumption the reviewer continues to make. He considers it ridiculous to assert that Christ is in his own *person* no part of the new *creation*, and its fountain in no more intimate sense than that of being its creator. His intimate and immanent presence in—not *by*—his creative act is not enough to satisfy our Mercersburg doctor. But, from the very nature of things, Christ cannot be the fountain of the new life of his people in a more intimate sense, without being identically it, and in his substance identified with their substance. In the first place, how can Christ in his own *person*, which is wholly divine, be any part of the new *creation?* Is the *person* of Christ created? Is the reviewer not only a Eutychian, as we before proved him, but also a Nestorian? In the second place, how can the Christian life be called a new *creation*, if it is the very substance of the life of Christ's *person*, which is God? And if it is the very substance of that life, how can the author deny that in the supernatural order he maintains pantheism? or, if he maintains pantheism in the supernatural, how can he deny that he also maintains it in the natural?

The reviewer replies, "We carefully distinguish Christ from his church." Very true, as the fountain from the stream, not as the cause from the effect. "Yet we hold them to be in a deep sense one, even as the head and members are indissolubly joined together in the living constitution of one body." (p. 310.) But you hold this oneness to be, not mystical, as we ourselves hold it, but substantial, physical,—a oneness in substance, as the substance of the stream is one with the substance of the fountain from which it emanates, or "flows forth." "The position of Christ is absolute and central, while that of his people is relative and peripheral." (*Ibid.*) This does not relieve the reviewer. *Absolute* and *relative* mean, in modern philosophy, being and phenomenon, substance and accident, and are the very terms used by pantheists to express their conception of the relation between the external world and its internal origin.

The very fact, that he uses these terms in the connection he does, is presumptive proof that his thought is pantheistic. "The position of Christ is central; that of his people peripheral." This does not help the matter. The periphery is simply the external termini of the rays which emanate from the centre, which implies that the Christian life is not a creation by our Lord, but an emanation from him, in the Oriental sense of emanation. Then, again, in the circle, centre and circumference are mutually dependent, and the one is inconceivable without the other; and to suppose God in any order to be dependent on creation, or in any sense to come within the category of relation, is, if not atheism, at least pantheism. It is, of course, not easy to determine the reviewer's exact meaning, for he gives us figures of speech instead of scientific statements, and descriptions instead of definitions; but, as far as we can determine his doctrine, it is virtually the old Oriental doctrine of emanation from, and of final absorption into, God. If so, our first charge against his doctrine, that it converts the object into subject, and denies all faith by denying all object of faith, is, of course, well founded.

The second principle we found the reviewer to hold, namely, the supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural, he concedes and defends. The simplest way of doing him justice is to cite what he says, and we are happy to acknowledge that what he says on this point is for the most part intelligible and *ad rem*.

"We have never meant to deny the supernatural; nor yet to make it the same thing simply with the supersensible, the world of pure thought as distinguished from the world of sense. Our objection to Mr. Brownson is, not that he sets the supernatural out of nature, over it, and above it, but that this *transcendence*, in his hands, is carried to the point of such an absolute disruption of the one world from the other as amounts at last to downright dualism, and leaves no room for the accomplishment of any real conjunction between them in the life of man; which, however, at the same time is the necessary conception of all religion, and the very form especially in which the idea of Christianity becomes complete. We see not how such a real conjunction should imply any thing like a full sufficiency on the side of nature, left to itself for the actualization of the supernatural as its own product; but it does seem to us certainly to require a constitutional fitness and capability on the part of the first, for apprehending with some inward connatural grasp, the presence of this last when brought within its reach. We question not the full objectivity of the supernatural, as an order of life above nature; only we ask that a corresponding subjectivity be allowed also on the part of man,

whereby he may be able to receive the object which is thus higher than himself into true union with his life, so as to be lifted by the power of it, not magically but rationally, into its own superior sphere. Such directly receptive capacity we take to be inherently at hand in the gift or faculty of faith. Faith carries in it a real, inward, living, and rational correspondence with the truth it is called to embrace; and in this view it belongs to the proper, original nature of man, though a divine influence is needed certainly to bring it into exercise. Such drawing out of the subjective capacity of our nature, however, by no means implies that the truth itself is drawn out in this way; just as little as the awakening of sight in a previously blind eye would imply, that the surrounding world was brought to pass by its becoming thus an object of vision. What else does our Saviour mean when he says, No man can come to me, except the Father *draw* him; He that is of God, heareth God's words; If any man will do my will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God? For the reception of Christ, all depends on a certain inward sympathy and correspondence with the truth revealed in his person, a real receptivity for the supernatural on the side of the human soul itself, such as all men ought to have, but only some men have in fact."—pp. 322, 323.

We say this is for the most part *ad rem;* we speak relatively, and only mean that it is so in comparison with the reviewer's statements in general. He evidently does not comprehend the precise point of the objection we urged. It is, however, clear that he holds that the supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural, and therefore, that, though it is doubtless contrary to his intention, he really denies the supernatural; for whatever lies within the sphere or reach of the natural, no matter on what side or under what relation, is natural, not supernatural. The conjunction of subject and object, or correspondence between them, contended for, must, of course, take place, or the creditive subject and credible object must remain always apart, and no act of faith be ever elicited. The reviewer is right in asserting the necessity of the conjunction, or correspondence; his error lies in supposing that the conjunction is that of the natural subject and the supernatural object. No such conjunction or correspondence of the natural and supernatural is conceivable. The reviewer is right, too, in assuming that this conjunction or correspondence is by virtue of the gift or faculty of faith; his error is in maintaining that this gift or faculty is natural, belonging "to the proper, original nature of man," and needing only a divine influence to call it into exercise, simply drawing out "an original capacity of our

nature." For the conjunction or correspondence to take place, subject and object must be in the same order, and therefore the subject on its side must be *supernaturalized*, elevated to the plane of the supernatural. What thus elevates the subject is the *donum fidei*, or *gift* of faith, which is not an original capacity, or faculty, of our nature, but a supernatural gift, a supernaturally infused habit, as all Catholic theology teaches, and as we thought we had sufficiently explained in our previous answer to the reviewer. The reviewer has fallen into his fatal error, an error which involves the denial of the supernatural altogether, in consequence of the Protestant denial of supernaturally infused habits. All heresy is illogical, and inconsistent with itself. In consequence of rejecting, or not recognizing, the infused habit of faith, which is the supernatural elevation of the creditive subject to the level of the supernatural credible object, he is obliged to restrict the supernatural to the credible object and the divine influence which simply excites the natural subject to activity, without elevating that activity above the order of nature; and so restricting the supernatural, he is obliged either to bring it within the sphere of the natural, which is to deny it to be supernatural, or else to keep it always beyond the reach of the subject, and thus incur the very objection he strangely enough imagines must lie against us. The reviewer should learn from this how dangerous it is to reject or misconceive any Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine is a unity, and you must either accept the whole or reject the whole.

The reviewer passes over in profound silence the third principle we represented him as holding, and the objection we drew from it, namely, faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed; therefore, faith is science, and mysteries are incredible. Consequently he leaves us free to conclude that he concedes both, since he says nothing in his answer which in any respect indicates or implies the contrary. We, then, rightly apprehended the reviewer's doctrine on these three points, and he has failed to set aside the consequences we drew from them. Then his doctrine is antichristian and false, and by his own concession our church is true,—the church of God.

Here we might stop, but there are two or three other points on which we wish to offer a few remarks, more for the reviewer's sake than our own. The reviewer is an able and learned man, an earnest, vigorous, and eloquent writer.

He has caught some glimpses of certain important Catholic truths, not much regarded by Protestants generally, and which he wields with murderous effect against vulgar Protestantism. But he only partially apprehends these great truths, and he combines them in his own mind with principles utterly repugnant to them, and which, taken by themselves, involve all the fatal consequences we have pointed out. But, unless we have entirely mistaken the character of his mind and heart, his real intellectual and moral wants would be much better satisfied by the Catholic doctrine on the points covered by the uncatholic principles, than by these uncatholic principles themselves. It seems to us that he values those principles for the sake of the Catholic truths in his view connected with them, and not by any means for their own sake. He clasps the errors to his bosom, because he does not see how, without them, he can hold the Catholic truths which he sees in connection with them, and which really enrapture his heart. What he wants is to see the Catholic truths discriminated from the erroneous principles, and its gaps, as existing in his mind, really filled up, as they are in Catholic minds, with Catholic doctrines.

The reviewer's first and principal objection to Catholicity is, that it sunders subject and object in both the natural order and the supernatural. After what we have said, he must see that this objection is unfounded, and indeed it can appear only ridiculous to those who are acquainted with Catholic theology. The object is independent of the subject, but the subject is never independent of the object. God is independent of his creatures, but they are absolutely dependent on him, and exist, as we have constantly maintained, only by virtue of his intimate presence, and the immanence of his act creating them from nothing. More than this no man can say, without falling into pantheism. In the supernatural order there is no sundering of object and the subject. The supernatural object exists *a parte rei*, independent of the subject, and is as real *in se* when not apprehended or believed as when it is. But nobody supposes, at least no Catholic supposes, it can be believed by a subject that has no inward correspondence with it,—only that correspondence is not natural, but must be supernatural. Grace is twofold, exterior and interior, or objective and subjective. As exterior, or objective, it constitutes and presents the supernatural object; as interior, or subjective, it raises or elevates the subject to the plane of the object, and establishes a proportion, a correspondence, between them.

The second objection of the reviewer is, that Catholicity denies individual freedom, or, in other words, individual freedom and authority are irreconcilable on Catholic principles. The boast of the reviewer is, that his doctrine reconciles the two, and his objection is, that ours sacrifices liberty to authority, and, as a consequence of sacrificing liberty to authority, loses authority itself. Both the boast and the objection proceed, as it strikes us, from a total misconception of liberty and authority, as well as of Catholic theology. We are not very positive as to what is the reviewer's precise doctrine on the subject; for what he says, in the article before us, to elucidate it, only renders it to our apprehension more obscure and indefinite; but he appears to us to resolve both authority and liberty into necessity. His conception of law seems to be that of simple force, acting, in regard to the subject, either from abroad or from within. If from abroad, the subject is not free, and belongs to the physical world as distinguished from the moral; if from within the subject, if through the subject's own intelligence and will, it is the law of freedom, and the subject is free. Slavery would seem, then, to consist, not in being held to obey an unjust law, but in being held to obey a law that comes from abroad, from a source foreign to or distinguishable from the subject; and liberty would seem to stand, not in being held to obey only just law, but in not being held to obey any law not self-imposed, or which does not proceed from the subject himself. This is what we gather from the following passage.

"It may now appear in what sense, and in what sense only, we have ever dreamed of allowing man a will or voice in the constitution of the law by which he is required to be governed. 'To assert man's authority, or right to be governed only by his own will,' according to Mr. Brownson, 'is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the sovereign good. Does the reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists?' Nothing of this sort, we reply; nothing of this sort whatever. All we mean to say is, that mind is not matter; that morality is not nature; that the law of freedom, to be different from the law of blind necessity, must come to its actualization in the world, not in the way of merely outward force under any view, but through the self-moving spontaneity of its own subjects, the thinking and willing of the created minds in which it works and reigns. The planets obey a law which they have no power to accept or not accept; it is in them, but not from them or of them in any way; and for this very reason their action is blind and unfree. So throughout

Nature, as such. Its very character is to be without autonomy in its own order of existence. The Moral, on the contrary, as distinguished from the Natural, is self-conscious, self-active, in a certain sense we may say even self-productive, and in such form truly free. It is not made, except as it at the same time makes itself. It is not moved, save as it originates its own motion. It stands, like all created existence, in the power of law; but the law here is not from abroad simply, as in the case of mere nature, not objective and outward only, but inward also and subjective; it is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects. On the outside of such self-conscious life, it can have no being in the world whatever. Turn it in any way into mere blind force, simple outward compulsion, and all proper morality is at an end. The necessary medium of its revelation, the very element in which it exists and makes itself felt, is the self-moving activity of the life it is formed to bind; which at the same time has full power to be untrue to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law, and which can be rightly bound by this in the end only as it receives the law freely into its own constitution, and so enacts it into force for its own use. Mind thus, by its very constitution, is required to be autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of law for itself; while the law, notwithstanding, has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force whatever as the product merely of any lower intelligence. Objective and subjective here must fall absolutely together. The will without the law is false; denies its own proper nature; falls over to the sphere of bondage and sin. But the law, on the other hand, without the will, has no power either to accomplish its proper work. Only as the law, previously necessary by Divine constitution, is *willed*, freely embraced, affirmed and constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act virtually and deed, can there be any true escape from the idea of slavery, any true entrance into the sphere of freedom, any morality or religion in the full and right sense of these terms. It is this union of law and will, necessity and liberty, not outwardly, but inwardly, which brings the life of man emphatically to its proper form. This is what we mean by the autonomy of the human subject, the right of man to be governed by his own will, and not simply by a heteronomic force acting upon him from beyond his will, the voice that belongs to him properly in the constitution of the law which he is called to obey."—pp. 315, 316.

This, we think, sustains the view we take, especially as we are bound to interpret it in an anti-catholic sense. What the reviewer says about the moral subject being "self-conscious," "self-active," &c., makes nothing against our interpretation; for it is all reconcilable with the assumption that the law is an inherent principle, operating from

within the subject, and the further assumption that the subject, as his intelligence is developed, apprehends and wills it. We are inclined to believe this is the reviewer's doctrine, for it is genuine Calvinism, and corresponds to the general pantheistic character of his speculations. Moreover, we nowhere find him recognizing, unequivocally, any freedom but that which he calls "free necessity," and his very boast is, that his doctrine reconciles *necessity* and *liberty!* The freedom with which man acts he likens to the freedom with which God creates or causes his own being, which, as we have seen, is no freedom at all, for God is *ens necessarium*, and uncaused. We therefore conclude that the reviewer really means to teach that the law is necessity, and operates necessarily; but as it operates from within, and is apprehended and willed by the subject, it, at the same time that it is the law of necessity, is also the law of freedom. We need not tell our readers that this does not reconcile liberty and authority, for it resolves both into necessity. There is no freedom in our simply apprehending and willing the necessity to which we are subjected.

Perhaps, however, the meaning of the reviewer is simply that the law, in order to bind, to have the obligatory force of law, must be accepted or assented to by those it is intended to govern. Much he says may be interpreted in accordance with this view. Hence he would maintain, that to require man to obey a law which he has not voluntarily assented to is tyranny, and he who is required to obey such a law is a slave, and no freeman. This view makes the legality, or binding force, of the law depend on the assent of the subject. This doctrine has been held; we find traces of it in some of our so-called Gallican authors; it lies at the bottom of all the Jacobinical and anarchical theories of the day; it is the fundamental principle of all Protestantism, that is, private reason judging public authority; and it is appealed to in justification of all rebellion in church or state, and as sanctioning the wild and destructive revolutionary movements which have recently come so near overthrowing all European governments, abolishing all law, and dissolving society itself. Law is law only in that it binds, and therefore, according to this principle, law derives its legality, its character, its very existence as law, not from the authority which wills and promulgates it, but from the voluntary assent of the subjects it is intended to govern. It is law

only by virtue of that assent or acceptance. But this makes the subject the real legislator, and the sole source and ground of the law as law. Men are then in every sense their own law-makers. But this the reviewer denies. He says expressly, "Men make neither truth nor law"; that the law "has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force as the product merely of any lower intelligence." It would seem, then, that the reviewer does not, after all, mean this, and we must return to the view already given.

But pass over this; suppose the reviewer really does mean that the law, to be actually law, must be apprehended and voluntarily assented to by the subject. This, undeniably, makes the subject the real sovereign, which is a contradiction in terms. The law regarded *in se* exists prior to the assent of the subject, as the reviewer must concede; for if not, there would be nothing to assent to. Now, has the subject a right to withhold his assent? The self-moving activity of man, the reviewer says, "has full power to be *untrue* to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law." To refuse his assent to the law which is made "previously necessary by divine constitution," would then be for man to be "untrue," that is, disobedient to his proper law. Has man, we say not the *power*, but the *right*, to be thus untrue or disobedient? If you say, yes, you utter a palpable contradiction, and deny all morality; if you say, no, you assert that the law binds prior to the voluntary assent of the subject, and then deny your thesis, for you say man "can be *rightly* bound by this [the law], only as" he "receives the law freely into" his "own constitution, and so enacts it into force for" his "own use."

The law, in the sense we are to consider it in this controversy, is not a power or force, but a simple rule or measure of action, prescribing what is to be done and what is to be avoided, or commanding good and prohibiting evil. Voluntary obedience to it is virtue, right conduct, righteousness, or justice; voluntary disobedience to it is evil conduct, vice, unrighteousness, or injustice. Now we ask the reviewer, whether he does or does not admit the reality of a law prescribing the good and prohibiting the evil, and thus constituting a distinction between right and wrong, independent of man's assent. Is it man who prescribes the good and prohibits the evil? Is it his will that makes the distinction between right and wrong? and could man, if he chose, alter the relations between good and evil, right and wrong,

by giving or withholding his assent to the law? If you say, yes, you deny the eternal law, and make the whole moral order dependent, not on the eternal and immutable will and nature of God, but on the will of man; if you say, no, you admit a law above man, independent of his will, demanding no assent of his to be obligatory, and which convicts him of sin, of rebellion, if he does not both assent to and obey it. In the former case, you deny the whole moral order, all immutable morality, and make virtue and vice whatever man wills them to be,—nay, destroy the very conception of both, and leave man, as we before said, free to live as he lists. If the latter, you cannot make the binding force of the law depend on the assent of the subject. Law is not law unless it prescribes what the subject *ought* to will, and what he *ought* not to will, and therefore must be a law *to* the will, not a law deriving from it, and consequently must, by its very nature, derive all its force from an authority above it, from an authority which has the eternal and indefeasible right to command the will. We here repeat only the A B C of ethical science, which the reviewer must concede, or deny ethical science altogether. To make the law derive its binding force, that is, its character as law, from the assent of those whom it is to govern, is to deny its essential character as law,—is to deny that men are under law, and therefore to deny all morality, for there is morality only where there is law, and if no law binds the assent, there is no law for man.

What the reviewer really wants to maintain, if he did but see it distinctly, is, however, a very obvious and a very certain truth; namely, none but a rational being, capable of apprehending and voluntarily obeying the law, can be the subject of a moral law; for the simple reason that none other is by the constitution of his nature a moral being. Man must have a moral constitution, or he cannot be the subject of the moral law. No doubt of this. But we must never confound that which constitutes man a moral being with the moral law itself, or the law to which he is morally bound to conform all his thoughts, words, and deeds. Here is where the reviewer seems to us to err. He does not keep the two distinct, but runs them one into the other, as is evident from his saying that "objective and subjective must here fall absolutely together." The law is not constituted, or actualized, or made binding, by our moral constitution; but God, in giving us a moral constitution, has made us capable

of being governed, not by a physical law, as is external nature, but by the moral law, which addresses itself to reason. We are moral not because we are not bound to obey the law till we voluntarily assent to it, but because we are morally free in obeying it, that is, are not forced against our will to obey it, but can refuse to obey it, if we choose,—because to obey or not to obey rests always in our own free will; we are, however, always *bound* to obey it, and the law is just as obligatory when we reject it as when we actually assent to it, and we disobey it only at our peril; we never have the *right* to refuse our obedience.

The reconciliation of authority and liberty is never a difficult question. The authority of God is absolute over all his creatures, and as his authority is will inseparable from infinite justice, and therefore always inherently just will, it is legitimate, for law is power conjoined with justice, or will regulated by reason. Subjection to God, or to any authority immediately or mediately deriving from him, is never any encroachment upon liberty, for liberty is destroyed, not in being held to obey legitimate authority, but in being subjected to an authority which is illegitimate. Liberty is intact so long as man is left in the full possession of all his rights, and no one of his rights is taken away or abridged by holding him to obedience to God; for he never had and never can have any right to disobey God. If, then, as the Catholic maintains, the church be really commissioned by God, authorized by him to speak in his name and by his authority, there is and can be no violation of liberty in requiring all men to believe what she teaches, and to do what she commands. If she is what she professes to be, her authority and our liberty are perfectly compatible, one with the other; for in submitting to her authority we submit simply to the law, which we never had and never can have the *right* to disobey.

"Our objection," says the reviewer, "to the Roman doctrine, as we understand it to be exhibited by Mr. Brownson, is that the law objectively taken is *so far sundered* from the activity of the obeying subject, as to be in fact set over against this in the character of another nature altogether, and under a wholly outward form. Objective and subjective are made to fall apart dualistically into two distinct worlds. We do not wish to confound them, [then you must acknowledge them to be distinct,] to mix them together, or to make one absorb or destroy the other; *we recognize their differ-*

ence; but still we object just as strenuously also to this abstract separation." (p. 317.) This may all be very clear and distinct in the reviewer's mind, but is a little obscure and confused in ours. His objection is, that we sunder *too far* the law objectively considered from the activity of the obeying subject. But before bringing this objection he should point out *how far* the two may be legitimately sundered, and where is the line beyond which it is not lawful to go. Then he should show that we do transgress, and in what respect we transgress, that line. We have to regret that he has done neither. We set the object over against the subject, it seems. But the very definition of object, taken simply as object, is that which is over against the subject, or that which stands facing the subject. The very word itself says as much. "In the character of another nature altogether." Subject and object are of the same nature, or they are of different natures. By *nature* here we must understand that which constitutes the thing what it is, and distinguishes it from every other. In this sense, it is incommunicable, and its presence always asserts identity, and excludes diversity. You cannot then assume that subject and object are, as subject and object, partly of the same nature, and partly of diverse natures. You must either assert them as one and identical, as does the pantheist, or you must assert them as differing by nature altogether. The same is the same, and things different are different, then not the same. Are then object and subject the same, one and identical? The reviewer says, "We recognize their difference." Very good, what more do we ourselves do? We assert their difference, and maintain that they are really as well as apparently distinct. "Under a wholly *outward* form." We do not know what this means. The reviewer is perpetually talking about "inward" and "outward." We wish he would explain himself, and tell us in what sense he uses these words; for, as the case now stands, he seems to us to be frightened by apparitions raised by his own fancy. In the sense of *distinct from one another*, we oppose subject and object to each other under an *outward* form, if you please, and so does the reviewer; for he recognizes their difference; but we are not aware that we distinguish them in any other respect in an *outward form.* We recognize an intelligible world distinct from the sensible, and hold that the intelligible exists *a parte rei*, and is as truly objective as the sensible. The law pertains to the intelligible

world, as the object of the intellect, not of the senses. But it is not for that reason any more one with the intellect that apprehends it, than a tree is one with the sense of sight by which we behold it. As the tree does not become subject by our beholding it, so the law does not become subjective, or cease to be purely objective, by our apprehending or understanding it. Here is all the "outward form" we assert, and we are very much mistaken if our *outward* is more outward than the reviewer's *inward.**

"But still we object just as strenuously to this abstract separation." What *abstract* separation? The abstract separation which he understands us to make? What is that? We are sure we make no *abstract* separation; if we make any separation at all, it is real, not abstract. We do not deal in abstractions. But what separation do we make between object and subject? We distinguish them one from the other as different *a parte rei*, and so does the reviewer; but to distinguish is not to separate. The doctrine we have insisted on in our *Review* is, that the object, regarded as existing *a parte rei*, is distinct from and independent of the subject, but that the subject, though really distinct from the object, is dependent on it, and does and can live only by union with it. We deny in no sense the intimate relation of the subject to the object, but we do deny that the relation is reciprocal, that the dependence is

*The reviewer seems to us to reason throughout as if he held that the activity of the subject transforms the object into subject, that the fact of knowledge identifies the intellectual subject and the intelligible object, and that the act of willing identifies the voluntary subject with the object willed; hence he never objects that we distinguish the subject and object, but that we assert them to be *wholly* distinct, and he never denies the objectivity of the object altogether, but simply that it is *merely* objective. So, again, he does not deny that the distinction between subject and object is outward, or that they exist as distinct under an outward form, but denies that the form is *wholly* outward. The two may be sundered, but must not be sundered *too far*. It is remarkable that throughout he never dares affirm or deny any thing absolutely. At the tail of his affirmations or denials there always comes in a qualification, which takes off at least one-half of the assertion or the negation. He never makes a strictly categorical statement, and hence there is not a single definition, properly so called, in either of his articles against us. Whence comes this? It certainly comes not from his ignorance of the categories, or from his want of logical capacity or discipline; but it comes, in our judgment, from a vicious ontology, which he has been led to adopt, partly by modern philosophers, but still more from his having plunged deeply into the study of mystical theology before having devoted sufficient time to the study of speculative or dogmatic theology. He seems to mistake everywhere mystical union for substantial unity, or

mutual. The object is God, the only intelligible object *per se*, and all else that is object to us is so only mediately, as made intelligible to us by his intelligibility. To make the dependence mutual would be to make God as dependent on man as man is on God, and would, as we showed in our former reply, involve Buddhism, and finally nullism. God is separable from man, for he can annihilate man and be all that he now is, but man cannot be separated from God, and live; for it is in him we live, and move, and are, and our separation from him would be our annihilation.

One more point we must consider, and then we shall await the reviewer's response. The reviewer, after disavowing the pantheistic consequences we charged upon him, adds:—

"But now, as we take it, the truth, in opposition to these several pantheistic consequences charged upon us by Mr. Brownson, does not stand on the other side, in their simple negation and contradiction. There is another class of conceptions in this form, and which the common understanding is always prone to lay hold of as the necessary and only alternative in the case, that go as directly and as surely in the end to exclude God from the world, and to unsettle all the foundations of religion. These are comprehended collectively in the idea of *dualism*, or abstract deism, which may be taken as the immediate reverse of what is properly pantheism in the bad and false sense. It may be said that dualism involves a great truth, the actual distinction of God and the world; and

---

identity of substance; or if he does not do this, he assumes that the denial of this unity or identity, or the assertion of the distinction of substances, is a denial of the mystical union itself. The soul in the Christian life is certainly mystically united to God, and its life consists in an ineffable union with him; but there is no identification of substance. The creature remains in the category of created things, and the Christian's highest life, here or in the beatified state, is never the identical life of God; for the promise is, not that when he shall appear we shall be God, but that "we shall be *like* him, for we shall see him as he is"; and likeness always implies difference, as the reviewer must have learned from the old controversy between the homoöusians and the homoiousians. Love makes us one with God, we concede, but mystically, not physically, for we remain always creature, and he always Creator. So in the fact of knowledge the subject and object are united, but not unified, or made identical. They remain—Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, and Schelling and Hegel, to the contrary notwithstanding—as distinctly two things in the fact of knowledge, as they are out of that fact. This the reviewer seems to us to overlook, and hence the pantheistic character of his own statements, and his apprehension that we, in asserting the two to be distinct *a parte rei*, and also *in conceptu*, are denying, not only their union in the fact of our life, but the very possibility of such union. This apprehension is idle, for union is inconceivable without distinction and difference

this we are freely willing to admit ; but it is just as certain, on the other side, and just as necessary to be affirmed always, that pantheism also involves a great truth ; such a truth indeed as may be said to meet us on almost every page of the Bible, as well as from the inmost and profoundest depths of our own religious nature. That is a poor and cheap orthodoxy, in any case, which stands barely in the rejection of error in some one direction, while it makes no account of the danger, always on hand, of falling under the power of its natural counterpart in a direction just the opposite. We are bound to do justice, in the case before us, to the truth which underlies pantheism, as well as to that which underlies dualism ; and we are not more bound to fear and avoid heresy in the first shape, than we are bound to avoid and fear it also in the second shape. It has been our wish at least, and our honest endeavour, to keep clear of both extremes, as well as to acknowledge and honor the great truths out of which both grow. Mr. Brownson, we are sorry to say, in common with a large amount of what we conceive to be bad Protestantism, (the almost universal thinking, we might say, perhaps, of New England,) turns the two phases of thought into the form of a simple syllogistic dilemma, where one horn is the only resting-place from the other, and avoids and rejects thus the pantheistic extreme only in such a way as to lay himself open, in our estimation, to the charge of dualism. We distinguish, of course, as he also has done in our case, between his theory and himself, and speak of what the first is by necessary consequence, as it strikes our own mind, rather than by open and direct avowal ; although at some points, the general consequence itself might seem to be not indistinctly allowed, in the particular propositions by which we find it indirectly affirmed. The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong, serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position. It shows this to be itself a dialectical extreme, whose very character it is always to condemn in a wholesale way, as its own opposite, all that is different from itself, or that carries towards it in any way the aspect of negation. No such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite ; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil."—pp. 310,311.

The reviewer, while conceding that we were right in condemning the pantheistic conceptions, maintains, that, since we asserted their immediate contradictories as the truth in opposition to them, we fell into an opposite error, which he calls dualism, and this because the truth in opposition to them "does not stand on the other side, in their simple negation and contradiction." That there is an error as well as a truth opposed to pantheism, we do not deny ; that we asserted dualism, if he chooses so to call it, in opposition to

pantheism, we concede, but not in the sense in which dualism is false. Dualism is false only when taken in the modern deistical sense, which, after acknowledging God as Creator of the world, denies him as Providence, as Conservator, and as Governor, and asserts that the world, now it is created, is sufficient for itself, and goes "ahead on its own hook,"—the sense common to most of our modern geologists, naturalists, or cultivators of the physical sciences, and advocates of the Baconian philosophy; or in the sense in which, as in Plato's Timæus, it asserts God on one side, and the eternity of matter on the other; or, in fine, in the Oriental sense, in which it asserts the dual origin of the universe, and of two original, eternal, self-existent, and mutually independent principles, or beings, one good, the other bad,—the old Manichean doctrine, held by the Albigenses in the Middle Ages, and perhaps, in modern times, by the great body of Protestants, who boast of being their descendants and continuators. But the reviewer will not pretend that we assert dualism in any one of these three senses; and the only sense in which he can pretend that we assert it is in the sense in which it asserts that creation is contingent, not necessary, and that God and the world are distinguished as Creator and creature, cause and effect. That the truth in opposition to pantheism does not stand in an opposite error, we of course concede; but that it does not stand on the other side, or side opposed to pantheism, we cannot concede, for if it does not, it is not the truth *in opposition* to it. There may be opposite errors, but the truth always stands between them, opposed to both, opposing one face to the one, and another face to the other.

The reviewer is not satisfied with this. He holds that a great truth underlies pantheism, and another underlies dualism, and that our duty is to accept and harmonize the two. Neither is to be denied absolutely, but we must deny a little and affirm a little of both. This is all very well for a Protestant, who can have truth only as mixed with falsehood, and who can never make an affirmation or a denial without falling into error, but the reviewer must excuse us for not consenting to place ourselves in his unpleasant position. Pantheism is either true or it is false, and if false it is to be denied absolutely, and no truth does or can underlie it; for if a great truth did underlie it, it would be founded in truth, and a doctrine founded in truth is true doctrine, not false. So of dualism; it is either true or it is false, or true in one sense

and false in another. If true in one sense and false in another, your business is to distinguish, and define in what sense it is true and in what it is false, and then to affirm it in the former sense, and deny it in the latter. In the sense it is false, or as a false doctrine, no great truth underlies it, for it is a perversion or denial, of the truth. Let us have no eclectic or syncretic twaddle on the subject.

The reviewer says of us, "The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position." That is, we must have fallen into the *error* opposed to the pantheistic error, or we could not have so easily thrown the reviewer into the wrong! This is not so clear to us. We should draw an opposite conclusion from the same premises, and say that the facility with which we threw him into the wrong serves to illustrate the truth of our position and the falsity of his; for we are quite sure that, without the truth on our side, we should never have been able to throw such a man as the reviewer into the wrong. "It shows itself to be a dialectical extreme." And "no such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil." Here is the mere vulgar cant of our modern eclectics, by which they seek to rehabilitate falsehood, and consecrate every error and heresy, past, present, and to come. It rests on the assumption that error is merely a partial or incomplete truth, as Cousin and his school expressly teach. The assumption is itself a monstrous error. Error is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, but a false view, that is, a denial of truth. Every false doctrine is, in that it is false, a contradiction of the truth, and must be killed, or the truth cannot live. Pantheism, the reviewer concedes, is an error. Its essence consists in the denial of the contingency of the universe, and the assertion that in their substance God and the world are identical. This is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, to be completed by an error from the opposite quarter; but it is a sheer, unmitigated falsehood, and is got rid of only by asserting its direct contradictory, namely, the universe is contingent, not necessary, and God and the world are of different substances, or distinct and different

as to substance. It and this truth which we oppose to it are in the very nature of things irreconcilable, and one can be asserted only by the absolute, unqualified denial of the other. And what we say of pantheism, we say of every false doctrine. The reviewer is all wrong in his eclectic twaddle, for we can in conscience call it by no name more respectable. There is no logic by which opposites, that is, contraries, can be reconciled. Truth is never opposed to truth, and of opposites one must always be false. In the power of what higher idea than either truth or falsehood can truth and falsehood come to a true inward reconciliation with each other?

The reviewer wishes to be able to assert the immanence of God in his works, and he thinks this immanence is the truth that underlies pantheism. With his leave, this is a great mistake, for pantheism, by his own concession, is false. Then the immanence of God cannot be asserted in a pantheistic sense; then, in the only sense in which it is permitted us to assert it, it is not pantheistic, is no part of pantheism, is not related to pantheism, neither underlies it nor overlies it, and is not denied in denying pantheism, but in fact is denied in *asserting* pantheism. In denying pantheism, the reviewer may be in danger of denying this immanence; but no one who has an infallible guide is in danger of doing it, or has any occasion to fear that, in the plain, plump denial of error on one side, he may fall into an error on the other. Let the reviewer define the true immanence of God, as distinguished from the pantheistic immanence, and perhaps he will find that we have not denied it, and that he, in order to maintain it, must take his stand with us.

We have now replied to the reviewer's article, as far as we have judged it necessary. We are not conscious of having overlooked a single important point, and we have done our best to seize and reply to the real thought of the author. If we have failed, it has been unintentionally, and perhaps the reviewer's fault more than our own; for we must tell him that, if he writes with vigor, he by no means writes with clearness and definiteness. He seems rarely to express his meaning with distinctness and precision. If he replies to us, we hope he will be more explicit, and try and accommodate himself somewhat to our dulness of apprehension. We wish to be just to him, and have no disposition to charge upon his principles consequences which they do not logically

involve. We think, also, that he would find his own advantage in attempting to give his doctrines a more rigidly scientific and logical method and statement. He will find it no useless discipline, and one of the speediest ways of arriving at truth. In conclusion, we must beg him to excuse us if we have seemed now and then a little severe in our remarks. Our severity is intended for his doctrine, not for him personally, for personally we have a high esteem for him.

NEWMAN ON THE TRUE BASIS OF THEOLOGY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1851.]

Mr. Francis Newman is a younger brother of Dr. John Henry Newman, the Superior of the English Oratorians. He was formerly Fellow of Baliol College. Oxford, and, as far as he reveals himself in the works before us, is a man of a grave and earnest turn of mind, good natural parts, and respectable scholarship. He evidently has a kind and warm heart, and full persuasion of his own honesty and sincerity. As a man, he interests us much, and we regret to see him wasting his fine powers and attainments in the unpraiseworthy effort to obliterate faith from the human heart, and reduce mankind in their own estimation to a level with the beasts that perish.

It were easy to say severe things against Mr. Francis Newman, and to prove even from his own writings that his persuasion of his own sincerity and guilelessness is simply a delusion. We cannot respect his complaints of the coldness or harshness with which he says his religious friends have treated him, and we regard him as quite wrong in alleging that he could not honestly have escaped the infidel conclusions at which he has arrived. No man, brought up and liberally educated in a country where Christianity is preached as extensively as it is in England by the Catholic clergy, can be an unbeliever, except through culpable ignorance, or wilful persistence in error. In fact, no modern infidel's plea of sincerity can be entertained, for no really sincere mind, honestly and loyally seeking the truth, can ever fall under the gross delusion that truth warrants the rejection of Catholicity. Nevertheless, Mr. Newman must stand or fall to his own master. We remember our own past delinquencies, and the great mercy of God in bringing us to the truth, as it were in spite of ourselves, and we can speak of no one personally in severe or censorious

---

* 1. *The Soul, her Sorrows and her Aspirations. An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology.* By Francis William Newman. Second Edition. London: 1849.

2. *Phases of Faith; or Passages from the History of my Creed.* By Francis William Newman. London: 1850.

terms. We can interpret his unbelief, and even his blasphemies, by our own past experience, and although unable now to sympathize with him, we remember all too vividly the time when we should have done so, and have hailed him as one of the lights of the age.

But however we may be disposed to treat the man, we can have no toleration for the author. His principles and doctrines are utterly abhorrent to Christian faith and piety, and we have the right to subject them, if we choose, to the most rigid criticism. In setting them forth, he has challenged the Christian world to mortal combat, and he is not permitted to complain if his challenge is taken up, and some stripling from the camp of Israel shall do his best to discomfit the modern son of Anak, who rashly defies the armies of the living God. Between his system and the Gospel there can be only war, and war to the death; for if the Gospel is true, if our Blessed Lord was not an impostor, but what he declared himself, his system is false and destructive; and if his system be true, the Gospel is a cheat, and all who adhere to it are wretched idolaters, enemies of God and man, laboring only to keep the human race bound in the chains of ignorance, vice, and superstition.

For Mr. Francis Newman as a man, and before his Protestant brethren, there may, indeed, be some excuse; for he has only followed out to its last consequences the Evangelicalism in which he appears to have been brought up. He was reared in the bosom of the so-called *church* of England. The members of that crazy Establishment are divided, among other divisions too numerous to mention, into high-churchmen and low-churchmen. High-churchmen speak always with a double tongue,—a thing which God abhors. They both assert and deny sacramental grace. They assert it against low-churchmen or Evangelicals, who deny it, and they deny it against Catholics, who always assert it. If they are right against Evangelicals, they are wrong in protesting against Catholics, and can never clear themselves of the charge at least of schism, since they are severed from the Holy See, and are out of Catholic unity. If they are right against Catholics, they are, since distinguished from Evangelicals, mere formalists, holding that the observance of a few outward forms and ceremonies, or, at furthest, the practice of mere natural morality, is sufficient for salvation, than which nothing is more unchristian or unreasonable. No earnest-minded man, with tolerable intellectual capacity, can

long continue a high-churchman. He must either press forward to Rome, or fall back on Evangelicalism, as Mr. Francis Newman says he told his illustrious brother, as far back as 1823. Protestantism is essentially in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, as its whole history proves, and for a Protestant, holding as he invariably does to imputed justice, to embrace what the Puseyites call "the sacramental system," is suicidal, since justification by faith alone, in his sense, is simply the denial of sacramental grace.

Evangelicalism on one side stands opposed to mere formalism, and is so far commendable; but on another side it stands opposed to sacramental grace. Its blunder is in recognizing no distinction between mere formalism and the infusion of sanctifying grace into the heart by the Holy Ghost through the sacraments as its instrumental cause. Denying habitual grace, infused through the sacrament of Baptism, and renewable, if lost, by the sacrament of Penance, the second plank after shipwreck, as the Fathers are accustomed to call it, the Evangelical has no resource but the assertion of justification by faith alone. But this justifying faith, since it is not an infused habit, cannot be intellectual faith, for the devils believe and tremble. Nor can it be an affection of the will; for, since the will is unelevated by habitual grace, such an affection could not rise above the order of natural morality. Justifying faith, then, must be an affection of the sensitive nature, and be essentially a feeling or a sentiment. Hence Evangelicalism, as every body knows, is mere sentimentalism, and teaches that sanctity consists in a right state of the sensitive affections. Consequently, it teaches that concupiscence is in itself sin, and that its motions are sinful, even when not assented to by the will, but actually resisted.

Starting as an Evangelical from this point, with the doctrine of imputed justice, that is, that Christ justifies forensically, without sanctifying, you fall practically into antinomianism, and conclude with Luther that the regenerate are in effect relieved from the obligations of the moral law. Or if, to escape this difficulty, you hold, with the more recent Evangelicals, that there is a twofold imputation of the merits of Christ, one which justifies us in the eye of the law, and another which effects in some way internal sanctity, you fall, if of a tender conscience, into despair; for you always find concupiscence, a law in your members, warring against the law of your mind, and bringing you into captiv-

ity to the law of sin and death. Brought to this point, what are you to do? Feel right and you will be right. Perhaps so, perhaps not so. But the precise difficulty is that you do not feel right, and your feelings are not under the control of your will. Here was our great difficulty, when, awaking from our rationalistic dream, we felt it necessary to escape from sin, and to strive after real sanctity; and God in his mercy sent us to the church for a solution. The church solved it for us by teaching us that concupiscence, when not assented to, is not sin, that our merely sensitive feelings count for nothing, and that all we need strive after is to have the will or the voluntary affections right, in which, through the aid of divine grace, never withheld, we may be always successful. But this solution is no solution at all to those who reject the church, deny sacramental grace, and place sanctity in a right state of the sensitive affections. For them there are only three alternatives;—1. The practical antinomianism just mentioned, that is, that sins committed after justification are not imputed or reckoned as sins; 2. Perfect despair of God's mercy and salvation; or 3. The denial of sin itself, by resolving all that passes under the name of sin into simple imperfection, natural defect, or natural infirmity. The first alternative is the one generally adopted by Evangelicals. They make a superb act of hypocrisy, and persuade themselves that they are regenerated by the Spirit, and therefore that they are saints. Assuming that whatever saints do must be saintly, they conveniently conclude that they may do whatever they list, without detriment to their sanctity or danger to their salvation. How can this thing be a sin, since he who does it is a saint? A smaller number, yet at times comparatively large, adopt the second alternative, and fall into complete despair, conclude that they are reprobates, predestined to hell, and become religious maniacs, and not unfrequently murderers and suicides; or, assuming that their doom is sealed, and that nothing they can do will affect it one way or the other, give loose reins to their appetites and passions, and plunge into every excess of vice and iniquity. Mr. Francis Newman adopts the third alternative, and denies sin to be properly sin, and considers it the necessary result of natural imperfection, and as naturally tending to develop and perfect the sinner, or the one we should call a sinner; which is only another phase of the first alternative, or antinomianism.

Again, by placing the faith by which the sinner is

assumed to be justified in the sensitive nature, as distinguished from reason, that is, intellect and will, Evangelicalism necessarily declares all dogmatic theology and all belief in dogmas proposed to the intellect, unessential, and really worthless, if not absolutely hurtful. It leaves the believer, therefore, free to reject, without any impeachment of his religious character or danger to his salvation, any intellectual proposition he pleases. If he has the approved feelings or affections, he has all that is required, although he denies every article of the creed, and even the existence of God; and perhaps the further he carries his denial the better, because the affirming of dogmas requires an intellectual exercise, and leads to a reliance on intellect, which tends to impair the purity and intensity of the feelings, and therefore the true religious life. The nearer one approximates the pure animal, or, it may be, the mere sensitive plant, the better Evangelical he is. Moreover, placing religion in the sensitive affections as its subject, Evangelicalism makes one's feelings the test or criterion of truth, and therefore binds him to reject as false and hurtful whatever is disagreeable to them. Mr. Francis Newman finds the inspiration of the Scriptures, the church, ecclesiastical authority and discipline, the sacred mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, and especially the doctrine of future retribution and the endless punishment of the wicked, very disagreeable to his feelings, and therefore boldly and decidedly rejects them as blasphemous errors, as lets and hindrances to Christian freedom and genuine piety. All this is deplorable, but it is only the legitimate development of Evangelicalism, and no Protestant has the least right to complain of it.

We have foreshadowed in these preliminary remarks the general character of Mr. Francis Newman's doctrines, or rather negation of doctrines. His system, if system it can be called, is no novelty to us or to our readers, and we have on several occasions discussed its chief principles and main features, especially in our *Admonitions to Protestants* and our articles on Parker, Channing, Morell, Bushnell, and the Mercersburg reviewers. The author is a developmentist, and belongs to the great Protestant neological party of our times. In this city, he would be classed with the transcendentalists, though transcendentalizing in very tolerable Anglo-Saxon. The second title of the first-named of the works on our list reveals at once his principle and method; —*An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as*

the True Basis of Theology. His system, be it what it may, is derived, then, from the *natural* history of the soul, and therefore excludes the supernatural order, and can be only naturalism. If derived from the natural history of the *soul*, it must be pure humanism, egoism, or psychological idealism; for from the soul alone, only the soul can be obtained. This in the very outset asserts both the unchristian and the unphilosophical character of his system, and ranks it among the later forms of infidelity.

"By the soul," the author says, "we understand that side of human nature upon which we are in contact with the Infinite, and with God, the Infinite Personality; in the soul, therefore, alone is it possible to know God; and the correctness of our knowledge must depend eminently on the healthy, active, and fully developed condition of our organ." (Preface, p. vii.) The author, therefore, it would seem, distinguishes between the Infinite and God. Can he tell us what the Infinite is as distinguished from God? or what God is as distinguished from the Infinite? Nothing is or exists but God and his creatures; no creature is or can be infinite, and consequently, if God is not the Infinite, there is no Infinite, and if no Infinite, then no God. What, we may ask, does the author mean by "our organ"? Does he, as his words seem to imply, mean the soul? Does he then regard the soul as distinct from us? What, then, are we whose organ is the soul, and who are distinguishable from it? The human personality, then, is not in the soul, and does not pertain to it, but uses the soul as its organ! What is this personality? Of what is the soul an organ? And what sort of an organ is it? Material, or spiritual? If spiritual, what is a spiritual organ? Moreover, what is the test or criterion of the soul's healthy, active, and fully developed condition? How is the author, or how are we, to know whether the soul is in that condition, or whether it is in an unhealthy state, abnormally developed, and morbidly active? Unless he can determine this, he cannot determine the correctness of his knowledge, and his utterances are worthless for him and for us, for they may turn out to be those of a diseased soul or a madman. Here is a grave difficulty at the very threshold, and one which excites numerous misgivings. But let this pass.

The author says that it is in the soul alone that it is possible to know God. But he distinguishes, as is evident from his book, the soul from the intellect or understanding,

and therefore must make it, in itself considered, a mere blind faculty, like the will, and without light except as enlightened by some other faculty. How, then, can the soul be a medium of knowledge, correct or incorrect, of God, or of any thing whatever? The soul distinguished from the intellect cannot know any thing at all, and consequently we can know in it or through it only what is intelligible, or an object of intellect. The soul, in Mr. Francis Newman's sense, is the sensitive nature, or the capacity of feeling,—as he snpposes, of *feeling the infinite;* but feeling is always, as feeling, purely subjective, and never of itself introduces us to any object distinguishable from the sensitive subject or feeling itself. The apprehension of an external, material, or sensible object as the exterior occasion or cause of the feeling or sensitive affection, is never the work of the feeling, or of the soul as simple, sensitive subject, but always of the intellect, that is, of the soul as understanding, or intellective subject. If, then, the author distinguishes the soul from understanding, as he certainly does, and maintains that it is only in the soul that we do or can know God, he virtually denies that we can know God at all, and excludes from his religion all objective reality, that is, resolves religion into mere egoism or psychological idealism.

That religion has a subjective side is unquestionably true; but to assume that it is purely subjective is to deny it outright. Religion, or worship, the author says, "is a state of the affections"; and that he means sensitive affections is evident from his adding, that they "are not under the control of the will," and defining them to be "gentle emotions," or a lower degree of the same thing. But worship can be a state of the affections, sensitive or otherwise, only in relation to an object really existing. The author elsewhere calls worship "a spiritual exercise"; but it cannot be a purely subjective exercise, for by the very force of the term it is an exercise in reference to and for an object, that is, God, and therefore an exercise not possible without intuition or intellectual apprehension of God, or the object who commands it, and to whom it is due. In point of fact, every exercise of the soul demands as its essential condition intuition or intellectual apprehension of its object. None of our faculties can operate without their specific objects. The specific object of the eye is light, and where there is no light there is and can be no seeing; the specific object of

the intellect is truth, and where there is no truth, that is, no objective reality, there can be no intellection, or act of knowing; the specific object of the will or of love is good, and where there is no good apprehended, there can be no act of will or of love. No faculty creates its object, because no one can operate without its object. Abstract the subject from all object, and you annihilate its actual existence; abstract any particular faculty from its specific object, and you annihilate it as an active faculty, render it inoperative, and practically as if it were not. Consequently, the author by losing the object loses the subject, and by excluding religion as objective necessarily excludes it as subjective, that is, even as a spiritual exercise, or state of the affections.

The author asserts in his very title-page that the natural history of the soul is the true basis of theology, and therefore, in philosophical language, supposing him really to intend to admit objective reality, that psychology is the true basis of ontology. Nobody can suppose that the author in this really means to affirm that the soul is the true basis of all being, and that God is merely a creature or emanation of the human soul; yet this is the real import of his assertion, for psychology can be the true basis of ontology, or the natural history of the soul the true basis of theology, only on condition that the soul is the true basis of all being, and therefore of God himself. From the natural history of the soul, strictly defined, we obtain only the soul and its subjective affections, and therefore no predicates of which the soul is not the subject. This fact is evident enough of itself, and has been proved again and again by modern philosophers. To call any thing we thus obtain theology, which is the science of God and whatever pertains to him as cause,—either first cause or final cause,—whether evident *per se* to natural reason or evident only by faith, is to assume, either that God and the soul are identical, or that God is an affection or mere product of the soul.

What deceives many excellent people on this point is their not taking note, in stating their thesis, that the facts they include under the name of psychological facts are always complex facts, having always a twofold character, the one psychological and the other ontological. As the soul never actually exists or operates abstracted from its object, so we never do or can apprehend our soul without at the same time, and in the same act, apprehending that which is not the

soul, but its object, really distinguishable from it, and existing objectively *a parte rei*. Contemplating this object, which we intuitively apprehend in apprehending ourselves, or rather, in apprehending which we recognize ourselves as apprehending subject, and reflecting on it as it is presented to us anew in language, we without much difficulty find it to be real and necessary being, that is God; but having neglected to distinguish the intuition of it from the recognition of ourselves as the subject of the intuition, they conclude it to be a product of our intuition of ourselves, and therefore that psychology is the basis of ontology, the natural history of the soul the basis of theology,—a great mistake which vitiates all modern philosophy.

Chronologically considered, it is no doubt true that the psychological fact and the ontological, the *primum psychologicum* and the *primum ontologicum*, are given to the mind simultaneously; but they are not given as identical, nor is the ontological given as contained in the psychological, but the psychological is given as proceeding from the ontological. It is this fact that the psychologue overlooks, when he makes war on the ontologist, and contends that psychology is the basis of ontology. He assumes that all the facts he studies in studying psychology are simple psychological facts, and neglects to observe that in all these facts there is an element purely ontological in its origin and character. In every cognition, or distinct act of knowledge, there is unquestionably a recognition of the soul as knowing subject, or subject of the act, in scholastic language, as *ens percipiens*, and it would be a grave mistake to regard the intellectual act as a pure intuition of the object. But it were equally a mistake to regard any intellectual act as a pure apprehension or recognition of the subject perceiving, including no intuition of object. There is no apprehension where no object is apprehended; and there is no apprehension of the soul by itself, where there is no intuition of object distinguishable from it, and existing objectively *a parte rei*, that is, there is no *ens percipiens* where there is, distinguishable from it and independent of it, no *ens perceptum*. This *ens perceptum*, regarded simply under the relation of object perceived, is consentaneous with the *ens pecipiens*, but in itself, in the order of reality, it must be prior to the perception, or *ens percipiens*; because no *ens* can be perceived before it is, since what is not is not perceptible, and because the *ens percipiens* is *percipiens* only in perceiving. As the soul is

percipient, or *ens percipiens*, only in perceiving the object, as perception or intuition does not create its object, and as the object must be in order to be perceived, it follows that also in the order of science the object is logically prior to the subject. Hence the order of science, contrary to the pretension of the psychologists, follows the order of reality, or the ontological order, and therefore the *primum logicum*, or *primum philosophicum*, must be the *primum ontologicum*. The *primum psychologicum* is the recognition of ourselves as percipient, or *ens percipiens*, and it can never be the *primum philosophicum*, as Mr. Francis Newman and modern psychologism assert, because, though chronologically simultaneous with the *primum ontologicum*, it is logically subsequent to it, and dependant on it, since the soul perceives itself only in perceiving the object which is not itself. The *principium*, or *primum philosophicum*, must then be the *primum ontologicum*, and the first verse of the book of Genesis gives us the *principium* of all philosophy as well as of all theology, namely, *In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.*

The mistake of psychologists on this point lies in supposing that what they call the genesis of ideas, that is, the genesis of knowledge, is in the reverse order of the genesis of things, and that the *primum philosophicum*, or principle from which in philosophizing we are to start, is not the *primum ontologicum*, that is, the principle of things, but the *primum psychologicum*, or the soul apprehending itself. They suppose that we do not see things as they are in the order of reality, in the order in which they exist to the divine mind, but in a contrary order; and therefore they imagine a *mundus logicus*, or logical world, distinct from the *mundus physicus*, or real world. The former they give as the immediate, and the latter as only the mediate, object of intuition, or of knowledge. They appear to have been led into this error by the doctrine of Aristotle, that the mind can know only in itself, and by their laudable effort to escape Platonic pantheism. But they should recollect that this *mundus logicus*, as distinguished from the *mundus physicus*, is a mere abstraction, and, in itself considered, a sheer nullity, for there are no abstractions in nature; and they should also bear in mind, that, if the soul has immediate intuition only of this logical world, it is impossible to assert any real existence, for nothing can be concluded from abstractions not contained in them, and if

in intuition of them there is no intuition of the physical or real world, no such world is contained in them. Moreover, if the mind can have intuition only of what is in it, since whatever is in it is it, the mind can know only itself, and then can assert nothing but itself. How the soul can perceive what is not in it, or what is objective to it, we for ourselves do not know, any more than we know how it can know itself or any thing in itself. How it can know at all is to us an inexplicable mystery, and we take good care to refrain from all attempts to explain it. We know that we know, and we know that if the soul cannot know what is objective to itself, or if it can know only in identifying the object with itself, or if knowledge be the identification of the subject with the object, as some of the Alexandrian philosophers seem to teach, we cannot really know at all. We explain nothing by means of the *phantasms* and *species* of the peripatetics. There is no *tertium quid* between subject and object conceivable. What is not subject is object, and what is not object is subject. The subject either apprehends the object, or it does not; if it does not, there is the end of the matter, and science or knowledge is out of the question; if it does, it apprehends it where and as it is, in so far as it apprehends it at all.

The peripatetics sought very properly to escape the pantheism evidently involved in the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Plato made all science consist in the intuition or knowledge of ideas, and ideas were in fact the only reality he recognized. All else he regarded as merely phenomenal. The *idea* in his system is the divine paradigm, or archetype in the divine mind or reason, and therefore God himself; for whatever is in God, or the divine reason, is God. Hence St. Thomas says, *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.* Plato, then, must have regarded God as all and the only reality, and the universe merely as phenomenal, of which God is the substance or subject, which is sheer pantheism. To avoid this fatal conclusion, the peripatetics, in accordance with their doctrine that the mind apprehends only in itself, conceived ideas to be in the mind, and a *tertium quid* between the mind and the object existing *a parte rei.* Hence they regarded ideas, which are also the forms or possibilities of things, as something distinguishable from the mind on the one hand, and from God on the other. Hence they asserted an ideal or logical world, in itself neither ontological nor psycho-

logical, neither God nor creature, like the *ens in genere* of Rosmini. Hence the interminable question of the scholastics as to *possibilities*, which a slight reference to the pages of St. Augustine would have speedily disposed of. Plato was right in asserting the objectivity of ideas, and the old realists, like St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and St. Bonaventura, were perfectly right in asserting their reality, their existence a *parte rei;* Plato was also right in considering them as the paradigms, archetypes, or models of things in the divine reason or mind, for as St. Thomas says, *Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum*;* but he erred in regard to the fact of creation, and in considering actual things not as creatures, but as the mere impress of these ideas or forms on an eternally existing matter, as the impress of a seal on wax. Man according to him is this divine idea or eternal form impressed on matter, instead of a real creation by God from nothing, according to, or after, this idea, form, or archetype in the divine mind. But this idea, regarded as paradigm or archetype, is simply the divine intelligence, and is the same whether there be or be not a creature *ad extra* created after it. The divine intelligence, being infinite, includes all ideas, paradigms, archetypes, or *creatable* existences, which God may or may not create as it seems to him good. As paradigms, archetypes, models, or ideas, they are *creabilia*, or possible creatures, the possibilities of things, or, as some say, *essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ*, and therefore the divine omnipotence, and consequently really and identically God, for no distinction *in re* is admissible in God between one attribute and another, or between his attributes and his essence. Ideas, the eternal forms, essences, or possibilities of things, are then neither mental conceptions existing only in our own minds, nor a *mundus logicus* distinguishable from the real world, but are God himself, apprehended by us in him, and real with all the reality of his being. God is himself the ideal or the possible, the paradigm and possibility of all things. The distinction we are to make is not a distinction between God and the possible, nor between ideal or possible and real, but between God and creature, between the idea and the actual existence created after it. The possible creature is God; the actual creature is the product of God's creative act, creating according to his own divine idea, or

* *Summa Theol.* 1, Q. xv., a. 1 ad 3.

the form eternal in his own mind, that is, according to his own divine essence, the *similitudo omnium rerum.*

The error of the Platonists lies precisely in confounding the creature, the *creatum* or *creatura*, with the creatable, or *creabile*, that is, in overlooking or denying the intervention of God's creative act, and thus asserting only God and in him the possible world, but no actual world created *ad extra.* The error of the peripateties lies in distinguishing the ideal or possible from God, making it neither something nor yet nothing, and at best only subjectively real. Such modern philosophers as follow the Platonists tend to pantheism; and such as follow the peripatetics tend to conceptualism, nominalism, and nihilism. The former lose the creature as actual existence. The latter lose God, for the creature is inconceivable without the creator. To escape atheism, we must understand that ideas are the divine intelligence, and possibles the divine omnipotence, therefore truly and identically God; and to escape pantheism, we must understand that ideal or possible existences are actual and distinguishable from God only *mediante* the creative act of God, or that the idea or the possible is actual existence distinguishable from God only as an existence, responding to it as its type or paradigm, is actually created by God from nothing.

It follows from this that there is and can be no *mundus logicus* distinguishable from the *mundus physicus*, or possible world, interposed midway, as it were, between reality and nullity. God and actual creation include all that is or exists, and what is not actual creation is God, and what exists and is not God is creation. As what is not is neither intelligible nor conceivable, it follows that in every intuition there must be intuition of some object existing *a parte rei*, and this object must in all cases be either God or actual creature. The *ens possibile* of the philosophers is *ens reale* in God, is God himself, and therefore in conceiving it we really conceive God. In conceiving it as possible, or in denominating it possible, we only say it is an idea in the divine mind, which he can endow with existence if he chooses. We conceive it in conceiving the divine intelligence and omnipotence, and it is intelligible to us only in the intelligibility of the divine attributes, and known only in so far as we know them, in which it is real, because identically God in his own being. The logical order and the real then are identical, and the genesis of

knowledge follows the genesis of things; that is, in knowledge we know things themselves and as they are, not the mere images, species, or phantasms of things, and things as they are not. Consequently, the *primum philosophicum* must be the *primum ontologicum*, and as God creating is the *principium* in the ontological order, so God creating must be the *principium* in the order of science. To deny God the creator in the order of science is as really to deny all knowledge, as to deny him in the ontological order is really to deny all existences. Psychology, then, strictly defined, can no more be the basis of ontological science, than the soul can be the physical basis of all existences. Utterly impossible, then, is it, that the natural history of the soul should be the true basis of theology. Theology, on the contrary, is the true basis of the natural history of the soul. Instead of its being true that we know God only in the soul, it is only in our knowledge of God that we can know the soul itself. We must study, not God in the soul, but the soul in God, as all masters of spiritual life uniformly teach; and it is only in proportion as we know God that we ever do know ourselves,—the natural history of the soul, her wants, her sorrows, or her aspirations.

The reason why some learned and good men, whom we love and venerate, shrink from admitting that the *primum ontologicum* is the *primum philosophicum*, is their supposing that they who assert it hold that we have a distinct and conscious knowledge of God prior to our knowledge of existences or consciousness of ourselves, which manifestly is not the fact. The *primum ontologicum* is undeniably the formula, God is, and is the creator of all things or existences distinguishable from himself, as faith teaches us all. In proving that the genesis of knowledge follows the genesis of things, and therefore that in every intuition the immediate object apprehended is God, we have proved that this formula must be the *primum philosophicum*. But while we assert intuition of God in every intellectual act, and that the soul in the intuition really apprehends God, we yet maintain, as St. Augustine says, that it does not intuitively advert to the fact that what it thus apprehends is God. Though it really apprehends God intuitively, it does not take note intuitively that it apprehends him. It comes to know this only subsequently, by means of reflection on the intuition repeated in language, the indispensable instrument of all reflection. To be able to say to others or to ourselves,

God is, and is the creator of the world and all things therein, demands, besides the immediate intuition, both instruction and reflection; and to *prove* that God is, to him who rejects instruction, demands reasoning, and not seldom long and intricate processes of reasoning, of which St. Thomas has given us, in his *Summa Theologica*, most admirable specimens in his five well-known arguments for the existence of God.

The question between us and the peripatetics is not as to the necessity or the legitimacy of these arguments in a controversy with atheists, but as to the principle on which they as arguments are conclusive. They could not prove the existence of God, if we had no intuition of God, if in the act or fact of knowledge or intellectual apprehension we did not along with the apprehension of that which is not God apprehend also that which is not ourselves or creature,—that which is increate, independent, real, necessary, and eternal, on whose creative energy we and all other creatures depend, and without which neither we nor they could either begin or continue to exist. The real office of the argument in the case is not strictly to prove that God is, but to prove that what we thus intuitively apprehend is God. As a matter of fact, in arguing against atheists we use the very arguments and method used by theologians in all ages and of all schools. We have invented or discovered no new method or argument, and we have not the temerity to assume that the fathers and doctors of the church have never understood how to combat atheism. We do not believe in modern discoverers. We use the syllogism precisely as others use it, only we deny what some few pretend, that we can conclude in it matter which transcends the matter of intuition. Demonstration does not supply new matter; it only clears up and establishes the matter already intuitively apprehended, and never enables us to assert any existence not apprehended in the intuition. From our intuitions of what are really creatures, we demonstrate the existence of God, but solely because in these intuitions there is always intuition of that which is not creature, and which therefore is God. The real demonstration is in detecting this intuition, and showing that its object is God the creator. Here the basis of the demonstration is this intuition, really and truly intuition of God, an ontological, not a psychological intuition.

The doctrine we oppose is, that the existence of God is

concluded from the pure intuition of creature, or that his existence or being is a deduction from the simple intuition of created existence, or recognition of ourselves as thinking subject. Its error lies in assuming that God may be concluded from *data* in which he is not given, or in which there is no intuition of his being or attributes. It is a principle of logic, that there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If God is not contained in the premises intuitively given, or rather intuitively evident, he cannot be concluded from them. They who fall into this error do so by confounding proof with knowledge, and the intuition of God with the intuition of creature. They take in their reasoning the complex fact as a simple psychological fact; but as it really is a complex fact, and really does contain intuitive apprehension of God, they in point of fact, though illogically, arrive at the conclusion that God exists. This conclusion being true and evident *per se*, they cannot or will not be persuaded that they have not attained it by a strictly logical process. But having formally excluded God from their premises, from the intuitions from which they reason, the conclusion on their ground, is logically unsound. The fact is, in all our intuitions which include intuition of the relative, the finite, the contingent, the temporal, we have always intuition of real being, of the independent, the infinite, the necessary, the eternal; and real being, the independent, the infinite, the necessary, and the eternal, are God, and if we have intuition of these, we have all that is meant by intuition of God. If we have no intuition or intellectual apprehension of these, we have no means of proving the existence of God. Without intuition of the necessary, for instance, we could not in the syllogism assert that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and therefore could not reason in proof of any proposition whatever. All reasoning rests on the supposition of a necessary *nexus* between the conclusion and the premises, or between the effect and the cause. And if we have no intellectual apprehension of the necessary, how can we conceive even the possibility of this *nexus?* And yet the necessary is always God, for he is necessary being, and he alone is necessary being, since all that is distinguishable from him is contingent, created by him, and dependent on his free will.

We have enlarged on this point, because necessary to show the radical falsity of Mr. Francis Newman's principles, and the utter viciousness of his method, common to nearly

all British and American neologists. Evidently we do not mean that Mr. Francis Newman, in asserting that the natural history of the soul is the true basis of theology, admits, in fact, no objective reality, and therefore falls into absolute nihilism. Common sense and common tradition in general get the better of speculation, and even the wildest theorizers, by a felicitous inconsistency, seldom fail to recognize more truth than their theories can embrace. No man, can be totally depraved in a rational, any more than in a moral sense, and every one always retains some traces of the image and likeness of God to which he was originally created. Moreover, no man ever really divests himself of all traditional faith or science. What we mean to charge upon Mr. Francis Newman is, that he cannot consistently with his own principles and method assert any existence but the soul itself, and this is amply confirmed by the details of the book under review. Undoubtedly, as a matter of fact, there is an ontological element in the premises from which he reasons, but he does not distinguish it; he even denies it, and contends that his only ontological element is concluded from purely psychological *data*. Logically, according to his own principles, his *principium* or *primum philosophicum*, or point of departure, is the soul, which is therefore necessarily the subject of all his ontological or theological predicates. Analysis of the soul, however sharp or thorough, can obtain only the soul and its subjective contents. No man capable of any degree of reasoning can deny this; consequently, from psychological *data* alone, supposing it possible, which it is not, to commence with such *data* alone, it is impossible to conclude any God but the human soul. In the sense of his system, Mr. Francis Newman's God is simply an abstraction of himself, the several faculties, qualities, or properties of his own soul, taken abstractly, and carried up, in imagination, to infinity, and concreted in an imaginary perfect soul. Systematically considered, this is the only God of the majority of our modern metaphysicians. Their God is no objective reality, but a mere logical abstraction of themselves, and hence their reasonings to prove that God is seldom satisfy any one really troubled with atheistical doubts. Their arguments professedly proceed on the supposition, that we can conclude beyond what is contained in our premises,—that from intuition of the soul, without any intuition of an objective reality distinguishable from it, we can conclude that which is distinguishable

from it, and in fact its creator and preserver. But reasoning never supplies its own premises, and can operate only on premises given; hence the premises are called *data*. They must be given, that is, intellectually apprehended, prior to reasoning, and must be intuitively evident, or science is not possible, and the reasoning concludes nothing. If intuition supplies only psychological *data*, gives us only the soul for our premises, or our *principium*, we can conclude only the soul. To conclude something beyond, we must have intuition of something beyond, and therefore to conclude God we must have intuition of that which is really God, although not without reflection distinctly known to be God; that is, he must be really given us in our *principium*, or intuitive premises. As Mr. Francis Newman does not concede this, but avowedly proceeds from purely psychological *data*, his system necessarily excludes God, and all objective reality, and is mere egoism, and in the last analysis mere nullism.

But our difficulties with Mr. Francis Newman's doctrine do not end here. The theology he proposes to construct from the natural history of the soul is natural theology, that is, what we call philosophy; and as he derives it from the *natural* history of the soul, and denies all supernaturally revealed and all traditional *data*, it is evident that he proposes to construct it by the independent operations of his natural reason alone. He then assumes two things. First, philosophy is an independent discipline, and secondly, reason by her own light and energy, without the aid of tradition or the light of faith, is competent to construct it. We can admit neither of these assumptions. Philosophy is not properly an independent discipline, and it is not possible without faith or supernatural revelation to construct for even the natural order a complete and coherent system of philosophy, or of natural theology.

Others than Mr. Francis Newman, it is true, maintain that philosophy is and should be an independent discipline, and that it can be constructed by natural reason alone. Some go so far in this direction, as to maintain that moral obligation may be asserted even on the supposition that there is no God, and that a respectable code of atheistical ethics is not impossible. But all moral obligations, even in the natural order, and the natural relations of men, are resolvable into the single obligation to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, or to render unto him, as

our final cause, the tribute of our whole being; and therefore no moral obligation is conceivable without God. The atheist may practically observe some of the precepts of the moral law, but if there were no God there could be no moral law, and therefore no morality; as an atheist may be a geometrician, but, as St. Thomas says, if there were no God there could be no geometry. Morality does not consist in fitness, propriety, or utility. Its basis is not the Greek *νόμος*, but the Latin *lex*, which imports on the one hand authority which has the right to command, and on the other a subject bound to obey. It implies the supreme lawgiver and the obligation of obedience, and therefore is inconceivable without God; for neither men nor nature have in themselves any legislative authority, or lawmaking faculty.

No doubt, as a matter of fact, the atheist has the conception of justice, or sense of duty, and therefore, to some extent, does hold himself bound to observe what is due from man to man, as well as from man to society; and this we suppose is all that they really mean, who assert the possibility of atheistical ethics. But this conception of justice, or of duty, is manifestly an inconsequence in the atheist, and wholly incompatible with his atheism; for the denial of God is really the denial of justice. God is justice, and justice in itself, and therefore there can be justice aside from him only by participation of his justice. Doubtless, the atheist can have the conception of justice without any distinct or reflex conception of God, but not without a conception of that which really is God, though he may not take note, or even deny, that it is God. The conception depends on the intuition of God, which, as we have seen, is an element of every intellectual act. The fact that even the atheist has it is not a proof that atheism and morality are compatible one with the other, but that no man can wholly divest himself of the virtual conception of God, or make himself really, truly, and consistently an atheist; for let him do his best, there will always be at the bottom of his thought intuition of God.

We therefore deny the possibility of atheistical morals, and we even go further and deny the possibility of constructing a code of natural ethics, theology, or philosophy, by reason alone. We say nothing in the present discussion of the purely industrial, or strictly material order; but aside from that order, whatever he may be within it, man is neither an

inventor, nor an original discoverer of truth, and is restricted in his knowledge to what has been taught him, and at first immediately by God himself. This is as true of that portion of his knowledge which pertains to the natural order as of that portion which pertains to the supernatural order. What man in the pride of his heart calls his progress in philosophical, ethical, political, and social science, is but a forgetting, is but his departure from truth, and unhappy fall into error. He walks securely only as he walks in the path of instruction,—in the light, only as he walks in the wisdom of the fathers in primitive tradition, under the guidance of its divinely assisted and protected guardians.

The truth man has been taught from the beginning is twofold,—truth pertaining to the natural order, and truth pertaining to the supernatural order; but both were taught by supernatual revelation to the first man,—save further explications of the supernatural subsequently made by our Lord and his apostles,—as two parts of one whole, and in the Holy Scriptures they are never found separated, or even formally distinguished from each other. In the Holy Scriptures philosophy is never disengaged from theology, or reason from faith; or if St. Paul, for instance, sometimes distinguishes philosophy, and seems to speak of it as an independent discipline, it is only to condemn it, as the folly of the gentiles, to declare its impotence and vanity, and to bid the faithful to beware of being spoiled or deceived by it. The sacred writers and even the doctors of the church treat the two orders of truth uniformly as one complex body of truth, neither able, in the present providence, to subsist without the other, as they always treat man himself as a being with a single, never with a twofold destiny. The man of Christian theology, though a natural creature and endowed with reason, exists only in a supernatural providence, destined either to a supernatural recompense or to a supernatural punishment. He has no natural destiny, for he is not in a state of pure nature; and if no natural destiny, it is certain that he can have no independent natural discipline. Every such discipline must be adapted to an order which does not exist, and to a purely imaginary man.

Let it not be objected, that we confound the natural and supernatural, and therefore identify either faith with philosophy or philosophy with faith. We no more confound the natural and supernatural, than the theologian confounds nature and grace, when he says nature accomplishes nothing

without grace, and grace always supposes nature. Reason and faith stand in the same relation to each other in which stand nature and grace; and as man cannot fulfil even the law of nature without the assistance of grace, so reason cannot construct for even the natural order an adequate philosophy or theology, without the light of faith, as all imply who attempt to prove from reason alone the necessity of supernatural revelation. Yet as we distinguish in the meritorious act, without separating them, the part of nature and the part of grace, since there is no such act without the concurrence of both nature and grace, so in the truth transmitted us, or presented for our assent, we distinguish, but also without separating them, a part belonging to the natural order, and a part belonging to the supernatural order. The two parts are distinguishable, but both must mutually concur to make either the perfect theologian or the perfect philosopher. Theology is mutilated without the rational element, indeed inconceivable, as grace would be without nature; and philosophy without the light of supernatural faith, or separated from the revelation of the supernatural order, would be unable even to state its problems, and would fall not to the level of reason merely, but far below it.

The natural and supernatural truth are distinguishable, but not separable, first, objectively, in that they pertain to two different creations, and, second, subjectively, as to the conditions on which we assent to them, or affirm them. The natural is evident *per se*, or intuitively evident to natural reason; the supernatural is not evident *per se*, and is assented to or affirmed by us only on the authority of God revealing it. The former is reason or philosophy; the latter is faith, and, when drawn out by reflection and its several propositions placed in their logical relation with one another and with reason, supernatural or Christian theology. So, in saying both are originally given supernaturally by divine revelation, and therefore in admitting no distinction between them as to the mode or manner in which they are made objects of the reflective understanding, we do not, as some suppose, fall into the absurdity either of basing philosophy on faith, or faith on philosophy. We give a supernatural basis for faith, and a rational basis for philosophy, which is all that is required to save science on the one hand, and faith on the other.

The point to be observed here is, that, while we adopt the ordinary distinction between faith and reason, theology and

philosophy, we reject the doctrine contended for by rationalists, that the principles of philosophy are originally *discoverable* by natural reason. These, when they admit Christianity, distinguish the two, by defining faith or theology as embracing all the matter supernaturally revealed, and philosophy as embracing all those first truths which are not only evident to natural reason, but discoverable by it. But we deny that the principles of philosophy are ever distinctly discoverable by natural reason, although they are when stated intuitively evident to it. We make a distinction between being intuitively evident when presented to reflection, and being intuitively discoverable and presentable to reflection. We assert, indeed, against the psychologists, direct intuition of the ontological principles of all philosophical science, but we do not assert, nay, we deny, that reflection takes the principles immediately from intuition, because intuition is always indistinct and indeterminate, and because man is not a pure intelligence, but an intelligence united to a body, and has never in this life that sort of intuitive vision of intelligibles which supersedes reflection as essential to distinct science. Intuition affirms the principles, but does not teach them, or present them as objects of distinct and reflex thought. It is itself a universal and permanent fact, inseparable from the human intellect, and is really what is ordinarily called reason, when reason is distinguished from the intellectual faculty, and from the habit or act of reasoning. The real purport of what we affirm in affirming it is, that reason as so distinguished, instead of being a faculty of the soul, is a real intuition by the soul of the intelligible world. The importance of this, in settling the question of the validity of science, or of our cognitions, is very great. All demonstration rests, in the last analysis, on reason as thus distinguished. If, as most modern philosophers maintain, we assume reason to be a faculty of the soul, we assert only a psychological basis of certainty; and we may ask the value of this basis, and what is the voucher for reason itself. Having only reason, a psychological faculty, with which to answer, we are involved in a paralogism from which there is no escape but absolute scepticism. But understanding that it is not a faculty of the soul, but a real intuition of the intelligible world, affirming simply, not itself, but the object apprehended, we can ask no such questions, and scepticism becomes absurd and inconceivable. Proof or demonstration is then conclusive; for it rests on

immediate intuition of the principle, and therefore on a real ontological basis.

The instrument of distinct science is reflection, in which the mind returns upon or rethinks the matter of the intuition; and the instrument of all reflection in the intelligible order, as distinguishable from the sensible, is language,—a sensible sign by which the primitive intuition is repeated, or its object presented anew to the mind and held there till the mind distinctly seizes it. The principle when thus presented, or re-presented, is immediately evident, or immediately affirmed, by virtue of the primitive and permanent intuition. With all the intuition of the intelligible we claim for man, he would be practically unable to make any distinct affirmation either to his own reflex consciousness or to others, if deprived of language and of all direct or indirect instruction through the medium of words or signs of some sort, repeating to reflection the matter of intuition. Hence M. de Bonald was right when he asserted that man cannot think, or, as we say, *reflect*, without language, and thus refuted those who allege that language is a human invention. Language is as essential to reflection as the algebraic signs are to the algebraist, and as man evidently could not invent it without reflection, it must have been a divine creation and given to our first parents by their Creator. God in giving to the first man language must have given him the understanding of it, that is, infused into him with language the significance of language, or the knowledge of the truth it contains or is fitted to signify, and therefore all the principles of moral, philosophical, political, and social science that belong to our order of intelligence,—the principles of the whole science of the natural order, or what is evident *per se* to natural reason; in like manner as through the infallible language of the church he has given us in addition all the truth he has revealed of the supernatural order. Both orders of truth are alike taught us or communicated to us through the medium of language, and both have been preserved by language, and transmitted in substance from the first man by tradition from hand to hand even down to us, unseparated, in their unity and integrity, through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Christian church, but out of the church altered, broken, corrupted, and travestied, as they are in all gentilism and heresy.

In the view taken here, two errors are avoided, which have vitiated much modern speculation. M. Cousin claims

for man intuition of the intelligible, of what he calls absolute idea, or ideas of the infinite, the true, the beautiful, and the good, that is, of the principles of all science; but he supposes the reflective understanding takes them immediately from the intuition. This is the grand error of our modern Transcendentalists. It implies that man knows all that is intelligible to him at once, and distinctly, by direct and immediate intuition, thus denying the possibility of error, and claiming infallibility for every man. It places the new-born babe and the full-grown man, the simple rustic and the ripe scholar, on the same level as to knowledge. Hence instruction, study, reflection, reasoning, become quite superfluous, for all knowledge is obtained by immediate and open vision, than which nothing is more false or absurd. The error lies in supposing that reflection discovers its principles immediately in intuition, or, what is the same thing, that intuition itself distinguishes and determines its objects. This error is avoided by the doctrine that reflection takes its principles from language, as represented through the medium of words, and only finds them affirmed by immediate intuition.

M. de La Mennais fell into an opposite error, by denying that any thing is evident *per se* to natural reason, and reposing the principles of science for their certainty on faith. This seems to us to be the error of the estimable M. Bonnetty, with whose general spirit and tendency we sympathize not a little. He maintains that we know the principles of philosophy, that is, distinctly apprehend them, only as they are supernaturally revealed and taught us through the medium of words. Thus far we go with him; but is what is taught formally assented to on the authority of the teacher or revealer? Then it is received on testimony, and philosophy is identified with faith, and science is denied to be possible. But if science be impossible, how establish the credibility of the testimony, or the competency of the authority? Nay, how do we apprehend or take cognizance of the principles taught, or of the fact that they are taught at all? Deny to man all power of knowing, deny that any thing is evident to him *per se*, and he becomes as little the subject of faith as of science. There must be somewhere, in some form, a *nexus* between science or reason and faith, or faith itself becomes wholly unreasonable, and therefore impossible. M. Bonnetty's doctrine, as we understand it, demolishes science to make way for faith, as Lutheranism

demolishes free-will to make way for grace, and loses both in an inevitable and universal scepticism, as Lutheranism loses grace by leaving it no subject. This fatal consequence is avoided, by understanding that the truths taught us pertaining to the natural order, and constituting the principles of philosophy, do not rest, when taught, on the authority of the teacher, but are evident *per se*, or intuitively evident, affirmed by primitive and unfailing intuition.

Understanding now that the principles of philosophy are obtained neither immediately from direct intuition, nor by way of induction from psychological *data*, but from language in which, so to speak, they are incarnated, it is evident that the method of philosophy or of natural theology cannot be, as Mr. Francis Newman assumes, that of psychological observation and induction, or the natural history of the soul. Nothing is more fatal than the Baconian method applied to philosophy, to the moral and intellectual sciences, and it is due to the memory of Bacon, a great though not a good man, to say, that he himself proposed his method as applicable only to the purely physical sciences, and expressly asserted its inapplicability to the moral and intellectual,—a fact his English and American disciples generally remember to forget. The Baconian method in the physical sciences, which are only secondary, is legitimate enough, because those sciences deal with sensible objects, which can be observed and distinguished without the medium of language, so long as they remain in their proper sphere below philosophy and under its dominion; but it is inapplicable in the region of philosophy, which deals solely with principles, that is, with non-sensibles, or intelligibles [*intelligibilia*, *νοήτα*], it is inapplicable, because the object cannot be observed and studied in the intuition, since to all observation an object sensibly represented is essential, and in the intelligible order language is the only sensible representation possible. In philosophy, then, the only proper method is to take the *principium* or *primum philosophicum*, that is, the *primum ontologicum*, from language, and proceed by way, not of observation, but of ratiocination, bringing every conclusion in the last analysis to the test of intuition. This is what we call the synthetic as opposed to the analytic, and the ontological as opposed to the psychological method.

It is evident that if, in philosophizing, we must take our principles, that is, the ontological *data*, from language, we can take them only as we are taught them, for it is only by

instruction that we do or can learn the signification of words. Words are no signs to us, but unmeaning sounds or characters, till we are taught what they signify. Hence philosophy or natural theology is not possible by the independent operations of individual reason alone, and no individual deprived of all instruction and left to the operations of his own individual mind could ever attain to philosophy or natural theology, either as to its principles or its conclusions. Instruction is indispensable; the elders must instruct the juniors, as we assert in sending our children to school, or in providing masters for them. But the elders, for the same reason, cannot teach unless they have been taught, and hence there must have been an unbroken series of instructors or teachers till we arrive at the first man, and him God himself must have instructed,—since for him no other instructor is conceivable. So in philosophy, as well as in faith, we must assert divine revelation and tradition, and whoever denies the former or breaks the thread of the latter fails in philosophy as much as he does in religion. To deny revelation and break away from tradition is the way, not to philosophize, but to remain fools all our life long. In philosophical science, as in Christian dogmas, the method of ascertaining or knowing what is to be held is one and the same, namely, that of instruction, of learning from the teacher, though in the latter we take the truth learned on the authority of the teacher, because it is not intrinsically evident to reason, and in the former on the authority of the intuition, or its intrinsic evidence.

But to true philosophy, then, as well as to true religion, it is necessary that language from which we take our principles should be preserved and handed down to us in its unity and integrity, and that the teachers have an infallible understanding of its sense. If language has become corrupt, as indeed our modern pantheists are corrupting it, or if the teachers have lost its original sense, in whole or in part, philosophy is vitiated in its source, and serves only to mislead. True philosophy becomes impossible, and we have for schools of philosophy only schools of sophistry, error, and vain speculations. But as language is preserved, even as to the natural order, uncorrupted, in its original purity and integrity, only in the church or orthodox society, and as its original sense is retained unimpaired only in the divinely assisted and protected teachers of the church, it is evident that it is impossible to have sound

philosophy out of the orthodox society, and that schism and heterodoxy in an ecclesiastical or theological sense involve schism and heterodoxy in a philosophical sense. The gentile philosophy was schismatic and heterodox, and deserves no respect any further than it follows primitive tradition. It contains many fragments of truth, but it is always, systematically considered, even in its two greatest masters, Plato and Aristotle, radically false, for it always mistakes the fact of creation, the creative act of God, by which the world and all things therein are created from nothing. Gentile philosophy has no knowledge of the first verse of Genesis. Gentilism itself was the Protestantism of the old world, the falling away of the nations from the patriarchal traditions, as Protestantism is the gentilism of the modern world, the apostacy of the Protestant nations from the traditions of the church; and neither, how much soever it may philosophize, ever attains to sound philosophy. Either may have its schools, sects, or systems, but they only recall the confusion of tongues at Babel. No sound philosophy is ever to be looked for out of the church, because out of her language is confounded or corrupted, and the chain even of scientific tradition is broken.

But even in the bosom of the church it fares no better with those individuals who attempt to disengage philosophy from theology, reason from faith, and study to build up, distinct from the supernatural theology, a system of pure rationalism. We have even amongst ourselves a great diversity of philosophies or philosophisms, and not seldom do we find men able to preserve their orthodoxy only at the expense of their logic, as in the case of the excellent Abbate Rosmini. The reason of this is obvious enough. When a Catholic waives his theology, and turns his back on the supernatural light of faith, and enters upon the field of independent philosophical speculation, he foregoes all the advantages of his Catholicity, and places himself on a level with the ancient Greek or the modern Protestant, and there is no reason conceivable why he should succeed better than a heathen or an infidel. Moreover, success is impossible in the very nature of the case, because man since the fall is neither in the state of integral, nor even of pure nature. In his present state, he has no natural destiny, and his reason does not suffice for his reason, nor his nature for his nature; otherwise we could never conclude the necessity of supernatural reparation from his present infirmities, and it

would not be true that medicinal grace is necessary to enable us to fulfil the law of nature. Every system of pure rationalism denies this, and proceeds on the assumption that man has a natural destiny, or at least, that in thought we can abstract him from the supernatural providence in which he now exists, and construct a system of philosophy, of metaphysics, and ethics, that would be true and comformable to his intellectual and moral state, were he, as he is not, and probably never was, in a state of pure nature. Every such system proceeds, then, from false or at least unreal premises, and can at best end only in falsehood or vain abstractions. The only safe way of reasoning is, to reason from man as he is, and not from him as he is not, and what is wanted is a discipline adapted to his present state, to his actual condition in the present providence, not a discipline adapted to some imaginary state or condition, which is not and cannot be real.

The grand heresy of our times is rationalism,—rationalism in religion, in politics, and in morals; natural theology is set up against revealed, the state against the church, and morals against religion; and all this has originated, not in the denial of supernatural revelation outright, but in attempting to assert the independence of reason in the natural order. The state did not begin to assert its independence by denying the divine authority of the church, or what is the same thing, its obligation to be Christian, but by disengaging the temporal from the spiritual, and asserting its supremacy in its own order,—claiming at first to be only the friend and ally of the church, then her protector, and then her master and oppressor. Just so has it been in the philosophical order. Abelard, the father of modern rationalism, only sought to disengage philosophy from revealed theology, to erect it into a separate and independent discipline, supreme only in its own order. His philosophy would be the friend and ally of Catholic theology, would even serve her by vindicating her titles; but, under pretence of proving her titles, it assumed the right to sit in judgment on her dogmas, and therefore to be her judge and master. The movement, thanks to St. Bernard and the Roman See, received a check for a time; but ere long it manifested itself anew; and, strengthened by the political rationalism of Louis of Bavaria and Louis the Twelfth of France, and by the revival of Greek literature, it gradually became formidable, mastered some of the late scholastics, disputed the empire of the

schools in the sixteenth century, won the victory in the seventeenth, and enjoyed its triumph in the eighteenth in the worship of an infamous prostitute as the Goddess of Reason. This tendency to rationalism manifests itself now everywhere, though not without some earnest voices to protest loudly against it. Unhappily, it is not confined to persons out of the church. In the church even we find men deeply affected by it, and, as they cannot indulge it in matters strictly of faith, they seem resolved to indulge it to the utmost extent in all else. But it would be well to bear in mind, that to contend for a system of rationalism in regard to matters *extra fidem* is not only to prepare a rival to faith, but to assume that there is a body of truth, and therefore a real good, for man without faith, which is not true, and thus, instead of weakening, to strengthen the very world, the flesh, and the devil, which as Christians we are compelled to renounce and to wage unremitting war against. Let it not be supposed that we are to cure the prevailing disease of our times by homœopathic prescriptions. The maxim *similia similibus curantur* is of as little value in relation to moral as to physical diseases, and as in the latter all trustworthy practitioners adhere to the principles of medical tradition, so in the former all sound doctors rely on the church and her teaching.

St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and all the great doctors of the church, are able reasoners, and some of them now and then, it is true, seem to recognize a *quasi* independence in philosophical discipline; but it will be found that they accept and use philosophy only as the rational element of theology. They use reason in the service of religion, and whenever they discuss questions of pure reason it is always with an eye to supernatural theology, and by the supernatural light of faith. They regard philosophy, not as the independent ally of theology, or, as we Yankees say, "help," but as the *ancilla*, or *slave* of revelation, with no independence or will of her own, and bound to do the bidding of her mistress. They compel her to serve, and to serve faith, her mistress, not herself, or mere rationalism, whether a rationalism assumed to be above or below faith. Hence, although we always find them making a free and noble use of reason, we never find in them a philosophy disengaged from theology, and presented as a separate and complete body of independent rational truth. They are Christian theologians, and philosophers only in that they are Christian theologians.

They have true theology, and therefore they have always sound philosophy, that is, sound reason. But all, whether in or out of the church, who undertake to build up an independent philosophy, that is, a system of pure rationalism, are sure to fall into grievous errors, even as to the rational order itself.

We repeat that it must be so, because man is in a supernatural providence, not in a state of integral, or even pure nature. Being in a supernatural providence, if the words mean any thing, he has no natural destiny, that is, no destiny lying in the plane of his nature as it now is, or to which he can attain by his unassisted natural powers. Manifestly, then, his nature has no purely natural good, and therefore does not suffice for itself. It follows necessarily, then, that his reason alone cannot construct a system of rational truth complete and coherent in its own order, for truth is only the intellectual phase of good. Philosophy deals with principles, and last principles as well as first; it embraces always ethics, and ethics have always reference to final causes. If man has only a supernatural destiny, his final cause cannot be in the natural order, and consequently simple natural ethics must be impossible and absurd; and so then must also be the philosophy that not only asserts, but undertakes to teach them. What is the significance of a system of doctrines constructed in relation to the state of pure nature, and on the supposition that man has a natural destiny, when it is conceded that the state of pure nature does not exist, and that there is and can be no natural destiny?

As nature subsists, though in a supernatural providence, questions of reason will arise, and must of course be solved; but they must be solved under the conditions of the providence in which we are, that is, in relation to supernatural theology. All rational questions needing to be solved can be solved, one after another, when taken up in connection with the dogma or theological principle to which they are related. When the revealed truth raises the question of pure reason, then is the time to settle it, because then it is raised in the form in which it can be settled, and reason is then, and then only, in the proper state to settle it. It is only by the light of Catholic faith that we can truly state even rational problems, and reason cannot solve them unless they are truly stated, that is, proposed to the understanding according to the truth of things. Who has not found that,

in discussing a point with another, the chief difficulty is to make him understand the state of the question, the precise point in issue? A question properly asked is already virtually answered, unless a question as to simple matters of fact. But it is only Catholic faith that can rectify our point of sight, or place us in the position from which even questions of reason can be seen in their real character and relations; for it is only from the point of view of supernatural faith that we see the natural universe in its real order, in the real relations of the several parts to one another, and of the whole to God as its first and as its last cause. We could not philosophize at all without the principle that God is, and creates the world and all things therein, and creates them for himself, as final cause, or *finis propter quem;* and this principle, although when stated in language and subjected to reflection, it is evident *per se* to natural reason, could never have been distinctly known or practically available without supernatural revelation, and is attainable by us only from tradition as embodied in the catechism.

Clearly, then, Mr. Francis Newman's doctrine, which is not only rationalism, but mere psychological rationalism, cannot be even entertained, and would deserve no respectful consideration as a system, even if it were conceded that we have received no revelation of a supernatural order; for without revelation and tradition, by reason alone, man is utterly unable to construct even a complete and self-coherent system of rationalism, and for the best of all reasons, because he does not exist in a purely rational order. Our preliminary difficulties in the way of Mr. Francis Newman's theory are of themselves conclusive against it. We have no occasion to go beyond his title-page. That asserts his principle and method. His principle being false, and his method vicious, his theory, though it may contain by a happy inconsistency some slight traces of rational truth, must be, as a theory, utterly worthless, and, as far as it goes, mischievous. It is entirely unnecessary for us to take it up and examine it in detail, It is clearly antichristian and repugnant to sound reason, and having refuted it in principle, we may dismiss it as unworthy of any further consideration; for a man who starts wrong, and travels in a wrong direction, is pretty sure never to reach the goal.

In fact, in what we have said we have had no special reference to Mr. Newman as an individual author. We heve aimed to discuss rather the general question the princi-

ples and method of his book raise in the mind of the theologian. Our purpose has been to refute his psychological rationalism, and to vindicate the ontological method of philosophizing, not for the sake of substituting ontological rationalism in the place of the psychological, but for the sake of demolishing rationalism altogether, and bringing the student back to tradition and the method of the catechism. What we really oppose is every system of pure rationalism, whether psychological or ontological. Logic, which teaches us to use and to make a good use of reason, we respect, we demand, and consequently we honor reason; but we have, and we want, no philosophy any further than it enters as the rational element of true Christian theology. We have never known any good purpose answered by your independent philosophies or philosophisms. The attempt to disengage the rational from the supernatural element, and to give it an independent discipline, whether it be in the form of Gallicanism, natural ethics as distinguished from revealed religion, or metaphysics as disjoined from supernatural theology, never comes to any good, and we have never yet met a system of philosophy, that is, of pure rationalism, ancient or modern, that we could not push logically either to pantheism or nihilism. The spirit that leads men to attempt the separation is at bottom a schismatic and heretical spirit, and we owe to its prevalence most of the schisms, heresies, and moral disasters of the last three or four hundred years, and we wish to protest not only against its effects, but against the spirit itself. They who cherish it are unwilling to admit the universal supremacy under God of the church, but wish to have at least a subordinate sphere in which they can assert human independence, and be as gods knowing good and evil without having learned them. Let our readers ponder well, whether the spirit that dictates the wish is Christian or satanic.

For ourselves, we aimed to be a consistent rationalist, to spin all knowledge, spider-like, from our own bowels, till we found the thing was impossible. There was for us no alternative but rationalism, and with it nihilism, or the Catholic church and tradition. We were never able to comprehend, with our Anglican friends, a *via media* between truth and falsehood. Nihilism, therefore, pure rationalism, is pure falsehood, for pure falsehood is simply absolute negation. Then Catholicity must be true; for nothing else is or can be. We must then take the church as supreme, and as supreme

in the natural as well as in the supernatural order. Then nothing is independent of her, and as the vicegerent of God on earth she has authority over all disciplines, and in every department of life. Her appropriate sphere is universal, and whoever seeks in any thing to act as independent of her, sins against the very providence of God in which he is placed.

God has made us, and not we ourselves; he has made us for himself, to know, love, and serve him here, and to be happy with him for ever hereafter. This is our only end, the end of all life, and for this end and this alone, we are to live. If we live for this end and for this alone, there is and can be nothing else for us to care for. The earth, society, the state, instruction, education, are valuable only in relation to and as they subserve this end. The state, though it deals directly only with temporal matters, is bound to manage these matters themselves with sole reference to this the only end of man, and woe to the state that forgets it, that imagines itself free from the law which binds it in its temporal enactments to consult only the spiritual good of its subjects, for sooner or later it will fill up the measure of its iniquity. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, all the nations that forget God." Here is the most fearful condemnation of the rationalist politics that have reigned throughout all modern nations if we except Austria, and even her we cannot wholly except, and the bitter fruits of their madness are they now beginning to reap. The functions of the state are indeed secular, but it is bound to discharge them in relation to a spiritual end, and the spiritual end man himself is bound to seek. All life, individual, social, political, is by the law of God subordinated to this end, and has no legitimacy, no right, no morality, but as rendered subservient to it.

How it is to be subordinated and made subservient to this end, God has not left us to find out by our individual reason; he himself has condescended to teach us in his revelation, and continues to teach us by unfailing tradition, of which he has made the church the depositary, the divinely assisted and protected keeper and witness, teacher and judge. It is to her, that is, to her pastors, and especially to her chief pastor, the successor of St. Peter, that, directly or indirectly, all individuals, states and nations, subjects and rulers, must repair to learn their duty in the natural order and in the spiritual, for God has made her the judge of both laws, the natural and the supernatural, and in her courts made them

but one law. She is the keeper of the consciences of princes and peoples in all things, for she alone has received from God authority to teach and declare his law. This is what we must concede if we concede the church, or even truth at all. Men of the world, haughty statesmen, and proud philosophers may relnct at this, may turn away from it, and say they will never submit to an order so humiliating, so fatal to human independence; but that will not alter the truth, and it will still remain true that true wisdom and sound reason approve it. The church is Catholic, for she subsists through all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth. We may learn sophistry and error outside of her; we may have pride and slavery without her; but truth and freedom, real virtue and beatitude, only in and from her. Happy are they who as docile children delight to sit at her feet and learn the gracious truths that fall from her lips, who wish to be humble, faithful Christians, and desire nothing more.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ON CHRISTIANITY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1853.]

We have brought these works together, because, notwithstanding their very striking differences, they have certain points of resemblance, and are all three very properly ranged under the head of *Philosophical Studies on Christianity*. The author of the last-named work is Louis Veuillot, the principal editor of the *Univers Catholique*, a Parisian journal on which we offered some strictures in our *Review* for April last. After our strictures were in type, we received through the papers the *mandement* of the archbishop of Paris interdicting the *Univers* to the ecclesiastics and religious of his diocese. The archbishop censured the *Univers*, as we understand it, not for any error of doctrine or opinion, but for its inopportune discussions, its violent and sarcastic manner towards its Catholic opponents, the ridicule and contempt it was in the habit of showering upon those ecclesiastics, whatever their rank or respectability, who ventured to question its opinions or statements, and its want of proper respect for the episcopal character and office. The judgment formed of the *Univers* by the archbishop was the one we ourselves expressed in our strictures; but whether, in the actual state of things in France, it was expedient for him to pronounce it officially, is another question, but one of which, under the pope, he was the proper judge, and on which we have no right to express any opinion.

The real matter in issue, as usually happens in similar cases, had become somewhat complicated, and is not, we apprehend, well understood by the public generally. The *Univers*, and the journals friendly to it, as well as some opposed to it, pretended that it was opposed by the arch-

---

* 1. *Études philosophiques sur le Christianisme.* Par Auguste Nicholas. Ancien Magistrat. Nouvelle Édition, revue avec soin et augmentée. Paris. 1852.

2. *Ensayo sobre el Catolicismo, et Liberalismo, y el Socialismo, considerados en sus Principios fundamentales.* Por D. Juan Donoso Cortés, Marqués de Valdegamas. Madrid. 1851.

3. *Les Libres Penseurs.* Par Louis Veuillot. Seconde Édition, augmentée. Paris. 1850.

bishop of Paris, and other prelates and ecclesiastics, because it was a vigorous ultramontane journal, and edited principally by laymen. We have seen no evidence that such was the fact, and we are unable to perceive any necessary connection between the principal questions on which it encountered opposition and ultramontanism or Gallicanism. Certain it is, that among its opponents were found men as strong in their papistical tendencies, and as energetically opposed to the so-called "Gallican Liberties," as M. Louis Veuillot and his colleagues. Its opponents no doubt reminded its editors that they were laymen, but we suspect not precisely because they objected to journals conducted by laymen of a Catholic spirit and the requisite intellectual, theological, and literary qualifications, but because its editors often assumed in their discussions a tone and manner ill becoming laymen, who are neither judges of faith nor governors of the church. It has seemed to us that the *Univers* occasionally confounded the sentiment of the half-infidel secular press which dreaded its influence and evoked the old Gallican prejudices in the hope of crushing it, or at least of sowing divisions among the bishops and clergy of France, with that of the respectable body of Catholics who felt aggrieved by its course; and we cannot doubt that, with more prudence on its part, a gentler manner, and a sweeter temper in regard to persons, it might have maintained its ultramontanism, lay journal as it was, with all the energy it possessed, without falling under episcopal censure, or encountering any very serious opposition from the Catholic public. Even its warm friends and admirers, as may be gathered from the complimentary communication to Louis Veuillot from the secretary of Latin Letters, and the friendly criticisms of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, could not deny that its tone and manner towards the prelates and other ecclesiastics who differed from it were in no slight degree objectionable.

Louis Veuillot was in Rome when the archbishop of Paris published his *mandement*, and he lost no time in appealing from it to the Holy See, and in petitioning for a suspension of the interdict till the final decision of the case. The journals tell us, or insinuate, that he succeeded, and obtained a complete triumph over his metropolitan. But this must be a mistake. His petition does not appear to have been granted, and we have seen no evidence that his appeal was even entertained. There has been, if we may judge from the documents published, no decision in the case, favorable

or unfavorable to either party, and consequently for either party neither triumph nor defeat. If Rome has not confirmed the censure of the archbishop, neither has she reversed it, or, so far as we can discover, pronounced it undeserved. Undoubtedly, Rome has done something on the occasion of the difficulty between the *Univers* and its archbishop, but not precisely the thing that is pretended by those who through friendship or malice to the *Univers*, claim for it a complete triumph. It is well known, that on several questions agitated by the *Univers*, as on the subject of the *Univers* itself, the bishops of France were very nearly equally divided among themselves, and a violent controversy was threatened, which could hardly fail, without serving any good purpose, to be of serious disservice to the cause of religion. In view of this fact, the Holy Father, without touching the merits of the case as between the *Univers* and the archbishop of Paris, addressed an encyclical letter to the cardinals, archbishops, and bishops of France, in which he exhorts them to restore and maintain peace and concord among themselves; to encourage laymen of distinguished abilities and literary attainments, when animated by a truly Catholic spirit, to devote themselves to writing books or editing journals in defence of religion, and to reprove them when necessary with great prudence, Christian charity, and paternal tenderness; incidentally decides against the *Univers* the question as to the use of the pagan classics as text-books for the study of Greek and Latin; and reminds the French prelates of the necessity of rallying to the Chair of Peter as the rock on which the church is founded, and rests for its prosperity and well-being. Here is no judicial decision of the case, and what the Holy Father says affects at most merely the prudence of the archbishop in pronouncing his censure, and not the justice of that censure itself; far less does it declare the *Univers* to have been blameless. The archbishop of Paris, on receiving this letter, anxious to contribute what was in his power to promote the peace and concord it urged, hastened, *spontaneously*, as he himself declares, that is, of his own accord, without any order to that effect, to publish a second *mandement* removing the interdict he had placed on the *Univers*, trusting, we presume, to the assurances recently given by Louis Veuillot in its columns, that that journal would henceforth study to avoid the things he had felt it his duty to censure. The *Univers*, on finding the

interdict removed, thanks the archbishop for his generous conduct, and promises to amend its errors, and to labor to do nothing in future that may displease him. This is all that we can gather from the documents in the case, and this, if we have not lost our understanding, is victory or defeat for neither party. The matter between the archbishop and the *Univers* has been disposed of much to the joy of all good Catholics, not by a decision condemning or approving one of the parties, but by an amicable settlement, in which neither triumphs over the other.

Thus much we have felt it necessary, in passing, to say, in order to correct the false impressions produced by the statements of partisan or ill-informed journals. For ourselves, we are not aware that we have said any thing in our strictures that needs to be retracted, excused, or defended; and whatever the judgment we have expressed in regard to the *Univers*, we could read a decision of the Holy See unequivocally in its favor without any pain or mortification; for in the decisions of the Holy See truth and justice are always sure to triumph, and the triumph of truth and justice is precisely what in all cases we most ardently desire. But justice to the archbishop and those who have sustained him, as well as the truth of history, makes it necessary that the actual facts in the case should be truly represented. To represent either party in the case as triumphing over the other, is to do violence to the sense of justice, and to irritate the feelings of the party represented as defeated, and the unseemly exultation of some indiscreet friends of the *Univers* can only tend to revive the angry passions now happily by the voice of the common father of the faithful hushed to sleep, and to defeat the very object of the encyclical letter. The *Univers* is, no doubt, an able and brilliant journal, and its *rédacteur en chef* a rare man, characterized by many noble qualities, and one of those men who stamp themselves upon their times; but better that every journal in the world should perish, than that the peace of the church in a single country should be disturbed.

Journalism is a power in our modern society, but it is a power for evil as well as for good. Religious journalism has been instituted by the pastors of the church to counteract the evil effects of irreligious journalism, but as their servant, not as their master. As long as it is contented with its ancillary position and office, it will be of service to religion; but let it aspire to be a power in the bosom of

the church, let it once forget that its appropriate office is to circulate correct information among the faithful and to defend the church against her enemies, and commence agitating, after the manner of the secular press, for particular measures or a particular line of ecclesiastical policy, which depend for adoption on the pastors of the church, and it becomes, even if that policy or those measures are in themselves unexceptionable, dangerous, and can no longer be tolerated. The religious press must never aspire to exert a control over ecclesiastical administration, like that which the secular press exerts over political administration. The attempting to do it is the danger to which all religious journalism is exposed. In more than one Catholic journal, we think we have seen a disposition to meddle with ecclesiastical affairs, and to compel the divinely appointed pastors of the church to act, even against their own judgment or wishes, under the pressure of a public opinion brought by a ceaseless agitation to bear upon them. We regret this. The Holy Father in his encyclical letter, it is true, has approved, under certain conditions, of lay journalism, and exhorted the bishops to encourage laymen who are qualified to write and publish in defence of religion; but his exhortations are addressed to the pastors of the church, not to the laymen themselves, and he approves of lay journalism only as it approves itself to them. He has in nothing derogated from the canon, which prohibits laymen writing and publishing on religious and theological subjects without the permission of the Ordinary. We hold our right to edit our journal from the Holy See indeed, but only through our own bishop, and we have no right to continue it independently of his permission. We insist on this fact for the sake of religious journalism itself, no less than for the sake of order, which is always dear to every loyal heart.

But enough of this, and more than we intended. We return to the works before us. *Les Libres Penseurs*, or *The Free-Thinkers*, by Louis Veuillot, is a remarkable work, though somewhat local in its character, and such as cannot be fully appreciated out of France, except by persons who have more than ordinary familiarity with French literature and philosophy. It is rather a series of leading articles in a daily journal, than a book properly so called. It is written in Louis Veuillot's strong, nervous, and brilliant, but not very refined style, and is sometimes vituperative, rather than witty. We should like it better if it had more unction,

more sweetness of temper, and were less sneering and flippant in its tone. But it is marked by real genius, by a high order of intellect, and a glowing zeal for Catholic morality. It is one of the most scathing works we have ever read, and nothing can more effectually expose and cover with ridicule and contempt the arrogance, vanity, ignorance, credulity, absurdities, blasphemies, and scientific inanity of modern free-thinkers. Its strong and rough expressions, and its severe judgments, in some instances perhaps too severe, we are disposed to treat with forbearance, for in a work of this sort they are, if faults, faults which lean to virtue's side. The tone of the French apologists during the last century has never pleased us much. They always treated their infidel opponents with too much tenderness, with too great personal consideration, and we seldom read them without growing impatient, and breaking out, Pray let us have a little less politeness, a little less regard to personal dignity and decorum, and a little more earnestness and energy of thought and expression! It is hard beating down mud-walls with bouquets of roses. The more recent apologists have assumed a bolder tone, and though in the finish and amenities of style they fall somewhat below their predecessors, they are far more effective in execution. They are men terribly in earnest, who are not afraid of discomposing their features when they speak, nor easily startled at the sound of their own voices. They are not over learned, but they know their age from having shared its passions, and though often men of "one idea," often inexact in their thought and in their language, seeing only a particular aspect of the subject they are treating, and sacrificing all to that one aspect, they are devoted heart and soul to the truth, and able to burn their words into the very hearts of their readers. Among these men, who have during the last thirty years done so much for religion in France, Louis Veuillot holds a distinguished rank, and the work before us is the best thing we have seen from his pen.

The second work on our list, by that eminent Spanish statesman and devoted Catholic, the marquis of Valdegamas, better known as Donoso Cortés, is the work we referred to in our last *Review* as accused by the Abbé Gaduel, vicar-general of the bishop of Orleans, of containing grave errors against Catholic doctrine. We had not then, as we stated, read the work, and expressed no opinion of it, save on the condition that its critic had correctly represented its contents.

We have not yet seen the French translation, which the learned abbé appears to have had under his eye, but we have read the Spanish original, and we must say, in justice to its illustrious author, that the Abbé Gaduel's criticisms seem to us unreasonably severe, and in several respects wholly uncalled for, if not wholly unfounded. The very just remarks of the Abbé Gaduel on the rashness and presumption of laymen, without previous study and discipline, in writing and publishing on religious and theological topics, and without, before publishing, submitting their lucubrations to the revision of a competent theologian, do not appear to have been required in the present case, and are not precisely applicable to Donoso Cortés. The abbé complained that the noble author had published his work without having previously submitted it to the revision of a professional theologian; but his complaint seems to have been unfounded; for we read in front of the copy before us the following *Advertencia*:—

"Esta obra ha sido examinada en su parte dogmatica por uno de los teòlogos de màs renombre de Paris, que pertinece à la gloriosa escuela de los Benedictinos de *Solesmes*. El autor se ha conformado en la redaccion definitiva de su obra con todas sus observaciones."

The letter of the author to the *Univers*, on the occasion of the Abbé Gaduel's criticisms, we did not like, and it seemed to us to indicate an improper spirit; for surely an author, when his work is gravely accused, from a respectable quarter, of containing serious errors against sound doctrine, owes something more to the public than a general profession of obedience to the church. We are happy to know that Donoso Cortés takes the same view himself, and acknowledges in a letter to the Abbé Gaduel that the note in the *Univers* was not all, and was never considered by him as all he owed to the public, and assures him that he has submitted his work to the proper authorities for examination. This proves that the author recognizes the true ethics of the case, and, if ever a shadow of a doubt of his loyalty as a Catholic flitted across our mind, it completely dissipates it. Certain it is, that the author is not to be accused of rashness, of presumption, or of an undue reliance on or attachment to his own judgment; that he is humble, simple, and as docile as a child, and that, if there are errors in his book, they are unintentional, and errors of his head, in no sense errors of his heart.

It is not our province, nor are we competent, to judge this remarkable book. We have read it with intense interest. It is very abstract, very profound, and withal decidedly the most eloquent book we have ever met with in any language. Nothing can surpass the sweetness and harmony, the beauty and strength of its periods, the clearness and terseness of its expressions, and never has the noble Castilian tongue been used by a more, if an equally, consummate master. It is well worth reading and re-reading time and again for the grace and eloquence of its diction, and the artistic perfection of its style. As to the contents of the work, we certainly find in it all the passages extracted and commented on by the French critic, and those passages appear to have been faithfully translated; but we cannot persuade ourselves that the thought of the author, though perhaps not always expressed in the exact language of a professional theologian writing a dogmatical work, is deserving of grave censure, or really irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine. Unquestionably, if we should read the work with the presumption against it, and should take these passages without considering them in relation to their context and to the obvious intention of the author, we might easily convict the author of the very grave errors laid to his charge; but we know no reason for reading such a man as Donoso Cortés with the presumption against him, as the sense of the passages criticized seems to us to be materially modified and controlled by their context, and the general purpose and design of the author, of which the Abbé Gaduel does not appear to have made sufficient account.

The Abbé Gaduel is a learned theologian and an estimable man, for whom we entertain a very sincere respect, but we hope we may without offence suggest, that he perhaps is not the best fitted in the world to appreciate such a work as this of the marquis of Valdegamas. His mind by his studies has been cast in a scholastic mould, and the essay of the noble marquis is constructed in a manner foreign to his habitual forms of thought. He, too, is one of the principal writers for that generally excellent periodical, *L'Ami de la Religion*, and shares its feelings towards the *Univers*, whose principal editor published and highly praised the book of Donoso Cortés. Its author, therefore, became in some sense associated in his mind with Louis Veuillot and the *Univers*. On several questions controverted between the two journals, especially on that of the pagan classics, we have for ourselves

sympathized with the *Ami*, while on some, especially on those relating to philosophy, the natural law, and human rights, we have leaned to the side of the *Univers*. The *Univers* maintains that man, strictly speaking, has no rights, but duties only; and, as we gather from the *Ami*, cites in support of this doctrine, Donoso Cortés. The *Ami* opposes this doctrine, and contends that it is contrary to the uniform teaching of Catholic theologians on the law of nature, and the origin and legitimacy of human governments. In an article on *Rights and Duties* in our *Review*, we discussed this subject at length, and defended the assertion of Donoso Cortés, that "right on human lips is a vicious expression," against the very learned and able periodical, the *Civiltà Cattolica*, conducted at Rome by members of the illustrious Society of Jesus. In that article we maintained that, strictly speaking, only God has rights, and that man has only duties, and duties only to God; and we think we showed that this doctrine is in harmony with the real sense of the great doctors of the church, however repugnant at first sight it may appear to their ordinary forms of expression. No doubt we should guard against profane novelties even in words, but we should also be on our guard against being so enslaved to the mere words of the theologians as to miss their sense. Every age has its own specific wants and mode of thinking. Principles are eternal and invariable, but the mode of expressing and applying them, in a world where all is mutable, must vary with the ever-varying wants and circumstances of time and place. The dominant tendency of our age is to atheism,—to exclude God, and to put humanity or nature in the place of God. It is this tendency which it is now especially necessary to resist and guard against. If, with some of our modern writers, more attached, it would seem, to the letter than imbued with the sense of the great doctors of the church, we assign to nature a proper legislative power and represent it as competent to found rights and impose duties, or contend that man has rights of his own, in the strict sense of the word, we here and now compromise the great truths of religion, and strengthen the atheistical tendency of the age. Never in reality did any of our great theologians teach that nature has a true and proper legislative power, for they all teach that what they call the law of nature is law only inasmuch as it a transcript of the eternal law. They all teach, after St. Paul, that *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, that God is the

absolute lord and proprietor of the universe, that he is the fountain of all law, or sole legislator, because all dominion belongs to him. Without law, neither right nor duty is conceivable, and without God as absolute and universal legislator, law is an unmeaning term. All legislative power is his, because he is the creator and final cause of all things, by whom and for whom all things exist; and no one can rightfully exercise any legislative authority, but as his delegate or vicar. In strictness, he only has rights, because he only can impose duties. Then what we call human rights, whether rights of government or of subjects, are his rights and our duties, and duties only to him, and payable only to his order. These rights, nay, all the rights which our theologians deduce from the law of nature, are no doubt real rights, and neither individuals nor governments can violate any one of them without wrong,—a fact which it may be that those whom the *Ami de la Religion* opposes are not always careful to recognize, and which, if not recognized, renders the doctrine when applied to man in relation to human government favorable either to despotism or to anarchy; but though real rights, they are divine, not human, and their violation is not merely a crime against the individual, the state, or society, but, in the strict and proper sense of the word, a *sin* against God. This great truth, which underlies all Catholic teaching on the subject, but which the authorities do not always clearly and distinctly state, because in their time there was little danger of its being misapprehended, needs, it seems to us, to be now distinctly and prominently brought out, and earnestly insisted on as an elementary truth of which our age has nearly lost sight, and as the precise contradictory of its dominant heresy. Some learned and estimable men in France, as well as elsewhere, who appear to have learned the errors they are to combat from their libraries rather than the world in which those errors obtain, apparently overlook this important fact, and in their writings address themselves to a bygone age, instead of the one in which they are called upon to take an active part. We love and honor these excellent men, but we think that, in their laudable devotion to the scholastic forms of thought, it is possible that they have failed to apprehend the principles and meaning of the great masters in the sense, and to present them in the form, in which our age can understand them, and in which they stand directly opposed to its prevailing errors. Their learned labors are therefore not always as valuable and as effective as they themselves suppose, or as we could wish.

Finding themselves opposed, on this and other questions, to the *Univers*, and its editors citing Donoso Cortés as an authority against them, nothing more natural than that the writers of the *Ami* should undertake to ascertain the intrinsic value of that authority. Hence, as one of these writers, it is very possible, and perhaps not improbable, that the Abbé Gaduel approached the *Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism* not indisposed to find it unsound, or at best disinclined to take sufficient pains to fully master and appreciate its thought. Certainly his criticisms give us no clew to the real purpose of the author, what he proposed to do, or the principles on which he relies for the solution of the great problems with which he grapples. We might infer from his criticisms, that the noble marquis had attempted a dogmatic work on God, the Trinity, Creation, and Liberty; but it is no such thing. His Essay is designed as a refutation of Liberalism and Socialism, and a demonstration of the necessity and truth of Catholicity as the basis of the family, the state, and society, of private and public morality, of authority and liberty. It is the work of a Catholic statesman, rather than of a theologian, and its purpose is, not to teach theology, but to apply it to political and social life. It is very profound, as we have said, and it seeks to apply to the solution of the great political and social problems of the age the deepest and most abstruse principles of Christian mysticism. That in seizing, stating or illustrating these principles he falls into no error, would, we think, be saying too much; but the errors into which he falls, so far as we are able to judge, are incidental, are never the direct object aimed at, and do not affect the substance or general doctrine of his work.

The author seeks to find God in the type and law of the family, society, and the state, on the principle that the type or the *idea* of all created things is in the divine mind, and that God is not simply the Creator, but in some sense the similitude of all things, *similitudo rerum omnium*, as says St. Thomas. The great law of the universe, which has its origin in God himself, is that of unity in diversity, and diversity [distinction] in unity. Thus God is unity in essence and diversity in the persons of the Godhead, and a similitude of this unity and diversity runs through all things. It was not in illustration of the Trinity, as the Abbé Gaduel seems to have supposed, but in illustration of this universal law of unity in diversity, that the

author introduces the passage which his critic regarded as implying the error of the tritheists. If the author had been explaining the doctrine of the Trinity by the example of Adam and Eve and Abel, Adam as man father, Eve as man mother, and Abel as man son, three persons in one and the same human nature, he would certainly have favored tritheism; but as he was only illustrating the law of unity in diversity, which he calls the law *par excellence*, by which all things are explicable, and without which nothing can be explained, he cannot justly be accused of doing any thing of the sort. His illustration may be felicitous or infelicitous, but taken as an illustration of that law, it certainly cannot be cited as a proof that the author's views of the mystery of the Trinity are unorthodox, especially as he had just stated the doctrine with dogmatic precision.

Proceeding on this universal law, the author shows how Catholicity forms the basis of all true science, politics, and morals, and exposes the fundamental vice of both liberalism and socialism, inasmuch as each contravenes the law of unity in diversity, the former asserting diversity without unity, and necessarily ending in anarchy, and the latter asserting unity without diversity, and necessarily ending in despotism. Liberalism destroys all authority, socialism all liberty; whereas Catholicity, based itself on the law of unity in diversity, accepts and reconciles both. In treating the subject of liberty itself, the author seems to us now and then to pass unconsciously from liberty in one sense to liberty in another; and thus to fall into some confusion, if not error. He says that the views on the subject of liberty which have hitherto prevailed are false in every point; but he seems to have said this simply because he erred as to what is, and always has been, the general doctrine of Catholic theologians. He says the general doctrine is, that the essence of liberty or free will is in the faculty of choosing good and evil, which attract it with two contrary solicitations; but this is a mistake, for all concede, that God is free, and that, in virtue of the perfection of his own nature, he cannot choose evil. Yet the author does not really deny that the liberty of choosing good or evil is essential to the free will of man in his present imperfect and probationary state, which is here the main point. Still, we are not quite satisfied with all the author says on this subject, nor are we quite sure that we always seize his exact meaning; but even the Abbé Gaduel does not go so far as to charge him with emitting on free will any absolutely heretical opinions.

This much we have felt it necessary to say, in justice to the distinguished author, who, we learn as we are writing these remarks, died at Paris on the evening of the 3d of May last. Few men could have died whose death would have affected us more painfully, or whose loss we should have more deeply deplored. In his youth and early manhood, we have been told, he, like so many of us of his generation, was affected by the modern liberal and irreligious doctrines which are even yet so widely prevalent. But his reflections and experience, aided by the grace of God, had revived in him the Catholic faith which he had received in his infancy, called him back to repose in peace on the bosom of the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, and ranged him on the side of the friends of liberty and authority. He was among the ablest, the most learned, the most eloquent and unwearied of that noble band of laymen, who, beginning with De Maistre, have from the early years of the present century devoted their talents and learning, their genius and their acquirements, to the service of religion, and done so much honor to themselves and our age in their eminently successful labors to restore European society, shaken by the French Revolution, to its ancient Catholic faith, and to save it alike from the horrors of anarchy and the nullity of despotism. He had, in the last few years of his life, done much, and done it nobly, and we had hoped that he would be permitted to do still more, for the battle has ever to be renewed day by day. But it has pleased the Great Disposer of all events to call him from his labors to his rest. Our loss, and it is great, we doubt not is his gain, and we must acquiesce. Yet we feel that he could ill be spared, and we fear it will be long before the blank he has left will be filled. Honor to his memory, thanks to God for the good he has done, and may his mantle fall upon many a young disciple, who, stimulated by his example, will labor to console us for his loss. Not in vain do such men live, not in vain do such men die; alike in life and in death do they serve the cause of truth and love.

More we had intended to say of his masterly *Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism*, for what we have said can give our readers no adequate conception of its merits; but as we should also have to find some fault with it not precisely of the kind noticed by his French critic, we have no heart to do it. The work is before the public,—an

original and profound work, on the loftiest themes which can occupy the human mind,—and if it has errors, they are of a sort that will do little harm, while its truths are such as need in our days an eloquent voice, such as are always necessary to the direction of human life, and such as can never grow obsolete. As the last word that has come to us from its illustrious and now lamented author, we treasure it in our heart, remembering in it only the true, the beautiful, and the good, and willingly forgetting whatever a nice critic might find in it defective or inexact. It is the earnest word of a brave man, of a loyal heart, and a sincere Catholic, who, we may hope, is now with the redeemed and sanctified in heaven.

The first-named work on our list, *Études philosophiques sur le Christianisme*, is an able and interesting apology—in the old sense of the word—for the Christian religion. It has been flatteringly received in France, highly commended by the best judges, and obtained for its pious and learned author distinguished marks of approbation and encouragement from the Holy Father himself. The author was originally a lawyer, and susequently a civil magistrate, or judge, of rare merit. He is evidently a good man, a man who prays at the foot of the cross, and whose heart and soul are thoroughly imbued with his religion. He has studied his subject conscientiously, and appears to have mastered all the philosophical, historical, and scientific knowledge necessary to its successful treatment. His style is lucid, manly, and unaffected, and occasionally rises into eloquence. His mind is of a high order, strong and healthy, well disciplined, and commendable for its modesty and sobriety. We find nothing ultra or exaggerated either in his opinions or his statements, and his arguments are as persuasive as convincing. He is naturally led to regard the moral aspect of his subject rather than its purely intellectual aspect, and though he loves truth, he is chiefly affected by it under the form of the good, as the object of the will. He has written his work to do good, not to gain a name for himself, though a name he has gained, and his work will do good for time and eternity, wherever honestly studied.

Yet, estimable as is this new apology, and as highly as we appreciate it, we do not think it entitled to rank with the *De Civitate Dei* of St. Augustine, or the *Summa Contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas, the two great works against un-

believers, and which every one who would defend Christianity for this or any other age should begin by studying. We do not suppose that we are to take the approbation and encouragement the author has received as a sanction by the church of every opinion or statement in his book, or as a guaranty of its absolute freedom from imperfection, or even error. Rome is exceedingly tolerant. She wishes, as we may learn from the recent encyclical letter to the cardinals, archbishops, and bishops of France, that earnest-minded Catholics, of distinguished abilities and attainments, should be encouraged to devote their talents, their literary and scientific acquirements, and their enlightened zeal to the defence of religion; and that the pastors of the church should treat their short-comings, and even their errors, with great indulgence and paternal tenderness. She knows that to err is human, and she exacts infallibility of no one. When the work written is not a purely dogmatic work, or a work expressly intended to teach the faith, and is fitted, upon the whole, to exert a salutary influence, to correct prevalent errors, or to commend religion to the intellect or the heart of those who are prone to treat it with indifference or contempt, she is never severe against the slight errors which it may contain, and which spring, not from bad faith, but from human infirmity, inadvertence, or the lack of exact information, and which are merely incidental, and do not affect its main purpose, doctrine, or argument. It is in this spirit of encouragement and tolerance that she uniformly treats able and distinguished authors, who in good faith devote themselves to the defence of religion. In this spirit, we presume, the archbishop of Paris has removed the interdict from the *Univers*, although far from being satisfied with the tone and manner of many of its discussions; in this spirit the archbishop of New York generously encourages the *Freeman's Journal*, as, upon the whole, a good Catholic paper, without, however, approving every thing to be found in its columns; in this same spirit, too, the venerable archbishop and bishops of the United States approve and encourage the publication of our *Review*. They approve and encourage it as serviceable to the cause of religion, but without holding themselves responsible for every thing, either in the manner or matter, contained in its pages. We publish with their approbation, indeed, but not with their authority, or their approval of whatever we publish. Nobody but the Editor is responsi-

ble for the errors it may contain. We aim to comply with their wishes as far as we know them, but there is no doubt that we sometimes discuss topics which the venerable pastors of the church, or at least many of them, would prefer that we should let alone, and all of them must regret that our merits are so few, and our faults, both of thought and expression, so many. But having confidence in our intentions, and regarding the general tendency of the *Review* worthy of encouragement, they generously encourage us, and charitably bear with our many faults and imperfections. In the same spirit, in the same wise and generous policy, we presume, we are to understand the approbation and encouragement the Holy Father has given to M. Nicholas,—an approbation and encouragement which demand our respect for him and his book, indeed, but which do not sanction every thing in it, or deny us the right freely, in a reverential spirit, to examine, and, if we see cause, to criticise.

There are some opinions expressed by the author which are not approved by those from whom we have learned our theology, and we detect much looseness and inexactness in his language,— a looseness and inexactness which sometimes we find it difficult to excuse, and which we always regret. Exactness and precision of language do not detract from the popularity of a book, or render it less intelligible and interesting to the mass of readers. M. Nicholas is a man of broad and profound views, but is not remarkable for clearness and distinctness of thought. His style is very well, but his language is not precisely adapted to the present form of philosophic thought, as we have learned it; and he uses important terms in senses which obscure and render uncertain his own philosophy. He uses *subject* and *object* frequently as convertible terms, and commonly *subject* in the sense of *object*. He tells us in one place that both God and man are *made*, and asserts the illimitable progress of man, or that human nature is indefinitely progressive; and in such connection, too, that he leaves us doubtful whether he does or does not mean to assert the modern doctrine of progress, as advocated by the enemies of Catholicity. We choose, however, in these and all other cases to regard his thought as substantially orthodox, but we regret that he has not been more exact in his expressions.

We have rarely read a book of no greater size in which we have found more sound philosophy and various and valuable knowledge; but we do not think the author has suffic-

iently appreciated the advantages of a strictly logical and scientific method in setting forth his views. He began his work on a much smaller scale than that on which it is completed,—for the sake of consoling a dear friend suffering under a painful bereavement, and who wanted to be convinced of the immortality of the soul. Undertaken for a special object, from motives of charity and personal friendship, it seems to have expanded beyond the expectations of the author, and become too large for his original plan. Hence it lacks order and unity of design, and resembles a building which has grown into a huge pile by successive additions not contemplated by the original architect.

The logical unity of Catholic doctrine, M. Nicholas appears either not to have seen, or to have undervalued. He seems to us to have never studied Catholic dogmas in their logical unity and connection, and never to have seen them in that relation of interior mutual dependence, which compels the logical mind either to admit or to deny them all, if he admits or denies any one of them; or perhaps he has felt that it would be impossible so to present that relation as to render it intelligible and profitable to the great mass of his readers. If the former is the case, he had not sufficiently mastered his subject; if the latter, we think he has erred in judgment; for the great difficulty with popular apologies is their attempting to prove Christianity as a collection of unrelated and mutually independent dogmas. Nothing contributes so much to clearness, or makes so deep an impression on the mind of the reader, as to have a subject presented in the light of its real and substantial unity. Christianity is not a collection of isolated and unrelated dogmas; it is an organism in which, by virtue of an internal principle, all the parts are joined together and compacted into one indissoluble whole, as in a living being; and such is its internal consistency, such the living relation of the whole to each part, of each part to the whole, and of the several parts to each other, that no mind, embracing it at once in its unity and variety, can possibly doubt its complete and absolute truth. No nicely organized living being proclaims half so loud that the hand that made it is and can be none other than the hand of God. It is to be regretted that M. Nicholas was not more deeply impressed with the importance of this fact. Overlooking it, he has given to his work a disjointed and fragmentary character, and has failed, not only to present the several Christian dogmas in their proper internal

relation to each other, but he has failed to construct the several parts of his book so that they mutually enlighten and support each other, and concentrate their several rays of evidence in a single focus.

The author appears to us to have copied, save in regard to particular doctrines, the models furnished by Protestant apologists, rather than those furnished by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Protestantism loses the unity of Christian doctrine as well as the unity of Christian polity, and therefore its apologists can never prove Christianity as a real and living whole. The most they can prove is a sort of vague, unintelligible Christianity in general, not the church, which is Christianity, and without which Christianity is a mere abstraction, a mere name, destitute of all real meaning. We think, also, he places, at least so far as regards those without, too high a value on the concessions of certain notorious infidel philosophers, as Voltaire, Rousseau, and D'Alembert. These concessions do not weigh with unbelievers themselves, for unbelievers never hold themselves bound by the utterances of their own philosophers, unless their utterances are favorable to unbelief. The only weight these concessions have, is that of the argument which may be in them; but that argument would, so far as we have known unbelievers, be better received and produce more effect if presented by the Christian apologist as his own, and in his own words. But this is a matter of opinion in which the author may be right and we may be wrong. Certainly he follows in this the general practice of all the French apologists we are acquainted with, and is borne out by the example of the excellent De Bonald,—to whom he is not a little indebted for some of the best parts of his book, which, by the way is no disparagement, for it is a high merit to appreciate and borrow from the viscount de Bonald, one of the soundest and most original philosophical heads France has ever produced.

M. Nicholas is what in France is called a traditionalist, though not an exaggerated traditionalist. He contends that man has in himself, in his own reason or intellect, no faculty to *invent* the moral and religious truths necessary to support the understanding and direct the conduct of life even in the natural order, and hence he infers the necessity of a primitive revelation. Yet he attempts, and not unsuccessfully, to establish by reason the existence of a God, the immortality of the soul, and the duty of worship. If human reason is as impotent as he contends in his

argument for a primitive revelation, how has he been able from reason alone to establish his natural religion? The difficulty which is here suggested, and which is obvious to every logical reader of his book, has not escaped the observation of the author, and he attempts to solve it by maintaining that, though reason knows some things, it does not all, and, though it can go a little way, it cannot go the whole length of establishing natural religion. But this does not appear to us satisfactory; because the author himself has proved in his book that it not only can, but does, go the whole length of establishing the truths of natural religion, for he has rationally proved them all; because, if natural religion were not naturally evident to *natural* reason, it would not be natural, but supernatural; and because, if the author concedes that human reason can find out any natural religion, however little, he gives up the principle on which he founds his whole argument for a first revelation. The author has shut himself out from the right to give this answer. And yet we agree with him entirely in the doctrine, that man by reason never did and never could have found out God and natural religion without a primitive revelation, and that both are rationally demonstrable; we differ with him only in his mode of solving the apparent contradiction in the case. This apparent contradiction is solved, not by distinguishing in reason different degrees of power, but by distinguishing between intuition and reflection, and between proving by reason a proposition presented to the reflective understanding, and originally inventing or finding it out by the operations of our own reason. When the traditionalists tell us that man knows the great primal truths of natural religion and morality only by virtue of a primitive revelation to our first parents, preserved and handed down to us by tradition, they tell us, we hold, an important and undeniable truth; but when they assert in our knowing them the absolute nullity of reason, as some of them seem to us to do, at least in principle, after the suspicious example of Pascal, who demolishes reason to obtain a site for faith, we cannot agree with them, for they then deny all knowledge properly so called, and base science on faith, which is not admissible. In their laudable recoil from the exaggerated psychology of the non-Catholic schools, they seem to us to have lost sight of the real importance to the theologian, although recognizing authority, of rational investigations into the facts and conditions of the phenomenon we call knowledge.

M. Nicholas himself contends, and very properly, that we have immediate intuition of the intelligible, of God even, for he contends that we have immediate perception of necessary truth, and that necessary truth is God. But this intuition, that is, intuition of the intelligible as distinguishable from the sensible, is not a transitory act of the understanding, and is not, strictly speaking, an act of the understanding at all. It is an act of the understanding only in the sense that every living being necessarily acts in receiving an action. It is the result of the constant and permanent presence to our minds of the intelligible truth, and the unremitted action of that truth on them. On its objective side it is the constant and permanent affirmation of the intelligible object by itself to the intellectual subject; and on its subjective side it is the constant and permanent apprehension by the intellectual subject of the intelligible object. This permanent and invariable intuition is the basis of all science, of all demonstration, and of all certainty in the natural order.

Yet as man is not a pure intelligence, but an intelligence united to a body, intellect combined with sensibility, his reflective understanding cannot take its object immediately from the intuition, and therefore, without something besides intuition, the intelligible truth could never be an object of distinct knowledge; we should be unconscious of it, could make no use of it, and it would remain to us, practically, as if it were not. To be known, that is, to be an object of conscious, reflex, or distinct knowledge, it must be represented—re-presented—or presented anew to the mind in a sensible form, or through a sensible sign, that is, language or speech. When thus represented, the mind, by virtue of the presence of its invariable and permanent intuition, seizes it, affirms it to be true, and reposes on it as intuitively evident.

Now, although the great truths of natural religion are intuitively evident when distinctly represented to the mind, they could never have been so represented, if God himself had not originally revealed or taught them to man. Hence the author is perfectly correct in asserting the necessity of a primitive revelation, and in contending that we know those truths only as we receive them from tradition. But as, though not originally discoverable in the reflective order by natural reason, they are, when discovered and represented to the mind, intuitively evident, he is equally right in asserting

that they are rationally demonstrable. Rational demonstration does not consist in the original discovery of truth; it consists in proving a truth presented to the understanding, by bringing it to the test of invariable and permanent intuition. Revelation—we use the word in its proper sense—through the medium of tradition proposes the truths of natural religion to the understanding, and natural reason proves them by discovering in our invariable and permanent intuition their evidence. Both are necessary to all distinct knowledge in the intelligible order, and we could no more know the intelligible without the one than without the other. Revelation without the intuitive reason would be no better than a telescope to a man in the dark, or to a man without eyes, and human reason without revelation would be impotent through defect of matter on which to operate. This view of the case solves the difficulty the author acknowledges, and presents a ground of reconciliation between the French rationalists and traditionalists, who have so long been fighting each other, as it seems to us, with very little advantage to either party. It would relieve M. Bonnetty from his embarrassments, and save him from the paralogisms and subterfuges so frequent in those of his writings which we happen to read. It would give him all he needs, and require him to sacrifice nothing he values; and we suspect, after all, that it is at bottom what he is really aiming at, but which he either does not clearly apprehend, or is unable clearly to express. M. Bonnetty's opponents, too, may find here a solid ground for the distinction, which they suppose the traditionalists lose, between faith and science, and for the assertion of real knowledge in the natural order. Truths of the natural order are distinguishable from those of the supernatural order, not by the fact that the latter are revealed and the former are obtained without revelation, but by the fact that the truths of the supernatural order repose for their certainty on the extrinsic authority of him who reveals them, and therefore assent to them is the assent of faith; while the truths of the natural order, of philosophy if you will, repose for their certainty on natural evidence, and therefore assent to them is the assent, not of faith, but of knowledge. This is all that the opponents of the traditionalists need to maintain, unless they wish, as some of them seem to imagine to be possible, to build up a system of philosophy and morality without God,—a wish no less vain than impious, as the experience

of all ages fully proves. We see not why Father Chastel, the unwearied opponent of M. Bonnetty, cannot accept this view of the case, and thus spare himself the necessity of his long dissertations against the traditionalists, and, as it seems to us, that of exaggerating the power and independence of simple human reason beyond all bounds. If he respected reason more, we think he would have more respect for tradition, and separate man less in his operations from his Creator. It does not require, it seems to us, any great depth of philosophy to show that nature is no lawgiver, and that it is impossible to suppose that any proper morality can be asserted if God is denied. Is it not possible that some of our modern professors have, in their devotion to the letter of the great philosophers of the church, unconsciously lost sight of their real sense? We ask the question respectfully, not sneeringly, for we confess that we find philosophical doctrines put forth in the name of these philosophers which we cannot find in them. St. Thomas is frequently made in our days to stand godfather for a rationalism which we cannot but think he would never have consented to hold at the font. St. Thomas as to the form of his doctrine follows Aristotle, as distinguished from Plato; but we have studied him to no purpose, if he is not, as in reality was Aristotle himself, at bottom an ontologist. Certainly he was no modern psychologer, and we see not wherefore Father Chastel imagines that he finds in him a sympathy with his exaggerated rationalism.

M. Nicholas offers us seven arguments in proof of the existence of God:—1. Common sense, or *consensus hominum*. 2. The necessity of a first cause. 3. The existence of motion. 4. The harmony of the universe. 5. The existence of spirits. 6. The notion of the Infinite. 7. The existence of necessary truths. The argument from the *consensus hominum*, or common sense, is a good argument, after we have proved that the original conception of God is not possible without revelation, but its precise value, prior to having proved this, we do not understand. The author, we think, should have begun, not by attempting to prove the great truths of natural religion, but by drawing up an inventory of them as universally held, and then proceeded to show that the human mind, though after it has been taught them it can establish them, could never have originated them, or conceived them without revelation. By so doing he would have saved himself the necessity of con-

stant repetition, and of reasoning from premises before arriving at that part of his work in which he proves them, and have given to his argument more compactness and practical force. His second argument is a paralogism. It simply begs the question; for cause and effect are correlatives, and connote each other. When you have asserted the world as an *effect*, you have asserted a first cause; for it is impossible to assert an effect without asserting a cause, or to assert a particular and finite cause without asserting a universal and infinite cause. With the atheist the point is, not to prove that there can be no effect without a first cause, but that the world is an effect, or that there is any proper effect at all, and that what we call effects are not merely different modes or aspects of the universe of things. It is only by inductive reasoning that we can from the world prove that it is an effect, and induction is never demonstration, and gives at best only probability. It consists in drawing general conclusions from particular premises, which logicians, we believe, teach cannot be done. The third proof, drawn from the fact of motion, is only the second in another form. The fourth proof, drawn from the harmony of the universe, is liable to the same objection. When you have proved the world has been created, and therefore that there is a God, no doubt you can find in this harmony a corroborative proof of his existence; but before having done this, and on the supposition of a real doubt as to his existence, we confess we have never been able to appreciate the value of this argument. The fifth argument, drawn from the existence of spirits, does not strike us as any additional argument to that drawn from the existence of matter. A creator is no more necessary to give existence to spirits than to material bodies. A single spire of grass that grows by the way-side is as conclusive evidence to our mind that God is, as are the celestial bodies whose magnitudes and revolutions are described by astronomy, as is the loftiest human intellect or the tallest archangel. A grain of sand on the sea-shore implies God as much as any created spirit you can name.

The sixth and seventh arguments are in principle one and the same argument, which is the famous argument borrowed by Descartes from St. Anselm, and which was not unknown to St. Augustine. The argument has been objected to by many able theologians, and on the principles of the Cartesian philosophy it strikes us as of no value. Yet we

hold it to be a good argument, and we have seen nothing in M. Nicholas's book that has given us so much satisfaction as his assertion and vindication of it. We have in our minds the idea of the infinite, therefore the infinite, that is, God, exists. This conclusion is valid, because the human mind cannot have an idea or notion of what has not its foundation in an objective reality, since what is without reality is non-existent, is not, and exists not at all, and what neither is nor exists is not intelligible. Thus far the author, and his reasoning is solid. But he might, perhaps, by analyzing the fact which we call thought, and which the French eclectics call a fact of consciousness, have rendered it still more clear and conclusive. Whoever properly analyzes this fact will find that it is the result of two factors, subject and object, and never of subject alone. It is characteristic of every created being, that it can never act at all save in concurrence with some object which is distinct from itself. God alone is the direct object of his own intelligence, and he alone is capable of purely independent action. All creatures depend for their action, not only on the creative energy of God, which creates them from nothing and sustains them in existence, and gives to each its special form of existence, but also as an objective reality in immediate relation with which they are placed. Every reasonable creature requires for its proper activity an object for which, and an object with or by which, it acts. Hence there never are, and never can be, any purely subjective facts, or facts which are the pure effects of the mind's own proper activity; for if there were, each man would be God, and reproduce in himself the eternal and ever-blessed Trinity. Our activity can be reduced to act, be a proper *vis activa* as distinguished from the *potentia nuda* of the Schoolmen, only as it is met by an activity from without itself; or in other words, we can act only on condition that we are acted upon, in concurrence with the activity acting on us, and our acts are always the joint product of the two activities or forces,—the one of which we ourselves are, and which acts from within outwards, the other of which is God or something created, which is independent of us, and acts upon us *ab extra*, or from without. When Descartes said, *Cogito, ergo sum*, he expressed a truth, but not the whole truth; for the whole conclusion is not only we exist, but, in addition, something besides us is or exists, since we cannot think our own existence but by virtue of thinking at the same time,

and in the same mental act, something which is not ourselves, but is really objective to us and independent of our existence. In ourselves, according to St. Thomas, we are unintelligible, therefore we cannot apprehend ourselves in ourselves, but only in another, as reflected, as in a mirror, from some object which is not ourselves. Pure idealism is, therefore, an impossibility for any created being. Pure idealism can be predicated only of God, for he only is intelligible *per se*, and the direct object of his own intelligence, and in him it is the eternal generation of the Son, the Logos or Word, who is in the bosom of the Father and his exact image, consubstantial with him, and from whose mutual love eternally proceeds the Holy Ghost.

Now, as there are and can be no purely subjective facts of consciousness, it follows that nothing exists *in conceptu sine fundamento in re*, that is, without an objective foundation in reality, or existing, as say the Schoolmen, *a parte rei*. We have not, then, after having established the fact of the mental idea or conception, to inquire whether there is or is not an objective reality that corresponds to it; for if there were no such reality, the idea itself could never have been formed, or have entered into our heads. A pure *ens rationis* is a figment of the Schoolmen. *Entia rationis* are the product of abstraction; but abstraction can never precede the intuition of the concrete. In abstraction the mind simply takes a special view of a subject, and puts all the rest aside, and what it considers has reality in the concrete subject only. We can conceive of a mountain of gold, but in doing so we operate on real elements, and imagine two real things, gold and mountain, to be united. This mountain of gold may not exist in reality, it may be, as the fabled Pegasus or Hippogriph, an *ens rationis*, but it is not a pure *ens rationis*, because the conceptions gold and mountain are conceptions of realities. Nobody denies to man the power of abstracting and combining his conceptions according to his imagination or his fancy, or that his combinations may be without any prototypes in the real world. But this power of abstraction can operate only on materials furnished by revelation or intuition, and is therefore subsequent to the apprehension of them. The question we are considering precedes all abstraction or imagination, and concerns the concrete ideas or conceptions which are abstracted or compounded by the judgment or the imagination, and these ideas or conceptions are impossible without the concurrent

activity of both subject and object, and of course of an object which is not subject, and is placed over against it, and exists and acts independently of it. Without such object, our intellect would not be *intellectus in actu*, but at best only *intellectus in potentia*, because it cannot act without an object, and it can never be its own object. We cannot think without thinking something; we cannot see where there is nothing to be seen,—love where there is nothing to be loved,—think where there is nothing to be thought. The existence in our minds, then, of the idea or notion of the infinite, is full evidence that the infinite exists; for this conception cannot be formed by any abstraction or combination of finite things. This is evident, because the finite is the negation of the infinite, and therefore the conception of the finite must be subsequent to that of the infinite and impossible without it. The infinite then is, and therefore, God.

There is no question that we have the perception of what are called necessary truths. Without them the reason could not operate at all. We could neither affirm nor deny any thing, if we had not in our minds, more or less distinctly noted, the conception of the necessary as opposed to the contingent, the immutable as opposed to the mutable, &c. We could in metaphysics prove nothing without the principle of contradiction, and our arguments would all be inconclusive without the conception of a necessary *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion. In every operation of the human understanding, there is a conception, not always clear and distinct indeed, of the real, the necessary, the eternal and immutable. This conception is not obtained by abstraction, for without it there could be no abstraction. It is not any more a mere subjective form of the understanding, as Kant pretends, but, according to the principles we have established, must be a real object of intuition, and therefore a reality. Then it must be being, and real being, since what is not is not intelligible, can be no object of thought or conception, as Descartes implies when he maintains that whatever the mind clearly and distinctly apprehends is true, and thus places certitude in the evidence of the object. The fact, then, that we have the idea of necessary truths, and could perform no intellectual operation if we had not, is a full proof that we have direct and immediate apprehension of real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being; therefore that such being really is or exists. But real,

necessary, eternal, and immutable being is God, for all agree that God is *Ens reale et necessarium*. Therefore God is.

This is virtually the argument of the author, with one or two links supplied by ourselves; and we regard it as irrefutable, although the superficial and the captious may, no doubt, cavil at it. M. Nicholas is, as must be the case with a traditionalist, an ontologist, who takes things in the concrete and the real order, not in the abstract and unreal order of modern psychologers. The only fault which we are disposed to find with him under this head is, that he asserts his ontology too timidly, and does not bring it out clearly and distinctly. He hardly does justice to his own thought. He has the uncommon fault of being too modest, and we see throughout that his doctrine is far superior to his expression. In his excessive fear of saying too much, and his unnecessary distrust of himself, he leaves incomplete and obscure important views which he might easily develop and clear up. He never puts forth his real strength, and he perpetually provokes us by placing his weakest arguments in front, and his strongest in a form and position which to our understanding deprive them of half their force. He is himself far superior to his book, and might have done better if he had been bolder, and had had more confidence in his capacity to treat successfully the profounder problems of philosophy.

The author, as the Abbé Lacordaire hints, relies mainly on moral as distinguished from purely intellectual arguments, and aims to prove the truth of religion by proving its practical goodness and utility. He does not seem to be aware of the very general prejudice which unbelievers entertain against this line of argument. He does not in a work like this make sufficient account of their intellectual difficulties. His fault in this respect endears him to us as a man, but it is a fault which detracts from his merit as an author. These proud infidels who scoff at religion need first of all to have their pride of intellect humbled,—to be shown the truth of what the Psalmist says, *Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus*, and made to feel that reason on every point is against them, and laughs at their folly. It is necessary to prove to them,—what no man knows better than the author,—that it is only in abdicating their reason and in renouncing their manhood that they reject the church of God. All these moral arguments, all these proofs of the

beauty and utility of our religion, and all these evidences adduced from history, are all very well for the faithful, to help them to guard and preserve their faith, but they do not meet the great difficulties of the unbelievers of our times. The author has done well, but he had the ability and the learning to do better, and we can hardly forgive him for not having done as well as he could. He might have produced, what we want, a work which shall be to our age what the *Summa Contra Gentiles* was to the thirteenth, and the *De Civitate Dei* to the fifth century. But he has not done it, chiefly because he was afraid that he could not be original without being an innovator; which is an idle fear, for the Catholic apologist may be original without innovating. The materials for a new work and such as our times demand *Against the Gentiles* are collected and are at hand, and we only wait the man, the Christian artist, who shall take them and mould them into a complete and living whole.

In concluding our remarks on the three works before us, we may say, that the first named is the largest, and covers the most ground, but is the feeblest in execution. The last named aims at less, deals less with principles, has a more local object and character, but is the most practical and effective. It is not a monument which the author has erected to his memory, but it is a work for the moment in France, and fitted to produce an immediate and a great amount of good. The second, the Spanish work, is, however, the great book of the three, the boldest in its conception and the most vigorous in its execution. Aside from what may be considered a few incidental errors, and a little exaggeration on certain points, which do not, as far as we have been able to discover, affect the substance of the work, it is almost the book needed. It brings the deepest and broadest principles of the highest Christian theology to bear upon all the great practical questions of the day, with a depth and force of thought, with an eloquence and strength of expression, a noble and manly piety, a sweet and pursuasive manner, that leave little to be desired. If the three works could be blended into one, by a man as learned as M. Nicholas, as practical and witty as Louis Veuillot, and as profound, as elevated, and as eloquent as Donoso Cortés, a death-blow would be struck to the incredulity, liberalism, and socialism of the age. But God raises up the man the world needs when it suits his purpose, and we need not

doubt that in due time the man for the present age will be sent, and do his work.

Intellect throughout the civilized world has greatly declined since the sixteenth century, and was never lower than at the commencement of the nineteenth. The great schools and universities of earlier times had lost their grandeur, and no longer turned out scholars fitted to grapple with the new times. They seemed to have lost the faculty of stimulating mental activity, and developing and directing the intellectual energies of their students. They taught to their passive pupils the old formulas, indeed, but as if they were dead formulas without any living soul in them, and apparently without ever suspecting that a living and breathing soul was needed. The apologists for religion fell into a dull routine, and the active intellect of the day left the church, and, without the aid, the restraints, and the guidance of faith, undertook to create a new world for itself, with what success experience has proved. But happily this state of things is passing away, and there is in our day, not only a *renaissance* of Catholicity, but a most wonderful revival of mental activity among Catholics in every European country. Catholic history is reëxamined and rewritten, Catholic rights are asserted and vigorously defended, and a new Catholic literature is produced. Active intellect returns to the church, and finds itself at home, and free only in her communion. The really intellectual men of England and Germany, reared outside the church, can find their wants satisfied and a proper field for their exertions only in becoming Catholics. It is beginning to be the same in this country. The infidel world is attacked as it has not been before for centuries, and let us honor every scarred veteran and every new recruit in the constantly increasing army of Catholic apologists.

PHILOSOPHY AND CATHOLICITY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1855.]

A warm personal friend of the distinguished Father Ventura has very obligingly presented us with a copy of this highly instructive and most valuable work of the ex-general of the Theatins, which consists of discourses preached during the season of Lent, at Paris, in the years 1851 and 1852, augmented and accompanied with remarks and notes by the author. Of the genius, learning, ability, and extraordinary eloquence of the illustrious Italian it is not necessary for us to say a single word. In these respects he is above any eulogism of ours. When Gregory XVI., of immortal memory, was asked by a Frenchman who was the first *savant* at Rome, he replied, after a moment's reflection, "Father Ventura." "We have," continued his Holiness, "no doubt, many distinguished theologians, apologists, philosophers, publicists, orators, and men of letters, but there is only the Father Ventura who is all these, and in himself alone."

In 1848 we made some strictures on Father Ventura's Funeral Oration on O'Connell, for it seemed to us to incline too much to the liberalism of the day. We regarded it as likely to encourage the revolutionary party throughout Europe, and as containing expressions which, in the state of men's minds at the time, were likely to be understood as conceding that the church had not always been on the side of true freedom. His stay at Rome during the Roman revolution, and his conduct, as reported to us, during the short-lived reign of the Roman republic, gave us very unfavorable impressions as to his Catholic loyalty, and we feared that he would prove another La Mennais. But a friend of his, who professes to have been with him during the period we refer to, and to have shared his confidence, has assured us that the gravest things laid to his charge were false reports, and has satisfied us, if his account be correct, and we have no reason to doubt it, that the most to be said

* *La Raison Philosophique et la Raison Catholique.* Par le T. R. P. VENTURA DE RAULICA. Paris. 1851–1853.

against him is that he suffered his impulsive nature to betray him into some imprudences, and perhaps some improprieties. But his subsequent conduct, and his honorable submission to the censure of the Congregation of the Index on one of his discourses, have amply repaired whatever faults he may have been guilty of, and should restore him to the full confidence of the Catholic public. We have nothing to censure ourselves for in what we have heretofore said respecting him, for we were never animated by any uncatholic feeling towards him, and we spoke according to the best information at the time within our reach. But if we have expressed at any time any opinion respecting him personally founded on false or inadequate information, we of course regret it, and assure him that we are any thing but disposed to persist in it.

In the confusion of revolutionary times, many false judgments of men and things are inevitable, even to the best disposed and the best informed. In 1848 and 1849, though ardent lovers of liberty, we found ourselves obliged to oppose what was called the republican or democratic movement, and to oppose it both in the name of religion and rational freedom. We thought we saw Father Ventura on the side of that movement, and aiding it against the Holy Father and the real interests of Europe, and we judged his doings and sayings by the position in which we saw him, and the company in which we found him. If he did and said the things ascribed to him, we did not judge him too severely. Many of those things, we are assured by his friend, were falsely ascribed to him. We are told that he did not celebrate High Mass on the grand altar in St. Peter's on a certain occasion, as reported, and that, though present, it was not as a priest, but as the Neapolitan [Sicilian?] ambassador. And we are further told, that he remained at Rome after the escape of the Holy Father to Gaëta, in order to do what he could to restrain the excesses of the republicans and to protect the interests of the Papacy. If this was so, we can exonerate him from the charge of disloyalty to religion, but we cannot think very highly of his discretion. But those things are past, and he has made all the submission that has been required of him, and we have no right to remember them against him. We shall make it a point, for ourselves, to give him all the respect and confidence due to his eminent ability, his profound learning, his rare genius, and his zealous and energetic labors as a Catholic priest.

Father Ventura is not, and never was, a sympathizer with red-republicanism; he is not, in the popular sense of the word, a democrat; but there can be no doubt that his sympathies are with the people rather than with their masters,—that he would wish to see the Catholics of Europe less disposed to make common cause with the superannuated dynasties and modern bureaucracy, and more in earnest to restore the free constitution of European society which generally obtained prior to the heresy and schism introduced by the so-called reformation. In this there is much with which we agree, but there are serious difficulties in the way of realizing what he wishes, and the most serious of all is in the corruption of the people themselves. We are in favor of republicanism, but not on the principles of the party in Europe struggling for it. We like the general constitution of European society as it was during the Middle Ages, though not the barbarism we meet there side by side with Christian civilization; but joining the democracy, and aiding what is called the popular movement of the day, will not bring back what was good in those ages, or advance the cause of civil freedom. The republic, on the principles of English, American, or French statists, is not a whit better than the Cæsarism of the courts. The fundamental principles of Cæsarism and modern democracy are precisely the same, and liberty, in any rational sense, is possible under the reign of neither. Liberty presupposes the sovereignty of the spiritual order, under whose dominion authority and liberty are harmonized. But this sovereignty is rejected alike by modern democracy and modern monarchy. The one places the monarch, the other the people, above all law, and the principle of both is political atheism. The people are as averse to recognizing the supremacy of the divine law in the government of the world as are kings and emperors. The shallow and atheistical political system, which flows from the innovations of Luther in theology and of Descartes in philosophy, has penetrated nearly the whole modern world, and is embraced by the Catholic populations almost as generally as by the Protestant. Scarcely a Catholic statist of our acquaintance retains any conception of the profound political philosophy engendered by Catholic theology; and seldom do we meet one who seems capable of comprehending the state as it was comprehended by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, or even Suarez and Bellarmine. In the political order the mass of Catholics, as well as Protestants and infidels, follow either

Bossuet and James I. of England, or Locke and the shallow-pated Rousseau.

Here is the grand difficulty. If we side with authority and uphold the sovereigns, we favor, and cannot help favoring, monarchical despotism,—what we call Cæsarism. If we side with the revolution and support the popular party, we favor, and cannot help favoring, the despotism of society, the absolutism of the many, and the unlimited right of the majority for the time being, which is scarcely less intolerable. The essential element of liberty is rejected alike by princes and people, and we are compelled to alternate between the despotism of the one and the despotism of the many. Gallicanism, so called, with Catholics, and unbelief with Protestants, have excluded God from the state, and no place is given to the divine Idea, or to the sovereignty of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. Nor is this the worst. In countries where Protestantism prevails, we are obliged to wish for the success of the party that professes the least respect for religion, for, politically speaking, religious indifference is less to be deprecated than Protestant or Evangelical fanaticism. We have then in Protestant countries another difficulty. The support we give to religion as an element of government turns to the advantage of Evangelicalism, the predominant religion of Protestants, and the favor we show the party of indifference, though it may stave off the evil day, tends in the end to undermine society, and to render the catastrophe still more terrible when it comes. The truth is, modern society, in both Catholic and Protestant countries, is pagan, and is everywhere becoming a prey to pagan errors, vices, and corruptions. All we can do is to refrain from siding absolutely with either party, and to use what freedom we have to recall men to the recognition of the divine sovereignty, to make our Catholic populations, who have as yet a conscience, as Catholic in their politics as in their religion.

The divorce of Christianity from the church, proclaimed by Luther, led the way to the divorce of philosophy from theology, proclaimed by Descartes, which in its turn led to the divorce of religion from the state, proclaimed by Louis XIV. and his courtier bishops, who forgot their God for their king, and which was popularized by the philosophers and statists of the last century. We must labor to reunite in Catholic minds and hearts what God has joined together, and which no man had the right to put

asunder; for it is only through the Catholic people that we can hope to save society. This is a great work, and a work that cannot be done without meeting opposition on all sides, —on the side of Catholics, who have become Pagans as to their politics, as well as Protestants; but nevertheless we must labor to accomplish it, whatever the opposition, for the salvation of society, of freedom, of civilization, depends on it. We shall encounter persecution, and the land may be saturated with our blood, as was that of pagan Rome with the blood of the early martyrs; but we know that we are following out the spirit of the church, and that, if we proceed with singleness of heart, Almighty God will approve us, and give us success. We see nothing else for us here or elsewhere, but to devote ourselves, heart and soul, for life or death, to the great work of reconverting society relapsed into paganism to the Gospel of our Blessed Lord, and, to do this, to begin with ourselves.

In one department of this work Father Ventura has, in the volumes before us, done manly and heroic service. His aim has been, if we may so express it, to undo the work of Descartes, that shallow thinker and but too successful corrupter of modern thought, and to reunite theology and philosophy, which he had divorced. He shows, by a wealth of erudition that astonishes us, and by an eloquence which, though he speaks and writes in a foreign tongue, hardly yields to that of the great Bossuet, that philosophy divorced from theology, or human reason proceeding by itself alone, has never in the moral and intellectual order discovered or established a single truth, but has uniformly made shipwreck of the common faith of mankind, obscured or lost sight of the most essential truths, and, falling from error to error, has uniformly ended in the frightful abyss of universal doubt. He contrasts, in all ages, the Catholic reason and the philosopical reason, and shows conclusively that by the former truth is attained and preserved, while by the latter it is lost and finally denied, even in relation to the natural order, as well as to the supernatural. This our readers know is what we have uniformly insisted on, and though never accepting the doctrines ascribed to the traditionalists by their opponents, we have never failed to assert that philosophy or human reason alone never can attain to any solid system of truth, even in the natural or intelligible order. We are most happy, therefore, to find this doctrine, which we regard as all-important, powerfully and conclu-

sively vindicated by so distinguished an advocate as is the Very Reverend Father Ventura de Raulica.

"If," says the illustrious author, "a man could by his own means and private reflection formulate his beliefs and duties easily, with certainty, and without mixture of error, *de facili, sine miscela erroris, fixa certitudine*, as says St. Thomas,* it would be all over with revelation; *Si ratio humana sufficienter experimentum præbet, totaliter excludit meritum fidei.*† And in fact, what would be the use of a positive revelation, if man were able of himself to know what he ought to believe and what he ought to do? If such were the case, all the world would have the right to say, with the Genevan sophist, 'I have no need of a revealed religion; I am contented with natural religion'; and rationalism would be at the same time true religion and true philosophy. This is the doctrine, which, as Clement of Alexandria tells us, Plato summed up in these words: 'My system is to believe on no authority, and to submit only to the reasons which, after reflection, appear to me the best.' Cicero professed the same doctrine: 'Every one should follow his own reason, for it is difficult to obey the reason of others,'—'*Cum suo quisque judicio sit utendus, difficile factu est me id sentire quod tu velis.*'‡ It is this doctrine or this method that I call *the philosophical reason.*

"But if, on the contrary, man cannot without a superior revelation in an easy manner attain to a precise and certain formula of his beliefs and duties, it is necessary that our great philosophers, those lofty intelligences as empty as they are proud, should prostrate themselves before the doors of the church, and listen to the instructions of life from the God-made-man; *Ipsum audite.* If this be so, nothing is more reasonable than to submit their reason as their will, and rationalism is only a culpable delirium or an enormous extravagance. This is the doctrine of the Apostle St. Paul, who says, 'Subject your intellect in obedience to Jesus Christ, and believe that this obedience is reasonable,'—'*In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. . . . . Rationabile obsequium vestrum.*,* And this constitutes what I call *the Catholic reason.*

---

* *Contr. Gent.* lib. i. c. 4. † Id. *Summa*, 2. 2, q. ii. a. 10.

‡ *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. iii.

* 2 Cor. x. 5; Rom. xii. 1. An ill-natured critic might cavil at the application of the text from Romans, for the Apostle there does not say intellect, but body: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present your *bodies* a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God, your reasonable service." The doctrine is sound, but the text does not appear to us to contain it. This practice of forcing a meaning from a sacred text which it was apparently not designed to convey, though very well in ascetic writing, where the principal end is edification, is not very judicious, to say the least, when arguing in defence of the truth against its adversaries. It hurts rather than serves our cause. There can be no doubt, however, that St. Paul teaches all that the learned and eloquent author asserts.

"In these few words is summed up the whole question debated to-day between the Church and the School, between Catholicity and Rationalism, between Religion and Philosophy. On the one side, we have the Philosophical reason maintaining that man is sufficient of himself to know perfectly his own nature, his relations to other beings, and his final destiny; and on the other, the religious or Catholic Reason, asserting that, to know all these things, man has great need of God, and that he must submit his understanding to the teachings of the Son of God made man."—Tom. I. pp. 5–8.

The philosopical reason, so called by the author, because it pretends to be philosophical without being so, is human reason proclaiming its own sufficiency, operating without accepting any aid from revelation, and refusing to recognize any truth which it has not by its own unassisted efforts found out and established; the religious or Catholic reason is the same human reason operating with principles originally supplied it by direct revelation from God, in submission to those principles, and for their preservation, development, and realization in the conduct of life, intellectual and moral. To enter fully into the thought of the very reverend author, we must bear in mind that the revelation of which he speaks dates from the origin of the world, and was made to the first man, and from him, by means of tradition and language, has been propagated through all the world, as has been material existence by natural generation. The first man had the same revelation that we have, and the same faith that we possess. The Catholic faith began with Adam before his prevarication, and has always been in the world as the one only true faith, as the one only means of knowing our duty and returning to God as our final destiny. The patriarchs believed as we believe, only for them Christ was to come in the flesh, and for us he has so come; and hence you find that to the question, What must I believe? the apostles answered, In the Lord Jesus Christ; that is, that he who was to come had come, and was that same Jesus of Nazareth whom the Jews with wicked hands had crucified, and whom God had raised up on the third day from the dead; for this was all that was necessary to complete the faith of those who retained the primitive revelation. Our Lord did not come to give a new faith or to found a new religion, but to fulfil the promises, or to accomplish the things promised in the beginning,—to perfect the faith of the fathers, which otherwise would have been vain. The church dating from our Lord and his apostles is founded on the *fulfilment* of the

promises, but it existed before, from the beginning of the world, as founded on the promise to be fulfilled; yet as it is impossible for God to promise and not fulfil, the church has substantially existed from the beginning, as it will exist to the consummation of the world, the one and the same holy Catholic church, *una sancta ecclesia catholica*, the Spouse of God, and Mother of all the faithful. Hence the Abbé Rohrbacher with perfect propriety commences his *Universal History of the Catholic Church* with the creation of the world, and brings it down in an unbroken series to the pontificate of our present Holy Father, Pius IX. We undoubtedly have an explicit belief of many things which the patriarchs believed only implicitly; but the world had in substance, as St. Thomas teaches, the same revelation of truth before as it has had since the coming of Christ. On this point the Holy Scriptures are explicit. "God created man of the earth; and made him after his own image. . . . . He created of him a helpmeet like unto himself; he gave them counsel, and a tongue, and eyes and ears, and a heart to devise; and he filled them with the knowledge of understanding. He created in them the science of the spirit; he filled their heart with wisdom, and showed them both good and evil. He set his eye on their hearts to show them the greatness of his works, that they might praise the name which he hath sanctified; and glory in his wondrous acts, that they might declare the glorious things of his works. Moreover, he gave them instructions and the law of life for an inheritance. He made an everlasting covenant with them; and he showed them his justice and his judgments. And their eyes saw the majesty of his glory; and their ears heard his glorious voice; and he said to them, Beware of all iniquity. And he gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbour." Ecclus. xvii. 1–12. Or, as rendered by Father Ventura:—

"God in creating man of the earth and in forming from his body the first woman, to be, since of the same nature, his companion through life, gave to both the perfect use of their senses and their faculties, the rule of the understanding, the law of the mind and heart, thought, sentiment, language; so that they might from the first moment walk, operate, think; understand, reason, will, and speak. God revealed to them evil that they might avoid it, and good that they might practise it. He deigned also to look with a peculiar love upon these first human souls, in order to elevate them even to himself. He showed them the divine

magnificence of his works. He taught them to render worship unto his name, not only because that name is all-powerful, but also because it is alone holy. He taught them not to glory in themselves, but in him, considering themselves as the most noble works of his hands, and to relate to their children the wonders of the creation of the world. In fine, he taught them in what manner they should conduct themselves, in giving them the law of life, which they were to transmit as an inheritance to their descendants. He established with them, by his grace, an everlasting covenant of love, and fixed its conditions in the revelation which he made them of the sanctity of his precepts, and the severity of his judgments."—*Ibid.*, pp. 8–10.

This rendering of the sacred text, if not literal, is just, and does but bring out its real sense. Hence the author may well say:—

"Thus, then, according to this admirable, this magnificent, this touching passage of the Sacred Books, God was for the first man what our parents, our fathers, have been for us. Our parents, our fathers, have not given us merely physical life, which consists in the union of soul and body, but they have also given us intellectual life, which consists in the union of the mind with truth. Yes, what all fathers in the succession of time have done for their children, God did instantaneously for the first man. When, therefore, the Scriptures tell us (Genesis ii.) that man came forth from the hands of his Creator a living soul, *factus est in animam virentem*, it is manifest that the Holy Ghost would tell us that man from the first instant of his creation began to live the double life proper to him,—the life of the body by the soul, and the life of the soul by the truth.

"Of the grand fact of a primitive revelation, attested by Scripture, the great St. Thomas gives the reason and the proofs. In his admirable treatise *De Scientia* [*Cognitione*] *Primi Hominis*,* or on the Knowledge of the First Man, he tells us, 'that Adam must have had from the very instant of his creation a knowledge of natural things, not only in their principles but in their conclusions, because God created him to be the father of the human race, and children must receive from their father not only material existence by generation, but also the rule of life by instruction. Adam must then have been perfect in all his parts, perfect under the relation of body, so that he could become a father, and perfect in relation to knowledge, so that he could be the teacher of mankind. We cannot conceive, we cannot admit, that the human mind was created a blank sheet on which the hand of his Creator wrote nothing. As the first man knew not the weakness of infancy in relation to the body, so he knew not the darkness of ignorance in relation to the mind. He obtained from the first moment, instantaneously, all that we learn successively

* *Quæst. Disput., De Veritate*, Quæst. xviii.

during our early years. He received by the Divine operation what we receive by human education, a perfect body, and a mind endowed with the full and perfect use of reason admirably enlightened by the truth. It would have been contrary to the perfection necessary to the first man, to have been created without the plenitude of science, and obliged to learn it slowly and painfully from experience.

"'But independently of natural knowledge, Adam received also the knowledge of grace. *In Adamo duplex fuit cognitio, naturalis et gratiæ.* He knew not only at once natural things, which the human understanding may know by the aid of first principles, but also many supernatural [superintelligible] things by virtue of a special revelation, to which reason by its own strength cannot attain; and in knowing these only by revelation, and receiving them solely on the authority of God revealing them, he had from the first faith. *Adam in primo statu fidem habuit.*'

"Now would you know who instructed Adam in the beginning of the world? It was, says Tertullian, 'the divine person of the Word, who was to be made flesh,—it was he who instructed the first man.' '*Deus in terris cum hominibus conversari non alius potuit quam Sermo* [*Verbum*] *qui caro erat futurus.*'* Thus he whom the Eternal Father constitutes now our Master in all things, he himself taught the first man all the truths of the moral and intellectual order, and even of the most elevated [the superintelligible] order; for St. Thomas adds that Jesus Christ taught Adam the mystery of his Incarnation even before Adam had sinned. '*Ante peccatum, Adam habuit fidem explicitam de Christi incarnatione, prout ordinabatur ad consummationem gloriæ.*'† It was then in testimony to this same Divine Word before he was incarnated, and in supporting itself on this primitive revelation of the Word preserved in the world by this Word, that human reason commenced from the origin of the world its progress; it was sustained by this faith, enlightened by this light, that the ancient patriarchs fixed the public worship, developed the truth, defended and preached it to the world, which obtained them the glorious title given them by St. Peter, of 'preachers of justice.'

"This is what the Apostle John would tell us when he says: 'The Eternal Word is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world,'—'*Lux vera quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*' And it is the light of this primitive revelation, of this primitive instruction given by the Word to the first man, which, from the first man, through tradition and language, is diffused over the whole world, as by material generation is diffused through all the earth material life; and it is this instruction which has always remained, and which the darkness of idolatry has obscured, but has never been able to efface.

---

* *Advers. Praxeam.* c. xvi. † 2. 2. q. ii. a. 7.

Lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebræ eam non comprehenderunt. It was in applying divine revelations to the knowledge of causes, to the usages of human life, that the great men of antiquity developed the intellect of man, founded public society, established laws, created science, invented the arts. In the primitive revelation is the origin of true philosophy, proceeding always by the light of religion, having for its purpose to maintain and defend religion, and to procure man the greatest happiness on earth possible without losing sight of heaven. Thus true philosophy established in the world with faith commences also with the world."—*Ibid.*, pp. 10–15.

To avoid all misunderstanding here, and to keep clear of the Jansenistic heresy, which founds science on faith, and involves the denial of both faith and science, it will be well to remark, that, according to St. Thomas, the primitive revelation is twofold, of natural things and of things of grace, that is, of two orders, which we call, after Gioberti, the intelligible and the superintelligible. The primitive revelation makes known to man supernaturally, for all divine revelation is supernatural, both orders, and in the conduct of life the knowledge of both constitutes one inseparable and indissoluble doctrine, what our author calls the religious or Catholic reason. But while the truth in either order is revealed, and never could have been found out by the human reason operating by itself alone, we must beware of confounding the truth of the one order with that of the other, or of maintaining that the truths of the intelligible order are held only on the authority of the revelation. On this point the illustrious author is not so clear and precise as we could wish, and he even seems at times to favor the notion, that the principles or first truths of natural science are held on the authority of faith, and are not, even when revealed, evident *per se* to natural reason. This is the error we have so often pointed out in the so-called traditionalists, into which, as they are presented by their opponents, they certainly fall; and it is an error fraught with fatal consequences. We are far enough from charging this error upon Father Ventura, but we are obliged to say that, as far as we have seen, he does not take sufficient pains to guard his readers or hearers against it. He no doubt for himself observes the mean between the two extremes, but he does not always observe it for others.

We agree perfectly with the illustrious author, that all true science, all our knowledge in the intellectual and moral order, as distinguished from the material order, begins in

the supernatural revelation made to our first parents; but we distinguish, without separating, in that revelation, between the truths of the intelligible order and those of the superintelligible. The latter constitute the matter of faith, the former the matter of science,—the principles of knowledge, of philosophy, as distinguished from Catholic theology. The truths of the superintelligible order are inevident *per se* to natural reason, and are held by us as belief on the authority of the Revealer. The truths of the intelligible order, though they require, for our clear, distinct, and reflective understanding of them, to be revealed and presented to us through the medium of language of some sort, are, when represented by language, evident *per se* to natural reason. The principles of science, or the first truths of the natural order, must, although indemonstrable, be evident to natural reason, or science is impossible; and if science is impossible faith is impossible, since *gratia præsupponit naturam*. The difference between science and belief is, that in science the matter received or assented to is, in principle at least, evident *per se* to natural reason, or our noetic faculty, whereas the matter of faith, even in principle, is inevident *per se*, and is evident only *per alium*, and is accepted on authority or testimony. It is not known in itself, and is cognizable only analogically, by the analogy it bears to the intelligible. If, then, there be for us no intelligible, no science proper, there can be no faith, as there can be then no analogical recognition of the unintelligible. While, then, we recognize that the primitive revelation contained a revelation of the principles or first truths of both orders, and that man never could have had moral and intellectual science if it had not, we maintain that only those which pertain to the superintelligible are held on the authority of the revelation, and that those which pertain to the intelligible order are evident *per se*, and of the domain of science as distinguished from faith. We take as an illustration what Gioberti calls the ideal formula, *L'Ente crea l'esistenze*, *Ens creat existentias*, or Real and necessary being creates existences. This formula every Christian of course holds to be true, and every philosopher worthy of the name detects it as the ideal and apodictic element of every thought; but without the revelation, *In principio creavit Deus cœlum et terram*, it never could have been discovered by the human mind, and held as a distinct truth. Yet when once represented to the human mind through the medium of

language, it is evident *per se*, that is, it affirms or evidences itself to our reason as an intelligible truth, and therefore, as the principle of science, as of things. It is held as a formula known, not merely as a formula believed.

With these remarks, thrown out solely as a necessary precaution to our readers, we accept the doctrine of the author with regard to the primitive revelation without hesitation and without reserve, and contend with all the earnestness of our nature, that it is only from that revelation, as preserved by tradition and language, as the substance of the instruction which, through every generation, children receive from their parents, we must take alike the principles of our faith and of our science.

The primitive revelation, however rejected by the philosophical reason in ancient or modern times, has never been wholly effaced from the minds of the race of Adam.

"St. Irenæus, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, St. Augustine,—all the apologists of Christianity, all the theologians and Christian philosophers,—when wishing to demonstrate the existence of God from the general consent of mankind, have proved that the human race, even after the fall into idolatry, preserved the idea of one only God, Master and Governor of heaven and earth. Nothing more true. With Homer, Hesiod, Virgil, Ovid, those witnesses to the popular beliefs, Jupiter is the puissant God, the Father of gods and men, the superior God, the God whose will is the last reason of things, whose decrees are fate, which nothing can resist. It is from him that emanate wise laws; it is he who gives to kings their power, who breaks the pride of cities, hurls the thunderbolt, raises the tempest, and holds the first link of the chain on which hangs the universe; it is he who orders all events, who blesses the labor of the husbandman, inspires courage, assures victory, protects persons, gives mind, talent, well-being, riches, health, life.

"With Cicero the orator, who, inspired by the beliefs of the people, speaks far otherwise than Cicero the philosopher, Jupiter was not the Jupiter of mythology, but the Jehovah, or very nearly the Jehovah, of the Jews; for he was God supreme and most perfect. *Deus optimus maximus*, the eternal reason, the sovereign God, *Ratio æterna summi Jovis*, Author and Preserver of nations, states, and empires.

"'Idolaters,' says a great contemporary theologian, the archbishop of Rheims, whose lofty science and merits the Sovereign Pontiff has just rewarded with the Roman purple,—'idolaters have never confounded their celestial and terrestrial gods with the supreme God. If by Polytheism you understand many sovereign, independent, increate, eternal gods, it is false that the people in this sense have ever admitted a plurality of gods. Polytheism means the belief, not in many equal gods, but in many gods subordinated to one supreme God. The notion of the

true God, it is agreed, has never been as distinct, as pure, as perfect, with the Pagans as with the Jews; but it is nevertheless true, that, though altered or impaired by the superstitions of idolatry, this idea is found everywhere, and that, as the martyr Saturninus declared to the Council of Carthage in the year 258, the Pagans, although they worship idols, yet know and confess God sovereign, father, and creator,—*quamvis idola colant, tamen summum Deum patrem et creatorem agnoscunt et confitentur.*'"—*Ibid.*, pp. 21–23.

The pagan nations never, in their most degraded state, lost entirely the notion of the true God, as we learn from St. Paul, who makes their guilt consist in not having worshipped him, although he was known by them. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice, because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and his divinity; so that they are inexcusable. Because when they had known God they did not glorify him as God, nor give him thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and of creeping things." Rom. i. 18–23. Polytheism may have grown out of a satanic corruption of the true doctrine with regard to good and bad angels, and of ministering spirits. We know on divine authority that the gods of the heathen were demons, that is, fallen angels, who succeeded in seducing men from their allegiance, and in persuading them to render them that service and worship which they owed to God. But we are more inclined to believe that polytheism originated in pantheism, which certainly underlies all the mythological systems known to us. But be this as it may, all polytheism bears witness to the fact that the notion of one God, supreme Author and Ruler of the universe, was never wholly effaced from the minds of the pagan people, and that all traces of the primitive revelation were never wholly lost. The following, from our author, is strictly true:—

"By the side and under the shadow of this first truth of the existence of one eternal, increate God, Author and Lord of all, the various peoples of the earth still preserved, even after they had fallen into the absurdities

and obscenities of idolatry, many other great and important truths. They all and always believed in the existence of a moral law, whose author is God, commanding obedience and respect to parents and superiors, and forbidding theft, murder, adultery, lying, and detraction,—a moral law which is obligatory on all, and the observance or violation of which constitutes justice or sin, virtue or vice. They have always believed that it is necessary to honor God by sacrifice, to propitiate him by repentance, and to seek his assistance by prayer; that, to show that we acknowledge him as the Lord of the earth, of life, and of the means of sustaining it, we must especially consecrate to him some portion of space, by erecting temples,—some portions of time, by setting apart certain days for festivals in his honor,—some portions of our aliments and goods, by the practice of fasting and almsgiving; that besides this Supreme Deity, we must also honor with a religious worship, always in his name and for his sake, those lesser spirits whom he has been pleased to use as his ministers in the government of the world, as also those great men who, by the perfection of their lives, or by the services they have rendered to other men, have visibly represented here below the most beautiful attributes, and exercised the providence of the invisible God. They have very nearly all and always believed that the human race have fallen from their primitive happiness and perfection; that they can be restored only by the sacrifice of blood; that the merits of an innocent, holy, and perfect being may be communicated to a wicked, guilty, and imperfect being; that the latter may be redeemed by the devotion and voluntary sacrifice of the former; and that the gifts of the gods and purely spiritual graces are conferred and spread over the human race by corporal and sensible means, rites, and ceremonies.

"They have all and always believed that virginity is a sublime virtue, which renders man pleasing to God; that the priest should be more or less chaste, according to the functions he is called upon to perform in the exercise of worship; that there is a communicable merit of expiation in the voluntary practice of chastity; that every guilty action displeases God, and cannot escape punishment, just as every virtuous action is pleasing to him, and will be rewarded either in this world or in the other; that in the other world there is a paradise and a hell, where the rewards of virtue and the punishment of crime are eternal. Finally, they all and always believed that, besides the place of eternal punishment, there is a place where the souls of the dead expiate their lighter faults, and are purified by temporal privations and sufferings; that in this state of expiation and suffering they may be assisted, and even entirely delivered, by the prayers and sacrifices of the living; that the body of man, no less than his soul, is destined to be immortal, to partake of his eternal happiness or pain. This is proved by the care and respect which have always and everywhere been paid to the human corpse, by the rites which have always accompanied its burial, and by the profound and universal respect for tombs.

"Certainly these truths have not been always and everywhere believed, nor these laws always and everywhere understood, in the same manner. At different times and in different places error has been more or less mingled with truth, and vice with virtue. It is thus that the Holy Scripture understands the work of religious despotism of certain governments, and of the license of human reason and passions. Hence that prodigious difference of theogonies, worships, manners, and religion among the ancients. But it is not less true, that the symbol that I have just traced was, at bottom, the symbol of the human race, though more or less disfigured by absurd superstitions in its results and application. The gods of the Hindoos were not the gods of the Medes and Persians, any more than the gods of the Egyptians were the gods of the Greeks and Romans. But the supreme, eternal, omnipotent God was everywhere the same, under different names, and even under gross and absurd forms; and Jehovah, whom the Jews alone knew in all his truth (*notus in Judæa Deus*), was worshipped by all men.

"Each people had its own religion, as it had its own language; but these different religions in their general and common principles were but the same religion differently understood and differently applied. Scarcely an error can be found in their beliefs which, as Bossuet has remarked, had not its roof concealed in a truth. Scarcely a vice in laws or manners which, as St. Thomas has explained, was not the false and absurd application of some one of the immutable principles of the natural law. There is not a single nation which has not preserved more or less pure the primitive traditional beliefs of mankind. Constantly everywhere we perceive these beliefs floating upon the ocean of errors, fables, superstitions, and obscenities which darken the surface of the earth. We see them everywhere standing up like an inextinguishable beacon lighted by the hand of God since the beginning of the world for the direction of man. *Erat lux vera, illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebræ eam non comprehenderunt.*"—*Ibid.*, pp. 24–29.

We have permitted the author the more fully to develop his views on this point, because many Catholic writers, misapprehending the relation between the intelligible and the superintelligible, and more or less affected by the philosophical reason, which is by no means confined to the non-Catholic world, make little or no account of the primitive revelation made by our Lord as a good father and a wise instructor to our first parents. In some Catholic writers even, we find a total forgetfulness of the real state of the first man, and the doctrine that the human race were left, as to the natural or intelligible order, to find out every thing by their own unassisted reason, to invent language, and to create for themselves all the moral and intellectual sciences. Hence

even they favor the absurd doctrine that the savage was the primitive man, and barbarism the primitive state of human society. This doctrine is embraced by many educated Catholic laymen, and is one of the greatest obstacles we have to surmount in reconverting the world from paganism. It places God at too great a distance from us, and obscures the close and tender relations which subsist between him and us as our Father, our Teacher, our Guide, our Director, and our Friend. It places a contradiction between what is called reason and faith, philosophy and religion, which it is all but impossible to remove. Men believe because they think they must or be damned, because they are unable to get over the proofs of the credibility of Catholicity, and because they see that the church is indispensably necessary to the maintenance of order and consistency in religion and morals, since both are evidently shipwrecked among the sects; but it were idle to pretend, that between their faith and what they regard as science there does not appear to them an invincible mutual repugnance. Piety may prevent them from daring even to avow it to themselves, but they feel unable to reconcile the immovable character of their church with what seems to them the progressive nature of man and society, and they would feel much better satisfied with her if she would accept what they regard as liberal ideas, and place herself in harmony with the spirit and tendencies of the age. They are disposed to believe that in process of time there has been discovered and accumulated in the intelligible order a large body of truth unknown in the primitive ages, which the church does not accept, nay, which she rejects.

Such is the fact as to the state of the minds of many, deny or disguise it as we will, and it is to this state of mind we must more particularly address ourselves. We may say that our church accepts and teaches all truth, for such is the fact; we may say that it is impious to doubt it, for so it is; but the voice of authority, or the tenderness of conscience, may silence, but it cannot and does not remove, the difficulties which even well-disposed Catholics, nurtured in the philosophy and literature of our age, do and cannot but feel. There is another task, and a more difficult task, imposed upon the instructors of our times, than that of mere appeals to extrinsic authority, because, whatever the respect felt for authority, or however clear and distinct its voice, it cannot reach the heart of the difficulty. What is wanted is not posi-

tive commands to the will, but instruction for the understanding, an actual clearing up of the difficulties felt. Our older controversialists did not come down at once with the authority of the church upon misbelievers; they sought first to enlighten and to convince their understandings, by arguments drawn from sources which they admitted. Thus when the erring still recognized the Scriptures as the word of God, Catholics appealed to them, and sought to show the harmony between the Catholic doctrine and the manifest teachings of the Scriptures. The difficulty now lies deeper; for the philosophic reason of our age places the Scriptures and the church in the same category, and in point of fact is even less indisposed to recognize the latter than the former. We have, then, in order to meet the difficulties now felt, to recur to first principles, and to show that the philosophical reason, in so far as it causes these difficulties, is demonstrably false, and that this supposed body of truth, discovered and accumulated by the ceaseless activity of the human mind during the ages, and which the church disowns, is in reality no truth at all, but vain imagination, or idle theorizing. We must not merely *say* this is so, but we must take the pains to *show* it.

The first step to this is, with Father Ventura, to recall our Catholic laity, disturbed by the rationalistic philosophy of the times, to Catholic reason, and show them what in regard to the human race has always been the gracious providence of God, and under what conditions and what conditions only the human intellect has been developed and placed in possession of intellectual and moral truth. The second step is to show that, just in proportion as men, whether in ancient or modern times, overlook or depart from these conditions, they fall, not upon the truth, but into the gravest errors and grossest absurdities, and therefore that what passses for philosophy as detached from theology is manifestly not true philosophy, but a fatal illusion. Both of these points have been shown by the illustrious Ventura in these volumes. He proves that in the intellectual and moral order man started, through the bounty of his Maker,' with the full complement of truth, and that philosophy, whether ancient or modern, has made no addition to the original stock, but has wasted the goods it received, and reduced itself to the condition of the Prodigal Son, that of tending swine and feeding on the husks they eat; that is, under it and by it men have been reduced to the low and ignoble condition

of mere animal life. This is not idly said. Every body knows that the ancient philosophy resulted in the denial of the moral and spiritual life of man, and in representing him as a mere animal. Horace did not blush to avow himself a pig from the sty of Epicurus, *Bene curata cute vises Epicuri de grege porcum*, and a French philosopher at the beginning of the present century defined man to be "a digestive tube, open at both ends." Philosophy, taking its portion of goods and departing from its father's house, has squandered them, and found itself unable to discover and establish any thing more in or for man than this pig of Epicurus, or this digestive tube of Cabanis. But surely this is not and never has been the belief of mankind. We have seen what were in ancient and what are in modern times the beliefs of the human race when not *enlightened* by philosophers; but if philosophy can attain only to the herd of swine or the digestive tube, whence came the human race by these sublime beliefs, which they have always had, and which they have for the greater part always in substance maintained, in spite of the corruptions, the darkness, and the abominations of pagan idolatry, and in spite too of the speculations of philosophers? You can, on the principles of that very inductive philosophy you boast, account for them only by assuming the primitive revelation the Holy Scriptures assert, that God was himself the original instructor of mankind. If so, then nothing can be more reasonable than in our philosophizing to recur to that primitive revelation for our first principles, our primitive *data*, or, so to say, our premises.

The grand error of philosophers in ancient and modern times is, if they but did know it, precisely in that which they regard as their chief glory, namely, the divorce of the natural from the supernatural and of the intelligible from the superintelligible, and the attempt to build up a complete system of moral and intellectual truth by the lights of natural reason alone. No doubt, the rationalistic philosophy begins with an effort, in many cases honest, to explain and account for the primitive beliefs of mankind; but it uniformly ends by denying them. And it cannot help it, because it seeks their origin and explanation in unassisted reason alone; because it seeks to be, not the servant, but the mistress, of faith. This rationalistic philosophy is of comparatively a recent date, and is commonly fixed for the ancient world with Socrates, and for the modern world with Descartes.

In the ancient world prior to the rise of the Greek philosophy, and in the modern Christian world prior to Descartes, philosophy was not disengaged from theology, and, though cultivated, was cultivated as the rational element of faith, distinct but not separate from revelation. At these two epochs it was separated, and took up an independent course of its own. This it boasts, and this it calls its glory. But what has it done by its free and independent action? What new light on God, man, or the universe has it shed? You imagine that it has in its progress made a succession of brilliant discoveries, and amassed a body of truth unknown to the primitive ages and overlooked or denied by the church. If this really were so, the church would and ought to give way; but if you who think so were called upon to specify any one of these supposed discoveries, or any particular truth, held outside of the church and rejected or not accepted by her, and from the first making part of her doctrine, you would be not a little embarrassed. In the purely material order, there have no doubt been discoveries and inventions of greater or less value to our simple animal life, and this we may well assert without supposing any corresponding discoveries in the intellectual and moral order; for the Holy Scriptures assure us that the Lord has given the earth to the children of men, and abandoned it to their disputations. Whatever the free activity of the human mind has accomplished in the material order, out of that order it has, unassisted, accomplished less than nothing. Your rationalistic philosophy, your philosophy emancipated from the tutelage of revelation, marching with its free and independent step, has reduced man to a pig or a digestive tube open at both ends. It matters little whom we cite, in order to show that the rationalistic philosophy reduces man to a mere animal. Let us take Horace, that almost universal favorite with our polished classical scholars,—Horace, who owns that he is one of the swine-pen of Epicurus. He tells us that

"The first human beings sprung, like animals, from the earth,—a mute and filthy herd, making war upon one another for an acorn or a den, at first with nails and fists, then with sticks, and afterwards with artificial arms. At length they invented speech, formed language for the expression of their sentiments, and gave names to things. They then desisted from war, began to build and fortify cities, and to found laws prohibiting theft, murder, and adultery. For even before Helen, woman had been the most shameful cause of war. Addicted to the pleasures of the flesh, without marriage, after the manner of wild beasts, they fought

among themselves, the stronger overpowering the weaker, as a bull in a herd of cattle. But those men have perished unknown. Explore the annals and monuments of the world, and you will be obliged to admit that laws originated in the fear of the wicked, for nature is impotent to distinguish good from evil, the just from the unjust, and to separate what is permitted from what is to be avoided." *

So sings the polished Horace. Cicero speaks to the same purpose:—

"There was formerly a time when men roamed the fields, fed themselves, and propagated their species after the manner of brutes. In the conduct of life they followed the instincts of the body, instead of obeying the dictates of reason. They observed as yet no religion, no law, no duty. Legitimate marriage was unknown, and fathers acknowledged not their own children. No one understood the utility of right and equity. All was ignorance, error, abuse of bodily forces, and under the shadow of these most pernicious satellites, blind and reckless passion domineered over the soul." †

Whether you consult the ancient or modern philosophers, this is what the rationalistic philosophy opposes, on the explanation of the origin of man and civilization, to the doctrine of the church and the universal traditions of the human race. Father Ventura may well ask,—

"Can any thing more shameful, more degrading for man be imagined than such an explanation of his origin, nature, and condition? Can there

---

* "Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus;
Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere: deinc absistere bello,
Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.
Nam fuit ante Helenam mulier teterrima belli
Causa. Sed ignotis perierunt mortibus illi,
Quos venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum,
Viribus editior cædebat, ut in grege taurus.
Jura inventa metu injusti, fateare necesse est,
Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.
Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum,
Dividit ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis."

(*Satyræ* Lib. i. 3.)

† "Nam fuit quoddam tempus cum in agris homines passim, bestiarum more, vagabantur, et sibi victu ferino vitam propagabant. Nec ratione animi quidquam sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant. Nondum divinæ religionis, nondum humani officii ratio colebatur. Nemo nuptias viderat legitimas, non certos quisquam inspexerat liberos; non jus æquabile, quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Ita propter errorem atque inscitiam, cæca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas, ad se explendum, viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus." (*De Invent.* 1.)

be any thing really more absurd than this system, which assumes that man, while ignorant and stupid as a sheep, was able to invent what is most profoundly scientific, what is grandest and sublimest in his possession, that is to say, reason and speech? That man, ferocious, degraded, corrupt as a wild beast, was able to create justice, duty, laws, and voluntarily submit to them? That by its sole means, by its own efforts alone, the brute is able to make itself a man, and that barbarism and savagism can spontaneously and without extrinsic aid transform themselves into civilization? But once impudently admitted that men originally sprung from the vegetation of the earth, as onions, or from the corruption of other beings, as insects, that they have created for themselves ideas, sentiments, reason, language, truth, justice, law, and religion, it is absolutely necessary also to admit, that man has nothing in common with God, holds nothing from God; that God has revealed him nothing, and imposed upon him no law whose execution he has a right to demand; that man is his own reason and law, and in that which concerns them he holds only from himself; that the reason of each individual must walk alone, and should acknowledge no superior law, no authority, but should regard itself as free to do whatever seems to itself good. Here is the doctrine which constitutes, as I have said, *the philosophical reason*. Here then is the ancient philosophical reason originating in a fable as absurd as degrading. Its origin is as ignoble, as abject, as that of the religious or Catholic reason is noble, worthy, and majestic."—*Ibid.*, pp. 19–21.

There is no difference between the ancient and modern philosophical reason, or, as we prefer to say, rationalistic philosophy. Waiving or denying the primitive revelation, it must suppose that man received no instruction, no reason, language, or science from his Maker, and therefore that he began his career on earth through the ages as an untutored savage, nay, as a ferocious beast, living a purely animal life. Now if man began as a purely animal life, and is left to his own resources, to his own self-development induced by his animal wants, nothing but a purely animal life can be arrived at; for you can have nothing in the development not contained seminally in the principle. Hence your modern doctrine of progress, which you boast of, and secretly or openly condemn the church for not accepting, and which some few Catholic writers even take it upon them to inform her that she may accept with advantage to her cause, based as it is on the denial of the primitive revelation, and the assertion of the purely animal or vegetable origin of human beings, can at best be only a progress in the growth or development of the animal or vegetable life of man. It is a homely but true saying, that one cannot

make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. It is, we apprehend, equally difficult for a sow to develop into a moral and intellectual, a speaking and reasoning, human soul. Hence it is that, when we analyze the boasted progress of man, we find that it is progress in provisions for the wants of the human body, or man as an animal, alone. Nothing but the animal being in the premises, nothing but the animal can be in the conclusion. But this is not the worst of it. The soul is, as the church has defined, *forma corporis*, and the life of the body, the animal life itself, depends on the union of soul and body as one person, and derives from the soul itself; so that in proportion as man neglects the proper life of the soul he loses that of the body, and suffers equally in his animal life. We are not to live the life of the soul for the sake of the body, but sensible goods are in their highest degree attainable only by those who live the rational life of the soul for the sake of God. Hence our Lord says, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things (sensible goods after which the heathen seek) shall be added unto you." So it falls out that by neglecting or denying the primitive revelation, and living not according to the law of the soul, but according to the instincts of the body, we retrogade instead of making progress in that order where we freely admit a large margin for human progress was left, namely, in providing for the animal life of man. You do the church foul wrong when you blame her for opposing the doctrine of progress asserted by the rationalistic philosophy of the day, because that progress is divorced from moral and intellectual truth, because it is no real progress even as to the actual enjoyments of animal life, and because its tendency is to destroy the animal life of the body as well as the moral life of the soul. It is not progress in earthly well-being the church opposes, as you foolishly imagine, but the attempt to effect that progress in disregard of the only conditions on which it can be a progress and not a regress. The multiplication of sensible goods, or the increase and accumulation of material riches, do not of themselves constitute a progress even in earthly well-being, unless preceded and accompanied by the higher life of the soul, by conformity, after the inner man, to the truth and law of God made known to us in the primitive revelation. The mere man of the world, the epicurean, the sensualist, is, as all experience proves, whatever his material wealth, the most wretched of mortals. We know well that no Catholic denies this; but

those Catholics who accept the modern doctrine of progress, and seek to incorporate it with the doctrine of the church, should know that this modern doctrine has for its basis the vegetable or animal origin of man, or the mere animal and savage state of the primitive man asserted by Horace and Cicero, or the ancient rationalistic philosophy, and cannot be accepted without denying the nobler part of man, without neglecting the moral life of the soul, and therefore not without losing that very earthly well-being that is sought. This well understood, no Catholic can for a moment countenance the modern rationalistic philosophy, fatal alike to soul and body, or feel that his church does not well in rejecting it. Let any man, Catholic, or non-Catholic, study these volumes, and he will understand this, and understand it well.

We have neither the space nor the ability to give a complete analysis of these volumes, for they are themselves only an analysis of the subject they treat. We have indicated a few of their more salient points, and that chiefly for the purpose of stimulating the curiosity of our readers to master their contents. What chiefly arrests our attention is the necessity demonstrated by the author of reuniting reason and faith, religion and philosophy, society and the church. The divorce proclaimed by philosophy in modern as in ancient times has led, and could not but lead, to the most fatal results. Religion divorced from reason becomes superstition or fanaticism, philosophy divorced from revelation becomes immoral, licentious, and falls into scepticism and nullity. But we must not misunderstand the nature of the union demanded. Science must take its *data* from faith, not on the authority of faith. The primitive revelation, preserved in its chief elements by universal tradition and language, in its purity and integrity with the patriarchs, in the synagogue, and in the Roman Catholic apostolic church, solves all the problems which require solution in our present state; but it does so in the intelligible order, not by force of authority, imposing dogmas, and enjoining obedience, as is too often imagined, but by unfolding, so to speak, the grand scheme of Providence in both the intelligible and the superintelligible orders, which orders, though distinguishable, are never separable in that scheme. What pertains to the superintelligible, being above but not against the intelligible, is received by faith, and on the authority of the revealer. That which is thus received, shows us the real

character and relations of the intelligible, and puts us in the position to apprehend it as it is; but it is affirmed by us, not on the authority of faith, but on its affirmation of itself in noetic intuition or rational demonstration to our understanding, in its principles as in its conclusion, as must always be the case with the *scibile* as distinguished from the *credibile*. The doctrine requires us to reason, to philosophize in the intelligible by the light of revelation, by the light which faith sheds on the natural order, but requires us to accept nothing in that order on extrinsic authority, and leaves us free to accept or reject in the region of the intelligible according to the presence or absence of intrinsic evidence.

COLLARD ON REASON AND FAITH.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1856.]

The Abbé Collard has given us in this volume an elaborate work on a subject of the highest importance. His style is lively, and his thought is usually just. His general design is excellent, and the method he pursues in treating his subject is scientific and felicitous. The fault we find with his work is that it is too diffuse, and lacks condensation and vigor. It, moreover, is not adapted to the wants of our country, however well it may be adapted to the wants of France; for it relies too much in its arguments on the concessions of rationalists,—concessions which mean little, and by which no rationalist or non-Catholic will hold himself bound any further than it suits his purpose.

Without intending any special reference to the Abbé Collard's book, we must be permitted to say, in general, that we seldom light upon a modern popular work against non-Catholics that seems to us to come directly to the point, and to touch with a free, bold, and firm hand, the precise difficulty, as it is conceived by the non-Catholic himself. Even the *Summa contra Gentiles*, of St. Thomas, perfectly conclusive as it is against all who reject the church, is by no means adapted to the state of the non-Catholic mind of this age and country. Very few non-Catholics are able to recognize their own objections in those stated and refuted by the Angelic Doctor. The objections of non-Catholics are, we concede, in all times and places substantially the same; but he who treats them as the same will always fail, because they who entertain them do not perceive the identity. They vary in their subjective forms with every individual, and unless met in those ever-varying forms, they are not practically met at all.

Perhaps the defect of our popular controversial works is mainly owing to the fact that they treat the objections of non-Catholics too exclusively from a purely intellectual point of view. The objections urged against us are never purely intellectual, and appear to those who entertain them to be

* *Raison et Foi: Essai sur l'Idée pure de la Religion, appliquée au Catholocisme.* Par M. l'Abbé Collard. Caen et Paris. 1855.

mutilated when reduced to their strictly logical value. They who urge them have never subjected them to a rigid analysis, and are unable to recognize them when stated in their strictly logical form. They feel that something is omitted, that some shade of meaning is neglected, and that they are, by no means, in our statements what they are in their own minds. This is because their objections are partly from the intellect, and partly from feeling,—partly objective, so to speak, and partly subjective, and our logical statements reproduce only the objective portion, and take no account of the subjective element. All the real value of the objection, of course, is in what is objective, and when that is refuted, all is refuted that logically needs refuting; and all that would be necessary, practically, if non-Catholics were always strictly logical. But such is not the case. They are rarely logical; they rarely understand that all truth is objective, and still more rarely reduce, in their own minds, their objections to distinct logical propositions. They do not distinguish what is of feeling from what is of reason; and practically what is of feeling, what is purely subjective, has infinitely more weight with them than what is of pure reason, or can be objectively stated. We are disposed, therefore, to attribute the failure of our popular controversial works, especially in our times and country, to the fact that they are too rigidly logical, or rely too much on the pure intellect, or scholastic analysis. The rigid logical training given in our schools fits us to be acute and subtile disputants, but in some measure unfits us, unless men of original genius and rare ability, to address, with effect, the non-Catholic public. A freer and broader, and a less rigid scholastic training, would render us more efficient.

The impression our controversial works make on the majority of non-Catholic readers is that our religion is purely objective,—addresses itself solely to the external senses or to the pure intellect, and has nothing for the heart, nothing for the soul, for the spiritual and deeper instincts of our nature. They turn away from it as merely outward and showy, or as cold, dry, and formal. Of course nothing is more false than such an impression, but have we taken sufficient care to guard against it? Do we sufficiently reflect on the unscholastic culture of modern non-Catholics, and their vast distance from mediæval scholasticism? We venerate the great scholastic doctors, and do all we can to induce people to study them, but scholasticism was

never intended to be adopted in addressing the popular mind, and was cultivated in the schools, and only for the schools. Out of the schools, with the people, a Doctor Eck stands no chance before a Doctor Martin Luther, who despises the schools, and speaks out from the impulses of his own rich but disorderly nature. We have now, for the most part, to deal with the people, to address the popular mind and the popular heart, and the more scholastic in form we are, the less practically efficient must we be. Our disputes are now not confined to the schools, nor to schoolmen; they are with men in the world, and of the world, —active, living men, that is, living men in their way; men not deficient in natural ability and acuteness, often possessing strong minds, brilliant genius, warm hearts, and great practical sagacity and experience, but unskilled in conventional or scholastic rules, and, indeed, despising them. We cannot affect these men unless we speak to them from warm and gushing hearts, as well as from pure intellect, and project something of our own subjectivity as a response to theirs. They regard less what we say than the tone and manner in which we say it; less what we address to their logical understanding than what we address to their sentiments and affections. To affect them it is necessary to speak to them as men, as living men, not as abstractions. The preacher is far more effectual with them than the controversialist, for he appeals to their feelings, their internal longings, and their nobler aspirations.

We cannot say that the Abbé Collard is too scholastic, too logical, but he is not strong and manly, and lacks vigor of thought and expression. He is too much of a dilettante, and has not enough of downright earnestness. He does not write with his whole heart and soul, and throw the whole energy of his being into his work. He forgets that *Ernst ist das Leben*, and mistakes a courtly polish, or a conventional politeness for the sweetness of Christian charity and the unction of the Spirit. The great question of faith or no faith, of life and death, is no question on which to trifle, or to play off quaint conceits or pretty phrases. Plain truth, plainly spoken, from a heart that loves it, feels its worth, and is ready to die for it, is the only politeness it is lawful in such a matter to study or to practise. Earnestness is not bitterness, nor is the clear, strong, direct, and energetic utterance of the plain truth rudeness or discourteousness. The great fathers of the church are never rude, never coarse,

never bitter,—but they never hesitate to speak out the plain truth, in strong language, in tones of fearful energy. And so men must speak, if they mean to leave their mark on their age, or aid the progress of truth and justice.

We say nothing here against the cultivation of gentleness and meekness, sweetness and love, or in disparagement of the threadbare admonition to the writer, or speaker, to study the *suaviter in modo*, as well as the *fortiter in re*. Perhaps we admire as much as any man the union of gentleness and strength, and are as much opposed as any man can be to vituperation and abuse. But we are grieved when we reflect how many a young enthusiasm has been damped, how many a noble genius has been blasted, how many a free, warm, loving heart has been crushed, or thrown back on itself to stagnate and die, by the mistimed admonitions of the wise and prudent, the sleek and timid, the tepid and the cowardly, to be mild and gentle, meek and courteous, and to avoid giving free utterance to one's living thoughts as they rise, in the burning words in which they naturally clothe themselves; nay, we are ourselves suffering from the withering effects of such admonitions, which have been dealt out to us without stint or measure by our own fastidious friends. We have done nothing in comparison with what we might have done, if our friends had been willing to let us have our own way, and had not been so afraid of our offending the enemies of truth and virtue, and we were half indignant as well as half amused the other day, at a friendly critic in *Le Correspondant*, who seems unable to repeat often enough that we are rough, rude and savage in our forms of expression. Out upon such fastidiousness! Be men,—be men in earnest; be men of faith, hope, charity, and then speak out as living men in the strong natural tones of men who believe their religion is a matter of life and death. The soft tones of the lute will never rouse an Epicurean age from its sensuality, and make it cry out, What shall I do to be saved? They will only lull it to sleep, and to a sleep which is the sleep of death. You must disturb the age if you would heal it; you must produce commotion in the soul before you can induce it to seek repose in truth, or peace in God. We are inefficient because we are weak and tame, because we are hemmed in by the proprieties, and hampered by the petty conventionalities of an effeminate civilization. We should rise above them when pleading the cause of God's church, when pleading the cause of immortal

souls, and prove that the truth we would defend warms our own hearts, fires our own souls, and raises us above ourselves.

The Christian, filled with the charity of the Gospel, can never be rude, can never be bitter or vituperative, however direct, energetic, or outspoken he may be. He has no need to be on his guard, or to speak under fear of the ferula of his master. Be sure that your purpose is holy, your end is just; recollect the presence of God, your accountability to him, and then speak as your own heart prompts. The fitting words as well as the fitting thoughts will be given you. It is not truth or love that seeks circumlocution and reticence, soft phrases and bland tones; it is error and craft. Truth spurns all disguise, and love goes always to its end by the direct and shortest route. Let our young writers—the old are past reform—lay this to heart; let them get their hearts right before God, fill them with the deep, earnest love of truth and goodness, and then let them speak as the spirit giveth utterance, fearing to offend God, indeed, but fearing nothing else, neither men nor conventionalities. Then will they give us a fresh, living, original literature; then will they make their mark on the age, and have the glory of doing faithful service to truth and virtue.

The Abbé Collard, writing, as he appears to be, for those who reject Catholicity, seems to us to err by not taking sufficient pains to point out and recognize those elements of truth which are contained in the doctrines he opposes. He labors with all his might to show their erroneousness, but he apparently forgets that non-Catholics embrace them, not for the sake of the errors, but for the sake of the truth mixed up with them. The human intellect cannot embrace pure error, any more than the will can embrace pure evil. The object of the will is good, and whenever one wills evil, it is under the relation of good, real or apparent; so the object of the intellect is truth, and the intellect assents to error only by virtue of the truth which it does not distinguish from it. In all these socialistic, communistic, pantheistic, and other non-Catholic theories, there is an element of truth which accredits them, which alone endears them to their adherents, and which their adherents suppose we deny. But we are Catholics, and hold all truth, in its unity and integrity. The church does and can exclude no truth, and, consequently, this truth which they have, and which is all they really assent to in their theories, we have and hold as well as they. Prove any thing to be true, and we are bound

by our religion to accept it. We should have been pleased, therefore, to find the Abbé Collard disentangling in the false theories he combats the element of truth they contain, and showing its place in Catholic doctrine. Non-Catholics are sure of a truth in their theories, and they do not detect that truth in ordinary Catholic teaching, or distinguish it from the errors which, in their minds, accompany it. It is of no use to point out their errors so long as we leave them to suppose that we reject their truth. Our first step should be to distinguish that truth, and show them that we do really hold it.

Modern infidelity is not, as so many suppose, a reaction against Catholicity, but against Calvinistic or Jansenistic theology and morals, and, as against them, it is perfectly defensible. It is a manly protest in behalf of human nature and human reason, which Calvinism theoretically annihilates. It is a protest against a pretended religion that outrages common sense, and deprives man of his manhood; that denies his nature under pretence of exalting grace, and his reason under pretence of magnifying revelation. So far it is just, and is prompted by the irrepressible instincts of human nature. Thus far they do and say nothing which we ourselves may not do and say. Their error is not in asserting the rights of reason, or the dignity and worth of human nature, but in supposing that in doing so they assert something denied by Catholicity. Human nature, since made by God, is and must be good, and cannot have been totally depraved and rendered a mass of corruption by the fall. In so far as the workmanship of God, it is as good to-day as it was when it came forth from the hands of its maker. Being and good—*summum ens* and *summum bonum*, as all the schoolmen, and all not Manicheans teach, are identical. All creatures have their being in God; in him live and move and are, so far as they are at all. They exist only by participation of his being, and so far as they participate of his being they participate of good, and are good. Their total corruption would be their total annihilation. Even Satan himself, as a creature of God, in his essential or physical nature is good, that is, in so far as he participates of being, for, in so far, even he participates of God. No creature of God can be evil in any other sense than in the abuse of his liberty or his moral faculties. Man is not evil in his physical nature, in his essential existence or his natural faculties; he is and can be evil only by abus-

ing his natural faculties, or using them for a wrong purpose. Whoever should maintain to the contrary would not only disparage nature, but dishonor God, its creator.

Are we wrong in supposing that our popular controversialists do not feel sufficiently the importance of recognizing this true side of modern unbelief, and presenting in a strong light that aspect of Catholic doctrine, which accepts and harmonizes it with the Catholic doctrine of the fall and of grace? The impression of non-Catholics, not of the Calvinistic scheme, is, that the church denies or denigrates nature to make way for grace, and reason to make way for revelation, or authority. Every Catholic knows that such is not the fact with the church, but does every one feel the importance of showing to non-Catholics that it is not? Indeed, even among Catholics we seem to ourselves to find, now and then, a slight Jansenistic tendency, which makes them afraid, that if they give to reason and nature their due, we shall practically encourage modern rationalism or naturalism, and strengthen the tendency, already too strong, to overlook the absolute need in which we all stand of grace and supernatural revelation. Ought we to share this fear? We should, indeed, always insist most earnestly on the truth which is the more especially opposed to the dominant error of the age and country, but not, it seems to us, till we have analyzed that error, and disengaged and accepted the truth which has led to its adoption. We would go, in our times, and especially in our country, where the old Calvinistic or Puritanical forms of Protestantism are losing their hold on the people, as far in our attempts to rehabilitate nature and natural reason, as the truth permits. We would give more prominence to the maxim, grace supposes nature, than is usually given it in our popular controversial works. We would undeceive our rationalizing adversaries, and show them that, according to the church, grace does not supersede nature, or, in converting the soul, suppress any of its natural instincts; or reverse any one of its inherent laws. Grace takes nature as its starting-point, leaves it all that it really is, free to do all that without abusing itself it can do; and simply comes to it as a help, as an *auxilium*, blends in with its normal action, elevates it above itself, and enables it to do what unassisted it could not do, and to attain to an infinitely higher and more glorious destiny, than it could aspire to by its own strength alone. It accepts nature, supposes always its presence and activity,—supposes always its

activity in the highest supernatural virtue, and its activity from its own centre, according to its own laws. In the supernatural virtue of charity, impossible without grace, nature is as present and as active, as in the natural virtue of philanthropy. Nature, indeed, is not grace, and can never rise of itself to the supernatural order; but it is fitted to the reception of grace, and it is only under the influence of supernatural grace that it does or can attain to its full development and growth, even as nature. In a certain sense, grace, in the present state, is necessary to complete nature, no less than to supernaturalize it. Thus understood, the assertion of the insufficiency of nature, and the necessity of grace, in no sense degrades nature or deprives us of our manhood.

Is a man degraded, is his nature wronged, by acquiring through habit a facility of doing a thing which is difficult, nay, impossible to him who has not the habit? Let a man who has never written a letter, attempt to form letters by writing, and he cannot do it. What a difference between the man habituated to it, in felling a tree with an axe, and him who has never taken an axe in his hand! We all know and understand the increased power or facility of doing a thing derived from habit; and none of us ever looks upon the acquisition of this power, or facility, as derogatory to nature. Now grace is a habit, *habitus*, not acquired indeed, but supernaturally infused; yet in relation to our natural powers, though infused, it operates the same as any other habit, precisely the same as if acquired. It blends with our natural powers, elevates them, and enables them to do what without it they could not do. How can the simple fact, that it is an infused instead of an acquired habit, depress nature, or detract from our natural dignity and worth? What is there in it, more than in an acquired habit, derogatory to our proper manhood?

Calvinistic theology denies reason to make way for revelation. It does not explain to us that, God from the beginning having designed us for a supernatural beatitude, natural reason must needs be inadequate, both to the comprehension and to the attainment of our destiny. It forgets that even before the fall man was constituted in justice, and possessed the integrity of his nature, by supernatural gifts and graces, not by his natural powers and endowments alone. Forgetting that the positive loss by the fall was simply the loss of innocence, of the supernatural grace

which elevated man, that is, supernatural justice, and the integrity of his nature, that is, exemption from disease and pain, and the subjection of the body to the soul, and the appetites and propensities to reason, attached to that supernatural grace, and made dependent on its preservation, it maintains that man lost his natural spiritual faculties, and became deprived of reason and free-will, incapable of thinking a good thought, or of performing a good deed, even in the natural as well as in the supernatural order. It thus degrades, really annihilates natural reason, and with it our natural moral faculty. Jansenism does the same. It annihilates nature, it destroys reason, and brings grace and revelation, not as an aid or a help to reason and nature, but as a substitute for them. It founds faith on scepticism, and science on faith, as do our exaggerated traditionalists, recently condemned by the Holy See. Men outside of the Catholic world, who have too much good sense to embrace such a theology, and concluding rashly that it is virtually, if not formally, held by all who maintain an authoritative supernatural revelation, feel that as reasonable men, as men who are not prepared absolutely to stultify themselves, they must reject all revelation and fall back on natural reason alone, not as absolutely sufficient, but as the best and only light they have.

Now these men fall, we concede, into a fatal error; but it is of no use to combat their error, unless we distinguish and accept their truth. As against Calvinists or Jansenists, they are right: a religion that begins by the denial of reason, or, what is the same thing, by asserting its total corruption, condemns itself in advance, for it is incapable of being proved. Whatever is provable, must be provable either by reason or to reason; and where there is no reason, there is and can be nothing provable. Faith itself presupposes reason; and even when supernatural it is an act of reason, though of reason elevated and assisted by grace. It is idle to bring arguments to prove either the fact of revelation or our need of a revelation, so long as we leave its rejecters to suppose that we deny or discredit reason. It is necessary to begin by disabusing them; by showing unbelievers that we are not Calvinists; that with us, as grace supposes nature, so revelation supposes reason; and by frankly conceding to them that reason is their right, and that it is their duty, as well as their necessity, to reject whatever is unreasonable, or really repugnant to natural reason. Revelation does not supersede

reason, or abrogate a single one of its rights; and we are very free to say that if it did, we would reject it, and refuse to hear a single argument in its defence. It is not that a man has less reason with revelation than he has without it, but that he has something more than reason, and something which even enlarges reason itself. Revelation may bring to our apprehension what is above reason, but nothing that is contrary to reason; and any thing purporting to be a revelation that is really repugnant to reason, is by that fact alone proved not to be a revelation of God. But the fact that a doctrine is above reason, is not a proof that it is against reason: nothing is more certain than that reason herself asserts her own limitation, and that what she knows is by no means the measure of all that is or exists. Man has, as Gioberti has well maintained, the faculty of *sovrintelligenza*, super-intelligence, or a faculty, a mysterious faculty most assuredly, that takes note of the fact that there is more than we know, or by our natural faculties can know.* This faculty, which has its root in the soul's sense of its own potentiality, is that within us which renders us capable of receiving a supernatural revelation, and co-operating with the grace given to enable us to believe it. We concede that Catholic dogma contains mysteries which reason cannot comprehend; but we deny that in any one of these mysteries there is any thing contrary to reason, or that reason can say is false, or cannot be. We assert the insufficiency of reason alone for all the necessities of man; we assert its impotence in the supernatural order, strictly so-called, but we assert its sufficiency and even its infallibility in its own order, when reasonably used, that is, when not warped by prejudice, or obscured by passion. It is important to dwell on this fact; and we think our popular controversialists do not usually take sufficient pains to make it clear to the non-Catholic mind, and to defend reason itself. Notwithstanding the rationalistic tendencies of our times, and perhaps because of them, the most fatal doubt of our age is, as Père Gratry has well said, the doubt, not of revelation, but of reason itself; and the Catholic is called upon to defend reason, as the preamble to his defence of his church.

* The author was misled by Gioberti on this point. It is true that reason asserts her own limitations; but man cannot have a faculty, or natural power to know that which is superintelligible, or above his natural power to know. See Vol. II. pp. 276–277.—Ed.

Non-Catholics object to us, that we demand belief on authority; but this in reality is an objection in their minds, chiefly because they suppose we substitute authority for reason, and do not recognize in belief on authority, a real act of reason. Nothing, of course, is more unreasonable than to substitute authority for reason, or to suppose that any authority can be a good ground of faith after reason is denied. Faith is an assent of the intellect, as well as the consent of the will; and is, and must be, in order to be faith, an act of reason. To deny reason is to deny both faith and the possibility of faith; and hence, without the act or exercise of reason, there is and can be no act of faith. The unbeliever sees this more or less clearly; and supposing that we, like Calvinists, assert authority only as a substitute for reason, he refuses to entertain any argument in behalf of the authority of the church. He sets us down as offering, in the very outset, an affront to reason; for the very proposition of authority in matters of belief he looks upon as the denial of reason. Here, again, we think our controversialists do not take sufficient pains to remove from the mind of the non-Catholic his prejudice against authority. They present authority, as it seems to non-Catholics, as an outward mechanical force, which has, and can have, no real relation to the interior acts of the understanding. He cannot understand how such exterior force, or such external authority, can convince the reason, and call forth its interior assent. Authority seems to him as addressed to the will only; and we are so constituted that we cannot believe at the simple command of the will. The assent of the intellect is not voluntary, is not an act of free-will; and it does not depend solely on our will to give it or to withhold it. But we cannot, whatever our dispositions, believe that to which our intellect does not assent, or that of which our reason is not convinced. Suppose our reason tells us one thing, and our church commands us to believe another, how is it possible for us to believe the church against our reason? Certainly, in such a case, supposing reason does really teach one thing, and the church its contradictory, we could not believe the church, for no man does or can, on any conceivable authority, believe what contradicts reason, or for which he has not an authority satisfactory to reason: we deceive ourselves, if we think we can, for the belief is always of that to which the intellect assents. The intellect is not, and cannot be, false; and where there is error there is no intelligence, no

intellectual act. The light of reason is God; and reason when it really acts rests for its truths on the veracity of God, and cannot be deceived, unless God deceives it. There is, then, and can be, no authority sufficient to accredit what is really contradictory even to natural reason. If the case of the church and reason coming in direct conflict occurred, or could occur, it would be fatal to her authority; and we could not rationally believe any thing for the reason that she teaches it. So much must be conceded to reason even in matters of revelation, or of Catholic faith. The authority of the church must be connected with reason, and shown to rest on that same divine veracity on which reason itself rests, or else it is no sufficient authority for asserting or denying any proposition whatever.

All certainty comes from God; and in those erroneous propositions of which people pretend to be certain, it is only of the truth contained in them, and which they do not distinguish, that they really are certain. In natural reason we are certain, because God is the light of reason, and we see the truth immediately in his light, which illumines the intellect—"the true light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world." But we attain through natural reason not all truth, and there is truth of a supernatural order. Nothing prevents God, if he chooses, from revealing this supernatural truth immediately to chosen messengers, and mediately through them to all. If he gives us full proof, that is, proof satisfactory to reason, that he has revealed it to them, and assures us that he takes care that they shall communicate it to us exactly as he has communicated it to them, we have precisely the same ground—the veracity of God—for believing it, that we have for believing any truth to which natural reason itself attains. Suppose this supernatural revelation to be made to the church; suppose that he is present with her, preserving her by his supernatural assistance from all error in apprehending or teaching it: then we should have for what she teaches, precisely the same divine authority, the ground of all certainty, that we have for what natural reason itself teaches. This is what we as Catholics allege; and it is only on the ground here supposed—the ground that the church simply teaches what God teaches her, and that her claims to be the organ through which he teaches men those truths above natural reason are sufficiently accredited to natural reason, that we believe, or ask any one to believe, any thing she teaches.

Here there is no merely external authority acting upon us by an outward mechanical force, but a real light, enlightening us interiorly, identically the very light which illumines us in natural reason itself. Faith and reason, then, rest on the same fundamental principle; and in believing on the authority of the church, we make an act of reason, as well as of faith. There is, in the case supposed, no demand made to believe on a merely external authority, which is not light for the intellect itself; for there is in principle and in fact the same light in the teaching of the church, as in reason itself; and a light as intimately related to the soul in the one case as in the other. Moreover, the external teaching of the church has not only the internal relation with reason just described, but it has in the soul of the believer an internal supernatural authority that responds to its authority, and which holds to it a relation analogous to that which reason holds to the divine Word or light which enlightens it. This is, in the first and highest sense, the habit of faith, a supernatural elevation of the creditive power of the soul, received in the sacrament of Baptism, that places it on the plane of the credible object; but is in a secondary, and a lower sense, an interior tradition common, in some degree, to all persons brought up in Christian countries, even though not baptized. Reason, in Christian lands, has an elevation, a Christian sense, which brings it, in some degree, into relation with the teachings of the church, and enables it, as it were, to forefeel them, and to receive them as the complement of itself, as the response to its wants and its aspirations. In some sense, reason, in Christian lands, even in men who regard themselves as unbelievers, is Christianized, and tends to Christian truth, to the doctrines of the church. You cannot converse five minutes with a non-Catholic, whether Protestant or infidel, without detecting in him the elements of Catholic thought; and whenever he speaks spontaneously, without reference to his heresy, or his unbelief, he talks like a Catholic. It is thus that natural reason itself becomes infused with Catholic light, and the elements of revealed truth become impressed upon the intellect, and engraven upon the tablets of the heart. Modern philanthropy is a phenomenon that could never have made its appearance in a pagan nation, and is only a feeble echo, often a travesty, of Christian charity. Socialism could never have arisen with a people that had not been taught the doctrine of Christian brotherhood. Proudhon proves in his infamous

maxim, property is robbery, that he was born and bred in a Christian country. His doctrine is the misconception and misapplication of the Christian doctrine, which declares the proprietor only a steward, and seeks to remedy by natural justice the evils which flow from the inequality of property, by charity and alms-deeds.

Now every Christian knows that there is formed in us an external Christian sense, a sort of Catholic instinct, which responds to the external authority of the church, and serves, in some sort, as an external authority, that of the Christian reason and conscience. This internal authority is greater in proportion as we live nearer to God, who instructs us by interior inspirations and illuminations, as well as by the exterior teachings of the church. The false mystics and pietists have exaggerated this interior tradition of the faith, and these illuminations of the spirit, and, as in the case of the Quakers, have pretended that they are sufficient without the external. They have, therefore, rejected the external altogether, and run into all manner of extravagances, and are carried away at times by all manner of enthusiasms. This has, no doubt, led our controversialists to lay the principal stress on the external tradition and authority. In doing so, they have, we are inclined to believe, led many non-Catholics to conclude that we do not recognize this interior light and authority at all, and that we assert only the outward. But this is a great mistake, as every one knows who is acquainted with our ascetic writings, especially with the writings of Catholic mystics.

We think it desirable that our popular controversialists should recognize more distinctly this internal authority, this interior tradition of the faith, which responds to what we may call the mystic element of the soul. This mystic element is integral in every soul, and can never be safely neglected. It seems to predominate in the German, and is in him the source of many fatal errors. It is not so strong in the Anglo-American, yet he has it, and cannot be made to embrace a religion which does not appeal to it, and meet its demands. His strongest prejudice against the church grows out of his supposition that she neglects this element of the soul, and has nothing to satisfy it. He imagines, how falsely every Catholic knows, that the church places God at an infinite distance from the heart, and recognizes no intercourse between him and the soul, except through an outward sensible medium. If we seek the con-

version of our countryman, we must undeceive him, and show him that precisely the reverse is the fact. The church is not something interposed between the soul and God. It does not separate them; it brings them together, and is a medium of the closest union and intimacy between them. The church, if you will, is the outward sign of the interior union, the ladder by which God descends to the soul, and the soul ascends to God. The church is in all respects simply sacramental; and every sacrament signifies the thing of which it is the sign. In every sacrament it is the Holy Ghost that enters the soul, and dwells in it. The Christian is the temple of God,—a temple which God deigns to inhabit, and to fill with his glory, as was shadowed forth in the cloud that filled the holy of holies of the old Jewish temple. It is with this in-dwelling God, the Holy Ghost within us, that the Christian soul communes, and by silent, interior communing finds light for the understanding, and inspiration for the will. Here is ample food for the mystic appetite of the soul; and it is easy to show our non-Catholic countrymen, that they can find all their mystic wants superabundantly supplied by our holy religion.

We have made these remarks, not precisely as applicable to the Abbé Collard's book, which we have read with much pleasure, and esteem very highly, but for their bearing on what is just now the great work pressing upon our Catholic zeal and charity,—the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen. As yet this work has hardly been attempted; and, unhappily, too many of us have regarded it as well-nigh hopeless. The Holy Father has spoken on this subject, and called upon our bishops and clergy, and through them upon all the faithful, to make strenuous exertions to convert the American people to that faith without which it is impossible to please God. It is our duty, as good Catholics and as specially devoted to the Holy See, to respond with our best endeavors to the call of the successor of Peter; and in our remarks we have simply aimed to throw out some suggestions which may not be without their utility in reference to it. We do not for ourselves, in the least, share the feeling so frequently expressed by Catholics, that the American people cannot be converted; and we believe that their conversion is comparatively easy, if Catholics themselves do their duty.

The American people are, no doubt, prejudiced against Catholicity, are fearfully indifferent to all religion, and

strongly devoted to mammon; but not more so than were many nations that have been, notwithstanding, converted, and elevated to the first rank among Christian nations. Before despairing of their conversion we should undertake it,—before we pronounce their prejudices invincible, we should do our best to remove them; and before denying them the capacity to appreciate and accept Catholic truth, we should present that truth in a manner suited to their understanding. As yet we have studied rather to preserve those who are already Catholics, than to make converts of those who are non-Catholics. We say not this, as implying a censure or a reproach, but simply as a reason why we should not be too ready to conclude that the American people cannot be converted, and that it is useless to labor to convert them.

We not only have not made any exertions to convert the non-Catholic portion of our countrymen, but we have done much to confirm their prejudices against us and our church. We have hardly presented them the church as Catholic. Accidental circumstances have made it appear to them chiefly as the national church of a foreign immigration. In the parts of the country where the prejudices against Catholicity are the strongest, it has seemed to be Celtic rather than Catholic; and Americans have felt, that to become Catholics, they must become Celts, and make common cause with every class of Irish agitators, who treat Catholic America as if it were simply a province of Ireland. A considerable portion of our Catholic population have brought with them their old prejudices of race, national animosities, and bitter passions, and make our country the arena for fighting out their old hereditary feuds. Our so-called Catholic journals are little else than Irish newspapers, and appeal rather to Irish than to Catholic interests and sympathies. Some of them teem with abuse of Americans, and are filled with diatribes against the race from which the majority of non-Catholic Americans claim to have sprung. Their tone and temper are foreign; and their whole tendency is to make an American feel, that, practically, the church in this country is the church of a foreign colony, and by no means Catholic. All this may be very natural, and very easily explained to the Catholic who is willing to pardon almost any thing to a people that has stood firm by the faith during three centuries of martyrdom, but every one must see that it is better fitted to repel Americans from the

church, than to attract them to it; especially when they find the foreignism which offends them defended by a portion of the clergy, and apparently opposed by none; and carried even into politics, and made, or attempted to be made, the turning point in our elections. We must present the Catholic church to the American people as the church of God,—not as a Saxon or a Celtic church,—before we can judge safely of their dispositions towards Catholicity. But, as this is a matter which more immediately concerns the clergy, we forbear to enlarge on it.

We have not always been just to our non-Catholic countrymen; and we sometimes infer their hostile feelings to Catholics and Catholicity from acts for which it hardly becomes us to censure them. Great allowance must be made for an impoverished people suddenly transplanted from one country to another. Many things are excusable in them that would not be in a people settled in their old homes; and it is by no means in our heart to speak harshly of any class of our Catholic brethren; but we must say that we sometimes complain of Americans, when we should rather commend their good intentions and consistency. We are often severe on them for making the public schools unfavorable to our religion, and for their pertinacity in getting possession of our children and bringing them up Protestants. But if we controlled the public schools, as they do, we can hardly think that we should make them less unfavorable to Protestantism than they do to Catholicity. If we neglect our children, and, by our improvidence or intemperance, leave them without a moral training and a religious education, are we to blame Protestants for not being contented to see them grow up rowdies, and become the vicious population of our towns, or because they do not see fit to take them and bring them up in the Catholic religion? How can we blame them, if in view of our improvidence, drunkenness, quarrelling, heedlessness, and neglect of the ordinary duties of parents, they are led to doubt the practical efficacy of our religion, and to smile incredulously when we tell them that Catholicity is necessary to save the liberty and morals of the country?

There is no use in our attempting to conceal that quite too large a portion of the vicious population of our cities have been born of Catholic parents, and themselves been baptized by the Catholic priest. The fact is glaring and well known. The Catholic wards of our city can hardly be

called model wards,—wards with which the police are unfamiliar. It is all very well to charge this upon the British Government, upon the poverty of the immigrants, or the Protestant atmosphere of the country; but no small part of it is chargeable to Catholics themselves. No boasting, no pompous declamation, can exonerate us from the charge of gross neglect of duty. We have not, as a body, set the non-Catholic community the example of those high-toned virtues, those lofty and sterling morals, which are the birthright of a Catholic people; and we have a terrible account one day to give our righteous Judge. God will demand of us the souls of those children we have suffered to be lost, and the souls, too, of those non-Catholic Americans who, but for our scandals, would have embraced the faith and been saved. We must do our duty, be Catholics, and live like Catholics, before we can blame the American people for their hostility to us. We must remove scandals from amongst ourselves, and prove by our lives the immense superiority of our religion,—that our religion does not make us morally imbecile, but strong and manly, honest and sober, virtuous and intelligent,—before we can hope to remove the prejudices of non-Catholics. Faith is a good thing, but faith without works will not save us, or convert the world. We must be up and doing, and not fold our hands in inglorious ease, or shameful sloth, leaving things to take their course, and saying, by way of salvo to our consciences, that they have always gone on very much as they are going, and always will continue so. Certainly, they always will, if we do nothing to prevent it.

But, notwithstanding the much we have done to confirm the prejudices of the non-Catholic American, and the little we have done to remove them, we are led to believe from our own observations, that the hostility of our countrymen to Catholicity is by no means so great as some of our Catholic friends pretend. They seem to have been far more deeply impressed by the conservative principles of the church, the solid worth, the devoted piety, the ardent charity, and edifying lives of a large number of Catholics in the country, than by the scandals to which we have referred. They seem to have remembered that our Lord said, "Scandals must come, but woe unto him by whom they come." They know that the great body, even of Irish Catholics, those who best know and practise their religion, are not agitators, demagogues, nor under the control of the agitators and

demagogues; and that, however strong may be their attachment to their native land, their attachment to their religion is stronger, and they conduct themselves as peaceful, sober, loyal, American citizens, and add not a little to the wealth, the virtue, and the respectability of the country. They see that they look upon this as their country, as their home, identify themselves with it, their interests with its interests, and are careful to train up their children in good habits, to be good Catholics, and good citizens. They excuse, in a liberal way, what offends them in a portion of the Catholic population, and set it down, not to Catholicity, but to the anomalous state of things which has long prevailed in the country from which they have escaped. The American people, in fact, have rather a fondness for the Irish, and a tenderness of feeling towards them which they have not, and never will have, towards the English. The Irish commit a terrible mistake when they attribute to Americans of English origin the feelings towards the Irish race usually entertained, or assumed to be entertained, by Englishmen. They have, and always have had, a sympathy for the Irish that has made them overlook in them faults which they would overlook in no other people. They are ready to excuse their faults for their sufferings and the wrongs they have received from a Protestant government, and to give them full credit for their noble qualities, genuine piety, and solid virtue.

The American people show their good dispositions, also, by the liberality with which they, in general, treat Catholics. We know no American society in which a Catholic gentleman, whether priest or layman, Irish or American, will not be received and treated as a gentleman. We have travelled in all parts of the Union since our conversion, and have mingled in all classes of American society, and have never found our religion in our way, or seen a man insulted because he was a Catholic. We have been uniformly treated with civility and all the personal respect to which we could lay any claim. We have heard our religion spoken of, and we have conversed with many respecting it; but it has never been our misfortune to hear it reviled by the company we were in. In railroad cars, in steamboats, on the rivers and the lakes, on the sea and the land, we have heard nothing said that we could not hear with great good humor, or which we could construe into an intentional insult to Catholics. The only instance in which our religion has been intentionally insulted in our presence, occurred in our

own office, when we so far forgot ourselves as to knock the insulter down.

We have rarely fallen into conversation with an intelligent stranger or fellow-traveller, who did not express more or less regard for the church, and intimate his persuasion that if Almighty God had founded a visible church, and has one now on the earth, it is the church of Rome. Many and many is the man who has said to us, that if he believed in any religion, he would be a Catholic. We have found, generally, a great desire among people of all classes to learn something of our religion, and to have its principles and usages explained. They have always seemed to listen to us with pleasure, perhaps with the more pleasure, because we were able to speak to them in their own language, without a foreign accent. But be that as it may, we have found them, for the most part, eager to learn, and listening with attention and respect, especially for the last four or five years. Now this may not be much; but we certainly regard it as indicating a favorable disposition, rather than otherwise, towards our religion.

In our country, the people are practically supreme, and the majority are non-Catholic; yet it must be confessed that in no country is the church so free as she is with us, and no where have Catholics, as such, fewer vexations and annoyances. Here our religion is independent, and the bishops and clergy are absolutely free to discharge their spiritual functions in their own way, according to the law and discipline of the church. Even the recent concordat of the Holy See with Austria does not secure them as perfect freedom as they have here. The state does not in the least interfere with them; and if citizens attempt to abridge their liberty, they can call in the law to protect them and to punish the agressor. Here is no minister of state to issue his mandate to our archbishop, and tell him he is not to order a *Te Deum* till permitted or requested by the government. He is his own judge in such matters, and is free to do whatever is in accordance with the letter and spirit of his church. The bishops may assemble in council, provincial or plenary, when they please, or when required by the head of the church, pass such canons as they judge proper for the spiritual government of the faithful, create new dioceses, and recommend to vacant sees without let or hindrance from the state, without even its notice. Where else are they so free and independent? How is it possible for them to be more

free or independent? And does this say nothing for the good dispositions of the non-Catholic American people, and the salutary tendency of our republican institutions?

It is true that there have been some annoyances and vexations, and now and then a riot or a mob. But these are caused, in most instances, perhaps in all, by considerations distinct from hostility to us as Catholics, or even Catholics of foreign origin and manners. Most of the hostility we encounter is occasioned by our conduct as politicians, rather than as Catholics. In so far as our bishops and clergy are understood to keep aloof from politics, and to confine themselves to their spiritual functions, no public hostility is manifested towards them. The American people, undoubtedly, are strongly opposed to our forming in the country "a Catholic party in politics," but not more opposed than they were to forming "a Christian party in politics," suggested some years ago by Dr. Ezra Stiles Ely, and favored by Theodore Frelinghuysen, and other prominent Presbyterians. A Presbyterian party in politics would be equally opposed. They are not altogether wrong in this. There should be no Catholic party in politics in a country like ours; and nothing would be more fatal to Catholic interests than the formation of such a party, since it would bring the church here under the control of the politicians, and make her their slave. The church has already suffered, and is still suffering, here from the politicians, and the Know-Nothing movement has done her far more good than evil. The connection of the church in Ireland with politics, and the influence exerted on bishops and priests by politicians, has been one of the most serious evils to Catholic Ireland; and every lover of Catholicity must pray for the success of Dr. Cullen, the papal legate, in his effort to disconnect the church in that island from politics, and emancipate it from the control of the Dublin agitators. The church is and can be in this country of no political party. She teaches her children to be honest, loyal citizens, to love their country, to make themselves acquainted with its interests, to learn their duties, and, with the fear of God before their eyes, to vote as simple American citizens, for such party or such candidate as their own judgment tells them is best. They are free citizens, and may give their suffrages according to their own choice, honestly and conscientiously formed. They do her wrong if they attempt to implicate her in their political preferences, or to bring her authority to bear on any political election. The mad-

ness in this respect of some of our demagogues who want to trade with what they call "the Irish vote," or "the Catholic vote," has created a suspicion in many minds that she enters as an element into our elections, because many people suppose Catholics never act but by the dictation and advice of their priests. We need not be surprised if the conduct of our demagogues has made it believed that we act as a political party, or that on that account we encounter a determined opposition.

Tho riots and mobs which have been excited against us, have, in most instances, been the work of foreigners, not of Americans. They have all been done in violation of law, but they have been neither numerous nor frequent. When the "Angel Gabriel" was blowing his trumpet among us, and Ned Buntline was organizing his Guard of Liberty in several of the states, we apprehended serious danger, and manifested some alarm. Our expressions at the time were caught up by some of our friends out of the United States, and made to mean far more than was ever intended by us. But the mobs soon subsided, and the law resumed its sway, and we are not aware that at this moment Catholics are more exposed to violence than any other class of American citizens. The mobs found no countenance in the general sentiment of the American people, and could not flourish. Besides, we never heard of a country where no violence was ever offered to the laws,—where there were no local and temporary outbreaks of popular passion. The history of our country will show that they have been less frequent and less destructive with us than in any other country. The Know-Nothing violence here has never equalled the Orange violence in Ireland, or even in Canada; and we have had no outbreak to compare with the Gordon riots in England, or even the outbursts of passion which led to the enacting of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill by the British Parliament. Such things are so rare with us that when they do occur they make a deep impression upon us, as spots on the sun, or thunder from a cloudless sky. The Know-Nothing party itself seems to have escaped the control of the parsons, and to have fallen under that of the politicians, and is no longer specially dangerous to us as Catholics. It has spent its fury, and the distinction we have been abused for having drawn between Catholicity and foreignism has operated, as we supposed it would, to shield both foreigners and Catholics.

The very violence of our no-popery ministers, and their

extraordinary efforts to inflame the old Protestant prejudices against us, prove, if rightly viewed, the good dispositions of the American people. These ministers are not such fools as to fear that the foreign Catholic immigration will take possession of the country and curtail the freedom of Protestants. What they fear is, the Catholic tendency of their own Protestant congregations. They see that Protestantism is daily losing its hold on the American people, that the candidates offering themselves for the Protestant ministry are yearly diminishing at an alarming rate, that the Protestant congregations are dwindling, and the "Revival" machinery is nearly worn out; that many of the best minds and purest hearts in the country are going over to Rome, and multitudes are falling back on nature, and becoming disgusted with all sectarian religion. They feel that Protestantism is declining, and that as it declines the church must gain, for the American people are not a people to remain long without a religion of some sort. They see that the American people are rapidly coming to the conclusion that the only alternative for a reasoning man is, either Catholicity or No-religion. Here is the secret of the no-popery violence, and of those spasmodic efforts made by the ministers to put off the day of their dissolution, the day when Protestantism shall go the way of all the earth, and Catholicity shall take its place. We should find in them a ground of hope, not of discouragement.

The fact that the Anglo-Americans are not debarred by any inherent vice of their race from becoming Catholics is established by the number of converts already made from all ranks and classes of the American people. These converts are more numerous than is commonly imagined, and, together with their families, already make up a considerable item in the Catholic population of the country. Some of them are among the most active, devout and influential members of our Catholic community. Among these are men of the Anglo-Saxon, or English race. We met the other day a convert, who is a lineal descendant of the famous Bishop Barlow, and another who was a lineal descendant of John Rogers, who was burnt at Smithfield in Queen Mary's reign, and was followed by his "wife and nine small children, with one at her breast." These prove that the race with the grace of God, is not incapable of conversion; and we know no reason for supposing God is not as ready to bestow his grace for the conversion of a Saxon as of a Celt.

These converts, too, have been made without any efforts on our part. What then might have been the harvest of souls had we made those efforts for the conversion of the American people, which we might have made, and which were made for the conversion of nations in the early ages of the church.

We do not and cannot entertain the notion that the American people are beyond the reach of Catholic truth and Catholic love. We will not believe it. Such a notion is unjust alike to them and to our holy religion. God excludes no race from his love; and his grace, as his sun, shines upon all. Where is our confidence in truth and sanctity? The Lord's ear is not deafened that he cannot hear, nor his hand shortened that he cannot save. Neither his power nor his grace is exhausted. He still lives; and lives here as well as in old Europe, or in old Ireland, and is as near the Saxon as the Celt, the American as the European. The conversion of America is not so great a work as was the re-conversion of Gaul by St. Columbanus and his Irish monks, or the conversion of pagan Germany by St. Boniface and his Anglo-Saxon fellow-laborers. It took three hundred years of persevering labor to convert the German conquerors of Rome: but at length they were converted, and the great majority of the Germanic race are still Catholics. A fourth of that time would suffice to convert the American people. God is as ready to assist the holy missionary to-day as he was in the sixth, seventh, or eighth century, and it is the fault of Catholics if a single people remains estranged from the household of God. It is our indolence, our prejudice, our faint-heartedness, our want of apostolic zeal, our lack of true missionary heroism, that makes us despair of the work. We sit down in our towns as did the bishops and clergy of Gaul in the sixth century, attending simply to those who adhered to the faith, without once attempting to convert the non-Catholics, pagans and heretics, who held and ruled the country, till roused to missionary zeal and activity by the migration of St. Columbanus and his colonies of Irish monks. Why cannot Ireland send us another St. Columbanus, another St. Gall, and England another St. Boniface? We need them. What we want are saints, holy men, whose vocation it is to devote themselves to gathering those without into the fold, under the one Shepherd. They will come if we pray for them, and prove ourselves worthy to have them. O, would that

we felt as we should what a glorious field to the apostolic missionary is open in this country! Would that we could see all Catholics in the country with one heart praying for its conversion! Would that we could inspire them with the hope that animates us, and make them feel the worth of these immortal souls, now out of the ark of safety, and ready to be submerged in the waters of the deluge! O God, thou canst make them feel it, and inspire them with hope; deign to do it, and this beautiful land will be consecrated to thy worship, and this American people, so richly endowed by nature, will taste the riches of thy love, and be reckoned among thy devoutest worshippers.

Entertaining a strong desire for the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, and believing the time has arrived when it becomes the duty of Catholics, in obedience to the admonition of the Holy Father, to present the claims of our religion more especially to their consideration, we have ventured to call attention to that mode of presenting it, which seems to us best adapted to the present state of their understanding, and to the actual wants of their hearts. We have wished to indicate the importance of taking our point of departure in the truths they have. and not in those which they have not. The Protestant Archbishop Whately undertook to refute Catholicity by showing that its several doctrines have their root in our fallen nature; we would show that they all have a basis in the human intellect and human heart, or, rather, respond to the wants alike of both fallen and unfallen nature, as a method not of refuting, but of establishing them. So presented, not as doctrines of reason and nature, but as meeting the wants of reason and nature, and elevating man into the region of the supernatural, they will be joyfully accepted by the great body of the American people.

LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1860.]

The American publishers tell us, that they hope the learned reader will pardon the liberty they have taken, of having the author's notes translated. We could pardon that liberty if they had published the originals along with the translation, so that the learned reader could judge for himself whether the translation is faithful or not. Briefly, we never will pardon any liberty taken by publishers or editors with any work, without the permission and sanction of the author. The reason that induced Mr. Mansel to leave the extracts from authors in various languages inserted in his notes untranslated, is a sufficient reason why his American editors should not translate them. We want no publishers' or editors' "improvements;" republish the work as you receive it from the author, or not at all. We say this without any reference to the fact whether Professor Lincoln's translation is trustworthy or not. We have no doubt that he has performed his self-imposed task conscientiously, and, in the few instances in which we have compared his translation with the original, it seems to have been well made.

With regard to Mr. Mansel's book itself we must confess we find it a very difficult book on which to pass a judgment, favorable or unfavorable. The author is evidently a man of honest intentions, of ability, and varied and solid learning. He appears to be very well read in modern philosophical and theological literature, and, though not blessed with a true philosophical genius, he has much intellectual strength and logical acuteness. Whether we agree or disagree with him, we are obliged to respect him as a superior man, and, as a scholar who devotes himself honestly to serious studies. So much we willingly say of the author. But his Lectures themselves are very far from satisfying us. Though written by an Oxford scholar they are hardly English, at least are written in an English with which we are not, and hope we

* *The Limits of Religious Thought Examined, in Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in the year* 1858, *on the Bampton Foundation.* By H. L. Mansel, B. D. First American (from the third London) Edition, with the Notes translated. Boston: 1859.

never shall be, familiar. Words are used in an unusual, frequently, it strikes us, in an un-English sense, and are unintelligible to one not familiar with the German schools of philosophy, either at first hand, or through the Scotsman Sir William Hamilton. His terminology is continually deceiving us, and we frequently find that we have understood his terms in a contrary sense from the one intended. His style has its merits, but is not our good old-fashioned English style; it wants the directness, clearness, and naturalness of the better class of English writers. His thought is not English, but Scoto-German, and is nearly as muddy as that of Schelling or Hegel. The reason of this is not in the original character of the author's mind, nor in the abstruse and difficult nature of the subjects treated, but in the false or defective system of philosophy which he has had the misfortune to adopt.

It is not easy to say what is or is not Mr. Mansel's thesis, or what he is really aiming at. We are even puzzled at times to decide whether he is defending or refuting certain philosophical theories and speculations; whether he is advocating or opposing scepticism, vindicating religion, or showing its vindication is impossible; and an intelligent and careful reader may innocently commend him for defending what he is refuting, and condemn him for maintaining what he really intends to deny. We are often at a loss to determine what are his premises or his conclusions, and still more to detect any relation between his conclusions and his premises. Much of his book seems to us insignificant or irrelevant, and the rest to be at bottom either unsound or mere common-place. We are not, therefore, surprised to find the book has been well received by the public, and has attained in a few months a popularity seldom reserved for works apparently of so grave a character.

The book, we suppose, must be classed with works devoted to the philosophy of religion, and its main design, most likely, is to remove the obstacles to belief in the Christian revelation, by showing that it may be true notwithstanding the grave difficulties we find in accepting it; for these difficulties are analogous to those which reason encounters in herself, and are no greater than those which are encountered in any possible system of rationalism. If we understand him, the difficulties reason experiences in accepting revelation, are not in the revelation itself, but are inherent in our reason, and inseparable from the present

constitution of our minds. He attempts to prove this by an exhibition of what Kant calls "the antinomies of reason," or showing that reason is in perpetual contradiction with herself. He shows that we are forced, by the constitution of our minds, to construct a rational theology, or so-called natural theology, and yet that reason is inadequate to the task. We are forced to believe there is an infinite, and yet obliged to confess that the infinite is inconceivable,—cannot be thought, and the word serves only to mark the limit of our ability to think. We must conceive of God as personal, and to conceive him as personal is to limit him, and therefore virtually to deny him.

Now, to us reasoning of this sort, if it proves any thing, proves that nothing is provable, and that nothing remains for us but doubt and uncertainty, in relation either to natural or revealed religion. Indeed, the author himself says expressly, "certainty is not attainable, only probability." We have for ourselves a strong dislike to the method of removing objections to revelation by proving the unreasonableness of reason. If reason is not true and infallible in her own sphere, revelation is not provable; for though it may itself transcend reason, it can be proved to be a revelation only by facts or evidence addressed to reason and within reason's competence. He who establishes scepticism demolishes with the same blow both science and faith. Mr. Mansel certainly does not intend to be a sceptic, or to favor scepticism; but by maintaining that reason is in perpetual contradiction with herself, at once affirming and denying contradictory propositions, he undermines science, and throws doubt on every thing, renders all so-called knowledge uncertain.

The author, if he had followed his strong English common sense, without aiming at any philosophical subtilty or refinement, would have served his purpose far better. We do not and cannot accept his philosophical system, if system it can be called. We encountered it in Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. We encounter it, latterly, in most Oxford scholars who pretend to any philosophy. It is Kantism, as modified by Sir William Hamilton, and has been refuted by us again and again. The gist of Sir William's philosophy is, that the infinite is unthinkable, inconceivable, and marks for us merely the negation of thought. The essential principle of the Kantian philosophy is, that the categories are forms of the human

mind, and that we can know or think objects only under the forms or categories of our own understandings; that is, the form of the thought, whatever it be, is imposed by the subject on the object, not by the object on the subject; or we think things so and so because such is our mental constitution, not because things are so and so *a parte rei*, independent of us or of our thought. But Kant and Sir William Hamilton agree that we cannot think things as they are in themselves, and that we can have direct and immediate intuition only of phenomena. The *noumenon* forever escapes us, although we are forced by the constitution of our nature to believe the *noumenon* really exists. Now, we, our readers very well know, reverse this famous theory, and maintain that we see things so and so because they are really so and so, not because such or such is our intellectual constitution. Mr. Mansel, following the renowned German and the illustrious Scotsman, maintains that the object of knowledge, of *consciousness*—a very equivocal term, which he nowhere defines—is never the thing or reality itself, but the thing under the forms of our understanding. He thus makes the subject *pro tanto* object; and, apprehending the object only under the forms of the subject, he can never say that the object is not, as Fichte maintains, simply the subject taking itself as its own object, or, what is the same thing, a product of the subject thinking—pure philosophical egoism, which resolves all into the *ego*, the *Ich*, or *I*, and its phenomena. Fichte only deduced from the doctrine of Kant, his master, its legitimate consequences, as Schelling's doctrine of Identity is, at bottom, only Fichteism, less boldly and scientifically stated.

Assuming that the understanding thinks its object only under the forms of the subject, Mr. Mansel denies that the infinite or absolute can be thought, since these forms are finite and present only the finite. He does not appear to be aware that the absolute, the unconditioned, the eternal, the infinite of which he speaks after Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, is a pure abstraction, and therefore a sheer nullity. Absolute being is pure being, and pure being, Hegel says truly, is identical with no being, because he understands by pure being abstract being. Mr. Mansel proves clearly, without appearing to be aware of it, that abstractions are unintelligible, because simple nullities. No philosopher worthy of the name asserts that we can think the absolute or the infinite—not, indeed, because thought

conditions or limits the object, but because neither is, or exists, *a parte rei*. Only the real can be thought. We think real and necessary being, which is absolute, not the absolute abstracted from the real and necessary being. We have no intuition of the infinite, but we have intuition of God, who is infinite, absolute, unconditioned, eternal. We think not an abstract infinite, but we think the infinite in the sense that it really is, that is, as infinite being. God is infinite, but we can never say the infinite is God, save by that figure of speech by which we put the abstract for the concrete. We cannot, of course, think the infinite infinitely, in its own infinite nature or essence, with an infinite thought on its subjective side. But to think the infinite finitely is, still to think the infinite Being, though inadequately, because the finiteness attaches to the subject thinking, not to the object thought. The argument used by Mr. Mansel, after Sir William Hamilton, to prove that the infinite—understanding not an abstract, but a real infinite, that is, the infinite God—can be thought by a finite being only under finite forms, is based on the false assumption, that the form of the thought depends on the subject, not on the object. Certainly, we can represent, or re-present the infinite Being to ourselves in reflection, only under finite forms, for, in the reflex reason, our own personality intervenes, and imposes on its thought its own limitations; but in intuition, which presents the object, the object is thought under its own forms, and is thought as it is, *a parte rei*. The pretence that we cannot think the infinite, because our thought limits the object thought; the unconditioned, because thought itself conditions its object—the great argument relied on by Sir William Hamilton,—we cannot accept; for the object is thought only as presented, and is itself the same, whether thought or unthought. To think it implies a change or modification in us, but none in it: to say we cannot think the infinite, because we cannot think it without thinking the finite, and, if we think the finite, we must think it as distinguished from the infinite, then, as a limitation of the infinite, will not answer; because the finite neither in fact nor in thought limits the infinite. The difficulty arises from dealing with abstractions instead of realities, and in assuming that finite existence stands opposed to infinite Being. If you conceive the finite as standing on its own bottom, as so much real being, this, undoubtedly, must be conceded to be the case; but conceive the finite existence as

the creature or product of the infinite Being, and then, instead of being thought as a limitation, it is thought as a manifestation of infinite power. The error is in conceiving the finite as real being, and therefore as limiting the being called infinite, which, of course, would deny the infinite, for the quantity of being represented by the infinite would need to be added to the other side to get infinite being, and the infinite can never be obtained by addition.

The finite must be distinguished from the infinite, but to distinguish is to limit, and what is limited is not infinite, says our author. What is limited is not infinite, we grant: but to distinguish the effect from the cause, is not, even in thought, to limit the cause. The fallacy is, in assuming that the relation between infinite and finite is the relation of co-existence, whereas it is the relation of cause and effect, Creator and creation. The creature does not limit the Creator, or the effect condition the cause; for the being of the creature is in the Creator, of the effect in the cause, as St. Paul teaches: "In him [God] we live and move and have our being." The distinction of the finite,—understanding by finite creature, not independent being,—from the infinite, limits the finite, but not the infinite, for the finite and infinite, in this case, do not stand in the same category. The creature takes nothing from, and adds nothing to the Creator; and however you increase or diminish the number of creatures, however exalted or however low you suppose them, the sum of being, to use one of Mr. Mansel's own expressions, remains the same. If Mr. Mansel had paid more attention to the facts of intuition, or to the intuitive *data*, which include the ideal elements of all our knowledge, and not confined himself so exclusively to the order of reflection, he would have seen that his reasoning is very unsound, and that the apodictic element of all thought is the intuition of real and necessary, and therefore, infinite Being.

Mr. Mansel adopts the teaching of Sir William Hamilton, that all our knowledge is simply knowledge of relations, is relative, and never absolute knowledge. We understand not how so acute a philosopher as Sir William could fall into so great an error. Relations in themselves are nullities, no object of knowledge, and, therefore, if we know only relations, we know nothing at all. Relations are nothing without the related, and hence we must know the related or not know relations. Finite existences, he tells us, are relative existences, and as we know only them, we have

knowledge not of the absolute, but of the relative only. He is the dupe of a word. If existences are only relative they have not their being, and, therefore, are not intelligible, in themselves; for only being is intelligible in itself, since what is not cannot be known. They are and can be intelligible only in the other term of the relation, and, therefore, are and can be known only in knowing the absolute, or being to which they are related, and on which they depend. Finite existence, then, is unintelligible without the cognition of infinite Being. Lay aside the abstract terms of reflection, take things as presented in intuition, and it will be seen that we know the relative only in knowing the absolute, or the unrelated,—the finite only in knowing the infinite, that is to say, only in knowing absolute and infinite Being, God, from whom finite and relative existences proceed, and in whom they have their being and their intelligibility.

We cannot agree with Mr. Mansel that a knowledge of the infinite presupposes on the part of the subject infinite knowledge. We may know that God is, and is infinite, without knowing all that he is. Let us drop vague and abstract terms. The infinite is God, real and necessary being. Now, in saying that we know God is, we never pretend that we know all that he is, or that we know him as he is in himself, in his interior essence. Reason can answer fully and with absolute certainty the question, *An sit Deus?* but we certainly do not pretend that it can otherwise than very inadequately answer the question, *Quid sit Deus?* If we can know God at all, and Mr. Mansel concedes we can, we can know the infinite, for he is infinite. But that we can know God in himself, in his essence, in his interior nature, so to speak, in this life, and by our natural faculties, we are as far, as Mr. Mansel himself, from maintaining; and though we do not accept, perhaps we do not understand, the process by which he refutes them, we agree with him in condemning the doctrine put forth by the advocates in Germany of the Philosophy of the Absolute, that we may have and must have that full and intimate knowledge of the divine being and essence that we can conclude from it what must be the nature and character of his revelation. But while we say this we are not prepared to go the full length of the author, and deny that we can by our natural faculties have the conceptions necessary to the construction of a rational theology in the natural order, or what is called

natural theology. If we understand him, he denies that we have or can have "such a knowledge of the divine nature as can constitute the foundation of a natural theology." But we must here let him speak for himself.

"There are three terms, familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of Philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of Metaphysical Theology. To conceive the Deity as He is, we must conceive Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the *First Cause*, is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the *Infinite*, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity.

"The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of a limited number of attributes, each unlimited in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for example, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length, but not in breadth; or of a surface, infinite in two dimensions of space, but bounded in the third; or of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others. Even if it be granted, which is not the case, that such a partial infinite may without contradiction be conceived, still it will have a relative infinity only, and be altogether incompatible with the idea of the Absolute. The line limited in breadth is thereby necessarily related to the space that limits it; the intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes, co-exists with others which are thereby related to it, as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness. The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality. "What kind of an Absolute Being is that," says Hegel, "which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?" We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation; but the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute and Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception required. That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible, modes of being, For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation. Indeed, it is obvious that the entire distinction between the possible and the actual can have no existence as regards the absolutely infinite; for an unrealized possibility is necessarily a relation and a limit. The scholastic saying, *Deus est actus purus*, ridiculed as it has been by modern critics, is in truth but the expression, in technical language, of the almost unanimous voice of philosophy, both in earlier and later times.

"But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. Creation at any particular moment of time being thus inconceivable, the philosopher is reduced to the alternative of Pantheism, which pronounces the effect to be mere appearance, and merges all real existence in the cause. The validity of this alternative will be examined presently.

"Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another, and the absolute as related to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case, the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for co-existence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation.

"The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to any thing else; but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own

nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.

"The fundamental conceptions of Rational Theology being thus self-destructive, we may naturally expect to find the same antagonism manifested in their special applications. These naturally inherit the infirmities of the principle from which they spring. If an absolute and infinite consciousness is a conception which contradicts itself, we need not wonder if its several modifications mutually exclude each other. A mental attribute, to be conceived as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is potential only with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and an unrealized potentiality is a limitation. Hence every infinite mode of consciousness must be regarded as extending over the field of every other; and their common action involves a perpetual antagonism. How, for example, can Infinite Power be able to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable to do evil? How can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner? How can Infinite Wisdom know all that is to come, and yet Infinite Freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear. How is the existence of Evil compatible with that of an infinitely perfect Being; for if he wills it, he is not infinitely good; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted and his sphere of action limited? Here, again, the Pantheist is ready with his solution. There is in reality no such thing as evil: there is no such thing as punishment: there is no real relation between God and man at all. God is all that really exists: He does, by the necessity of His Nature, all that is done: all acts are equally necessary and equally divine: all diversity is but a distorted representation of unity: all evil is but a delusive appearance of good. Unfortunately, the Pantheist does not tell us whence all this delusion derives its seeming existence.

"Let us, however, suppose for an instant that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There remains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of the absolute, the one as productive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes, and we are thrown once more on the alternative of Pantheism.

"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent, is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the Creator.

"The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from one original warp and woof;—namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the infinite and the finite, and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or the other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us, according as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the existence of the infinite."—pp. 75-82.

Through all this extract the reader will perceive runs the vicious philosophy already indicated. The author professes

to be a Christian, and his purpose, as far as we can get at it, is to refute, on the one hand, what he calls rationalism, or th · pretence that reason alone, without any revelation, suffices to construct an adequate theology, and to determine the proper worship of God; and, on the other, what he calls, as we think very improperly, dogmatism, of which Wolfius was the great advocate, and in some sense the founder, that reason, when once the revelation is made, is able to comprehend and demonstrate the truth of its dogmas. We have not, therefore, to prove to him any portion of natural religion, or what St. Thomas calls the preamble to faith; consequently, he must be supposed himself to accept the three terms he mentions, and hold, independently of revelation, that God is first cause, absolute, and infinite. If this cannot be done independently of revelation, no revelation can possibly be proved. Faith rests on the fact, that God is infinitely *verax* or true, and is himself *prima veritas* in being, in knowing, and in speaking; unless this fact can be known from reason, faith cannot be an intelligent and reasonable faith. To maintain, then, that God cannot be known, without revelation, to be real and necessary, that is, absolute and infinite Being, and the first cause of all things, is to maintain that man cannot be the recipient of a revelation from his Maker.

"The metaphysical representation of the Deity [God]" says the author, "as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality. 'What kind of an absolute Being is that,' says Hegel, 'which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?' We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation, but the reasoning is unassailable." Must contain in himself all real being and actual existence, *tanquam causa*, we concede, but not, therefore, evil, for evil is neither being nor existence; is not, to speak scholastically, an entity, but is simply a negative, the absence of good, as cold is the absence of heat. "Indeed, it is obvious that the entire distinction between the possible and the actual can have no existence as regards the absolutely infinite." Certainly not. The possible, when we speak of God, is his real ability to place such or such an existence *ad extra*, or to clothe such or such an idea,—*idea exemplaris*, eternal in his own essence,—with existence. There is no possibility in God; all in him is

real, actual; and hence the Schoolmen say, he is *actus purus*, or *actus purissimus*.

"But these three conceptions, the cause, the absolute, the infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction as attributes of one and the same being? A cause, as such, cannot be absolute; the absolute cannot be a cause. A cause exists only in relation to its effect—the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause." That is to say, the cause is a cause only in causing, and till it causes it is not a cause, consequently is made a cause by what it causes! "On the other hand the conception of the absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." The absolute is that which is free from all relation, but a cause is under a particular relation to the effect. The two conceptions thus mutually exclude each other. "We attempt to escape the apparent contradiction by introducing the idea of succession in time. The absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite become that which it was not from the first?" There is and can be no *becoming* in God, for he is *actus purissimus;* all in him is actual, and nothing simply potential; so much is certain. The difficulty suggested by the author is a well-known difficulty, and is amply met by all our theologians of any note. It is simply how to reconcile the fact of creation in time with the infinite perfection and immutability of God? The difficulty originates in precisely what Mr. Mansel supposes to be introduced as a means of escaping it, namely, the introduction of the idea of the succession of time into eternity. Eternity is not, as Sir William Hamilton maintains, the negation or limit of human thought, but is the negation of time, and positive duration without succession, or an existence always present. Eternity can be conceived neither as past nor as future, and is always expressed by the present tense of the verb to be. It is, and is included in the conception of God, as, I AM THAT AM, or as real and necessary being. Time is not an entity, but a relation, and simply the relation of created existences in the order of succession, as space is their relation in the order of coexistence. Time then begins and ends with creation, and is conceivable only within the created order; out of that order there is no relation of time or space; there is only the relation of the effect to its cause. The old question, whether

the world might have been created *ab æterno*, in its old sense is an unaskable question, because that sense is founded on a false notion of time. The world has truly been created *ab æterno*, for, prior to its creation, there was no time, and the *prior* is only in the logical order. God existed prior to the creation as the cause exists prior to the effect, but no time elapses between the existence of his causality and the creation. There is no space between the power to create and the actual creation, and therefore no reduction in God of possibility to act, no *becoming* of a cause, for the cause is eternal, and exerts its force in eternity, and time attaches only to the effect. The creative act is in eternity, not in time; with it time begins. There is, then, no contradiction between the conception of God as Creator, and the conception of his absoluteness, infinity, or unchangeableness. The contradiction arises from the fundamental error of the Hamiltonian and Kantian philosophy, that the understanding imposes its own forms and limitations on the object, and that time and space are necessary forms of all our conceptions. This is not true, and if it were, we could have no conception of God at all, for he is not in space and he inhabiteth eternity.

The main difficulty in what follows in the extract arises from supposing the relation of the creature to God is a relation between the relative and the absolute. The relation is not reciprocal, and God and creation are not correlatives, each connoting the other, for God is a free not a necessary creator; creation creates no change in him, and places him under no relation whatever; for the creation, if we would speak accurately, is not a relative or finite being, or as the schoolmen say, *ens secundum quid*. It is not *ens* at all, but *existens*, and has its *substans* not in itself, but in the creative act of God, and therefore has being only in God, only as joined to God, *mediante* that act. The act of God produces existences absolutely dependent on him, but does not place him in any dependence on them; it leaves him as independent as if no creation *ad extra* had taken place, therefore leaving him equally absolute in his own being. He does not go out of his own being to create, any more than he evolves creation from his own being. He does not impart his being or any being at all to creatures, but retains his whole being in himself, and they have and can have no being in themselves; otherwise they would be God, or Gods. They exist, are substances only as united to his

being through the creative act. Hence, if that act be withdrawn, interrupted or suspended, they cease to exist, drop into nothing, are annihilated, which could not be the case if they contained either their own being or their own *substans* in themselves.

The author maintains, very properly, that the absolute must be conceived as one and simple; but if so conceived, a new difficulty arises: "This absolute unity, as indifferent, and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma." The dilemma is unreal. If in God no distinction be admissible between his *essentia* and his *esse*, between his being and his attributes, or between one of his attributes and another, as is the case, then we must conceive of him as mere abstract and dead unity, the *reine Seyn* of Hegel! Whence does this follow? And what is the difficulty in conceiving God as one and simple, and at the same time real and necessary being, being in its fulness, and therefore actual living being? The difficulty comes from the unreal character of the author's philosophy, which deals with conceptions and abstractions, and passes over in unpardonable neglect, intuitions and realities. The being of the Hegelian philosophy is, no doubt, a dead being, a dead unity, without attributes, and indistinguishable from not-being, because it is derived from psychological abstraction; but such is not the being presented us by its own act in intuition. How often must we repeat that abstractions are nullities, and that a philosophy that starts from a nullity can end only in nihilism?

"The fundamental conceptions of rational theology being thus self-destructive." We have not found the real elements of rational theology self-destructive. The abstract conceptions with which the author supposes it is necessary to construct it are self-destructive, we grant; but what proves that it is necessary to construct it with those conceptions? What need is there of starting with abstractions at all? Suppose the author should abandon the Kantian and Hamiltonian conceptualism, and come to the conclusion that the elements and basis of our knowledge are not conceptions formed or created by the human mind, but realities presented to the mind objectively in immediate intuition; he would then see that the order of knowledge follows not the order of conception, but the order of intuition, therefore of

reality, of being, and can be no more self-destructive or composed of contradictory elements than being or reality itself. Let him once for all dismiss his *mundus logicus* which he interposes, without being aware of it, between the mind and the *mundus physicus*, or real world. "How can infinite power be able to do all things, and yet infinite goodness not be able to do evil?" God can do every thing but annihilate himself, and that is all that is ever understood by infinite power. Power in God is not separable from infinite goodness, and is an infinitely good power; and an infinitely good power cannot do evil, without contradicting, that is, annihilating its own nature. "How can infinite justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet infinite mercy pardon the sinner?" Because justice and mercy in God are never separable; and because, as sin is an offence against God, a debt due to him, he is always free to pardon when he sees proper, without offending justice. There is no repugnance in supposing God to pardon the sinner on simple repentance, if he chooses; and if he does not do so, it is not because he cannot do so justly, but because he chooses to make sin the occasion of an infinitely higher manifestation of his mercy, his love, and his goodness. "How can infinite wisdom know all that is to come, and yet infinite freedom be at liberty to do or forbear?" How it can be so we may not be able to tell, and yet not be obliged to conceive that the wisdom contradicts the freedom, or the freedom the wisdom. In knowing that God is infinite in his being, it is not necessary to assume that our knowledge of him is infinite, or that there remain no mysteries in the divine nature or in the divine operations inscrutable to human reason. We know that the divine wisdom does all things for a wise and good end, and that all a good being does is and must be good. God does not make the evil; man whom he makes, as coming from his hands, is good, and the only evil there is comes from the abuse which man makes of his own faculties. Infinite wisdom may see that it is better to create man with free will, of which sin is an abuse, than not to create him.

"Suppose these difficulties surmounted. Still," says the author, "we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea [the absolute] with that of a cause; we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite." Very true; but to a solid foundation for natural religion it suffices to know the

fact that God does create, and that the universe is his creation. If we know the fact, it is enough, without our being able to explain how it is done.

The author attempts to prove that while we are obliged to conceive of God as personal, we are equally obliged to admit that the conception of personality contradicts the conception of infinity.

"Subordinate to the general law of Time, to which all consciousness is subject, there are two inferior conditions, to which the two great divisions of consciousness are severally subject. Our knowledge of body is governed by the condition of *space;* our knowledge of mind by that of *personality.* I can conceive no qualities of body, save as having a definite local position ; and I can conceive no qualities of mind, save as modes of a conscious self. With the former of these limitations our present argument is not concerned : but the latter, as the necessary condition of the conception of spiritual existence, must be taken into account in estimating the philosophical value of man's conception of an infinite Mind.

"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence, Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example—can be conceived by us only as existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them all ; in one word, in a *Person.* But personality, as we conceive it is essentially a limitation and a relation. Our own personality is presented to us as relative and limited ; and it is from that presentation that all our representative notions of personality are derived. Personality is presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various modes of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought without a thinker ; there is no thinker, unless he exercises some mode of thought. Personality is also a limitation ; for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other ; and the several modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation likewise. If I am any one of my own thoughts, I live and die with each successive moment of my consciousness. If I am not any of my own thoughts, I am limited by that very difference, and each thought, as different from another, is limited also. This, too, has been clearly seen by philosophical theologians ; and, accordingly, they have maintained that in God there is no distinction between the subject of consciousness and its modes, nor between one mode and another. 'God,' says Augustine, 'is not a Spirit as regards substance, and good as regards quality ; but both as regards substance. The justice of God is one with his goodness and with his blessedness ; and all are one with his spirituality.' But this assertion, if it be literally true (and of this we have no means of judging), annihilates Personality itself, in the only form in which we can conceive it. We cannot transcend our own personality, as we

cannot transcend our own relation to time: and to speak of an Absolute and Infinite Person, is simply to use language to which, however true it may be in a superhuman sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself,

"But are we therefore justified, even on philosophical grounds, in denying the personality of God? or do we gain a higher or a truer representation of Him, by asserting, with the ancient or the modern Pantheist, that God, as absolute and infinite, can have neither intelligence nor will? Far from it. We dishonor God far more by identifying Him with the feeble and negative impotence of thought, which we are pleased to style the Infinite, than by remaining content within those limits which He for his own good purposes has imposed upon us, and confining ourselves to a manifestation, imperfect indeed and inadequate, and acknowledged to be so, but still the highest idea that we can form, the noblest tribute that we can offer. Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating, more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite. Personal, conscious existence, limited though it be, is yet the noblest of all existences of which man can dream; for it is that by which all existence is revealed to him: it is grander than the grandest object which man can know; for it is that which knows, not that which is known. 'Man,' says Pascal, 'is but a reed, the frailest in nature; but he is a reed that thinks. It needs not that the whole universe should arm itself to crush him;—a vapor, a drop of water, will suffice to destroy him. But should the universe crush him, man would yet be nobler than that which destroys him; for he knows that he dies; while of the advantage which the universe has over him, the universe knows nothing.' It is by consciousness alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer him any service. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form such a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity.

"It is from the intense consciousness of our own real existence as Persons, that the conception of reality takes its rise in our minds: it is through that consciousness alone that we can raise ourselves to the faintest image of the supreme reality of God. What is reality, and what is appearance, is the riddle which Philosophy has put forth from the birthday of human thought; and the only approach to an answer has been a voice from the depths of the personal consciousness: 'I think; therefore I am.' In the antithesis between the thinker and the object of his thought,—between myself and that which is related to me,—we find the type and the source of the universal contrast between the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable, the real and the apparent. That which I see, that which I hear, that which I think, that which

I feel, changes and passes away with each moment of my varied existence. I, who see, and hear and think, and feel, am the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists: relation to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist. And when from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects, we would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask to whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest personality; and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name I AM." —pp. 102–105.

We have heard all this before, but we have never yet been able to understand why personality should be said to be a limitation. By personality, we understand *the last complement of rational nature*, and to say of any rational nature that it is a person, is to say that it has its last complement, is full or complete. Now, how the fullness or completion of a nature can be its limitation, is more than we are able to comprehend. If the nature is infinite, it will, if it has personality, be an infinite person. We see, therefore, no contradiction between personality and infinity. "Our own personality is presented to us as relative and limited." No doubt of that, because we are ourselves relative and limited, not absolute and infinite. "It is from that presentation that all our representative notions of personality are derived." We are not sure of that, for we are not psychologists, making God in our own image and likeness; we are disposed rather to regard man as made in the image and likeness of God. Human personality copies the divine; not the divine the human. "There is no personality in abstract thought, without a thinker." It would be more pertinent to say, there is no thought without a thinker. "There is no thinker, unless he exercises some mode of thought." Why not say plainly, no one is a thinker unless he thinks? "Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other." The thinker limits thought, if you will; but we should be very much obliged if you would inform us how the thought limits the thinker. Thought is distinguished from the thinker, not as his limitation, but as his act or product. It is the same error we met before, that the finite limits the infinite, as if the effect could be a limitation of the cause.

We make one extract more, for the sake of doing full justice to the author:

"The results, to which an examination of the facts of consciousness has conducted us, may be briefly summed up as follows. Our whole

consciousness manifests itself as subject to certain limits, which we are unable, in any act of thought, to transgress. That which falls within these limits, as an object of thought, is known to us as *relative* and *finite*. The existence of a limit to our powers of thought is manifested by the consciousness of *contradiction*, which implies at the same time an attempt to think, and ability to accomplish that attempt. But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation between something within and something without itself; and thus the consciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly present to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot think. When we lift up our eyes to that blue vault of heaven, which is itself but the limit of our own power of sight we are compelled to suppose, though we cannot perceive, the existence of space beyond, as well as within, it; we regard the boundary of vision as parting the visible from the invisible. And when, in mental contemplation, we are conscious of relation and difference, as the limits of our power of thought, we regard them, in like manner, as the boundary between the conceivable and the inconceivable; though we are unable to penetrate, in thought beyond the nether sphere, to the unrelated and unlimited which it hides from us. The *Absolute* and *Infinite* are thus, like the *Inconceivable* and the *Imperceptible* names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible. The attempt to construct in thought an object answering to such names, necessarily results in contradiction,—a contradiction, however, which we have ourselves produced by the attempt to think,—which exists in the act of thought, but not beyond it,—which destroys the conception of such, but indicates nothing concerning the existence or non-existence of that which we try to conceive. It proves our own impotence, and it proves nothing more. Or rather, it indirectly leads us to believe in the existence of that Infinite which we cannot conceive; for the denial of its existence involves a contradiction, no less than the assertion of its conceivability. We thus learn that the provinces of Reason and Faith are not co-extensive; that it is a duty, enjoined by Reason itself, to believe in that which we are unable to comprehend."—pp. 109, 110.

The author has excellent intentions, but we are sorry to see him so completely a slave of Kant and Sir William Hamilton. We have already refuted this whole doctrine, and we had pretty effectively done it in an article on *The Problem of Causality*, discussing the principle doctrines of modern philosophers on causality, to which we must beg permission to refer our readers.*

Sir William Hamilton has, perhaps, served philosophy; but if so, it has been by showing the abyss into which it

* See Vol. I. pp. 390–398. Ed.

leads us, when we start with the assumption that the whole productive force of thought is on the side of the subject, and that the form of the thought depends on the subject, not on the object; which is really only another form of expressing the doctrine of Fichte, in his *Wissenschaftslehre.*

We find with Mr. Mansel's work very much the same fault that we find with the traditionalists. He builds science on faith; or, rather, demolishes reason in order to prove the necessity of revelation. We assert as strenuously as any man ever did, or ever can, the necessity of revelation,—but necessary to what, and for what reason? Necessary to supply the defects of reason in the natural order? No; for the existence of God, and what are called his natural attributes, the immateriality and the immortality of the soul, free will, and moral obligation, the fundamental truths of natural religion, or natural theology, can be proved with certainty by natural reason, and are presupposed by revelation, and constitute the preamble to faith. Indeed, throw doubt on these, and no revelation is, or can be, provable. We can never say with certainty it is God who speaks, if it be uncertain that there is a God, or if there is, that he can neither deceive nor be deceived; nor, indeed, if it be doubtful whether we are bound to obey God when he commands, can we prove that we are obliged to believe and observe his revelation when made. Why, then, is revelation necessary? It is necessary simply because God has seen proper to appoint man to a supernatural destiny, or has created for him, and requires him to enter, a supernatural order of life, the end of which is to see and enjoy him in the beatific vision. Prescind the supernatural order of life founded by the God-Man, and no necessity for a supernatural revelation can be alleged; for, in that case, no other guide than natural reason would be needed. It is the neglect to make this distinction that causes all the real or apparent contradiction between faith and reason. Reason is our natural light and guide, and it would be a contradiction in terms to deny its sufficiency in relation to a purely natural destiny, and it is only on the supposition of a supernatural destiny, that another and a higher guide becomes necessary.

The difficulty felt by most rationalists is, that the advocates of faith, as they suppose, deny the sufficiency of natural reason for a natural destiny, and make it in its own order give place to supernatural revelation. This is, it seems to us, precisely what our author does, and in doing it he out-

rages reason. In showing the insufficiency of reason, he makes no distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, and gives no intimation, as far as we have seen, that the insufficiency he asserts is only in relation to the supernatural. He denies the power of reason to attain to the first truths of natural, or what he in his terminology calls metaphysical, theology, and therefore denies the reality of such theology. Here he is wrong. Reason is really insufficient only in relation to the supernatural, that is, the supernatural order. But grant such order, and no man of common sense will deny that, in relation to it, reason must be insufficient. If it pleases God to found a supernatural order of life for man, it is clear that, if he intends man to live it, he must furnish him supernatural light and supernatural strength.

Reason alone is not able to demonstrate her own deficiency or the necessity of a revelation. We learn the necessity of revelation from the revelation itself, and we learn the deficiency of reason from the same revelation, which teaches us that God has, in his infinite goodness, prepared for us a supernatural destiny, far above that which is attainable by our natural faculties alone. We should, then, never begin by denying reason to be sufficient, in case man had only a natural destiny, but by establishing the fact that he has a supernatural destiny, and that, therefore, in relation to that, reason must necessarily be insufficient. Let us not be met with the remark, that though this might have been so in the origin, it is not so since the fall. Man is now born under original sin, from which all his faculties have suffered, and they no longer suffice, without reparation, for even the natural end. Man, by the fall, suffered severely in being violently divested of his supernatural gifts and graces, but he did not lose reason and free will. He retained after the fall his natural moral powers—all that would have been necessary to gain natural beatitude, in case he had been created and left in a state of pure nature, otherwise he would be incapable of sinning till regenerated. Men, prior to regeneration, are under the natural law, and with *gratia Dei*, as distinguished from *gratia Christi*, must be physically and morally able to keep it, or else they could not be amenable to it or be judged by it. By the fall, man lost his superadded power of gaining a supernatural end, but not his faculty of keeping the natural law. Any contrary doctrine smacks more or less of the

error of Luther and Calvin, or of Bains and Jansenius. The understanding became darkened by the fall, we grant, but negatively, in relation to the supernatural, not positively, or intrinsically as purely natural reason; the will became attenuated or weakened, but only in the same sense. The flesh escaped from its original subjection, but reason and will were still strong enough to control it, if put forth in all their strength; and although virtue was henceforth a combat, it nevertheless continued to be possible.

There is no doubt but revelation, even in relation to the natural law, is highly useful—more especially to the mass of mankind, as St. Thomas teaches. The revelation of the supernatural throws a flood of light on the natural, and we can, under grace, more easily understand and fulfil the requirements of the natural law, than we could if left to nature alone. But this utility is something very different from necessity. Pelagius, prescinding the supernatural order of life, was right, in saying that grace simply enables us to do more easily what, however, is possible to do without it. His error was the virtual denial of the supernatural order of life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel, and in recognizing for man only a natural destiny. Our author inclines to the error of Jansenius, which, after all, coincides with the Pelagian as to our final destiny. It really places our destiny in the natural order, but considers man's natural powers so corrupted and impaired by original sin that we can now do nothing of ourselves to attain it. Men of ordinary good sense find such teaching contradictory, and even absurd. The natural strikes them as unduly depressed, and the supernatural as a small and vexatious affair. God was free to create man or not, as seemed to him good; but he could not, consistently with his own wisdom and goodness, create any being for a natural destiny, and not endow him with the necessary faculties to gain it. Moreover, to tell a man that, though he originally had them, he has lost them through original sin, is not to help the matter, because, in the commission of that sin, he had no actual part. It is no fault of his that Adam sinned, for he was not then born; and to punish him for a sin of which he is not guilty is unjust, and God cannot be unjust. That he should be deprived, through Adam's fault, of a gratuitous gift to him, which would have passed to all his posterity if he had been faithful, he can understand, because, in that case, he is deprived of nothing that was ever due to his

nature as a man; but to deprive him, through Adam's fault, of his essential faculties as a man, and still to exact of him a man's work, is an outrage upon his natural sense of justice, and is what no reasoning in the world can satisfy him a just God will or can do. Bring in the supernatural, then, merely with a view of repairing nature, or to supply the deficiencies of nature in relation to a natural end, and you bring in what seems to us to be really superfluous, what is an indignity to our nature, and what we feel bound to reject,—especially if you add, that our refusal to accept it and thank God for it will be the greatest sin we can commit.

But to maintain that natural reason is inadequate to a supernatural end, is perfectly in accordance with reason, and is offensive to no natural sense of justice: nor can natural reason be offended by the assertion, that God, in his infinite love and mercy—in his superabundant goodness, has seen fit to confer on us, as our final reward, if faithful to the end, a good infinitely surpassing any to which we could have attained by our natural faculties, even in their integrity and normal exercise. No despite is done to nature by the proffer of a good above nature, if accompanied by the proffer of the supernatural assistance necessary to secure it. Does he wrong you, who, instead of leaving you to earn by hard toil your dollar a day, proffers you a million a day, and shows you how you may obtain it with even less toil? God, in the supernatural, does more than this. The supernatural is not a revelation of his wrath, but a revelation of his love, even for the sinner, and the revelation of a far higher love than is manifested by our creation. He who attains to even a faint conception of the glory to which he calls us, has, at first, only the feeling, "this is too good to be true; it is not possible that the infinite God should have so great a love for me, all unworthy as I am." But, if there be any truth in the Gospel, it is true. This unbounded love is real; and eye hath not seen, and ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what God hath reserved for them that love him. When the supernatural is presented in this light, as a higher order of life and a higher destiny than a purely natural life and natural destiny, reason herself, at once, concedes her own inadequacy, and affirms, alike, the necessity of supernatural light and strength. Then the conflict between reason and faith ceases, and our whole higher nature aspires to the supernatural. Then, too, the sin of unbelief—the deliberate rejection of the good

provided for us, and offered to us on the easiest terms, becomes quite intelligible. It is not only an act of disobedience to God, who has a right to command us, but an act of the basest ingratitude, and even contempt, which reason herself declares should not go unpunished.

We think Mr. Mansel would have better attained his end, if, instead of laboring to create a distrust of reason in this age of scepticism and indifference, he had labored to establish the truth of Christianity, as a supernatural order of life and immortality. No little of the unbelief that afflicts the Christian's heart arises from the confusion, in most non-Catholic minds, of the natural and supernatural, and the false notions of each, presented in the works of the ablest of non-Catholic theologians. Many of them understand, by the Gospel, little more than a republication of the law of nature,—among whom we find the vastly overrated Bishop Butler,—or a solemn sanction of future rewards and punishments given to natural morality. Nearly all of them regard the supernatural merely as a means of perfecting or completing the natural, as if God had sadly bungled in his original creation of man. They do not seem ever to rise to the conception of Christianity as a supernatural order of life, with a principle, means, and end of its own, not included in nature, or even indicated by it. It does not contradict nature, but presupposes it, and, though superior to it, harmonizes with it. What we want brought out and placed in a clear and strong light, is the fact that Christianity, though presupposing the natural, is itself really and truly a supernatural order of life, and by no means included in or developed from the natural. Christianity is this, or it is nothing and the sooner we cease talking about it the better. Of this order there are and can be no natural indications. Natural reason has and can have no prolepsis, or natural anticipation of it, and, till revealed, no aspiration to it. Reason can know, of herself, that there is more than she knows—mysteries she cannot solve, depths in the divine nature she cannot fathom; but she cannot know, of herself alone, that such an order exists, for there is nothing which she knows, either of God or nature, from which she can infer either its existence or its necessity.

The first indication of this order must, necessarily, come from revelation; and, if it had not been revealed, we should never have had the slightest conception of it, or felt the slightest need of it. But, though its existence is supernatu-

ral, the fact of its revelation can be established to natural reason with as much certainty as any other fact; and it is by the establishment of this fact to reason, that faith is joined to reason, and rendered itself reasonable. We know, by reason, that God is; that he is most perfect being; that he is infinitely true—the truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived. Knowing this, we know that whatever he says is true, and may be reasonably believed on his word. If, then, he has revealed this supernatural order of life, we know that it exists, and have ample reason, the best of all possible reasons, for believing it. We should, then, establish the fact of revelation, before spending our time in useless efforts to prove its necessity, or even its antecedent probability.

With regard to the nature of the supernatural order of life, it is undoubtedly mysterious, but, as Mr. Mansel probably wishes to maintain, it is hardly, when once revealed, more so than even our natural life. It is not the mysteries of the supernatural order that make men hesitate to believe it, but the false notion that its mysteries contradict reason. Reason never rejects, because it cannot comprehend; it rejects, only, because it finds itself contradicted. There are depths in this supernatural order reason cannot sound—mysteries, the truth of which she cannot intrinsically demonstrate, and which she must take on external evidence, the same as the majority of things of our natural life; but she can, nevertheless, comprehend the relation of these mysteries with herself and with each other, place them in a true scientific order, and give a true and scientific exposition, as we see in the science of Catholic theology. Taking our *data* from revelation, instead of reason, we can proceed to the construction of supernatural theology, with the same ease, the same firmness, and the same certainty, at each successive step, that we can natural theology itself. We do not demonstrate its principles, nor do we in any science, for the first principles of all science are given, not demonstrated. In the natural order, no more than in the supernatural, does reason seek and establish its own principles, because it cannot operate,—nay, cannot exist, without principles. In regard to the natural life, the principles are given in immediate intuition; in the supernatural, they are given mediately, through divine revelation. This is all the difference, and it is a difference that does not affect the science or certainty of our conclusions.

In controverting the Kantian philosophy embraced by the author, that the form of thought is imposed by the subject, and the Hamiltonian doctrine, which he also adopts, that the infinite is inconceivable, we by no means wish to be understood as maintaing that religious thought has no limits, or that its limits are not determined by the subject. We know, as well as any one, that the human understanding is limited, and that its knowledge, when the most full and complete, is inadequate, and never exhausts the subject. But what we do contend is, that our knowledge, as far as it goes, is not false, is knowledge, as it presents itself, not as we form it, and that the object is known, so far as known at all, as it is. What we wish to deny is, that the subject limits the object, or imposes its forms on the object. The subject is never on the side of the object, and it knows that the object is so and so, because so and so the object presents itself, not because such and such is the constitution of the cognitive subject. When we perceive a tree, it is the tree itself we see, not a projection of our own mind, and the tree is the same as we see it, whether we see it or not, as all the world believes.

Correct these errors of philosophy; bring out more clearly than the author does the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and insist that the supernatural does not depress the natural, but presupposes and elevates it, and the work before us will have very considerable merit, and deserve to be generally read. But as it is, with profound respect for the excellent intentions of its author, and a very high esteem of his learning and talents, we cannot award it any very high praise. It will hardly serve as an antidote to the errors it appears to have been written to refute, and it will be far more likely to confirm others of a hardly less dangerous character. As for the rest, the work is commendable for its calm philosophic spirit, its uniformly courteous tone, and freedom from all asperity or bitterness. It is the work of a scholar, of a gentleman, and one who, if he were not misled by a vicious philosophy, would be a sound Christian believer.

HARMONY OF FAITH AND REASON.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1861.]

Judge Baine, we are told, is a distinguished jurist in California, and a convert from some form of Protestantism to our most holy faith. His work comes to us most cordially recommended by the archbishop of San Francisco, and with the approbation of the archbishop of Baltimore. It is an able work, written in a free, popular style, unincumbered by legal, philosophical, or theological technicalities and refinements, addressed to the plain common sense of non-Catholics. The author devotes, as the archbishop of San Francisco well remarks, "his logical mind to prove, that the Catholic church is, as she was, the teacher, vested with God's commission to impart Christian revelation. This is done in a style rather new, yet forcible; familiar, yet conclusive."

The design of the author is to exhibit the harmonious relations between Faith and Reason,—or rather, to show that the claim of the church to teach a supernatural revelation with infallible authority is, supposing such a revelation made and committed to her to be taught, in perfect accordance with reason, and in no sense contravenes the rights of reason, or encroaches on its domain. The whole book is substantially devoted to the development and establishment of this thesis. We cannot say that the author's method of developing and sustaining this thesis is always strictly scientific or rigidly logical, but no honest man can read and understand his argument as a whole, without being convinced that it cannot be successfully controverted. The author is not a learned theologian, nor a profound metaphysician, and he is too diffuse, declamatory, and inexact as a writer to satisfy our fastidious taste and habits of mind, but his work will probably be none the less popular or useful on that account. It is not wholly out of the reach of non-Catholics, and it gives them Catholic thoughts in their

* *An Essay on the Harmonious Relations between Divine Faith and Natural Reason; to which are added Two Chapters on the Divine Office of the Church.* By A. C. Baine, Esq. Baltimore: 1861.

own tongue, after their own manner, and is more likely to get the truth intelligibly before them than if it were more rigidly exact in its exposition, and strictly scientific in its method. Non-Catholics are exceedingly averse in religious matters from precise statements and exact definitions; and in some measure require an argument to be conducted in a loose, vague, and popular manner, in order to be favorably affected by it. They set their faces against an argument which crushes them from first to last, which leaves them no respite from their torture, and if we would convince them, we must take care not to be too conclusive, so as to give them room to retain a little respect for their own understandings, and to display, in yielding to us, a little generosity. We must give them opportunity to say, in yielding, "We yield not to your arguments, which, upon the whole, are weak, but to the truth, which we see very clearly is on your side."

Judge Baine is, as far as we have discovered, orthodox in his real, honest meaning, but some of his expressions betray a want of familiarity with several important theological questions. Indeed, he uses, from first to last, a line of argument, not peculiar to him, which, rigidly taken, tends rather to shake than to confirm his thesis. His purpose is to show that the method of the church,—teaching a supernatural revelation by infallible authority,—is in strict accordance with the dictates of reason and common sense. He seeks to do this by showing the incompetency of reason, maintaining that its office is to submit to authority without presuming to form any judgment in the case, which is not showing the harmony between the methods of authority and reason, but placing them in direct antagonism. He furthermore has the appearance of founding the necessity of divine revelation on the fact of the primitive fall, whereas without divine revelation we could not even assert the fact of the fall. "The capacities of the human mind," he says (p. 15), "had become so enfeebled by the original disobedience, and the accumulations of error consequent upon the primal crime, that it could not have sustained, or even have embraced, revealed truth without supernatural aid." Could the human mind have done it before the "primal crime"? The natural powers of the human mind were no more adequate to the discovery, acceptance, and retention of supernatural truth before original disobedience than they have been since. Man did not, as Luther and Calvin teach, lose

by the fall his natural spiritual faculties, and so become incapable of understanding truth or willing good. The justice or righteousness in which man was constituted before his disobedience, was by supernatural grace no less than the justice to which he is now elevated by the sacrament of regeneration. After the fall, man needed what he did not need before, namely, medicinal grace,—but the grace that reveals supernatural truth, and the grace that elevates man to the plane of that truth, and enables him to believe and conform to it, were as necessary before as after the fall. The necessity of a revelation of the supernatural, or the necessity of an infallible authority to teach it after it is made, cannot be based on any loss or enfeeblement of our powers by original disobedience or its consequences. The necessity of either cannot be known or conceived till the revelation itself is made, because natural reason in its best estate has of itself alone no conception, anticipation, or *prolepsis* of a supernatural order. But we let the author speak further on this point for himself:

"At the institution of the Church she taught the *supernatural* facts of divine revelation, and denounced judgment upon those who refused to believe, without regard to the plea that reason gave them no evidence of the faith propounded for their acceptance and practice. What the Church did at her institution, she does yet. She makes no war upon reason, but she sternly rebukes reason when it invades the province of faith. The holy Catholic Church knows, and so instructs the world, that natural reason cannot weigh and measure the facts of divine revelation by her feeble, limited, and ruined capacity. The mysteries of divine revelation are not to be annulled because *puny reason* cannot unravel them and weave them into harmony with her philosophy. These mysteries are the foundation of the Church which was to 'teach all nations' whatsoever Christ *had* commanded her, *before* his ascension; and the Church received the Holy Ghost to bring to her remembrance all the things which *had* been commanded, and to guide her into all truth, and this Spirit was promised to abide with her for ever. It is obvious that none of these things are on a level with natural reason. It is equally obvious that reason could not perpetuate them any more than she could invent or originate them, nor could any other power of the human soul. If any could, the Holy Ghost would not have been given as a perpetual remembrancer and guide into all truth. If reason could have perpetuated the infallible truth revealed to the Church, the supernatural power of the Holy Ghost to be her remembrancer and guide in addition to reason, would not have been required or given. Reason may safely affirm that God would do neither a vain nor an unnecessary thing to perpetuate the divine truth committed to his apostolic Church to teach to all nations

to the end of the world. So that we conclude, upon the most certain principle of reason herself, that she was not only inadequate to originate or invent the divine truths of revelation, but, also, that she had no capacity to perpetuate them in their original purity and integrity, or else the Holy Ghost had not been given for this special purpose. Let reason now be put to the rack and interrogated under torture, and she will tell you that she is not equal to all or any of this scheme of divine faith and mystery. What then did our Saviour command his apostolic Church to teach? Those who protest against the teaching of the Church, and who make their canon of reason supreme and contradictory to divine faith, *must believe that this Church was restricted to teaching a system strictly in accordance and agreement with, and not of a superior order to,* the system of natural and mental philosophy to which they adhere, when they protest against the teaching of the Church, because, as they allege, she teaches for a revelation from God facts which are contrary to their reason.

"Is this not the analysis, the fact of their creed? We appeal to them, with all the fraternity of our nature, to examine the fact, and the principle of their position in relation to the divine faith the Church has always and now teaches. Approach with us the examination of the principle, with the utmost candor and most perfect good-will. The truth of God is not a matter for hot blood and disingenuous prevarication. Its investigation demands the sincerest honesty, the utmost simplicity and the purest regard for those with whom we investigate its teachings. Then let us repeat the substance of the statement, and let it be examined in the spirit we invoke for its investigation. We say, then, that those who protest against the teaching by the Church of the faith revealed to her, *because* it is contrary to their reason, must maintain the principle (however covertly it has insinuated itself among, and however secretly it has concealed itself with, the foundations of their doctrines), that the apostolic Church was *restricted to teaching a revelation from God, so as to make the revealed truth accord, agree with, and not go above, or out of the rationale of the systems of natural or mental philosophy to which they adhere,* as being the principles of right reason, and to which, in their judgment, human faith must conform, in the *divine order* as well as in the *natural order.*"—pp. 23–27.

What the author means by all this, may be very sound and very just, but he evidently does not mean precisely what he says, otherwise he would never have spoken in the title of his book of the "harmonious," but rather of the "discordant" relations between faith and reason. We have the right to assume beforehand that divine revelation, if made, and reason must be in perfect accord with one another. Thus the Holy See, in the first of the four articles required to be signed by the traditionalists defines:

Etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen vera dissensio, nullum dissidium inter ipsas inveniri unquam potest, cum ambæ ab uno, eodemque immutabili veritatis fonte, Deo optimo maximo, oriantur, atque ita sibi mutuam opem ferant. "Although faith is *above* reason, there can never be any *dissension* or *disagreement* between it and reason, since both have their origin in one and the same immutable source of truth, Almighty God, and mutually assist each other." It is as important to assert the mutual accord of faith and reason as it is to assert that the former is above the latter. It is necessary that a divine revelation, although above reason, should agree or accord with reason, because God cannot be in contradiction with himself. He may teach us in revelation what he does not teach us in reason, but nothing contradictory to reason; for it is a maxim in theology that grace supposes nature,—*gratia supponit naturam*,—therefore, revelation or faith supposes reason. If you bring as the revelation of God what really is contradictory to reason, we have the right, and it is our duty to reject it as an imposition. We say, then, the church is necessarily restricted to teach as the revelation of God what perfectly *accords* with reason, though not to what does not transcend or rise *above* reason. What the author means to deny, is the assumption that the church can teach as revelation only what is on a level with reason, and within its comprehension, and that we have no right to reject any thing she teaches on the ground that it contradicts or does not accord with our own developments of reason, or systems of natural or intellectual philosophy, which is certainly true. His thought is just; only his expression is not felicitous.

Still the extract, and others we might make, show that the author has not wholly escaped the tendency to disparage reason, in order the better to prove the necessity of revelation,—the tendency to make reason commit suicide in order to get a good reason for asserting authority. The author's rhetoric is better than his logic, and he must permit us to tell him, that the ordinary method of abasing the natural in order to be able to conclude the necessity of the supernatural, is far more specious than solid, and is founded on what we regard as unsound theology. It makes reason commit suicide. The method is well hit off in Gordon and Trenchard's *Independent Whig*, which, speaking of a certain class of persons, says: "They reason against reason, use reason against the use of reason, and sometimes give a very good

reason why reason should not be used." What have you in your method of arguing but reason with which to prove the worthlessness of reason? If reason is worthless, why take her own worthlessness on her own word? A confirmed liar is no more to be believed when he tells you he lies, than when he tells you he speaks the truth. The method answers well for rhetoric, but not for logic. What can be more absurd than to begin by knocking reason in the head, and then galvanizing it into life, in order to prove that to accept the method of authority is the most reasonable thing in the world? If the method of authority is reasonable,—if it accords with reason, and is such as reason accepts, which we hold to be the fact,—why begin by disparaging reason, representing it as feeble, puny, impotent, so as to render its acceptance of authority worth as little as possible? The higher the dignity and truthfulness of reason, the more valuable is its acceptance of authority. But if the method does not accord with reason, if it is only the ruin of reason by the fall that renders necessary the authority, and if the method can be adopted only in the absence or in the destruction of reason, why talk of the harmonious relations between faith and reason?

The author means right, and is laboring to bring out and establish the truth, but he operates on Calvinistic or Jansenistic, rather than on Catholic premises. The necessity of supernatural revelation, or of grace to embrace and sustain supernatural revelation, does in no sense depend on the fall of man, as we have already seen, nor does it grow out of the natural weakness or impotence of reason in its own order. If we had been originally intended for a natural destiny, and if we had been left to that destiny, reason would have sufficed, and we could have had no conception of its impotence or feebleness, for it would have been in proportion to our destiny. Man's natural reason is proportioned to man's natural destiny. But our Maker having designed us for a supernatural destiny, it is evident that, however exalted or strong he might have created natural reason, between it and a supernatural end there could be no proportion. It is not to natural beatitude, but to supernatural beatitude that natural reason is disproportioned, and to that it must always be disproportioned, for there is, and can be no proportion between the natural and supernatural, since they are of different orders. The supernatural is not merely the super-sensible, or the super-intelligible, nor is it connected

with the super-intelligible by the faculty of super-intelligence, as Gioberti seems to teach. The supernatural is a new creation, or regeneration, which presupposes the primitive creation or the order of genesis. In the latter reason, in the former, during our pilgrimage, faith is our principle of life.

The harmonious relation between divine faith and natural reason is the harmonious relation between those two orders. The new creation does not destroy or supersede the old; regeneration does not deny or supersede generation, but supposes it, and therefore necessarily accords with it. Faith and reason accord, for though it requires something more than reason to elicit an act of divine or Catholic faith, yet there is, and can be, no act of faith of any sort, without the assent of reason. Faith *ex parte subjecti*, is in the intellect as its subject, *tanquam in subjecto*, as St. Thomas teaches, and therefore cannot be discordant with reason, or require the suppression, or the abeyance of reason. Faith demands, and can demand, no *blind* submission; reason submits to authority, indeed, but only on conviction, only with its eyes open, because, convinced that the proposition to which its assent is demanded is true. There are two ways in which reason may be convinced—the one mediate, the other immediate. It is convinced immediately, when it apprehends the intrinsic truth or evidence of the proposition; mediately, when the proposition is presented by an authority which it knows can neither deceive nor be deceived. Convince a man that God has given the church full authority to teach and define the revelation he has made and committed to her, and you convince him that whatever she teaches or defines to be God's revelation is his revelation. If God's revelation, he is convinced that it is true, for he knows that God is truth itself, and therefore can neither deceive nor be deceived. He believes the truth of the revelation on the veracity of God; he believes that the revelation is God's revelation on the authority of the church; and he believes the authority of the church on the evidence that convinces him God has authorized or commissioned her to keep, teach, and define his revelation.

Now, the conviction of reason is as real in this process as in the case of immediate evidence, or in the case of strict logical demonstration. Reason, in both cases, submits, but in both cases its submission is an intellectual assent, and is precisely of the same nature in assenting to the mystery of

the Trinity or the mystery of the Incarnation, as in assenting to the proposition, two and two make four. This is precisely what the author wishes to establish. He wishes to establish, that belief or assent on the authority of the church, divinely commissioned to teach, is in accordance with reason, and is, therefore, not a blind, unintellectual act, but a truly reasonable act. What need, then, of incumbering the question with declamations about the feebleness or insufficiency of reason? Reason is sufficient for all that is asked of reason—to do all that is necessary in the case of a reasonable being it should do. There is more in the act of faith, as a theological virtue, than reason; but there is no less than reason, and reason is no less in that act than in any other act it performs. Indeed, if it comes to that, there is more of reason in eliciting the act of faith than in any other act of reason. It is reason's greatest, highest, noblest act, and we know no other that so fully demonstrates the greatness and dignity of human reason.

What it is of the greatest importance to establish in these days of little science and no faith, is the dignity and authority of reason. We know the age is regarded as rationalistic, but its real malady is its doubt of reason. It dares not trust reason when it asserts the authority of the church of God, and escapes assent by taking refuge in scepticism. It is this doubt of reason more than rationalism that the leading Catholic writers of our day feel it necessary to combat. They feel it necessary to restore men to reason as the condition of elevating them to faith in the supernatural revelation of God. We should, then, it seems to us, be on our guard against speaking disparagingly of reason, or of giving the slightest encouragment to the Calvinistic and Jansenistic, and, we may add, traditionalistic error of founding faith on scepticism. All we wish to impress on rationalists is, that our faith does not supersede our reason any more than the supernatural supersedes the natural. We would have them understand that we have not merely in divine revelation a something which they have not, but that we have all they have, and divine revelation to boot. Have they reason? So have we, and as much reason, as good, as cultivated, and as free a reason as they. At the very lowest we have all they have at the very highest, and at worst are as well off as they can be at best. Here is why we do not allow ourselves to speak disparagingly of reason, or to represent faith as demanding the submission, as distinguished from the conviction, of reason.

The point Judge Baine makes is a good one, only we do not quite like the way in which he puts it. The great principle he contends for, no man, who professes to believe in revelation at all really questions, or can question. The so-called orthodox Protestant asserts it as strongly as does the Catholic. The controversy between him and us does not turn on the principle of authority. He holds that principle as well as we. He holds, as well as we, that a supernatural revelation can be taught only by a supernatural authority, and he holds that this supernatural authority is and must be infallible. He is as strenuous as we in asserting infallible authority. The question between him and us is, not as to the necessity of authority, but as to what and where is this authority. He says it is in the written word and the interior guidance of the Holy Spirit, and nowhere else. We hold all he asserts, but do not concede his denial. We hold the written word to be infallible, and we hold as firmly to the interior light and guidance of the Holy Ghost as he does; but we hold, that we have also the living apostolic authority in the church, the same infallible apostolic authority which was established in the beginning. We have all he has at best, and something more; and at the very worst are as well off as he at the very best. The only question to be debated between him and us is, as to the continuance of the infallible apostolic authority in the church. Here, again, he has to meet all the difficulties in the way of asserting such authority that we have to meet, for he holds that it was once in the church, and in our church, too, since he concedes that ours was once the true church. Holding that there was once such authority in our church, it is for him to prove that it has ceased to exist, and no longer continues.

It is a curious fact that the *soi-disant* orthodox Protestant reasons against us Catholics with apparent unconsciousness that every objection he brings against faith by infallible authority, bears equally against his professed rule of faith,—the infallible authority of the written word. If the authority of the church is incompatible with the rights of reason, how can the authority of the written word, of a book, be less so? He, as well as we, has to meet all the objections of the rationalists the interior-light men, or Quakers, and sceptics, and he has far less with which to meet them, for while he has all the disadvantages of the principle of authority to overcome, he has none of its advantages to offer. Of all men in the world he is the most unreasonable; for, as to the

Bible, he has to meet all the objections, in order to assert its authority, that we have to meet in order to assert the authority of the church, and when he has asserted it, it avails him nothing, since it speaks only as he gives it a tongue. A very large portion of the Protestant world see this, and tell him he would be far more consistent and logical if he would go back to Mother Church; and, unwilling to occupy his position, they turn liberal Christians, and embrace a Christianity which each one makes for himself, in his own image and likeness. These are further removed from the supernatural than he is, but they are more true to the natural, though they should never call themselves Christians.

Either Christianity lies in the supernatural order, the order of regeneration, or it does not. If it does, then it is evident it can be known only through the medium of a supernatural revelation, for natural reason, by the very force of the term, cannot go out of the order of nature. The confusion in semi-rationalistic minds on this subject is, that while they concede a supernatural revelation has been made, they forget that the matter or truth revealed is also supernatural. God, they admit, has in a supernatural manner made known to us certain things which we should, —perhaps could,—never have found out by our natural reason, nevertheless, things which lie in the order of nature, and therefore in their own nature and character are in the same order with reason, and in no sense supernatural. Assuming this, they are perfectly consistent and perfectly just in assuming that the things revealed, when revealed, are on a level with reason, and as much within the jurisdiction of reason as any thing else within the natural order. This is wherefore they claim for reason the right to judge not merely of the proofs of the revelation or the credentials of the teacher, but also of the intrinsic truth of the matter revealed. Hence, as reason judges the matter revealed, no special authority, after the revelation, to teach, and interpret it is necessary. Reason itself, common to all men, suffices for that. Their reasoning on their own premises is just enough, and from reason alone you cannot refute them. It is no use now of talking to them of the weakness or aberrations of reason, for reason here is no weaker or more liable to error than elsewhere; and if it suffices in other matters, it must suffice in these. Nor will it be of any use here to speak of the arrogance or presumption of reason in

pretending to judge the revelation; for there is, on the supposition, no more arrogance or presumption than in judging the facts of natural science.

The author has hardly done justice to this class of non-Catholics, for in his argumentation with them, he assumes, or takes for granted, what it is necessary to prove. He assumes, not proves, that a revelation, if made, must contain mysteries above the reach of reason. Yet he should remember that in the Christian revelation is contained the revelation of the natural law, not, as St. Thomas teaches us, because the *élite* of the race could not know it without a revelation, but because the simple and uncultivated could not easily, if at all come to a knowledge of it. Before you can refute them you must prove to them that the revelation is not the simple revelation or reproduction of the natural law, but the revelation, also, of a supernatural order of life and truth unknown and unsuspected by reason, and therefore an order cognizable in our present life, by faith only, not by science. There is no necessity of proving that, supposing God reveals such an order, a living infallible authority is necessary to teach it, for that follows as a necessary consequence, and very few, if any of the class of persons we speak of would deny it. The usual argument of Catholics on this point has always struck us as defective when urged against those who deny that there are any mysteries in religion, or that the revelation, though supernaturally made, reveals any thing supernatural. The argument is good only against those who admit a revelation of the supernatural, for the supernatural is a mystery to natural reason, as lying out of its order, and known only as taught. To all others it is necessary to begin by proving the fact of the apostolic commission, or the divine commission of the church to teach all men and nations, the revelation God has made. The divine commission carries with it the pledge of infallibility in all matters covered by it, for God, who is truth itself, cannot authorize, directly or indirectly, the teaching of error. The fact of the commission may be proved either by taking the body claiming to have received it, for there is only one claimant, and showing that its claim has been steadily made from the present back to the very time of the apostles; or in the usual way in which we prove the authority of the Scriptures. In proving the authority of the Scriptures, we must necessarily prove the apostolic commission, as the voucher for this authority. It

is then easy from the Scriptures themselves to prove that the commission was not simply a personal commission to the apostles, but to an apostolic body, which was to remain until the consummation of the world. Either method is logical and conclusive. The authority to teach vindicates itself anew to reason the moment it begins to teach, for then it discloses mysteries which reason at once concedes demand a teaching authority.

Having shown that the method of authority is reasonable, in accordance with what reason demands in case the supernatural is to be taught and believed, and further shown that the authority is competent and infallible, since commissioned by God himself, reason herself is convinced that whatever authority teaches as divine revelation, is such revelation, and therefore true, since the word of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. The whole process is in harmony with reason, and the act of faith is a reasonable act. All this the author proves in reality, but not without some little defect of method, logical distinctness, and scientific development.

There is one other sense, not distinctly drawn out by the author, in which there must be a "harmonious relation" between revelation and reason, and in which reason has the right to sit in judgment not on what is proved to be revelation, but on what is proposed as revelation. Grace supposes nature, faith supposes reason; and the Holy See tells us that, although faith is above reason, there is no dissension or discord between them. Consequently any thing proposed as revelation, clearly and unequivocally contradictory to reason, we have the right, without further inquiry, to reject. God cannot teach one thing in reason and its contradictory in faith, and the Holy See has condemned the proposition that what is theologically true can be philosophically false, or what is philosophically false can be theologically true. This negative authority reason undoubtedly has even in regard to what is proposed as revelation. We do not understand Judge Baine to deny it; but he denies, and very properly, our right to take our systems of philosophy as the measure of reason, and to reject, as contradicting reason, whatever contradicts them.

> "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

We have no right to say a thing cannot be true because it contradicts our opinions or is not reconcilable with our

theories, for it may still turn out that our opinions are erroneous and our systems false. Some years ago, Catholicity was said to be false because it was unfavorable to the rights of kings; it is now argued that it cannot be true because opposed to the rights of the people. At one time men argue that she is false because repugnant to nature; at another, because she is not repugnant to our corrupt natures. Nothing of this sort is admissible. It is nothing that we merely regard as reasonable that can invalidate the claims of revelation. An alleged revelation that contradicts an evident principle of reason, that teaches that of contradictories, both may be true, that God is a malignant being, is changeable, untruthful, the author of sin, decreeing that men shall sin necessarily that he may damn them justly, that hatred and revenge are virtues, and the unbridled indulgence of the lusts of the human heart is sanctity, pleasing to God and entitled to a reward, we pronounce beforehand to be no revelation from God, and we make no inquiry as to the authority on which it is taught, for we know, *a priori*, that it cannot be a divine authority. But, unless it contradict some well-known and undeniable principle of reason, natural truth, justice, or morality, we cannot decide against it without examination. But reason can conclude nothing against a supernatural proposition merely because it is unable to see its truth.

But in the case of the teaching of the church there is never occasion to apply this negative test. We believe the church only because we have all the proof that reason demands that she is divinely commissioned and assisted to teach the revelation God has made to man. We know she cannot err in teaching his revelation, because we know he has authorized her to teach, and cannot authorize the teaching of error, as he would do if she could err as to his word. We have for the infallibility of the church in regard to faith and morals the guaranty so to speak, of Almighty God, and that is security good enough for any reasonable man. We know, then that whatever she teaches is truth, and truth without mixture of error; consequently, it never comes into our heads for our own sakes, for the satisfaction of our own minds, to institute any inquiry as to the fact whether what she teaches agrees with natural reason or not, for we know, *a priori*, that it cannot disagree with it. Whenever we institute the inquiry, it is to remove the difficulties of those who in the name of reason, object to her teaching, or else to increase our admiration of the divine wisdom by obtaining

a more lively sense of the harmony of the Creator's works.

For our own part, we dwelt at length on the necessity and proofs of authority in the earlier volumes of our *Review*, and said all that we feel it necessary to say on that head. Latterly, we have been more intent on showing the compatibility of authority with liberty, and the concord between nature and grace. We alienate in our age many minds from the church, as well as fail to recall those who have gone astray, if we present them the church only under the aspect of authority, and simply demand, in her name, unquestioning obedience. The church reasons, persuades, and resorts to her authority to command only when all other means fail; not that she distrusts her authority, or concedes to reason the right to dispute it, but because she is forbidden to lord it over God's heritage, and because she seeks for God a willing obedience. We do her great injustice when we represent her only as stern and inflexible authority, saying in imperative tones, "Believe or be damned," although it is certainly true that he that believeth not will be damned. We have felt that, having vindicated the authority of the church, proved her ability to teach and to govern all men and nations in all things spiritual, we could not better serve her interests than by showing that her authority by no means abridges our natural liberty or supersedes the necessity of the exercise of our natural reason. Outside of the church, men are driven by the false supernaturalism of Calvinists and Evangelicals to rationalism and naturalism, while non-Catholics, who do not profess to be orthodox Protestants, very generally suppose that false supernaturalism is precisely what the church herself teaches. We have believed we could render no better service to religion than to do our best to correct this injurious impression. We have labored for several years, not so much to establish the divinity as the humanity of the church: in other words, to prove, not so much that our Lord is God as that he is God made man, the Word made flesh, that he is perfect man as well as perfect God. In doing this, we have had not only false supernaturalism, which demolishes nature to make way for grace, outside of the church, but not a few Jansenistic tendencies among our own friends, to combat, which has led some to suppose we were turning our arms against Catholics instead of the common enemy. We leave it to time to write our vindication. We believe that what is now wanted by the non-Catholic world is not arguments in proof of our

religion, but explanations which disabuse non-Catholics of their prejudices against the church and her doctrines—explanations that shall enable them to see clearly how much of what offends them belongs to Catholic tradition, how much to the traditions of Catholics, which are not of faith, and how much to the invention of the enemies of the church. To this end Judge Baine's work has been intended by the author to contribute, and no doubt will contribute much. His book is not adapted to all classes of minds; but there is a large class to which it is adapted, and it will sweep away a mass of prejudice from the minds of most non-Catholics who will read it.

CHRIST THE SPIRIT.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1861.]

It is singular what a strong hold Christianity has on the minds even of those who reject entirely its historical truth and dogmatic teaching. Here is a writer who denies that there ever lived such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, who rejects the miracles and all other facts recorded in the New Testament, and yet is fascinated by the very name of Christ, and seems not to have a doubt that if he can only get for his own views the sanction of a primitive Christianity, he has established their truth. The author rejects Christ, and yet assumes the truth of Christianity, and proceeds from beginning to end on the assumption that when any view is proved to be a really Christian view, it is proved to be true. So hard is it even for an unbeliever to get entirely rid of the belief that Christianity is from God and the true religion!

We know personally the author of the work before us, and we highly esteem him as a man and a gentleman. He is, we believe, a man of strict moral integrity, of great purity and tenderness of heart, more than ordinary powers of mind, and of studious habits. We believe him a very ardent lover of truth, as he understands it, and capable of making great sacrifices for it. How happens it that such a man should, at the age of sixty and upward, be still wandering in the mazes of error, repeating the platitudes of Strauss, or seeking to revive the old so-called Hermetic philosophy, and to substitute it for the religion of Jesus Christ? It is idle to pretend that he is rendered averse from the truth by vicious propensities and vicious habits, and almost as idle to pretend that he is kept from seeing and embracing it, by his pride of intellect, for though doubtless he has more or less of that pride, it does not seem to be the governing principle of his life. Doubtless he finds a fascination in the mystery with which the old

**Being an Attempt to state the Primitive View of Christianity.* By the Author of "Remarks on Alchemy and the Alchemists," &c. Second Edition, enlarged. New York: 1861.

Hermetic philosophers surrounded themselves,—a pleasure in interpreting the mystic jargon of the old Alchemists, and an agreeable stimulus in the hope of being able one day to read the riddle of the Sphynx; but the mysteries of the Gospel are infinitely greater and grander, the Christian mysticism is infinitely richer and profounder than the Hermesian, and the solution of the enigma of life given by our holy faith is far clearer and sublimer than that even promised by the old Chaldean star-gazers, or the modern Rosicrucians. We agree with the author, that those whom, in another work, he calls the true Alchemists were, if you will, Hermetic philosophers, and that the philosopher's stone they were in pursuit of is to be understood in a moral, not in a gross material sense; but the secret of compounding that stone does not match the secret of the Christian life taught to every Christian child in the catechism. Their secret was nothing, as is really conceded in their uniform confession that it can never be written, or spoken, or communicated by one man to another; and, after all, their speculations end in the truism, Be good and do good, and then —you will be good and do good. They neither tell you what is good, nor impart to you the power either to be or to do good. The whole class of Hermetic or Alchemic philosophers are admirably described by the Apostle St. James, as those who say to the cold, the naked, and the hungry, "Be ye warmed, be ye clothed, be ye filled," while they give not one of the things needed.

The great aim of the author in this work is to get rid of the historical Christ, to reject the historical sense of the Holy Scriptures, to bring Christianity within the order of nature, and to make it by interpretation coincide with the so-called Hermetic philosophy. Now we will not say that he does not believe that the two are coincident; but we will say that he can never prove it. He says the Scriptures are to be allegorically interpreted, and he proceeds by allegorizing them to make them coincide with his Hermesianism; but what is his authority for asserting that the Scriptures are to be interpreted as a collection of allegories, or, if they are to be so interpreted, that he has seized their true allegorical sense? If the Holy Scriptures contain no truth but the Hermesian, are never to be taken in their plain historical sense, why does he trouble his head about them; why not bring out his Hermetic philosophy independently of them, and leave it to stand on its own bottom, if bottom it has? It

is true, the fathers recognize in the Holy Scriptures a moral and a spiritual sense distinct from the historical sense, and Origen allegorizes large portions of them; but both Origen and the fathers recognize and maintain also their plain, literal, and historical sense; and if the author relies on them as authority for allegorizing them he must take their authority throughout, accept the literal historical sense, and allegorize only in subordination to it, as they did. He cannot take the testimony of his own witnesses when it is in his favor, and reject it when it is against him.

Then, again, how does he prove his Hermesian teaching is true? He cannot as a good logician take it as his guide in allegorizing the Scriptures, and then the Scriptures Hermetically allegorized to prove it. That would be not only to reason in a circle, but in a *vicious* circle. Will he maintain that his Hermesianism is true philosophy, and attempt to demonstrate it from natural reason? But the Hermetic philosophy, or the philosophy called after the mythic Hermes, is pantheistic, and pantheism is repudiated by natural reason. If there is any thing certain to reason, it is that man is *from* God, but not God. If we know any thing we know that we are contingent and dependent existences, and that God is a necessary and independent being, in whom there is and can be no contingency or dependency.

The author rejects the personal or historical Christ, but seeks to preserve "Christ the Spirit." We understand very well his doctrine, for we encountered it years ago with the Boston transcendentalists. But the very authority on which he relies for asserting Christ the Spirit, asserts Christ the man, Christ conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, who was dead, and buried, and the third day rose again from the dead. Reject this authority and you know nothing of Jesus Christ at all, neither as person nor as spirit; accept it, and you must accept him not as spirit only, but as spirit with flesh and bones, as a real, historical person. We cannot allow you to accept what suits your purpose and reject what militates against it. The authority, if good for the existence of Christ the Spirit, is good for the existence of Christ the person, Christ the incarnate God.

We will not enter here into any formal argument to prove that our Lord was a real person, and not a myth as Strauss would have us believe; for that has been amply done by both Catholics and Protestants in their refutation of the

mythical theory as applied to the Gospels. It suffices for the present to say that we have in the church, in her doctrines, in her sacraments, in her rites and usages, undeniably extending back to apostolic times, a living testimony to the fact that there was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth. The Church in her festivals of the Nativity and of the Resurrection is an unimpeachable witness to it, as well as in her whole liturgical service, in which she commemorates his death on the cross. It is impossible to explain the origin of the sacrament of the holy Eucharist or the sacrifice of the Mass, without admitting the real existence of the historical Christ of the New Testament. The church is here to-day, a real institution, dating from the very time he is said to have lived, died, and risen from the dead, and her whole constitution, her whole significance is based on the reality of the historical facts recorded in the Gospels. You cannot explain the fact of her existence if you call in question these facts, any more than you can explain an effect without admitting a cause. This is enough for us, and enough for any man who is competent to judge of the matter.

The author questions these facts on the ground that they are improbable, and indeed impossible, since they contravene the permanent order of nature. He says :—

"In addition to this, there comes in the philosophical doctrine of the permanent order of nature, tending to enforce the same conclusion; for, although this doctrine is general, and does not definitively fix the line between the natural and the miraculous, yet the doctrine is sufficiently established among thinking men to make it certain to a disciplined mind, that the curing of a physically blind man by spittle and earth; the actual walking on the water by a grown real man; the actual raising of one from the dead, who had been dead four days, and whose body stank; though, I say, the line between the possible and the impossible be considered as indefinite on the doctrine of order, still such miracles as these must be regarded as impossible, or no relations can be so. If, therefore, we accept these miracles as historical realities, we must refuse the idea of law altogether, and must admit that there is no truth in the doctrine which affirms an *order* in the course of nature; and if this can be affirmed —that is, if the doctrine of order can be denied—we must then deny the possibility of science, in all its branches; and this must be extended to logic and reasoning, for these depend upon the permanent operation of our faculties, and then there could be no further reasoning, or inquiry even into the subject itself under consideration, and we must hold our hands and receive every thing as equally possible, and must live in an acknowledged anarchy of both nature and intellect. In such a case, we should have no rule for selecting and preferring, among ancient relations,

any one from many; we should have, for example, no ground in reason for rejecting the ancient Greek mythology—for this mythology can only be rejected by that decision of the reason which excludes it from the order of nature, and denies to it a veracious basis in that order, as literal truth. Hence, in modern times, that mythology is looked upon as poetry, or as philosophy in fiction, and by interpretation a great deal of beauty is discovered in it.

"These considerations will gain force in proportion as we reflect—with any tolerable reliance upon our instinctive conceptions and apprehensions of the nature of God—upon the impossibility, for example, of realizing or even imagining, without attempting to understand it, the story of the supernatural birth. That story, if taken literally, stands for us only as a form of words; for no man can conceive, or represent to his imagination even, the truth of it, and perceive in any manner, how the infinite and invisible God could come out of his infinitude, and give occasion, in a finite sphere of action preserving his infinitude, for a local history of his doings and sayings. Not that God does not appear in all history; but, for the very reason that he is in all history, universally, we are obliged to say that he is not specifically in any single history. When we say that God is everywhere, we introduce a contradiction into our minds by affirming that he is, or has been, *especially* in some local place, for this implies that he is, or was, not in other places. Those who deny this, do not seem to perceive how easy it is to speak without ideas, that is, without adjusting ideas to their necessary conditions; but words without ideas must necessarily be without sense.

"But this may be thought a speculative consideration, or a metaphysical abstraction, which ought not to be urged, as if any thing of the kind could put a limit upon the power of God. But this, when properly understood, does not assert a limit to the power of God. It only shows that there is a limit to our own power of affirmation; it denies to us the privilege of asserting any thing in contradiction to the organism of reason which God has given us. In this view, to submit to reason is to submit to God. In this obedience, we do not affirm a limitation to God, but we confess a limitation upon ourselves. There is no negation in God; nothing but infinite affirmation. If in the imperfection of language, we seem to deny any thing of God, we can only mean to deny the possibility of our conception of the thing; and this, I say, is simply a confession of the limitations under which we live. But, on the other hand, this is no reason for making affirmations, with respect to the divine Being, which we do not understand, or which inclose contradictions; for this is so far from a modest confession of weakness or limitation, that it shows both ignorance and arrogance. It is the indication of a presumptious spirit, and is in no sense a mark of piety."—pp. 26–29.

It is clear, from the way in which he expresses himself, that the author half suspects a fallacy in this reasoning, and that he feels that reason cannot, after all, deny the possibil-

ity of miracles. The facts recorded are impossible in the order of nature, or by natural agencies, we grant, and thank the author for the admission. Then their existence is a proof of a power or agency above nature; and he must prove that there is no such power before he can assert miracles are impossible, and from their impossibility conclude the falsity of the history recording them. He may say, and we will say it with him, that they are impossible by any natural agency, but not that they are impossible by supernatural agency, unless he knows the full power of the infinite God, which he will not pretend. For aught he or we know they are possible, and then the whole question is one of fact or of testimony. If the testimony is sufficient, we must believe the facts the same as any other class of facts. Hume, indeed, contends that no testimony is sufficient to accredit a miracle; because it is more in accordance with experience that a man should lie than that nature should go out of her course, or depart from her permanent order. But the objection is founded on a false definition of miracle. Nature does not and cannot go out of her course; she does not and cannot depart from her permanent order. Nobody pretends it, for nobody pretends that nature works the miracle. The very notion of miracle is that of a fact produced not by nature, but by a power above nature. No man who believes in God at all, can deny the existence of such power, and therefore no man who so believes can deny the possibility of miracles. If the possibility of a miracle cannot be denied, the miraculous fact is provable by testimony, and the only question is, Is the testimony sufficient?

We recognize as fully as the author the order of nature, and we recognize, too, its permanence. Miracles do not change or interrupt that order, for they presuppose it, and belong themselves to an order above it—to the supernatural order which they reveal and affirm, and which without it could not be called supernatural. The difficulty experienced arises from conceiving the miracle as *pro tanto* the destruction of the natural order, and therefore from conceiving the natural and the supernatural as opposed one to the other. But they are no more opposed one to the other than are the upper and lower stories of the same house. The supernatural order is above the natural, but is not placed over against it; it presupposes the natural, and though it may operate on the natural, and manifest itself through it, it by no means changes or impairs it. Nature, as nature, remains

during and after the miracle precisely what it was before; and all the miracle does is to introduce and affirm the existence of a supernatural order. We do not and cannot know by natural reason that there actually is a supernatural order; but we can and do know by natural reason that there is a power above nature; for we know that the production of nature has not exhausted the creative energy of its author, since that energy is infinite, and therefore inexhaustible. We know, then, by natural reason that God, if he chooses, can create and reveal a supernatural order of life, and therefore that miracles are possible, and consequently provable. The whole reasoning of unbelievers and rationalists against miracles is based on a shallow sophism, and concludes nothing.

We grant it is impossible for man, if restricted in his knowledge to the order of nature, to conceive or imagine what the author calls "the story of the supernatural birth." The mystery of the Incarnation, from first to last, lies out of the order of nature, out of the reach of natural reason, and is without any analogies in nature. But what is to be concluded from that? that it is false? Not at all, but simply that it is not and could not have been a human invention, conception, or imagination. Man has no faculty by which he could have invented or imagined such a mystery. This is what the author himself virtually maintains. Then, since the mystery is apprehended and believed, we must conclude that it has been revealed by a superhuman power. Then the existence of the mystery in human belief becomes if we duly consider it, a conclusive proof of its truth; for none but God could have revealed it, and he could not have revealed it if it were not true, since he is Truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived. The author is right in denying that "God could come out of his infinitude." But in the Incarnation, God does not come out of his infinitude, and become in his divine nature finite. The divinity remains in its own infinitude, unchanged and unaffected by the Incarnation; for it is the divine that assumes the human, not the human that assumes the divine. The "local history" is not the local history of the divinity, or God in his divine nature, for the divinity has and can have no history; but of God in his human nature. By the Incarnation he took human nature up to himself, and made it, without changing it, really, truly, substantially his own nature, his own *human* nature, as much so as the divine nature itself. The Word

was made flesh and dwelt among us. Christ the incarnate Word is at once perfect God and perfect man. In his perfect manhood God may have a local history, be born, grow, and die, the same as any one else. All that may be affirmed of man, sin excepted, may be affirmed of him in his human nature. God in his divinity is not localized, nor is God in his humanity ubiquitous. Keeping in mind the distinction of the two natures, the contradictions the author conjures up disappear, and reason has nothing to allege against this stupendous mystery.

The author contends that to deny the possibility of miracles, "is not to limit the power of God, but to place a limit on our powers of affirmation." But he must permit us to dispute it. When we say God cannot do this or that, it is precisely his power not ours, that we deny, and precisely our power of affirmation that we assert. We assume, not that we are unable to affirm that God *can*, but that we are able to affirm that God can *not*, do this or that. Surely here is no denial of our power of affirmation, but its assertion. We agree that we "can assert nothing in contradiction to the organism of reason which has been given us;" but reason herself teaches that God can do any thing but deny, contradict, or annihilate himself, as has been often shown in our pages. We are subject, no doubt, to the limitations of reason, and therefore we are not able to affirm the impossibility of miracles, for reason cannot say that a miracle is contrary to the being, or nature, or power of God. We are able to say on the contrary, that miracles are possible; but whether God works or will work miracles, we can say only on testimony appropriate in the case.

The author gives us a long account of the Jewish sects, especially the Essenes, and maintains that the Gospels were produced by persons who were or had been members of that Jewish sect. This is possible; but it is, as far as we can see, a matter of no moment to him or to us. The Essenes were Jews, and in some sense an ascetic or monastic community under the old covenant. They and the Therapeutæ were Jewish ascetics, the portion of the Jewish people among whom in our Lords's time, spiritual life still retained some degree of vigor. We should naturally expect members of these bodies to have been among the first to recognize in our Lord the promised Messiah; but we have no evidence that such was the fact. We should naturally expect to find them forming the nucleus of the first Christian congregation

among the Jews; but there is nothing in history that proves it was so. As they, better than the Sadducees or the Pharisees, retained the spiritual sense of the Jewish Scriptures, there would necessarily be a greater similarity of doctrine between them and Christians, than between Christians and the other Jewish sects. But whether so or not, amounts to nothing; for no Christian pretends that his religion originated at the epoch of our Saviour's Incarnation. Our Lord did not come to teach a new religion, a religion different from that of the Jewish, but to fulfil the promises made to the fathers, and to do those things without which their faith would have been vain, as St. Paul teaches in his Epistle to the Hebrews.

We are aware that several able learned writers, especially in Germany, have endeavored to disprove Christianity, by showing that much it teaches was held and taught by the Gentiles, long before the coming of our Lord. We believe it. There never has been, there never could be but one religion in the world. "Times vary," says St. Augustine, "but faith does not vary. As believed the fathers, so believe we; only they believed in a Christ to come, and we in a Christ who has come." "Christianity as Old as the World," said the Englishman Tindal, in the title of a work intended to overthrow it; we say also that it is as old as the world, and maintain with St. Thomas, the Angel of the Schools that there never has been but one revelation, for the whole faith was revealed in substance to our first parents in the garden. The mystery of the Incarnation, on which all that is distinctively Christian depends, was revealed to our first parents, when the Lord God promised that the woman, or the seed of the woman, should bruise the serpent's head. Then the great mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, in which is included the whole Christian revelation and all that is necessary to believe *necessitate medii* even now, must have been more or less explicitly revealed. Hence the fact that much coincident with the Gospel is found in the Jewish and gentile writings prior to the advent of our Lord, militates in no sense against the claims of the Christian revelation or of the Catholic church. Suppose you find in the Gospels traces of the doctrines and practices of the Essenes, indicating that their authors had been members of the Essenean community, what does it prove? It proves nothing against their genuineness, their authenticity, their inspiration, or their authority. All you can conclude from it, even if established, would be that the Essenes

retained prior to their acceptance of our Lord as the promised Messiah, in greater or less purity, more or less complete, the primitive revelation made to our first parents in the garden.*

Christianity, in a general sense, includes the publication of the law of nature, and the supernatural revelation made to man. By the law of nature is meant simply the dictates of natural reason common to all men. It is not strange, then, that in so far as relates to the dictates of reason, we should find the ancient Jews and gentiles coinciding with the Christians, for they all do or may draw from the same source. The primitive revelation, including, in substance, the whole supernatural revelation, being made to our first parents, therefore to the whole human race, necessarily enters, in some form and in some degree, into the primitive and universal beliefs of mankind. The dictates of natural reason form the basis of natural morality recognized and promulgated anew, with supernatural sanctions, by the Gospel; the primitive supernatural revelation forms the basis

* We have purposely passed over in the text the special argument on which the author relies, because we have chosen to refute it indirectly by the general doctrine we bring out. His argument is, that the Gospels were produced during what are commanly called the first three centuries, in the bosom of the Essenean community. But the Essenes were Hermetic philosophers, and therefore the Gospels are to be interpreted in an Hermesian sense. Christianity is simply the old Hermetic philosophy itself, and the blunder of Christians in all subsequent centuries has been in giving a literal interpretation to the symbolical language of the Gospels. Being himself an Hermetic philosopher, and heir to the lore of old Hermes Trismegistus, he is able to detect the blunder, and give us a true key to Christian symbolism. But the fact that the Gospels were produced in the bosom of the Essenean community nothing indicates, except certain coincidences of doctrine, which, conceding them, prove nothing, as we have shown in the text. The other assertion, that the Essenes were Hermetic philosophers, rests on certain alleged coincidences between their doctrines and those ascribed to Hermes, and the assumption that they were a secret society. The coincidences prove nothing; first, because it is impossible to fix the date of the so-called Hermetic philosophy, or to prove that in the form we have it, it is older than the Gospels; and second, because the coincidences alleged are not coincidences with any thing peculiar to the Hermesians, but with views which they hold in common with others. That the Essenes were a secret society is not proved and nothing in Philo, Josephus, or Eusebius indicates. The most that can be said is, that they were a corporation, into which new members were admitted after a longer or shorter probation. But even if they were a secret society, that does not prove that they were Hermesians; for the author will hardly pretend that there never was, is, or can be a secret society not composed of Hermetic philosophers. His argument therefore will not bear examination, and the general observations in the text suffice to deprive it of all force or pertinency.

of all the religions of all ages and nations of the world. In the great elements and principal precepts of natural morality, in what comes within the appropriate sphere of reason, you find the whole world substantially agreed. In regard to supernatural revelation, you find wide differences indeed; but you find also a substantial unity underlying the various and manifold forms adopted, showing that all the various religions of the world have their type in the Christian revelation. Eliminate from these religions their anomalies, inconsistencies, and what is repugnant to natural reason, and supply their defects so as to make them rounded and complete realizations of their original type, and you have the Christian religion as held and taught to-day by the Catholic church. Over your Greek and Roman polytheism hovers always, more or less distinctly visible, the divine unity, and in Indian and Egyptian incarnations are indications of the incarnation of the Word, originally promised to Adam and Eve before their expulsion from the garden. Analyze all the superstitions and idolatries of the world, however gross, immoral, inhuman, or absurd, and you will find that they are only corruptions, perversions, or travesties of Christian principles and dogmas, bearing testimony alike to the unity of the human race, and to the unity and universality of the original revelation. We cheerfully accept the facts brought out during the last sixty or seventy years by German scholars, tending to prove the common origin of all religions, though we do not accept their inference. They draw wrong conclusions, because they start with false premises. They start with the assumption that Christians hold, and must hold, that their religion was a revelation made to the world for the first time when our Lord is said to have tabernacled in the flesh. Protestants may hold this, and even some Catholics in combating the errors of La Mennais and his school, may not always be careful to show that Christians do not hold the same. Starting with this assumption, these learned writers adduce the facts in question as irrefragable evidence against the claims of Christianity to be a supernatural revelation.

But this assumption is unwarranted, and must be, so long as the church asserts the inspiration and authority of the Jewish Scriptures. Even our Lord himself, though he promises to build his church on Peter, speaks of the church as something already existing. The doctrine of the fathers and the theologians is, that the church is the continuation,

under other conditions indeed, of the synagogue, as the synagogue was the continuation of the patriarchal religion. In a restricted sense, the Christian church no doubt extends back only to the time of our Lord and his apostles, but in a larger and more general sense it extends back to the promise made that the woman, or the seed of the woman, should bruise the serpent's head, and embraces all the faithful before as well as since the coming of Christ. Adam and Seth, Enoch and Noah, Shem and Job, Abraham and Melchisedek, belonged to the church of Christ as well as Peter and John, Jerome and Augustine, Thomas and Bonaventura, Bossuet and Fénelon. It is so we understand the teaching of our church, and this is confirmed by the catechism, which tells us the church is catholic, "because she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She is catholic or universal, then, in time as well as in space. It is not the doctrine, then, of the Catholic church that the revelation of which she is the depositary, teacher, and interpreter, was a new and original revelation, made for the first time after the Incarnation. Our Lord came to fulfil the promises, that is, to do the things which would perfect the faith of those who had believed in him before his coming, and also, as he himself says, "that we may have grace, and have it more abundantly." Many things are more explicitly revealed under the new than under the old law; old institutions have been abolished and new institutions founded; but we are aware of no new dogmatic truth, no new moral principle or moral precept that has been added to the primitive revelation.

The argument the author seeks to draw against historical Christianity from the supposition that the writers of the Gospels were Essenes, is then worth nothing. If the fact were as he alleges, it would not prove them to be forgeries, or not what they profess to be. The author's arguments against the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels are not new, and though very well put, have been shown over and over again to be inconclusive. The question he raises we have examined on all sides, in all moods of mind, both as an unbeliever and as a believer; and we are satisfied that the evidence of the genuineness and authenticity of the four Gospels is far stronger than that in the case of any other books that have come down to us from an equally remote antiquity. We need not undertake to justify this conclusion, for it has been done unanswerably by writers of

the first ability and learning, among both Catholics and Protestants. The mythical theory of Strauss, which the author adopts, is the absurdest of all theories that can be imagined. The author supposes the books were written and the facts invented in order to symbolize, to set forth, or rather to conceal doctrines or ideas previously entertained chiefly by the Essenes. But he forgets that there is something besides doctrines or ideas to be accounted for. There are institutions, sacraments, rites, and festivals, external positive institutions to be explained, which presuppose and are intended to commemorate actual historical facts. These do not grow out of ideas, but necessarily out of facts. Deny the historical facts they commemorate and they are without meaning, and their origin is inexplicable. They are found too early, too near the date of the alleged events, to have allowed time for the myths to have grown up, and to have been received as facts. A myth to be received as an historical fact, and to have institutions founded on it, and festivals established to commemorate it, requires the lapse of more than one, two, or three centuries; and the author in the present case has not a half a century at his disposal. Moreover, the sacrament of the Eucharist we know was instituted professedly to commemorate an event said to have recently happened, and amongst a people who must have known whether it commemorated a real fact or only a fact invented to symbolize an idea.

The author relies on the alleged ignorance of the period in which the historical facts are said to have occurred; also on the alleged silence of external or profane history. The alleged silence of profane historians, if proved, would not move us. We have not all the historical works that were written during the period, and cannot say that our Lord was mentioned by no profane contemporary historian. Besides, it appears to have been the policy of profane writers to take as little notice as possible of Christ or his religion; first, through contempt, and afterward because they still, down to the Barbarian conquest, trusted the old religion would be restored, and all traces of the new be obliterated. Thus Claudian, a poet and courtier under the reign of the orthodox Honorius, in the fifth century, sings the praises of the emperor and of the empire, without letting slip a single word that indicates that he had ever heard of our Lord and his religion, or that he was aware that the old idolatry and superstition were not as flourishing as in the days of Augus-

tus. But we find the Christians persecuted by Nero, and mentioned by Tacitus and Pliny in the first century, to say nothing of the disputed passage in Josephus—a passage which has never been proved to our satisfaction to be an interpolation. There were already, in the first century, imperial edicts against the Christians, and neither the earliest Jewish nor gentile opponents of Christianity known to us, dispute the historical facts of the Gospel, regarded simply as facts.

It will not do to rely too much on the ignorance of the period when the Gospel histories must have been produced; for we must remember that it was the Augustan age—the golden age of Roman literature. The state of learning and intellectual culture among the Jews may in some measure be judged of by the works of Philo and Josephus still extant, and in the East generally by the subtile and erudite character of the early heresies. Our age is hardly able to understand the old Gnostic heresy which dates from the first century, and our author honestly believes that he is enlightening the nineteenth century, by reviving the exploded heresies of the second. Whoever has some knowledge of Roman literature, art, science, and philosophy, from Cicero down to the rise of Neoplatonism with Plotinus, about the middle of the third century, needs no argument to convince him that the age in which the Gospel histories were produced was by no means an age remarkable for its ignorance, but the most enlightened and highly cultivated age in all Roman history. It was precisely the age in which flourished the great imperial schools throughout the empire, and the last age that could be selected for the production of such a gigantic imposture as Christianity must be, if we are to believe our author.

The New Testament writers themselves, though some of them lacked the training of the schools, regarded as the author must regard them, as uninspired men, are remarkable for their sobriety, good sense, profound and accurate knowledge. We find in them no enthusiasm, no eccentricity, no exaggeration. Their writings are full of historical references; but nobody has yet been able to convict them of a single historical error. The subtlest and profoundest philosopher can convict them of not the slightest error in philosophy or morals. They relate things which transcend reason, but not an instance can be found in which they come in conflict with any principle of reason or known

fact of the natural order. Wherever we have the means of testing their statements we find them standing the most rigid tests we can apply, both as to the letter and spirit. This does not indicate any remarkable degree of ignorance, nor writers who are merely constructing myths in an age of ignorance and superstition. We hazard nothing in saying that the Gospel histories have not a trait in common with the mythical histories of Greece and Rome, or India and Egypt; and we do not fear to assert that they never could have been invented or fabricated by philosophers or any body else, as symbols of ideas or doctrines, or the gradual outgrowth of a people seeking to localize or to give form and color to their ideas, sentiments, and convictions. They bear on their face the stamp of reality, and their existence is inexplicable on any other hypothesis than that of their strict historical truth. They could have been produced only by men narrating events of which they had been eye-witnesses, or by men who drew from the relations of eye-witnesses. To suppose them to have been fabricated as symbols of ideas, or to be simply mythical productions, would be to suppose a more stupendous miracle than any recorded in them.

But, suppose we take the author at his word, what does he offer us that we have not already? What do we gain by rejecting historical Christianity, and by having it proved to us that Christianity at bottom is only the old Hermetic philosophy, and that its true expounders and faithful followers are the Alchemists babbling of the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life, and their salt, sulphur, and mercury? Grant, if you will, that the old Alchemists were not vulgar chemists, seeking the transmutation of metals and the production of material gold; grant that they did not dabble in the black art, that they were no conjurors, no mighty magicians, inspired and aided by Satan; we yet may ask, What were they? What do we owe them? What can they give us? For what art or science is the world indebted to them? What eternal principle, what truth, moral or spiritual, had they, or have their modern followers, that we have not, either in our natural reason, in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, or in the teaching of the church? Grant that they were, as the author holds, sages and philosophers; yet they had, as he himself maintains, no superhuman wisdom, no supernatural power, and wrapped up in their mystic jargon and unintelligible cipher, no knowledge that transcends

the reach of natural reason. Whatever their pretended "incommunicable secret," it was within the natural order, and therefore above neither our natural strength nor our natural intellect. But as we have all there is of nature and reason, they can, how ever much they may have retained of the mystic lore of ancient Egypt and Chaldea, have no order of knowledge or kind of power we have not already without their aid.

The author, carried away by certain discoveries which he thinks he has made, is not, we suspect, fully aware of what he does in attempting to prove that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures are Hermetic writings, and that Christianity rightly understood is nothing but the so-called Hermetic philosophy. Suppose the fact to be as he alleges, what conclusion is to be drawn? Simply that, since we have those Scriptures, and since Hermesianism is only a system of philosophy constructed by human reason, we have already the Hermesian doctrine, and all that we should have in case we rejected historical Christianity. The Hermetic philosophers can give us nothing which we have not in our own reason and Scriptures. They can teach us nothing that we do not already know, or which we may not know without them, for reason is common to all men, and the same in every man. Were we then to listen to him, to follow him, we might indeed lose something we have, and something of great value, but we could gain no increase of wisdom or power, for he has nothing to offer us above our natural reason and strength. His book, then, if good for any thing, is, rightly considered, good for nothing, and proves, if any thing, that it was not needed, since we already have all it can teach us, if not something more, of which it would deprive us.

Non-Catholics are slow to learn that we as Catholics have all they have or can have, and that all they can do is to persuade us to give up something that we have, which they have not. They remind us of the old fable of the fox. A certain fox had the misfortune to lose his tail by its being caught in a trap, whereupon he assembled his brother foxes, and made them an eloquent and feeling oration to persuade them to cut off their tails as an inconvenient and unseemly incumbrance. Our rationalistic friends wish not to be singular, and having by their folly or predatory expeditions lost their tails, they would have us cut off ours, so that we may be tailless like them. This is in human nature, as we

see in that story which is told of those poor French Icarians who settled for a time in Texas. Their grand aim was to realize practically their fundamental dogma of equality. It was essential to their scheme that all Icarians should be equal. One day their settlement was attacked by the Indians, who barbariously scalped two of the settlers, and departed. The poor Icarians were struck with consternation. Their dogma of equality had been savagely violated The Icarians were no longer equal. There was introduced among them the inequality of the scalped and non-scalped. What should be done? After much deliberation and many speeches, it was resolved that the non-scalped should be scalped, so that the Icarian equality should be re-established. We have all the rationalists or transcendentalists have or can have. Our scalps remain on our heads where God has placed them, and the rationalists and transcendentalists, finding themselves scalped, are trying to persuade us to tear off our scalps, so that we shall have no more than they have.

Suppose we reject the historical Christ and fall back on Christ the Spirit, we gain nothing, for we already have Christ the Spirit, and believe as firmly in Christ the Spirit as the author does, or as his Alchemic friends do. The historical Christ does not deny, conceal, or weaken Christ the Spirit, but manifests him to us. In asserting spiritual influence he asserts nothing more, but a great deal less than we assert; for he asserts the spiritual influence without a real spirit that influences. We lose much, but we gain nothing. We wish him to ponder this well; we wish him to understand that there is no need of giving up any thing we hold, in order to be able to accept any thing not a negation that he can offer. The truth in the natural order which he asserts, contradicts nothing we as Catholics hold to be truth. We have as much nature with our clothes on, as we should have were we to walk the streets *in puris naturalibus.*

The author is a rationalist, and like all rationalists, we suppose imagines that in laboring to free us from historical Christianity, and to bring all religion down to the natural order, he is vindicating reason and restoring to us the rights of nature. He, like all rationalists in religion, seems to suppose that Christians are in a sort of mental thraldom, for he holds, and supposes Christians hold, that the supernatural opposes the natural, and faith suppresses or supersedes reason, and forbids its use. He may be partially right as to

Calvinists and Jansenists, but he is wholly wrong as to Catholics. No Catholic can hold, without falling under the censure of his church, that the supernatural is hostile to the natural, or that faith denies reason or does away with the necessity of its exercise. All Catholic theologians adopt the maxim, Grace supposes nature, *gratia supponit naturam*; and if grace or the supernatural supposes nature, it cannot oppose it. The church herself has left us no room to doubt what is her mind on this point. She has asserted the harmony of faith and reason, declared that there is no dissension between them, and vindicated the use of reason, in four articles which she required M. Bonnetty and his friends to subscribe. They prove that the author's assumption, with regard to Catholics at least, is unfounded. The Holy See in the first of these articles defines that, "although faith is above reason, yet no dissension, no disagreement can ever be found between them, since both come from the infinite and good God, one and the same immutable fountain of truth, and lend each other a mutual support." *Etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen dissensio, nullum dissidium inter ipsas inveniri unquam potest, cum ambæ ab uno eodemque immutabili veritatis fonte, Deo optimo maximo, oriantur, atque ita sibi mutuam opem ferant.* This asserts explicitly that there is not only no discrepancy between reason and faith, but that they mutually assist each other. The second article shows that the church neither forbids the exercise of reason, nor suffers it to be disparaged or denounced as impotent, false, or illusory. *Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare protest. Fides posterior revelatione, proindeque ad probandum Dei existentiam contra atheum, ad probandum animæ rationalis spiritualitatem, ac libertatem contra naturalismi, ac fatalismi sectatorem allegari convenienter nequit.* "Reason or reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the free-will of man. Faith is subsequent to revelation, and therefore cannot properly be alleged in proof of the existence of God against the atheist, or in proof of the spirituality and free-will of the rational soul against the follower of naturalism and fatalism." Catholics, then, hold and must hold that reason is to be used, and that her light, within her sphere, is a true, certain, not a false and illusory light. They must hold her as indispensable in faith as in science; for these great truths which

depend on reason, are the preamble to faith, and must be proved before faith itself can be proved. In the third article the Holy See condemns the doctrine of the traditionalists that reason depends on faith. *Rationis usus fidem præcedit, et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiæ conducit.* "The use of reason precedes faith, and by the aid of revelation and grace leads man to it." So far is reason from being opposed to faith, or from being superseded by it, it is itself which by the aid of revelation and grace leads to faith; or, in other words, it is by the use of reason that, assisted by revelation and grace, we attain to faith; so that faith is an act of reason, or it is reason that in faith is the believing subject. We cannot by reason without the assistance of revelation and grace attain to faith, but still it is reason, or the soul as rational, that does attain to it, and all the revelation and grace in the world could not produce faith in an irrational soul. We need nothing more to settle the question that, however the case may stand with those the church condemns as heretics, Catholics assert, and can assert, no antagonism between faith and reason, and cannot denounce reason as useless, impotent, false, or illusory. If Catholicity is to be believed, reason is from God, a divine light, and therefore, in relation to all it illumines, a true and infallible light.

If on this point we ever find any thing among Catholics that seems to favor the notion that grace opposes nature, or revelation contradicts, suppresses, or supersedes reason, we must ascribe it to ignorance of the real teaching of the church, to the misapprehension or misapplication of the phraseology of the ascetics, or to the failure to distinguish accurately between the natural and the supernatural. There are, no doubt, among Catholics, many who are uninstructed on some points of Catholic doctrine, persons whose attainments, capacity, occupations, or state of life render them unfit to engage in discussions on faith, and who, were they to attempt to reason about it, would only involve themselves in doubt and perplexity, unsettle their faith, lose their peace of mind, and, perhaps, their souls. These a wise pastor will caution against reasoning, and bid them hold fast with simplicity and docility to what they have been taught. Let their faith suffice them. But these may misunderstand the reason of this caution, and conclude erroneously that reason is not to be used, or that there is some antagonism between faith and reason. The motive of the advice is not

that reason is not to be trusted, but that they to whom it is given have not the requisite cultivation, the requisite knowledge or facilities in the use of reasoning, to solve by reason the many problems they may encounter.

Others may be led into error on this point by misapplying the frequent phraseology of our ascetic writers. The ascetics, undoubtedly, speak of a warfare, a conflict, a struggle between nature and grace, and insist that nature must be mortified and crucified; but the nature of which they speak is the inferior soul, the carnal mind, the flesh, which lusteth against the spirit, and too often brings the rational soul, reason and free will, into bondage to sin and death. But even this lower nature, the carnal mind, the flesh, *concupiscentia*, though it contains the *fomes* or seed of sin, is not itself sin. The holy council of Trent has defined that it is not properly sin, but simply inclines to sin, *ad peccatum inclinat.* The mortification or crucifixion demanded is moral, not physical, the denial of its special gratification, which introduces disorder into the bosom of the individual and of society, and its moral subordination to the law of internal harmony, and the ultimate end of man. Some of our writers, no doubt, dwell on the impotence of reason, and, from its weakness and the errors of men left to reason alone, deduce an argument in favor of revelation and grace; but, though they may neglect certain necessary distinctions, they do not mean that reason is impotent, false, or illusory in her own order, but that reason alone cannot suffice in the actual state in which we are placed to conduct us to that sublime beatitude to which all men, through the reminiscences of the original revelation, in some sense, aspire.

The author, then, has no right to proceed on the assumption that in warring against Christianity as a supernatural religion, and asserting the truths naturally intelligible to natural reason, he is vindicating the rights of nature, or bringing out any truth denied or even not held by Christions themselves. We assert, no doubt, supernatural virtues; but we also assert and enjoin all the natural virtues. It is true, we hold that the simply natural virtues cannot merit the supernatural life proffered in the Gospel; but we maintain, nevertheless, that they are virtues, and that the eternal life cannot be merited or obtained without them. For the law that bids us love God with all our heart, bids us love our brother also, and if we love not our brother whom we

have seen, how can we love God whom we have not seen? He who fails in the natural, fails *a fortiori*, in the supernatural. There is no acceptable religion without morality. Reason does and can dictate nothing which Christianity does not suppose and include in her own code. In so far as rationalists present truth, they present only what we already have; in so far as they insist on the moral virtues dictated by our Maker through natural reason, they only insist on what the church always insists on with greater energy than they do or can, and with supernatural sanctions. Let them understand, then, that nature suffers no lesion from the supernatural, that reason receives no wrong from revelation, and that we under the supernatural and under divine revelation have all the reason or nature they have or can have, and consequently that there are no rights of reason or of nature for them to assert or vindicate against us. All their labor against us, in this direction, is labor lost, for at worst we have all they have at best.

Rationalists and unbelievers generally, as we find them in our times, fall into their grave error by taking for the Christianity they oppose, the doctrines and propositions which the church has formally condemned as heretical or as erroneous. The authorities on which they rely are, in the main, Calvinists and Jansenists, who in the eyes of Catholics are condemned heretics. Not an objection which we as an unbeliever or as a rationalist ever conceived against the doctrine or morality of the Gospel, bears against any thing taught or enjoined by the Catholic church. It is to what are called the "doctrines of the reformation," more especially as refined upon by the Jansenists, that we must attribute the rationalism and infidelity of modern times. The antagonism of the supernatural to the natural, and of supernatural revelation to natural reason, which gives birth, by way of reaction, to rationalism and infidelity, is asserted only in Protestant or Jansenistic teaching, and is essentially repugnant to the belief of Catholics. By the Protestant doctrine, that man by the fall lost his natural spiritual functions, and became wholly corrupted in his nature, man's natural light becomes darkness, and we become unable to think a true thought or to perform a deed not sinful, till renewed by grace, or even then, for justification in the Calvinistic sense is simply forensic, making no change in the intrinsic character of the justified. Hence we find Luther calling reason all manner of hard names, and the Jansenist

Pascal seeking in faith the certainty he despairs of obtaining from reason. Pascal's whole argument for Christianity is drawn from the weakness and untrustworthiness or the false and deceptive light of reason. Wherever Jansenism, Calvinism, or Lutheranism is confounded with Christianity, rationalism, or the rejection of the entire supernatural order asserted in the Gospel becomes the only resource of men who have the ability and the courage to think for themselves, as we have seen in Germany, Geneva, Holland, France, and our own New England. Without Jansenius, St. Cyr, Pascal, Arnauld, Quesnel, we should hardly have had a Voltaire, a Diderot, or a d'Alembert. It is against heresy, not Catholicity, the objections of rationalists have force.

We do not deny that the Pelagian heresy is rife in the modern world, but it is so only as a reaction against Calvinism and Jansenism; and rationalism is, in fact, to a great extent, only an honorable protest of reason and nature against the false and exaggerated supernaturalism introduced, or revived from earlier heretics, by the leading reformers of the sixteenth century. If we would save Christianity, and recall those who have gone astray, we must sweep away every vestige of Calvinism and Jansenism, recognize the legitimacy of nature, and restore reason to the rights and the place assigned by the church. We must revindicate human nature and human reason, and show that there is a real harmony between reason and faith, and between the natural and the supernatural, and that the antagonism between them, assumed by all rationalists and unbelievers, has no existence but in the false interpretation either of the one or the other by condemned heretics. Reason is worthless out of her own order, we very well know; but in her order she is as infallible as we Catholics believe the church to be in the order of revelation.

We say not that reason is equally developed in all men; we say not that all see equally and fully understand either the strength or the weakness of reason. Men may err through defective intelligence, and draw erroneous inferences in consequence of not seeing the whole case, or fully understanding their premises. But this we do say, that reason, as far as it goes, is never false; that, as far as it sees at all, it sees things as they are; that its light, as far as it shines, is a true light, and never does or can deceive. It may be feeble, but it is never false or deceptive. The

world, in so far as it has followed reason, has never gone astray in relation to the natural order; and men, in so far as they have adhered to reason, have never disagreed among themselves. The *dictamina rationis*, or dictates of reason, are, and always have been, the same for all men, in all ages and nations. If we find individuals who cannot discern them, the laws of all nations treat them as idiotic or insane, and do not hold them responsible for their acts. That part of Christianity which lies within the order of nature, or the province of natural reason, was recognized and held by the world from the beginning, and is the moral and intellectual sense, the common sense, of mankind. With regard to this not even the ancient gentiles fell into any substantial error. Plato and Aristotle hold still their place in our schools of philosophy, and the teaching of the gentiles in natural ethics, forms still the basis of the teaching of our own moral theologians. The *jus gentium* of the ancient Greeks and Romans is the foundation of the laws which are held even now to be binding upon all nations.

We, of course, mean not to deny the gross errors and abominable practices of the ancient or modern heathen; but we do deny that these errors are the errors of reason, or that reason ever approves these practices. They were and are seen by reason to be contrary to her own dictates. What Calvinist does not see that his Calvinism is unreasonable? or believes he can defend it without maintaining that reason is a false and deceptive light not to be trusted? The false religions and abominable superstitions of the old heathen world were never the creations of reason, and were as repugnant to the reason of their adherents as they are to ours. Reason no more approved of the human sacrifices, the prostitutions, the cruelties and gross impurities of those superstitions, the Bacchic and Isiac orgies, or the worship of the phallus, than it does of the *decretum horribile* defended by John Calvin in his *Institutes*. We know it from the writings of gentile philosophers and sages themselves, and from the arguments used against them by the free and acute reason of the fathers of the church. These superstitions all grew up out of the perversion and corruption, due not to reason, but to ignorance, passion, or lust, aided by satanic influence, of the original supernatural revelation made to our first parents, and were submitted to not as rational convictions, but as commands of the gods. St. Paul, in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, vindicates reason,

and gives us the key to the origin and existence of these abominable superstitions. "The wrath of God from heaven," he says, "is revealed upon all impiety and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice; because that which is known of God is manifest to them. For God hath manifested it to them. For his invisible things from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by those things which are made; his eternal power also and divinity: so that they are inexcusable. Because, when they knew God they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks; but they became foolish in their thoughts, and their senseless heart was darkened; for saying that they were wise they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness and image of corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their hearts, unto uncleanness; shamefully to abuse their own bodies." Romans, i, 18–24.

The Scriptures mean by a "fool," not a man destitute of knowledge, but one destitute of wisdom, or the true application of what he knows. It is clear from this passage, and what follows, that the ancients knew the truth of God, that neither their reason nor their knowledge was at fault, and therefore, they were inexcusable; for they, through self-conceit, pride, passion, sensuality, perverted in practice the truth they knew. There is nothing worse than the perversion or corruption of that which is good, and revelation is sure to be perverted or corrupted if left to be applied by private judgment and passion. The great evil was in what is called the gentile apostasy, followed and in part produced by the dispersion of the human race after the confusion of language at Babel, and their division into separate tribes and nations. Unity in the supernatural was lost; pride and passion became its interpreters; and Satan, seizing on these as his ministers, originated the terrible superstitions of the old world, brought reason and will into bondage to the flesh, and established his own worship in the place of that of God, as in time he will do with those who now follow the Protestant apostasy, if they do not return to unity and submit to the divinely-assisted guidance of the holy Catholic church; for though they have reason, they have no sure guide in the order of the supernatural. The cause will not lie in the insufficiency of reason in her own order, but in their attempting to make it serve them in an order which

it does not and cannot enlighten,—not in the corruption of nature, but in their neglect of the means of grace, without which they cannot live the life of Christ.

Here we find a reason why our author, if successful, would do the world a most serious injury. We have shown him that we have all that is in reason and the natural order, and therefore that by reducing Christianity to pure rationalism, he can give us nothing that we have not already in as great perfection at least as he has. But we tell him now, that by depriving us of what we have that he has not, he would deprive us of what is necessary to save the world from the abominable superstitions and practices of the heathen world. He cannot keep the world at the point of pure rationalism. All history proves it. There is more in the world than rationalism. There is more than simple nature. God placed man in the beginning under a supernatural providence, and gave him a supernatural revelation, because he would ennoble him, and give him a higher good than it is possible for any creature to attain to by his natural strength and faculties. He gave him a supernatural religion. But this supernatural religion becomes a savor of life unto life to the willing and obedient, and a savor of death unto death to the indocile and the disobedient. There is no use in quarrelling with this, for the fact is so, and cannot be changed by us.

Now, if we attempt to break from this religion, and to suffice for ourselves, we fall away from reason itself, come under the dominion of the flesh, and run into all the absurd and abominable superstitions of the heathen. The world cannot desert the true supernatural and fall back on the purely natural, and remain there; it can only desert the true supernatural for the false, leave God only for the devil. You have, practically, no alternative between Christianity and superstition. This is seen even now in our own country. They who had gone furthest in infidelity have become spiritists and demon-worshippers. They have not remained with rationalism, but have passed on to superstition, and a superstition, which, if not checked, will hardly fail to equal the grossest, the most abominable, the most inhuman, and the most impure recorded in history. With individuals it has already gone nearly as far. The only protection against the false is the possession of the true. The only safeguard against superstition is true religion, the religion of Christ, as infallibly taught by his church.

Here is a consideration that we address to the benevol-

ence, the humanity, to the justice of the author. Religion men will have, or if not religion, superstition. Let him regard that as a "fixed fact." If we deprive them of Catholicity, of the true religion in its purity and integrity, we plunge them into superstition, and cover the land anew with horrors. The author, then, in his undertaking, can do us no good, but may do us infinite harm. We tell him we cannot live in this bleak and wintry world without clothes. We must have something to cover the nakedness of nature. Let him ponder this well. It alone should teach him to abandon his work of destruction, and to cease to serve Apollyon. We have, of course, other and stronger reasons to allege, but this, of itself, is sufficient, and is enough for the present. We shall, if we proceed in the discussion to which he has invited us, show him that in his warring against Christianity as a supernatural religion, he is warring against the truth, against God himself, as well as against the true interests of both man and society.

ROME OR REASON.*

[From the Catholic World for Sepember, 1867.]

Mr. Parkman understands and describes very well the Indian character—a very simple character, and within the range of his comprehension. There is nothing deep or impenetrable in the Indian, and his ideas, habits, and customs are invariable. He is a child in simplicity, but he is cunning, fierce, treacherous, ferocious, more of a wild beast than a man—a true savage, nothing more, nothing less. Mr. Parkman has lived with him, studied his character and ways, and may, as to him, be trusted as a competent and faithful guide, save when there is a question of superstition, in which the Indian abounds, or of religion, which he accepts with more docility and ease than many learned and scientific white men.

Mr. Parkman may also be trusted for the purely material facts of the Jesuit missions among the Indians in the seventeenth century, and he narrates them in a style of much artistic grace and beauty; but of the motives which governed the missionaries, of their faith and charity, as well as of their whole interior spiritual life, he understands less than did the "untutored Indian." His judgments, reflections, or speculations on the spiritual questions involved are singularly crude, marked by a gross ignorance not at all creditable to a son of "The Hub." He claims to be enlightened, to be a man of progress, and he has indeed advanced as far as Sadduceeism, which believes in neither angel nor spirit: but the savage retains more of the elements of Christian faith than he appears to have attained to. He is struck, as every one must be, by the self-denial, the disinterestedness, the patient toil, the unwearying kindness, superiority to danger or death, and heroic self-sacrifices and martyrdom of the missionaries; but he sees in them only the workings of a false faith, superstitious missions, and a

---

*The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century. By Francis Parkman. Boston, 1867.

The Professor at the Breakfast-Table; with the Story of Iris. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. Boston, 1866.

Rationalism and Catholicism. The Enquirer, Cincinnati, May 26, 1867.

fanatic zeal. The Jesuit who left behind all the delights and riches of civilization, gave up all that men of the world hold most dear, braved all the dangers of the forest, of the savage, performed fatiguing journeys, underwent the inclemencies of the climate and the seasons, suffered hunger and thirst, in want of all things, submitted to captivity, tortures, mutilations, and death, was, in his judgment, a poor, deluded man; his faith, which bore him up or bore him onward, was an illusion, and his charity, which never failed or grew cold, was only an honest but mistaken zeal! Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?

It cannot be said that Mr. Parkman has overrated the marvellous labors and sacrifices of the Jesuits for the conversion of the North American Indians; but he is mistaken in supposing that they stand out as any thing singular or extraordinary in the general history of Catholic missions. They did well; they were brave, indefatigable, self-denying, heroic, and cold must be the heart that can read their story without emotion; but their high qualities and virtues are due to their general character as Catholics, not to their special character as Jesuits. Non-Catholic writers are very apt to consider that Jesuits are a peculiar sect, in some way distinguishable from the Catholic church, and that their merits belong to them not as Catholic priests and missionaries, but as Jesuits. What Mr. Parkman admires in them is really admirable; but its glory is due to Catholic faith and charity, which the Jesuit has in common with all Catholics, and he has toiled no harder, braved no more dangers, suffered no greater hardships, or a more cruel or horrid death, nor met them with a spirit more heroic than have other Catholic missionaries among heretics and infidels, from the apostles down to the last martyr in China, Anam, or Oceanica. It has been only by such suffering and such deeds as Mr. Parkman narrates, that the world has been converted to the Christian faith and retained in the Catholic church. At all times, since the descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, has the Catholic church nursed in her bosom, and sent into the world to preach Christ and him crucified, men not at all inferior in faith and love, in patient endurance, and heroic self-sacrifice to the Jesuit missionaries among the North American Indians. She has never wanted laborers, confessors, martyrs; and a religion that never fails to create and inspire them is not, and cannot be, a false religion, a delusion, a fanaticism. It is only in the Catho-

lic church you find or have ever found them. Let her have the credit of them.

The Professor at the Breakfast Table has been for some time before the public, and every body has read it. Its author has, we believe, a high reputation in the medical profession, and certainly has attained to distinction as a poet and as a writer of prose fiction. He has wit and pathos, a lively imagination, and a keen sense of the ludicrous. The snake portion of his *Elsie Venner* is horrible, but several of the characters in that remarkable book are admirably drawn—are real New England characters, drawn as none but a New Englander could draw them, and perhaps, none but a New Englander can fully appreciate them. He is like many of the descendants of the old Puritans, who, having lost all faith in the Calvinism of their ancestors, still identify it with Christianity, and float in their feelings between the memory of it and a vague rationalism and sentimentalism which is simply no belief at all. He would like to be a Christian, to feel that he has faith, something on which he can rest his whole weight without fear of its giving way under him, but he knows not where to look for it. He finds many attractions in the Catholic church, but, thinking that she holds what so offends him in the faith of his ancestors, he dares not trust her.

There is a large class of educated, thinking, and even serious-minded Americans who turn away from the church and refuse to consider her claims, not because she differs from the Protestantism in which they have been reared, but because she does not, in her spirit and teaching, differ enough from it. Those outside of the church, and who credit not the evangelical cant against her, identify her teaching with Jansenism, regard Jansenists as the better class of Catholics; and Jansenism is a form of Calvinism, and Calvinism is a system of pure supernaturalism, while the active American mind cannot consent that nature should count in the religious life for nothing. It would, perhaps, relieve them a little if they knew that not only the Jesuits condemned Jansenism, but the church herself condemns it, and Jansenists are as much out of the pale of the church as are Calvinists or Lutherans themselves. So-called orthodox Protestants were formerly in the habit of charging Catholics with rationalism and Pelagianism, and even now accuse them of denying the doctrines of grace or salvation through the merits and grace of Jesus Christ. This fact

alone should suffice to teach such men as the *Professor at the Breakfast Table* that the difference between Catholicity and Puritanism is much greater than they suppose.

The Professor, in defending himself against the charge of want of respect for Puritanism, says: pp. 154–155: "I don't mind the exclamation of any old stager who drinks Madeira worth from two to six Bibles a bottle, and burns, according to his own premises, a dozen souls a year in segars, with which he muddles his brains. But as for the good and true and intelligent men we see all around us, laborious, self-denying, hopeful, helpful—men who know that the active mind of the age is tending more and more to the two poles, Rome and Reason, the sovereign church or the free soul, authority or personality, God in us or God in our masters, and that, though a man by accident *stand* half-way between these two points, he must *look* one way or the other—I don't believe they would take offence at any thing I have reported." From the connection in which this is said, and the purpose for which it is said, it is clear that the *Professor* holds that the active mind of this century is tending either Romeward or Reasonward, that the doctrines held by his Puritan ancestors and so-called orthodox Protestants can be sustained only by the authority of a sovereign church, and that we must accept such authority, or give up all dogmatic belief, and allow the free, unrestricted use of reason.

The writer in the *Cincinnati Enquirer* seems to agree with him. A certain Protestant minister, an Anglican, we presume, had said in a sermon, that "the church's greatest enemies are now Catholicism and rationalism." The writer, in commenting on this proposition, says: "Catholicism is the theology of reason;" and "Protestantism is Catholicism with a dash of rationalism, or rationalism with a dash of Catholicism." Both represent Catholicity and reason as standing opposed each to the other, as two opposite poles, and each makes as does the age no account of the *via media* church receiving the shots of both reason and authority, and discharging its double battery in return against each.

Now, is it not time that thinking men and authors who claim intelligence and mean to be just, should stop this contrasting of Rome or authority and reason? The cant has become threadbare, and men of reputation and taste should lay it aside as no longer fit for use. It does not by any means state the fact as it is, for there is not the least discrepancy between the church and reason, nor is there, in

accepting and believing the revealed word of God on the authority of the church proposing it, the least surrender of reason or nature. The Catholic has all of reason that belongs to human nature, and full opportunity to exercise it; and his soul is as free as the soul can be, and he is, in fact, the only man that really has a free soul. If God is in his masters, he is also in him. He has no less internal light because he has external light, and no less internal freedom because he has external authority. The *Professor* is quite mistaken in presenting the church and reason as two opposite poles. Nay, his illustration is not happy, for the two poles, if we speak geographically, belong to one and the same globe, and are equally essential to its form and completeness, and, if we speak magnetically and mean positive and negative poles, they are only the two modes in which one and the same substance or force operates, and certainly in Catholic faith both authority and reason are alike active, and mutually concur in producing one and the same result.

It is only when we borrow our views of Catholicity from the theology of the reformation, or suppose that it is substantially the same, that the authority of the church can be regarded as opposed to reason or repugnant to nature. He who has read the fathers has discovered in them no abdication of reason or want of intellectual freedom; and he who is familliar with the mediæval doctors knows that no men can use reason more freely or push it further than they did. Melchior Cano, a theologian of the sixteenth century, in his *Locorum Theologicorum Libri XII.*, a work of great authority with Catholics, enumerates natural reason as one of the commonplaces of theology, whence arguments may be drawn to prove what is or is not of faith. A school of philosophers have latterally sprung up among Catholics, called traditionalists, who would seem to deny reason and to found science on faith; but they have fallen under censure of the Holy See, and been required to recognize that reason precedes faith, and that faith comes as the complement of science, not as preceding or superseding it. By far the larger part of the errors condemned in the syllabus of errors attached to the encyclical of the Holy Father, dated at Rome, 8th of December, 1864, are errors that tend to destroy reason and society. The church has always been vigilant in vindicating natural reason and the natural law.

But the reformation was a complete protest against reason and nature, and the assertion of extreme and exclusive super-

naturalism. In Luther's estimation reason was a stupid ass. The reformers all agreed in asserting the total depravity of human nature, and in maintaining the complete moral inability of man. According to the reformed doctrines, man never actively concurs with grace, but in faith and justification is wholly impotent and passive. Man can think only evil, and the works he does prior to regeneration, however honest or benevolent, are not simply imperfect, but positively sins. This was the reformed theology which the writer of this article had in his boyhood and youth dinged into him till he well-nigh lost his reason. The church has never tolerated any such theology, and they who place her and reason in opposition are really, whether they know it or not, charging her with the errors of Protestantism, which she has never ceased, in the most public, formal, and solemn manner, to condemn. There are, no doubt, large numbers included under the general name of Protestants, who imagine that the reformation was a great movement in behalf of intelligence against ignorance, of reason against authority, of mental freedom against mental bondage, of rational religion against bigotry and superstition; but whoever has studied the history of that great movement knows that it was no such thing—the furthest from it possible. It was a retrograde movement, and designed in its very essence to arrest the intellectual and theological progress of the race. Its avowed purpose was the restoration of primitive Christianity, which, whatever plausible terms might be adopted, meant, and could mean only, to set the race back some fifteen hundred years in its march through the ages, and to eliminate from Christendom all that Christianity for fifteen centuries had effected for civilization. The Protestant party was, by its own avowal, a party of the past, and, if there are Protestants who are striving to be the party of the future, they succeed only by leaving their Protestantism behind, or by transforming it.

The church has always been on the side of freedom and progress, and the normal current of humanity has flowed and never ceased to flow from the foot of the cross down through her communion; and whatever life-giving water has flowed into Protestant cisterns, has been from the overflowings of that current, always full. You who are outside of it, save in the application of the truths of science to the material arts, have effected no progress. You have worked hard, have been often on the point of some grand discovery,

but only on the point of making it, and are as far from the goal as you were when Luther burnt the papal bull, or suffered the devil to convince him of the sin of saying private masses. You have always found your works after a little while needing to be recast, and that your systems are giving way. You have been constantly doing and undoing, and never succeeding. Save in the physical sciences and some achievements in the material world, you are far below what you were when you started. Of course, you do not believe it, because you confound change with progress, and you count getting rid of your patrimony increasing it. It is idle to tell you this, for you have already fallen so low that you place the material above the spiritual, and the knowledge of the uses of steam above the knowledge and love of God.

Rome or reason, Rome or liberty, is not the true formula of the tendencies of the age; nor is it Catholicism or rationalism, but Catholicity or naturalism. The extremes opposed to Catholicity are, on the one hand, exclusive supernaturalism, or a supernaturalism that condemns and excludes the activity of nature, and, on the other, exclusive naturalism, or a naturalism that denies and excludes all communion between God and man, save through natural laws, or laws impressed on nature by its Creator, and held to bind both him and it. Your evangelicals are exclusive supernaturalists, as were the great body of the Protestant reformers; Auguste Comte, J. Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Mr. Parkman, and the *Professor* are exclusive naturalists, who deny the reality of all facts or phenomena not explicable by natural laws or natural causes. All the sciences, since Bacon, are constructed on naturalistic principles, and theology, philosophy, or metaphysics, which cannot be constructed without the recognition of the supernatural, are rejected by our *savants* as vain speculations or idle theories without any basis in reality. They belong to the age of ignorance and superstition, and will never be recognized in an age of light and science. As the church clings to them, insists upon them, she is behind the age, and they who adhere to her are to be tolerated and pitied as we tolerate and pity idiots and the insane, unless, indeed, they are clothed with more or less power; then, indeed, we must make war on them and exterminate them.

Few who have studied this age with any care will question the fidelity of this picture. The active living mind of

this age unquestionably tends either to this exclusive naturalism or to the Catholic church, which is the synthesis of the natural and the supernatural, of authority and freedom, reason and faith, science and revelation. Protestantism, which is exclusive supernaturalism, it is becoming pretty well understood, cannot be sustained. It cannot be sustained by reason, for it rejects reason; it cannot be sustained by authority, for in rejecting the church it has cast off all authority but that of the state, which has no competency in spirituals. It has supported its dogmas, as far as it has supported them at all, on Catholic tradition, the validity of which it denies. This cannot last, for, where people are free to think and have the courage to reason without let or hindrance from the state, they will not long consent to affirm and deny tradition in one and the same breath. They will either fall into the naturalistic ranks or be absorbed by the Catholic church, and it is useless to trouble ourselves with them as Protestants.

The naturalists or rationalists, by far the most numerous, and in most Protestant or non-Catholic states already the governing body, are repelled from the church by their supposition that all the substantial difference between her and Jansenists or Calvinists is, that in the one case supernaturalism is taught and explained by a living authority, claiming a divine commission, and in the other it is not taught at all, but collected by grammar and lexicon from a book said to have been written by divine inspiration. The Catholic theory is the more logical and more attractive of the two, but both alike discard reason, and insist on the submission of the understanding to an external authority, and it matters little whether the authority is that of the church, or of a book written many ages ago. In either case the faith is proposed on authority, which assumes to command the reason and to deprive the soul of her natural freedom. We are forbidden to think and follow our own convictions, and must, on pain of everlasting perdition, believe what others bid us, whether it accords with our own reason or not. This, we take it, is the view entertained by the worthy *Professor*, and the writer of this many years ago preached it, and counted the *Professor* himself among his hearers, if not among his disciples. Now, we need not, after the explanation we have given, say that this view is altogether wrong. The Protestant asserts the supernatural in a sense that excludes or supersedes nature, and therefore, natural

reason; the Catholic adopts as his maxim, *Gratia supponit naturam*, and asserts the supernatural as the complement of the natural, or as healing, strengthening, and elevating it to the plane of the supernatural, or a destiny far superior to any possible natural beatitude. This is in the outset a very important difference; for, if grace supposes nature, the supernatural the natural, the authority on which we are required to believe the supernatural may aid, may strengthen, or illumine natural reason, but cannot supersede it or deprive it of any of its natural activity and freedom. The supernatural adds to the natural, according to Catholic faith, but takes nothing from it. The prejudice excited by Protestantism against the supernatural cannot bear against it as asserted by Catholicity.

But we would remind our naturalistic friends that nature does not suffice for itself. It is impossible by nature alone to explain the origin or existence of nature. The ancients tried to do it, but they failed. Some attempted to do it by the fortuitous combination of eternally existing atoms, others made the universe originate in fire, in water, in air or earth, as some moderns try to develop it from a primitive rock or gas, or suppose it originally existed in a liquid or a gaseous state, whence it has grown into its present form. But whence the primitive rock or the gas? whence the fire, water, air, or earth? whence the original germ? Naturalism has no answer. We have a natural tendency, strong in proportion to the strength and activity of our reason, to seek the origin, the principles, the causes of things, but this tendency nature cannot satisfy, because nature has not her origin, principle, or cause in herself. For this reason Mr. Herbert Spencer relegates origin and end, principles and causes, and whatever pertains to them to the region of the unknowable, and maintains that we can know only phenomena, and therefore that science consists simply in observing, collecting, and classifying phenomena, not in the explication of phenomena by reducing them to their principle and referring them to their cause or causes.

We can know phenomena, but not noumena, is asserted by the reigning doctrine among physicists, which is as complete a denial of reason as can be found in any of the reformers. It reduces our intelligence to a level with that of the brutes that perish, for what distinguishes our intelligence from theirs is precisely reason, which is the faculty of attaining to principles or causes—first causes and final

causes—both in the intellectual and the moral order, while brutes have intelligence only of phenomena. Hence, philosophers, who define things *per genus et differentiam*, define man a rational animal, or animal *plus* reason. To our physicists, like the Lyells and the Huxleys, or to such philosophers as Mr. Stuart Mill, who knows not whether he is Mr. Stuart Mill or somebody else, whether he is something or nothing, this amounts to very little; for they, the physicists, we mean, are specially engaged in collecting facts to prove that man is only a developed chimpanzee or gorilla, and that the human intelligence differs only in degree from the brutish. But, then, what right have they to complain that belief in the supernatural tends to degrade human nature, to deprive reason of its dignity, and man of his glory? Moreover, this restriction of our power of knowing to simple phenomena, never satisfies reason, which would know not only phenomena, but noumena, and not only noumena, but principles, causes, the principle of principles and the cause of causes, the origin and end of all things, that is, God, and God as he is in himself. You cannot, except by brutalizing men to the last degree, suppress this interior craving of reason to penetrate all mysteries, to explore all secrets, and to know all things, nor can you by reason alone appease it. Do you propose to suppress nature, extinguish reason, and call it promoting science, vindicating the dignity of man?

Reason can never be made to believe that all reality is confined to what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the knowable, and we the intelligible. There is nothing of which reason is better or more firmly persuaded than that there is more reality than she herself knows or can know. Reason asserts her own limitations, and will never allow that she can know no more because there is nothing more to be known. The intelligible does not satisfy her, because in the intelligible alone she cannot find the explication of the intelligible, or, in other words, she cannot understand the intelligible without the superintelligible; for, though she cannot without divine revelation grasp the superintelligible, she can know this much, that the superintelligible is, and that in it the intelligible has its root, its origin, cause, and explication. Here is a grave difficulty that every exclusive rationalist encounters, and which is and can be removed only by faith. Nature, reason, science alone never suffices for itself, as all our *savants* know, for where their knowledge ends they invent hypothesis. It is not that reason is a false or decep-

tive light, but that it is limited, and we have not the attribute of omniscience any more than we have that of omnipotence.

So is it with our craving for beatitude. Whether God could or could not have so constituted man, without changing his nature as man, that he could rest in a natural beatitude, that is, in a finite good, we shall not attempt to decide; but this much we may safely assert, as the united testimony of the sages and moralists of all ages and nations, and confirmed by every one's own experience, that nothing finite, and whatever is natural is finite, can satisfy man's innate desire for beatitude. "Man," says Dr. Channing, "thirsts for an unbounded good." The sum of all experience on the subject is given us by the wise king of Israel, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas*—"Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." The eye is not satisfied with seeing, the ear with hearing, nor the heart with knowing. We turn away with loathing from the finite good as soon as possessed, which the moment before possession we felt would, if we had it, make us happy. The soul spurns it, and cries out from the depths of her agony for something that can fill up the void within her, and complete her happiness by completing her being. We need not multiply words, for the fact is old, and all the world knows it. Nature cannot satisfy nature, and the soul looks, and must look beyond it, for her beatitude. So much is certain.

Hence it is that men in all ages and nations have never been able to satisfy either their reason or their craving for happiness with nature alone, and have, in some form, recognized a supernatural order, or a reality of some sort above and beyond nature, whence comes nature herself. Neither atheism, or the resolution of God into natural laws or forces, nor pantheism, or the absorption of natural laws or forces into the Divine being itself, has ever been able to satisfy the man of a real philosophic or scientific genius, because either is sophistical and self-contradictory. Either is repugnant to the natural logic of the human understanding or the inherent laws of thought. Even such naturalists as Agassiz and our Dr. Draper find it necessary to recognize in some sense a Supreme being or God, although, for the most part, like the old Epicureans, they leave him idle, with little or nothing to do. But God, if he exists at all, must be supernatural, and the author of nature. If God is supernatural and the creator of nature, he must have created nature for

himself, and then nature must have its origin and end in him, and therefore in the supernatural. Man, then, has neither his origin nor end in the natural, and neither without the supernatural is explicable or knowable; without a knowledge of our origin and end, or an answer to the questions, whence came we? why are we, and how? and whither go we? we can have no rule of life, cannot determine the positive or the relative value of any line of conduct, and must commit ourselves to the mercy of the winds and waves of an unknown sea, without pilot, chart, rudder, or compass.

Nor is even this enough. Not only is the natural inexplicable without the supernatural, but even the intelligible, too, is not intelligible without the superintelligible, as we have already said. We know things, indeed, not mere phenomena, but we do not know the essences of things, and yet we know that there is and can be nothing without its essence, and that the ground and root of what is intelligible in a thing is in its unknown and superintelligible essence. So in the universe throughout. God, as creator, as universal, eternal, necessary, immutable, and self-existent being, is intelligible to us, and the light by which all that is intelligible to us is intelligible; but we know that what is intelligible to us is not God in his essence, and that what in him is intelligible to us has its source, its reality, so to speak, in this very superintelligible essence. Hence it follows that to have real science of any thing we need to know the supernatural, and by faith, or analogical science, at least, the superintelligible. We cannot satisfy nature without the science and possession of the essences or substances of things, and therefore not without faith, "for faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not seen," *Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum argumentum non apparentium*, according to St. Paul, who, even they who deny his inspiration, must yet admit was the profoundest philosopher that ever wrote. We think he was so because divinely inspired, but the fact that he was so no competent judge can dispute. St. Augustine owes his immense superiority over Plato and Aristotle chiefly to his assiduous study of the epistles of St. Paul, which throw so strong a light not only on the whole volume of Scripture, but on the whole order of creation, and the divine purpose in the creation and the redemption, regeneration, justification, and glorification of man through the incarnation of the Word, and the cross and passion of our Lord Jesus Christ.

But as we can know even by faith the superintelligible, the unknowable of Mr. Herbert Spencer, which even he dares not assert is unreal or non-existent, only by divine or supernatural revelation, it follows, that without such revelation, no science satisfactory to natural reason herself is possible. There is, then, and can be no antagonism between revelation and science, faith and reason, or supernatural and natural. The two are but parts of one whole, each the complement of the other. This dialectic relation of the two terms asserted by Catholic theology is denied by Protestant theology either to the exclusion of nature and reason, or to the exclusion of both the supernatural and the superintelligible, and hence the dualism which rends in twain the whole non-Catholic world, and presents revelation and science, reason and faith, authority and liberty, natural and supernatural, church and state, heaven and earth, time and eternity, God and man, as mutually hostile terms, for ever irreconcilable. The non-Catholic world does not know or it forgets that the church presents the middle term that unites and reconciles them, and that the Catholic feels nothing of this interior struggle of two mutually destructive forces which rends the hearts and souls of the wisest of non-Catholics, not because he does not think or has abdicated reason, as the *Professor* imagines, but precisely because he does think, and thinks according to the truth and reality of things. He has unquestionably his struggles between the flesh and the spirit, between virtue and vice, between temptations to sin and inspirations to holiness, but presents in his life none of those fearful internal tragedies so frequently enacted among serious and earnest non-Catholics, which make up so large and so distressing a portion of the higher and more truthful portion of non-Catholic literature. Non-Catholic poetry, when not a song to Venus or Bacchus, is either a fanciful description of external nature, scenes, and events, or a low wail or a loud lament over the internal tragedies caused by the struggle between faith and reason, belief and doubt, hope and despair, or vainly to penetrate the mysteries of life and death, God and the universe. Catholic poetry, Catholic literature throughout, knows nothing of those tragedies, is peaceful and serene, and is therefore less interesting to those who are not Catholics. We have had some experience of those interior struggles, and many a tragedy has been enacted in our own soul, but it is with difficulty that we can recall them; in the peace

and serenity of Catholic faith and hope they have almost faded from the memory, and yet the period of our life since we became a Catholic has been with us the period of our freest and most active and energetic thought. If we have worn chains we have not been conscious of them, and they certainly cannot have been very heavy, or have eaten very deeply into the flesh. The reason of it is that we find in Catholic faith and theology the two elements which in the non-Catholic world are in perpetual war with each other, perfectly reconciled, and mutually harmonized.

The peace the Catholic finds is not the sort of peace that was said to reign at Warsaw. The *Professor* is greatly mistaken if he supposes it is obtained by the suppression of reason, or that reason is forgotten in the engrossing nature or artistic perfection of the external services of the church. The offices of the church are beautiful, grand and, if you will, imposing, but they are all provocative of thought, meditation, reflection; for they all symbolize the greatest of all mysteries—God dying for the creature's sin, God become man, that man may become God. Take away this great mystery and the offices of the church become meaningless, purposeless, powerless. Without faith in that mystery to which they all refer, and which they at every instant recall, they would be no more imposing than the pomp and music of a military review or a concert in Central Park. From first to last they challenge our faith, and, if there were any discrepancy between our faith and reason, they would in a thoughtful mind bring it up in distinct consciousness, instead of suppressing or making us forget it. A Lord John Russell could call the sublime services of the church "mummery," and as such do the mass of Protestants regard them. To the profane all things are profane, and the offices of the church are really edifying only to those who believe the mystery of the Incarnation. Unbelievers who are not scoffers may admire their poetry and the music which accompanies them, but would admire equal poetry and music in the theatre just as much, and perhaps even more.

No; the peace of the Catholic is a real peace. Neither faith nor reason, revelation nor science, authority nor liberty is suppressed; but all real antagonism between them is removed and they are seen and felt to be but congruous parts of one dialectic whole. Peace reigns because the mutually hostile parties are really reconciled, and made one. The *Professor*, no doubt, will smile at our assertion, and set it down to our

simplicity or enthusiasm, but we have this advantage of him, that we know both sides, and taught or might have taught him more than thirty years ago the philosophy he brings out so racily at the breakfast table.

Our nature was constructed by the supernatural for the supernatural, and it can no more live its normal life without a supernatural medium than it could have sprung into existence without a cause above and independent of itself. Regeneration is, therefore, as necessary to enable it to attain its destiny or beatitude as generation was to usher it into natural existence. Hence it is that, when men cast off in their belief and affections the supernatural, and live as natural men alone, they sink even below their normal nature, and lose even their natural light and strength, live only a life which the Scriptures call death, the death which Adam underwent in consequence of his disobedience to the divine order. When men undertake by their simple natural reason to construct a system of philosophy, they construct systems which natural reason herself rejects. Reason disdains her own work, and hence pure rationalists never construct any thing that will stand, and they build up systems only to be demolished by themselves or successors. Of the systems in vogue in our youth not one is now standing, and we have seen them replaced by two or three new generations of systems that have each in turn gone the way of all the earth; and, unless we speedily follow them, we may be called to write the epitaphs of those now revelling in the heyday of their young life. The thing is inevitable, because our nature was made to act in synthesis with the supernatural, and is only partially itself when compelled to operate by itself alone.

This fact that man's normal life demands the supernatural, and that his own reason, though not able to know the super-intelligible, or to say what it is, yet assures him that there is a superintelligible, fits him by nature to receive the supernatural revelation of the intelligible; for this only supplies an indestructible and deeply felt want of his nature. His reason needs it and his nature craves it, and when receiving it relishes it as the hungry man does wholesome and appropriate food. As the natural and supernatural, the intelligible and super-intelligible, are not contradictory or mutually repellant orders, but parts of one complete and indissoluble whole, only ordinary evidence is required to prove the fact of revelation; and as God is infinitely true, truth

itself, his word, when we know that we have it, is ample authority, the highest possible, and the best of all conceivable reasons, for believing the revelation. So faith in a supernatural revelation, in whatever is proved to be the word of God, is so far from being repugnant to reason or requiring an abdication of reason, that it is the highest and freest act of reason possible.

The *Professor* objects to believing on the authority of the church, but we do not believe the revelation on the authority of the church; we take on her authority only the fact that it is divine revelation; the revelation itself we believe on the veracity of God. But, if we consider the church as a mere body, collection, or company of men, however wise, learned, or honest we might regard them, we should not hold her authority sufficient for believing that what she proposes as the revelation really is revelation. Every man taken individually is fallible, and no possible number, union, or combination of fallibles can make an infallible, and only an infallible authority is competent to declare what God has or has not revealed. The church is more than a collection, body, or company of individuals, as the human race, what our liberals call humanity, is more than an aggregation of individuals. There is, indeed, no humanity without individuals, but it is not itself individual, or dependent on individuals for its existence. The positivists, who would call no individual man divine, pretend that humanity is divine, and worship it as God. What the race is to individual men in the order of generation, that, in some sense, is the church to them in the order of regeneration. She lives not without them, but does not live by them. She is the regenerated race, and bears to Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word, who was with God and who is God, the relation, in the order of regeneration, that the human race bears to Adam, its natural progenitor, and therefore she lives a divine and superhuman life, which she receives not from her members, but imparts to them. Jesus Christ is the progenitor of regenerated humanity, and this regenerated humanity is in the largest sense what we call the church, in which sense it includes all the faithful, the laity as well as their pastors and teachers.

The church, again, is the body of our Lord, in which dwelleth the Holy Ghost. Individuals are to her what the particles which the body assimilates are to the body. There is no body without them, yet they are not, individually or

collectively, the body. The life of the body is not derived from them, for the body, by a vital process, assimilates them to itself, not they the body to themselves. The body, when suffering from a fever or when deprived of food, assimilates them only feebly, and wastes away or grows thin, and, when dead, assimilates them not at all, which shows that the vital power which carries on the process of assimilation is in the body, not in the particles, a fact far better known to the *Professor* than to us, and a fact, too, which may help remove the difficulties sciolists imagine in the way of the resurrection of the body.

The vital power or principle which gives life to the body enables it to carry on the process of assimilation and elimination, the church teaches, is the soul, for she has defined that the soul is the *form* of the body, *Anima est forma corporis.* But this has nothing to do with our present purpose. The vital principle, the life of the church, is our Lord Jesus Christ himself. The Holy Ghost dwells in her as the soul in the body, animates her, guides and directs her, and therefore is she one, holy, and Catholic, as he is one, holy, and Catholic, infallible by his perpetual presence and assistance as he is infallible. The Word incarnate explicates his life in her as Adam explicates his life in the race. The infallibility is from the presence and assistance of the Holy Ghost, and is in her very interior life. The Word is in her, a living Word, and the infallibility attaches to her, to this interior Word which she lives, but not to individuals as such in her communion. The pope regarded as a man, irrespective of his office, is no more infallible than he is impeccable, or than is any Christian believer.

But the church as a body has her organs, and as a visible body she has visible organs, through which she teaches the truth she has received and expresses the life she lives. These organs are the bishops or pastors in communion with their visible head, the successor in the See of Rome of Blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles. We call them organs of the church, inasmuch as the faith and love, the truth and life, they express is her life, which in turn is the life of him who said, "Because I live ye shall live also," and, "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world!" and who expressly declares himself "the way, the truth, and the life." The infallibility of the church comes from the indwelling Word and the assistance of the Holy Ghost; the infallibility of the organs comes from the infal-

libility of the church. Now, supposing the church to be what we represent her to be, we presume even the *Professor* will acknowledge her to be fully competent to teach without error the revelation supernaturally made and committed to her, for the revelation committed to her is deposited externally with her bishops and pastors, and internally in her living and unfailing faith, in her very life and interior consciousness. It is both a recorded and a present living revelation, which she is living and explicating in her continuous activity, the Word spoken from the beginning, and the Word speaking now. "Say not," says St. Paul, (Rom. x. 6–8) "in thy heart: Who shall ascend into heaven? that is, to bring Christ down: or who shall descend into the deep? that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead. But what saith the Scripture? The word is near thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart: this is the word of faith, which we preach." This was addressed by St. Paul to Christian believers, "to all that are at Rome, the beloved of God, called to be saints," and shows that the Christian not only hears the word in his ears, but has it in his mouth, in his heart, that is, in his very life, and he lives and breathes it. It is the very element of his soul, and he can have no higher certainty, not even in case of a mathematical demonstration, than he has that his faith is true, and that it is the living God he believes. The *Professor*, then in regard to the faithful, has no ground for asserting as he does an antithesis between "Rome and reason, the sovereign church and the free soul, God in our masters and God in us;" for Rome is the highest reason, the sovereign church is both external and internal, and God is both in us and in our teachers. We have not only the veracity of God as the ground of our faith, but a divinely constituted and assisted medium of bringing us to it, and sustaining it in us.

The church undoubtedly teaches the faith or divine revelation which has been committed to her through her pastors and doctors. But the competency of these to teach follows from the fact that they can teach only in union with the church; that she authorizes their teaching, and is ever present to correct them if they err, and that they are even externally commissioned by our Lord himself to teach what he has revealed. A mere external commission, which we know historically was given to the apostles and their successors, would not of itself give the capacity to teach or insure

infallibility in teaching; but he who has all power in heaven and in earth, who is God as well as man, and is himself "the way, the truth, and the life," assuredly would not, and could not, without belying his essential and immutable nature, issue a commission to teach and command all nations to hear and obey them as himself, without taking care that they should have the ability to teach his word and to teach it infallibly. That he does this is pledged in the very issue and in the words of the commission itself: "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, behold, *I am with you* all days, even to the consummation of the world." (St. Matt. xxviii.18–20.)

This external commission is all that needs to be proved by external evidence to the world outside of the church, and there is no more intrinsic difficulty in proving it than there is in proving the commission of George Washington as general of the American army in the Revolution, of Lord Raglan as commander-in-chief to the day of his death of the British forces employed in the Crimean war, or any other historical fact whatever. The unbroken existence of the church founded by the apostles from their day to ours, and the uniform testimony she has universally and uninterruptedly borne to the fact, would suffice to prove it, even had we no other proofs or evidence. The church, without citing her in her supernatural character, and taking her simply as an historical witness, is all that is needed, for she is a standing monument of the fact. In her corporate capacity she spans the whole distance of time from the apostles, and at each intervening moment she has been a present witness of the fact, testifying to what was present before her. The church as a corporation, without any appeal to her mystic character, has not been subject to any succession of time, has known no lapse of years, and is as present to-day to the events of the apostolic times as she was when those events occurred. She is at any moment we choose their contemporary, and as a contemporary witness to extraordinary facts, her testimony is as good for us as was that of the apostles themselves to their personal contemporaries. Indeed it is literally and truly the same, for her corporate existence from the time of the apostles to ours, or her historical identity, is unquestionable.

We are not now citing the continuous existence of the church for any thing but the simple external fact of the external commission given by our Lord himself to his apostles. To that fact, whatever you think of her, she is a competent witness, and, having constantly testified to it from that day to this, her testimony is conclusive. Assume, then, the fact, of the external commission, to which we who are Catholics need no external testimony, since we find the highest of all possible testimony in the internal life of the church, all the rest follows of itself. What the church believes, and teaches through her pastors and doctors, or what they in unison with her and her faith teach as the revelation of God committed to her, is his revelation, and we believe it because we believe him. Then we believe she is what she professes to be, the living body of our Lord, who lives in her and is her life, and through whom the Holy Ghost carries on the work of regeneration and glorification of all souls that do not resist him, but by his assistance coöperate with him.

Now, where in all this, from the first to the last, find you any discrepancy between Rome and Reason, the sovereign church and the free soul, between God in us and God in our masters? There is no discrepancy. There is more in it than natural reason by her own light knows, but nothing against reason, or which reason does not feel that she needs for own full and normal development. There is in it more than there is in nature, because our destiny, our end, that is, our supreme good, like our origin, lies in the supernatural order, not the natural, for our nature can be satisfied with no finite or created good, and it needs no argument to prove that the natural is not capable of itself of attaining to the supernatural. To assert the supernatural as the means of elevating nature to the plane of a supernatural destiny and of enabling it to reach it, assuredly is not to discard or to depress nature.

The difficulties which exclusive rationalists and naturalists feel in the case grow out of their supposition that Rome teaches that the intelligible and superintelligible are identical with the natural and supernatural, and that the natural and supernatural are two separate worlds, each standing opposed to the other, or two contradictory plans or systems, with no real nexus or medium of reconciliation between them, that is, that Rome, saving her authority to teach and govern, teaches Protestantism. The intel-

ligible and superintelligible are distinguishable only in relation to our limited intelligence, but in the real order are identical, one and the same, and would be seen to be so by an intelligence capable of taking in all reality at one view. The natural and supernatural are distinguishable, but not separable, any more than is the effect from the cause. They are simply distinct parts of one complete system, or one dialectic whole, united as well as distinguished by the creative act of God. They are expressed, in the Christian or teleological order, by the terms generation and regeneration. Man is created by the supernatural, but the race is explicated in the order of generation by natural laws; in the order of regeneration, by the election of grace. Generation is initial; regeneration is teleological, and completes generation, or places man on the plane of his end, as generation places the individual on the plane of his natural existence.

Now, it is clear that without generation there can be no regeneration, as without regeneration the end is not attainable. The two terms express two processes, or the two itineraries of creation—the procession of existences from God as first cause by way of creation and their explication by natural laws, and the return of existences by means of supernatural grace to God without absorption in him, as their end or final cause. The natural order or generation, the order explicated by natural laws, proceeds from and is sustained by the supernatural, for God is supernatural, since he is the author of nature; the end or the final cause, is supernatural, since it is in God; the medium of return, then, must be also supernatural, since the natural is not and cannot be adequate to a supernatural end. Evidently, then, there is and can be no opposition between the natural and supernatural but the opposition between the cause and effect, the medium and the end, the part and the whole. The supernatural is necessary to originate, sustain, and complete the natural. Hence, the difficulties created or suggested by Protestant theology have no place in relation to the teachings of Rome. Protestantism escapes an eternal war only by suppressing either the natural or the supernatural; Rome escapes it by reconciling the two, or presenting in the real order the medium of their union.

We may now dispose of the question of miracles and supernatural visions, which excite the disdain or contempt of Mr. Parkman and his class of thinkers, or no-thinkers. Man exists from, by, and for the supernatural. Christianity

is supernatural, and is the medium, and the necessary medium by which man attains his end, or supreme good. It is teleological, and hence the whole teleological life of man is supernatural. The supernatural is that which God does immediately by himself; the natural is that which he does mediately through the action of second causes or so-called natural laws, as generation, germination, growth, &c., which are in the secondary order explicable by natural or created causes. Now, as the supernatural is the origin, medium, and end of man, and as Christianity or the teleological order unites dialectically—really unites, as God and man are really united in the Incarnation—the natural and supernatural, there is and can be no *a priori* difficulty or antecedent improbability that God, in preparing the introduction in time of the Christian order, and in carrying it on to the end for which he creates it, should intervene more or less frequently by his direct and immediate action—action upon nature, if you will, but without the agency of natural causes. The whole Christian order, on its divine side, though included in the original plan or decree of creation, is an intervention of this sort. Grace is the direct action of God the Holy Ghost in regenerating the human soul, elevating it to the plane of its destiny, and enabling it to persevere to the end. The part assigned to natural agents is ministerial only, or signs through which grace is signified. The direct and immediate action of God is normal in the order of Christianity, and therefore, in no sense repugnant to the order of nature.

What, then, is a miracle? It is not a violation or suspension of the laws of nature, but a specific effect in the visible order produced by the direct and immediate action of God, for some purpose connected with the teleological order of creation, or the order of regeneration as distinguished from the order of generation. That he should do so from time to time, as seems to him good, is only in analogy with the very order he sustains for the perfection or completion of creation. There are, then, no *a priori* objections to miracles. Hume's pretence that no testimony can prove a miracle, for it is more probable that men will lie than it is that nature will go out of her course, is of no weight, because nature does not work a miracle, nor does it in a miracle go out of its course. The miracle is worked by God himself, and is in the teleological order of nature. Being wrought in the visible order, a miracle is as probable and as provable

as any other historical event. The only questions are, is the event not explicable by natural causes? and are the proofs sufficient to prove it as an historical fact? No more evidence is needed to prove it than is required to prove any historical fact in the natural order itself. If a real miracle, it is as easily proven as a natural event.

No doubt many things pass for miracles which are explicable by natural causes, and many visions are taken to be supernatural which have nothing supernatural about them. We do not hold ourselves bound by our Catholic faith to believe all the marvellous occurrences recorded in the lives of the saints, or treated as such in popular tradition, were really miracles, wrought by the direct and immediate action of the Almighty. We are bound to believe only according to the evidence in each particular case. Credulity is as little the characteristic of Catholics as is scepticism itself. We are in relation to alleged particular miracles as free to exercise our reason and judgment as we are in regard to any other class of alleged historical facts, and to sift and weigh the testimony in the case. That miracles are possible, are not improbable, have never ceased in the church, and are daily wrought among the faithful, we fully believe; but, when it comes to this or that particular fact or event alleged to be a miracle, we exercise to the full our critical judgment, and follow what seems to us the weight of evidence. The alleged appearance of our Lady to the young shepherds of La Salette is possible and not improbable, but before we can be required to believe it we must have sufficient evidence of the fact.

Mr. Parkman in his quiet way smiles at the credulity of the good Jesuit fathers, who seem to believe the stories of Indian magic, witchcraft, or sorcery which they relate; but has he any evidence that there is no Satan, and that evil spirits are mere *entia rationis?* Can he prove that magic, witchcrafts, sorcery, *diablerie*, in any or all its forms, is impossible or even improbable? All the world from the earliest and in the most enlightened ages have believed in what the Germans call the Night-side of Nature, and no man has any right to allege so universal a belief is unfounded, except on very strong and convincing reasons. Has he such reasons? Can he disprove the whole series of facts recorded? Can he deny the facts alleged by our modern necromancers or spiritists, or prove not that some of them are, but that all of them, are explicable without the supposition of some

superhuman agency? Doubtless there is much illusion, delusion, cheatery, but is there not also much inexplicable without satanic influence? Can he say that there is no Satan, that there are no fallen creatures superior to man in strength and intellect, who harass him, beset him, possess him, or that tempt him and perform lying wonders well fitted to deceive him, and to draw him away from the worship of the true God, though, of course, unable to harm against the consent of his will? Their deviltry is superhuman, but not by any means supernatural, and they who speak of it as supernatural entirely mistake its character. As in the case of miracles, while we concede the general principle, when we come to particular facts attributed to satanic agency, we use our critical judgment, and are, we confess, very slow to believe, and hard to be convinced.

We think we have said enough to prove that it is time to leave off the cant about the despotism of Rome, and to desist from placing the church in contrast with the free soul. The two poles are rationalism and supernaturalism; Catholicity combines both in their real synthesis, a synthesis founded in the creative act of God which really connects creator and creature in one harmonious whole. They who do not perceive it are ignorant of the teachings of Rome, and are mere sciolists. They have taken only superficial views of both reason and religion, and have far more reason to deplore their lack of light than to boast of their intelligence. There is infinitely more in this old church than is dreamed of in their philosophy.

Yet nobody pretends that the church teaches the details of science, and leaves nothing for the human intellect to observe, to investigate, to arrange, and to classify. The church is Catholic, because she teaches in her doctrine, whether known by natural reason or only by divine revelation, the universal ideal, or the Catholic principles of all the real and all the knowable; but she does not teach all the details of cosmology, history, chemistry, mechanics, geography, astronomy, geology, zoölogy, physiology, pathology, philology, or anthropology. She teaches the ideal or general principles of all the sciences, and teaches them infallibly, and thus gives the law to all scientific investigation, which *savants* in their inductions and deductions are not at liberty to transgress. Our philosophers and *savants* are perfectly free to explore nature in all possible directions, but they are not free to invent hypotheses and

theories not reconcilable with the universal principles she teaches, or to oppose their conjectures to the principles she asserts, because all such conjectures or theories are unscientific and false. The ethnologist is free to investigate the characteristics of the different races and families of men, but not free to deny the unity of the human race itself, or the descent of all men from one and the same primitive pair, who must have been immediately created and instructed by God himself. But this is saying no more than that the mathematician is not free to reject his axioms, or the geometrician his definitions; and we may add that, if our scientific men would take the principles the church teaches as their guide, they would find themselves much more successful in their observation and classification of natural phenomena, and save themselves from the ridicule which they now incur.

It follows from this that the sciences are not absolutely independent of the supervision of the church, and that she goes not out of her province when she censures officially theories, hypotheses, and conjectures which contradict the ideal truth committed to her charge. They by contradicting her principles are proved to be unsound and unscientific. But so long as the scientific confine themselves to facts and real principles, and do not run or attempt to run athwart the truth, they are perfectly free. The church interferes with them only when they impugn by their speculations the universal principles of things. The people, again, are free to adopt the form of government which they judge best, and civil governments are free to pursue the policy they judge the wisest and most prudent, so long as they contravene no principle or dictate of moral justice; and the individual is free to choose the calling in life he prefers, and to pursue it without let or hindrance from the church, so long as he violates no divine precept or law of God.

There is no doubt some restraint here, for the church excludes neither authority nor liberty. Liberty without authority is license, and as great an evil as authority without liberty, which is tyranny or despotism. The scientific, if truly scientific, study to know reality, the real and unmixed truth, which is alike independent of her and of them, and they can obtain it only by conforming to the immutable principles of things, according to which God has created and governs the universe. The church approves and

encourages free thought and free inquiry, but she certainly does not permit her children, under pretence of free thought, free inquiry, or of science, to subvert the very principles on which all science, even thought itself, depends, to degrade human nature and abase the dignity of reason by theories that deprive man of his humanity and rank him with the beasts that perish. Such liberty is repugnant to the very essence of science, and cannot be entertained for a moment by any one who is any thing more than a developed chimpanzee or gorilla. It is license, not liberty, and introduces only intellectual anarchy.

There is, too, a moral order in the universe, and the good of the individual and society can be secured only by conformity to it. No man, no nation, no society, no government has or can have the right to do wrong. The rejection of the restraints of the great fundamental principles of truth in science and the sciences, and of justice in the individual and in society, is the greatest of evils, and it is therefore that the church has it for her office to unite in an indissoluble synthesis both liberty and authority. To make the fact that she unites authority with liberty, and tempers each with the other, a ground of reproach against her is no proof of wisdom. She allows man all the liberty God gives him, and to ask for more is absurd.

In teaching the great principles of truth in all orders, and in judging of their explication and application, the church is infallible, but she is not infallible in the details of science. She is infallible in teaching whatever our Lord has commanded her, has revealed to her, and is realizing in her life, but not necessarily in matters not included in the faith. Her infallibility does not imply the scientific infallibility of all Catholics. It is no objection to her and no embarrassment to Catholics, that her children in the details of science have more or less erred. Others may be as well acquainted with these details as Catholics, and the scientific superiority of Catholics is in their knowledge of the great scientific principles, or what in science is ideal and catholic. Others may know the facts of history as well, but none can so well know the ideas or principles which govern the historical development of the race, and the science or philosophy of history. The same may be said of all the other sciences.

To develop fully and exhaust the great question we have touched upon in this article would require a volume, indeed many volumes. We have aimed rather at giving the

principles and method of their solution than at giving the solution itself. We have left much for the reader to do for himself by his own thought and study. It is as necessary that readers should think freely and wisely as that authors should, for mind can speak only to mind. But we trust that we have said enough to vindicate Rome from the charges preferred against her, and to prove that they who take pleasure in reviling her or her faithful children have little reason to boast of their intelligence or to claim to be the more advanced portion of the race.

ROME AND THE WORLD.

[From the Catholic World for October, 1871.]

Under the head *Rome or Reason* we showed that Catholicity is based on reality, and is the synthesis, so to speak, of Creator and creature, of God and man, of heaven and earth, nature and grace, faith and reason, authority and liberty, revelation and science, and that there is in the real order no antagonism between the two terms or categories. The supposed antagonism results from not understanding the real nexus that unites them in one dialectic whole, and forms the ground of their mutual conciliation and peace, expressed in the old sense of the word "atonement."

Christianity is supernatural, indeed, but it is not an afterthought, or an anomaly in the original plan of creation. Our Lord was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world; the Incarnation is included in creation as its completion or fulfilment; and hence many theologians hold that, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate, not, indeed, to redeem man from sin and death which comes by sin, but to ennoble his nature, and to enable him to attain to that supernatural union with God in which alone he finds or can find his supreme good or perfect beatitude. Christianity, whether this be so or not, must always be regarded as teleological, the religion of the end—not accidentally so, but made so in the original plan of the Creator. It enters dialectically, not arbitrarily, into that plan, and really

completes it. In this view of the case the Creator's works from first to last are dialectical, and there is and can be no contradiction in them; no discrepancy between the natural and supernatural, between faith and reason, nature and grace, the beginning, medium, and end, but all form integral parts of one indissoluble whole.

But, if there is and can be no antagonism between Rome and Reason, there certainly is an antagonism between Rome and the World, which must not be overlooked or counted for nothing, and which will, in some form, most likely, subsist as long as the world stands. Rome symbolizes for us the catholic religion, or the divine order, which is the law of life. The Catholic church in its present state dates only from the Incarnation, out of which it grows, and of which it is in some sort the visible continuation; but the Catholic religion, as the faith, as the law of life, dates from the beginning. The just before the coming of Christ were just on the same principles, by the same faith, and by obedience to the same divine law, or conformity to the same divine order, that they are now, and will be to the end; and hence the deist Tindal expressed a truth which he was far from comprehending when he asserted that "Christianity is as old as the world." Tindal's great error was in understanding by Christianity only the natural law promulgated through natural reason, and in denying the supernatural. Christianity is that and more too. It includes, and from the first has included, in their synthesis, both the natural and the supernatural. The human race has never had but one true or real religion, but one revelation, which as St. Thomas teaches, was made in substance to our first parents in the garden. Times change, says St. Augustine, but faith changes not. As believed the fathers—the patriarchs—so believe we, only they believed in a Christ to come, and we in a Christ that has come. Prior to the actual coming of Christ the church existed, but in a state of promise, and needed his actual coming to be perfected, or fulfilled, as St. Paul teaches us in his epistle to the Hebrews; and hence none who died before the Incarnation actually entered heaven till after the passion of our Lord.

Now, to this divine order, this divine law, this Catholic faith and worship symbolized to us by Rome, the visible centre of its unity and authority, stands opposed another order, not of life, but of death, called the world, originating with our first parents, and in their disobedience to the

divine law, or violation of the divine order established by the Creator, conformity to which was essential to the moral life and perfection of the creature, or fulfilment of the promise given man in creation. The order violated was founded in the eternal wisdom and goodness of the Creator, and the relations which necessarily subsist between God as Creator and man as his creature, the work of his hands. There is and can be for man no other law of life; even God himself can establish no other. By obedience to the law given, or conformity to the order established, man is normally developed, lives a true normal life, and attains to his appointed end, which is the completion of his being in God, his beatitude or supreme good. But Satan tempted our first parents to depart from this order and to transgress the divine law, and in their transgression of the law they fell into sin, and founded what we call the world—not on the law of life, but on what is necessarily the law of death.

The principle of the world may be collected from the words of the Tempter to Eve: "Ye shall not surely die, but shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." These words deny the law of God, declare it false, and promise to men independence of their Creator, and the ability to be their own masters, their own teachers and guides. "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil;" that is, determining for yourselves, independently of any superior, what is right or wrong, good or evil, or what is or is not fitting for you to do. You shall suffice for yourselves, and be your own law. Hence, as the basis of Rome is the assertion of the divine law, conformity to the divine order, or submission to the divine reason and will, that is, humility, the basis of the world is the denial of the divine order, the rejection of the law of life and the assertion of the sufficiency of man for himself, that is simply pride. Rome is based on humility, the world on pride; the spirit of Rome is loyalty and obedience, the spirit of the world is disloyalty and disobedience, always and everywhere the spirit of revolt or rebellion. Between these two spirits there is necessarily an indestructible antagonism, and no possible reconciliation.

The radical difference between Rome and the world is the radical difference between the humility of the Christian and the pride of the stoic. All Christian piety and virtue are based on humility; the piety and virtue of the stoic are based on pride. The Christian is always deeply impressed with the greatness and goodness of God; the stoic with the

greatness and strength of himself. The Christian submits to crosses and disappointments, to the sufferings and afflictions of life, because he loves God, and is willing to suffer any thing for his sake; the stoic endures them without a murmur, because he disdains to complain, and holds that he is, and should be, superior to all the vicissitudes and calamities of life. The Christian weeps as his Master wept at the grave of Lazarus, and finds relief in his tears; the stoic is too proud to weep; he wraps himself in his own dignity and self-importance, and, when his calamities are greater than he can bear, he seeks relief, like Cato, in suicide, thus proving his weakness by the very means he takes to conceal it. The Christian throws his burden on the Lord, and rises above it; the stoic insists on bearing it himself, and at last sinks under it. The world despises humility, and tramples on the humble. To it the Christian is tame, passive, mean-spirited, contemptible. It has no sympathy with the beatitudes, such as, Blessed are the poor in spirit; blessed are the pure in heart; blessed are the meek; blessed are the peace-makers. It understands nothing of true Christian heroism, or of the greatness of repose. It sees strength only in effort, which is always a proof of weakness, and the harder one strains and tugs to raise a weight, the stronger it holds him. We may see it in the popular literature of the day, and in nearly all recent art. The ancients had a much truer thought when they sculptured their gods asleep, and spread over their countenance an air of ineffable repose. The Scriptures speak of the mighty works of God, but represent them as the hiding of his power. All the great operations of nature are performed in silence, and the world notes them not. The Christian's greatness is concealed by the veil of humility, and his strength is hidden with God. He works in silence, but with effect, because he works with the power of him to whom is given all power in heaven and in earth.

Mr. Gladstone thinks he finds in Homer the whole body of the patriarchal religion, or the primitive tradition of the race, and he probably is not much mistaken; but no one can study Homer's heroes without being struck with the contrast they offer to the heroes of the Old Testament. The Old Testament heroes are as brave, as daring, and as effective as those of Homer; but they conceal their own personality, they go forth to battle in submission to the divine command, not seeking to display their own skill or

prowess, and the glory of their achievments they ascribe to God, who goes with them, assists them, fights for them, and gives the victory. What is manifest is the presence and greatness of God, not the greatness and strength of the hero, who is nothihg in himself. In Homer the case is reversed, and what strikes the reader is the littleness of God and the greatness of men. The gods and goddesses take part in the fray, it is true, but they are hardly the equals of the human warriors themselves. A human spear wounds Venus, and sends Mars howling from the field. It is human greatness and strength, human prowess and heroism, without any reference to God, to whom belongs the glory, that the poet sings, the creature regarded as independent of the Creator. In reading the Old Testament, you lose sight of the glory of men in the glory of God; in reading Homer, you lose sight of the glory of God in the glory of men. Abraham, Joshua, Gideon, Jephtha, David, the Maccabees fight as the servants of the Most High; Agamemnon, Ajax, Diomed, Achilles, even Hector, to display their own power, and to prove the stuff that is in them.

Perhaps no author, ancient or modern, has so completely embodied in his writings, the spirit of the world, the *Welt-Geist*, as the Germans say, as Thomas Carlyle. This writer may have done some service to society in exposing many cants, in demolishing numerous shams, and in calling attention to the eternal verities, of which few men are more ignorant; but he has deified force, and consecrated the worship of might in the place of right. Indeed, for him, right is cant, and there is no right but might. He spurns humility, submission, obedience, and recognizes God only in human ability. His hero-worship is the worship of the strong and the successful. Ability, however directed or wherever displayed, is his divinity. His heroes are Woden and Thor; Cromwell, Frederick the Great, Mirabeau, Danton, Napoleon Bonaparte. The men who go straight to their object, whether good or bad, and use the means necessary to gain it, whether right or wrong, are for him the divine men, and the only thing he censures is weakness, whether caused by indecision or scruples of conscience. His hero is an elemental force, who acts as the lightning that rives the oak, or the winds that fill the sails and drive the ship to its port. Old-fashioned morality, which requires a man to seek just ends by just means, is with him a cant, a sham, an unreality, and the true hero makes away with it,

and is his own end, his own law, his own means. He is not governed, he governs, and is the real being, the real God; all else belong to the unveracities, are mere simulacra, whose end is to vanish in thin air, to disappear in the inane. The man who recognizes a power above him, a right independent of him, and in submission to the divine law, and from love of truth and justice, weds himself to what is commanded, espouses the right and adheres to it through good report and evil report, takes up the cause of the oppressed, the wronged and outraged, the poor, the friendless, and the down-trodden, and works for it, gives his soul to it, and sacrifices his time, his labor, and his very life to advance it, when he has no man with him, and all the world unheeds, jeers, or thwarts him, is unheroic, and has no moral grandeur in him, has no virtue—unless he succeeds. He is a hero only when he carries the world with him, bends the multitude to his purpose, and comes out triumphant. The unsuccessful are always wrong; lost causes are always bad causes; and the unfortunate are unveracious, and deserve their fate. The good man struggling with fate, and holding fast to his integrity in the midst of sorest trials and temptations, and overborne in all things save his unconquerable devotion to duty, is no hero, and deserves no honor, though even the ancients thought such a man worthy of the admiration of gods and men. Carlyle forgets that there is an hereafter, and that what to our dim vision may seem to be failure here may there be seen to have been the most eminent success. The Christians conquered the world, not by slaying, but by being slain, and the race has been redeemed by the Cross. Indeed, pride is always a proof of meanness and weakness, is an unveracity; for it is born of a lie, and rests on a lie: all real magnanimity and strength for men spring from humility, which is not a falsehood, but a veracity; for it is conformity to the truth of things.

The principle of opposition to the church is always and everywhere the same, invariable in time and place as the church herself, and has a certain consistency, a certain logic of its own; but it varies its form from age to age and from nation to nation, and is enraged at the church because she does not vary with it. It is always at bottom, whatever its form, the assumption that the creature does or may suffice for itself: "Ye shall not surely die, but shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." This primitive falsehood, this satanic lie, underlies all the hostility of the world to the

church, or of the world to Rome. Analyze what is called the world, and you will find that it is only a perpetual effort or series of efforts to realize the promise made by the serpent to Eve in the garden, when coiled round the tree of knowledge. The world labors to exalt the dignity and glory of man, not as a creature dependent for his existence, for all he is or can be, on the Creator, which would be just and proper, but as an independent, self-acting, and self-determining being, accountable, individually or socially, only to himself for his thoughts, words, and deeds—subject to no law but his own will, appetites, passions, natural propensities, and tendencies. He is himself his own law, his own master, and should be free from all restraint and all control not in himself.

It is easy, therefore, to understand why, with the world and with men filled with the spirit of the world, Rome is held to be the symbol of despotism, and the church to be inherently and necessarily hostile to the freedom of thought and to all civil and religious liberty. The world understands by liberty independence of action, and therefore exemption from all obligation of obedience, or subjection to any law, not self-imposed. It holds the free man to be one who is under no control, subject to no restraint, and responsible to no will but his own. This is its view of liberty, and consequently whatever restricts liberty in this sense, and places man under a law which he is bound to recognize and obey, is in its vocabulary despotism, opposed to the rights of man, the rights of the mind, the rights of society, or the freedom and independence of the secular order. Liberty in this broad and universal sense obviously cannot be the right or prerogative of any creature, for the creature necessarily depends for all he is or has on the creator. Hence M. Proudhon, who maintained that property is robbery, with a rigid logic that has hardly been appreciated, asserts that the existence of God is incompatible with the assertion of the liberty of man. Admit, he says, the existence of God, and you must concede all the authority claimed by the Catholic church. The foundation of all despotism is in the belief in the existence of God, and you must deny, obliterate that belief, before you can assert and maintain liberty. He was right, if we take liberty as the world takes it. Liberty, as the world understands it, is the liberty of a god, not of a creature. Rome asserts and maintains full liberty of man as a creature; but she does and

must oppose liberty in the broad, universal sense of the world; for her very mission is to assert and maintain the supremacy of the divine order, the authority of God over all the works of his hands, and alike over men as individuals and as nations. She asserts indeed, liberty in its true sense; but she, does and must oppose the liberty the world demands, the liberty promised by Satan to our first parents, and which, in truth, should be called license, not liberty, and also those who strive for it, as disloyal to God, as rebels to their rightful sovereign, children of disobedience, warring against, as Carlyle would say, the veracities, the eternal verities, the truth of things, or divine reality. There is no help for it. The church must do so, or be false to her trust, false to her God, also to the divine order; for, let the world say what it will, man is not God, but God's creature, and God is sovereign Lord and proprietor of the universe, since he has made it, and the maker has the sovereign right to the thing made. Here is no room for compromise, and the struggle must continue till the world abandons its false notion of liberty, and submits to the divine government. Till then the church is and must be the church militant, and carry on the war against the world, whatever shape it may assume.

With the ancient gentiles the world rather perverted and corrupted the truth than absolutely rejected it, and fell into idolatry and superstition rather than into absolute atheism. The Epicureans were, indeed, virtually atheists, but they never constituted the great body of any gentile nation. The heathen generally retained a dim and shadowy belief in the divinity, even in the unity of God; but they lost the conception of him as creator and consequently of man and the universe as his creature. By substituting in their philosophy generation, emanation, or formation for creation, they obscured the sense of man's dependence on God as creator, and consequently destroyed the necessary relation between religion and morality. No moral ideas entered into their worship, and they worshipped the gods to whom they erected temples and made offerings, not from a sense of duty or from the moral obligation of the creature to adore his Creator and give himself to him, but from motives of interest, to avert their displeasure, appease their wrath, or to render them propitious to their undertakings, whether private enterprises or public war and conquest. They asserted for man and society independence of the divine order as a moral order. Severed from all moral conceptions, their

religion became a degraded and degrading superstition, an intolerable burden to the soul, and their worship the embodiment of impurity and corruption. Such was the effect of the great gentile apostacy, or gentile attempt to realize the freedom and independence promised by Satan. The promise proved a lie.

When the church in her present state was established, the world opposed her in the name of the liberty or independence of the temporal order, which implies as its basis the independence of the creature of the creator, and therefore resting on the same satanic promise, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." When our Lord was brought before Pontius Pilate, and Pilate was about to dismiss the charges against him and to let him go, the Jews changed his purpose by telling him, "If you let this man go, you are no friend to Cæsar." The heathen persecutions of the christians were principally on the ground that they were disloyal to the empire, inasmuch as they rejected its worship, and asserted the immediate divine authority of their religion and its independence of the state or civil society, holding firmly always and everywhere the maxim, "We must obey God rather than men." All down through the barbarous ages that followed the downfall of the Roman empire of the West, through the feudal ages, and down even to our own times, the state has claimed supreme authority over the church in regard to her temporal goods and her government, and has constantly sought to subject her to the civil authority, which in principle is the same with subjecting God to man. The world represented by Cæsar has constantly struggled to subvert the independence of religion, and to exalt the human above the divine. This is the meaning of the mediæval contests between the pope and the emperor, as we have elsewhere shown. There is not at this day, unless Belgium be an exception, a single state in Europe where the temporal power leaves religion free and independent, or where the church has not to struggle against the government to maintain the independence of the divine order she represents. Fidelity to God is held to be treason to the state, and hence Elizabeth of England executes Catholics at Tyburn as traitors.

The age boasts of progress, and calls through all its thousands of organs upon us to admire the marvellous progress it has made, and is every hour making. It is right, if what it means by progress really be progress. It has cer-

tainly gone further than any preceding age in emancipating itself from the supremacy of the law of God, in trampling on the divine order, and asserting the supremacy of man. It has drawn the last logical consequences contained in the lying promise of Satan, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." There is no use in denying or seeking to disguise it. The world as opposed to Rome, ceases entirely to regard man as a creature, and boldly and unblushingly puts him in all respects in the place of God. God, when not openly denied to exist, is denied as creator: he is at most *natura naturans*, and identical with what are called the laws of nature. Hundreds of *savants* are busy with the effort to explain the universe without recognizing a creator, and to prove that effects may be obtained without causes. Science stops at second causes, or, rather, with the investigation and classification of phenomena, laughs at final causes, and, if it does not absolutely deny a first cause, relegates it to the region of the unknowable, and treats it as if it were not. The advanced philosophers of the age see no difference between moral laws and physical laws, between gratitude and gravitation. The heart secretes virtue as the liver secretes bile, and virtue itself consists not in a voluntary act of obedience, or in deliberately acting for a prescribed end, but in force of nature, in following one's instincts, and acting out one's self, heedless of consequences, and without any consideration of moral obligation. Truth is a variable quantity, and is one thing with one man and another with his neighbour. There is no Providence, or Providence is fate, and God is the theological name given to the forces of nature, especially human nature; there is no divinity but man; all worship except that of humanity is idolatry or superstition; the race is immortal, but individuals are mortal, and there is no resurrection of the dead. Some, like Fourier and Auguste Comte, even deny that the race is immortal, and suppose that in time it will disappear in the inane.

But, without going any further into detail, we may say generally the age asserts the complete emancipation of man and his institutions from all intellectual, moral, and spiritual control or restraint, and under the name of liberty asserts the complete and absolute independence of man both individually and collectively, and under pretence of democratic freedom wars against all authority and all government, whether political or ecclesiastical. It does not like

to concede even the axioms of the mathematician or the definitions of the geometrician, and sees in them a certain limitation of intellectual freedom. To ask it to conform to fixed and invariable principles, or to insist that there are principles independent of the human mind, or to maintain that truth is independent of opinion, and that opinions are true or false as they do or do not conform to it, is to seek to trammel free and independent thought, and to outrage what is most sacred and divine in man. The mind must be free, and to be free it must be free from all obligation to seek, to recognize, or to conform to truth. Indeed, there is no truth but what the mind conceives to be such, and the mind is free to abide by its own conceptions, for they are the truth for it. Rome, in asserting that truth is independent of the human will, human passions and conceptions, one and universal, and always and everywhere the same, and in condemning as error whatever denies it or does not conform to it, is a spiritual despotism, which every just and noble principle of human nature, the irrepressible instincts of humanity itself, wars against, and resists by every means in its power.

We have shown that the world, as opposed to Rome, rests on the satanic falsehood, and this conception of liberty, which Rome rejects and wars against, has no other basis than the satanic promise, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," or be your own masters as God is his own master, and suffice for yourselves as he suffices for himself. The world is not wrong in asserting liberty, but wrong in its definition of liberty, or in demanding for man not the proper liberty of the creature, but the liberty which can exist only for the Creator. By claiming for man a liberty not possible for a dependent creature, the world loses the liberty to which it has, under God, the right, and falls under the worst of all tyrannies. Liberty is a right, but, if there is no right, how can you defend liberty as a right? If liberty is not a right, no wrong is done in violating it, and tyranny is as lawful as freedom. Here is a difficulty in the very outset that the world cannot get over. It must assert right, therefore the order of justice, before it can assert its liberty against Rome; and, if it does assert such order, it concedes what Rome maintains, that liberty is founded in the order of justice, and cannot transcend what is true and just. The world does not see that, in denying the spiritual order represented by Rome, it denies the very basis of liberty, and all differ-

ence between liberty and despotism, because it is only on the supposition of such order that liberty can be defended as a right, or despotism condemned as a wrong.

It is alleged against Rome that she opposes modern civilization. This is so or not so, according to what we understand by modern civilization. If we understand by modern civilization the rejection of the divine order, the supremacy of spiritual truth, and the assertion of the divinity and independence of man, Rome undoubtedly opposes it, and must oppose it; but, if we understand by modern civilization the melioration of the laws, the development of humane sentiments, the power acquired by the people in the management of their temporal affairs, and the material progress effected by the application of the truths of science to the industrial arts, the invention of the steam-engine, the steamboat, the railway and locomotive, and the lightning telegraph, the extension of commerce and increased facilities of international communication, though probably a greater value is attached to these things than truth warrants, she by no means opposes or discourages modern civilization. Undoubtedly she places heaven above earth, and is more intent on training men for eternal beatitude than on promoting the temporal prosperity of this life. The earth is not our end, and riches are not the supreme good. She asserts a higher than worldly wisdom, and holds that the beggar has at least as good a chance of heaven as the rich man clothed in fine linen and faring sumptuously every day. She would rather see men intent on saving their souls than engrossed with money-making. The experience of modern society proves that in this she is right. We live in an industrial age, and never in any age of the world did people labor longer or harder than they do now to obtain the means of subsistence, and never was the honest poor man less esteemed, wealth more highly honored, or mammon more devoutly worshipped; yet the church never opposes earthly well-being, and regards it with favor when made subsidiary to the ultimate end of man.

Yet certain words have become sacramental for the world, and are adopted by men who would shrink from the sense given them by the more advanced liberals of the day; and these men regard Rome, when condemning them in that extreme sense, as condemning modern civilization itself. We take the encyclical of the Holy Father, issued December 8, 1864. The whole non-Catholic world, and even some

Catholics, poorly informed as to their own religion or as to the meaning of the errors condemned, regarded that encyclical as a fulmination against liberty and all modern civilization. Nobody can forget the outcry raised everywhere by the secular press against the Holy Father, and what are called the retrograde tendencies of the Catholic church. The pope, it was said, has condemned all free thought and both civil and religious liberty, the development of modern society, and all modern progress. Yet it is very likely that four-fifths of those who joined in the outcry, had they been able to discriminate between what they themselves really mean to defend under the names of liberty, progress, and civilization, and what the more advanced liberals hold and seek to propagate, would have seen that the pope in reality condemned only the errors which they themselves condemn, and asserted only what they themselves really hold. He condemned nothing which is not a simple logical deduction from the words of the arch-tempter, the liar from the beginning and the father of lies, addressed to our first parents. All the errors condemned in the syllabus are errors which tend to deny or obscure the Divine existence, the fact of creation, the authority of the Creator, the supremacy of the divine or spiritual order, to undermine all religion and morality, all civil government, and even society itself; and to render all science, all liberty, all progress, and all civilization impossible, as we have shown over and over again.

The numbers who embrace in their fullest extent the extreme views we have set forth, though greater than it is pleasant to believe, are yet not great enough to give of themselves any serious alarm, and hence many able and well-meaning men who have not the least sympathy with them attach no great importance to them, and treat them with superb contempt; but they are in reality only the advance-guard of a much larger and more formidable body, who march under the same drapeau and adopt the same countersign. The archbishop of Westminster, than whom we can hardly name an abler or more enlightened prelate in the church, has said truly in a late Pastoral, that

"The age of heresies is past. No one now dreams of revising the teaching of the church, or of making a new form of Christianity. For this the age is too resolute and consistent. Faith or unbelief is an intelligible alternative; but between variations and fragments of Christianity men have no care to choose. All or none is clear and consistent; but

more or less is halting and undecided. Revelation is a perfect whole, pervaded throughout by the veracity and authority of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. To reject any of it is to reject the whole law of divine faith; to criticise it and to remodel it is to erect the human reason as judge and measure of the divine. And such is heresy; an intellectual aberration which in these last ages has been carried to its final analysis, and exposed not only by the theology of the church but by the common sense of rationalism. We may look for prolific and anti-christian errors in abundance, but heresies in Christianity are out of date."

The great body of those outside of the Catholic communion, as well as some nominally in it, but not of it, who are still attached to the Christian name, adopt the watchwords of the extreme party, and are tending in the same direction. Mazzini and Garibaldi are heroes with the mass of Englishmen and Americans, who wish them success in their anti-religious and anti-social movements. The universal secular press, the great power in modern society, with the whole sectarian press, has applauded the nefarious measures of intriguing Italian statesmen, demagogues, and apostates by which the Holy Father has been stripped of the greater part of his temporal possessions, the church despoiled of her goods, religious houses suppressed, and the freedom and independence of religion abolished throughout the Italian peninsula. The only non-Catholic voice we have heard raised in sympathy with the pope is that of Guizot, the ex-premier of Louis Philippe. Guizot, though a Protestant, sees that the papacy is essential to the Catholic church, and that the Catholic church is essential to the preservation of Christian civilization, the maintenance of society and social order. Our own secular press, so loud in its praise of religious liberty, applauds the Mexican Juarez for his confiscation of the goods of the church in the poor, distracted republic of Mexico. The sympathy of the world, of the age, is with every movement that tends to weaken the power of the church, the authority of religion, and even the authority of the state. The tendency with great masses who believe themselves Christians, a blind tendency it may be, is to no-religion or infidelity, and to no-governmentism. It is this fact that constitutes the danger to be combated.

The difficulty of combating it is very great. The mass of the people are caught by words without taking note of the meaning attached to them. Where they find the consecrated terms of faith and piety, they naturally conclude that faith and

piety are there. But to a great extent the enemies of Christianity oppose Christianity under Christian names. It is characteristic of this age that infidelity disguises itself in a Christian garb, and utters its blasphemy in Christian phraseology, its falsehoods in the language of truth. Satan disguises himself as an angel of light, comes as a philanthropist, talks of humanity, professes to be the champion of science, intelligence, education, liberty, progress, social amelioration, and the moral, intellectual, and physical elevation of the poorer and more numerous classes—all good things, when rightly understood and in their time and place. We cannot oppose him without seeming to many to oppose what is a Christian duty. If we oppose false intelligence, we are immediately accused of being opposed to intelligence; if we oppose a corrupt and baneful education, we are accused of being in favor of popular ignorance, and lovers of darkness; if we oppose false liberty, or license presented under the name of liberty, we are charged with being the enemies of true freedom; if we assert authority, however legitimate or necessary, then we are despots and the advocates of despotism. The press opens its cry against us, and the age votes us mediæval dreamers, behind the times, relics of the past, with our eyes on the backside of our heads, and the truth is drowned in the floods of indignation or ridicule poured out against us. Our success would be hopeless, if we could not rely on the support of him whose cause we seek to the best of our ability to defend, and who after all reigneth in the heavens, and is able to make the wrath of man praise him, and can overrule evil for good.

It is alleged that the church opposes democracy, and is leagued with the despots against the people. The church herself leagues neither with democracy nor with monarchy. She leaves the people free to adopt the form of government they prefer. She opposes movements pretendedly in favor of democracy only when they are in violation of social order and opposed to legitimate authority, and she supports monarchy only when monarchy is the law, and it is necessary to uphold it as the condition of maintaining social order, and saving civilization from the barbarism that threatens to invade it. In the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century the contrary charge was preferred, and the church was condemned by the world on the ground of being hostile to kingly government; for public opinion then

favored absolute monarchy, as it does now absolute democracy. We believe our own form of government the best for us, but we dare not say that other forms of government are not the best for other nations. Despotism is never legitimate; but we know no law of God or nature that makes democracy obligatory upon every people, and no reason for supposing that real liberty keeps pace with the progress of democracy. Democracy did not save France from the Reign of Terror and the most odious tyranny, and it certainly has not secured liberty and good order in Mexico. With us it is yet an experiment and we can pronounce nothing with certainty till we have seen the result of the crisis we are now passing through. We owe to it a fearful civil war and the suppression of a formidable rebellion, but the end is not yet. Still, there is nothing in our form of government in discord with the Catholic church, and we firmly believe that, if maintained in its purity and integrity, she would find under it a freer field for her exertions than has ever yet been afforded her in the Old World. At any rate, there is no room for doubt that the country needs the church to sustain our political institutions, and to secure their free and beneficial workings.

But the world does not gain what it seeks. It does not gain inward freedom, freedom of soul and of thought. It is difficult to conceive a worse bondage than he endures who feels that for truth and goodness he has no dependence but on himself. One wants something on which to rest, something firm and immovable, and no bondage is more painful than the feeling that we stand on an insecure foundation, ready to give way under us if we seek to rest our whole weight on it, and that our constructions, however ingenious, can stand only as we uphold them with might and main. The man with only himself for support, is Atlas bearing the weight of the world on his shoulders in a treadmill. He is a man, as we know by experience, crossing a deep and broad river on floating cakes of ice, each too small to bear his weight, and sinking as soon as he strikes it. He must constantly keep springing from one to another to save his life, and yet, however rapidly he springs, gains nothing more solid or less movable. The world in its wisdom is just agoing to get on to something on which it can stand and rest, but it never does. Its castles are built in the air, and it spends all its labor for naught. All its efforts defeat themselves. Its philanthropy aggravates the evils it would redress, or creates

others that are greater and less easily cured. In seeking mental freedom, it takes from the mind the light without which it cannot operate; in seeking freedom from the king, it falls under the tyranny of the mob; and, to get rid of the tyranny of the mob, it falls under that of the military despot; disdaining heaven, it loses the earth; refusing to obey God, it loses man.

All history, all experience proves it. Having rejected the sacredness and inviolability of authority in both religion and politics, and asserted "the sacred right of insurrection," the world finds itself without religion, without faith, without social order, in the midst of perpetual revolutions, checked or suppressed only by large standing armies, while each nation is overwhelmed with a public debt that is frightful to contemplate. This need not surprise us. It is the truth that liberates or makes free, and when truth is denied, or resolved into each one's own opinion or mental conception, there is nothing to liberate the mind from its illusions and to sustain its freedom. The mind pines away and dies without truth, as the body without food. It was said by one who spake as never man spake, that he who would save his life shall lose it, and experience proves that they who seek this world never gain it. "Ye shall not eat thereof, nor touch it, lest ye die." This command, which Satan contradicts, is true and good, and obedience to it is the only condition of life, or real success in life. In seeking to be God, man becomes less than man, because he denies the truth and reality of things. It is very pleasant, says Heinrich Heine, to think one's self a god, but it costs too much to keep up the dignity and majesty of one's godship. Our resources are not equal to it, and purse and health give way under the effort. Falsehood yields nothing, because it is itself nothing, and is infinitely more expensive than truth. Falsehood has no support, and can give none; whoever leans on it must fall through. And if ever there was a falsehood, it is that man is God, or independent of God.

The whole question between Rome and the world, turn it as we will, comes back always to this: Is man God, or the creature of God? He certainly is not God: then he is a creature, and God has created him and owns him, is his Lord and Master. He, then, is not independent of God, for the creative act of God is as necessary to continue him in existence and to enable him to act, to fulfil his destiny, or to attain his end or supreme good, as it was to call him from

nothing into existence. God is the principle, medium, and end of our existence. Separation from God, or independence of him, is death; for we live, and move, and have our being in him, not in ourselves. The universe, when once created, does not go ahead on its own hook or of itself without further creative intervention; for the creative act is not completed in relation to the creature, till the creature has fulfilled its destiny or reached its end. God creates us and at each moment of our existence as much and as truly as he did Adam, and the suspension of his creative act for a single instant would be our annihilation. So of the universe. He creates us, indeed, second causes and free moral agents; but even in our own acts or causation we depend on him as our first cause, as the cause of us as second causes, and in our own sphere we can cause or act only by virtue of his active presence and concurrence. When we attempt to act without him, as if we were independent of him, as our first parents did in following the suggestions of Satan, we do not cease to exist physically, but we die morally and spiritually, lose our moral life, fall into abnormal relations with our Creator, and are spiritually dead; for our moral and spiritual life depends on our voluntary obedience to the law of all created life: "Ye shall not eat thereof, nor touch it, lest ye die."

Here is the basis of the divine dominion. God is sovereign lord and proprietor because he is creator, and man and nature are the work of his hands. Hence the Mosaic books insist not only on the unity of God, but even with more emphasis, if possible, on God as creator. The first verse of Genesis asserts creation in opposition to emanation, generation, or formation: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." All through the Old Testament, especially in the hagiographical books and the prophets, there is a perpetual recurrence to God as creator, to the fact that he has made the world and all things therein, and hence the call upon all creatures to sing his praise, so often repeated in the Psalms. Indeed, it was not so much by belief in the unity of God as in the fact that God is sole and universal creator, that the Jews were distinguished from gentiles. It may be doubted if the gentiles ever wholly lost the belief in the existence of one God. We think we find in all heathen mythologies traces of a recognition of one God hovering, so to speak, over their manifold gods and goddesses, who were held to be tutelar divinities, never the

divinity itself. But the gentiles, as we have already said, had lost, and did in no sense admit, the fact of creation. We find no recognition of God as creator in any gentile philosophy, Indian, Persian, Chaldean, Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, or Roman. The gentiles were not generally atheists, we suspect not atheists at all; but they were invariably pantheists. Pantheism is the denial of the proper creative act of God, or, strictly speaking, that God creates substances or existences capable of acting from their own centre and producing effects as second causes. The Jews were the only people, after the great gentile apostasy, that preserved the tradition of creation. God as creator is the basis of all science, all faith, all religion; hence the first article of the Creed: "I believe in one God, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible." In this fact is founded the inviolable right of the Almighty to govern all his works, man among the rest, as seems to him good. We cannot deny this if we once admit the fact of creation; and if we deny the fact of creation, we deny our own existence and that of the entire universe.

But the right to govern implies the correlative duty of obedience. If God has the right to govern us, then we are bound to obey him and do his bidding, whatever it may be. There is nothing arbitrary in this, it is founded in the relation of creator and creature, and God himself could not make it otherwise without annihilating all creatures and ceasing to be creator. God could not create existences without giving them a law, because their very relation to him as his creatures imposes on them an inflexible and invariable law, which, if created free agents, they may, indeed, refuse to obey, but not and live. Here is the whole philosophy of authority and obedience. We must not confound the symbols employed in Genesis with the meaning they symbolize. The command given to our first parents was simply the law under which they were placed by the fact that they were creatures, that God had made them, and they belonged to him, owed him obedience, and could not disobey him without violating the very law of their existence. They cannot but die, because they depart from the truth of things, deny their real relation to God and go against the divine order, conformity to which is in the nature of the case their only condition of life. So Rome teaches in accordance with our highest and best reason. The world, listening to the flattering words of Satan and the

allurements of the flesh, denies it, and says, "Ye shall not surely die;" you may sin and live, may become free and independent, be as gods yourselves, your own masters, teachers, and guides. Hence the inevitable war between Rome and the world, she striving to secure the obedience of men and nations to the law of God, and it striving to maintain their independence of the law, and to make them believe that they can live a life of their own, which in the nature of the case is not life, but death.

Other considerations, no doubt enter into the worship of God besides the simple fact that he is our Creator, but that fact is the basis of our moral obligation to obey him. This obligation is obscured when we seek for it another basis, as in the intrinsic worth, goodness, or excellence of God. No doubt, God deserves to be adored for his own sake, to be loved and obeyed for what he is in and of himself, but it is not easy to prove to men of the world that they are morally bound to love and obey goodness. These higher views of God which convert obedience into love, and would enable us to love God even if he did not command it, and to desire him for his own sake without reference to what he is to us, may in some sense be attained to, and are so by the saints, but there are few of us perfect enough for that. The law certainly is an expression of the goodness and love of the Creator, as is creation itself, but this is not precisely the reason why it is obligatory. It is a good reason why we should love the law and delight in it, but not the reason why we are bound to obey it. We are bound to obey it because it is the law of our Creator, who has the sovereign right to command us, and hence religion cannot be severed from morality. No act of religion is of any real worth that is not an act of obedience, of submission of our will to the divine will, or which is not a frank acknowledgment of the divine sovereignty and the supremacy of the moral law. There must be in it an act of self-denial, of self-immolation, or it is not a true act of obedience, and obedience is better than any external offerings we can bring to the altar.

Here is where the world again errs. It is ready to offer sacrifices to God, to load his altars with its offerings of the firstlings of flocks and herds, and the fruits of the earth, but it revolts at any act of obedience, and will not remember that the sacrifices pleasing to God are an humble and contrite heart. It would serve God from love not duty, forgetting that there is no love where there is no obedience.

The obedience is the chief element of the love: "If ye love me, keep my commandments." We show our love to the Father by doing the will of the Father. There is no way of escaping the act of submission, and walking into heaven with our heads erect, in our own pride and strength, and claiming our beatitude as our right, without ever having humbled ourselves before God. We may show that the law is good, the source of light and life; we may show its reasonableness and justness, and that there is nothing degrading or humiliating in obeying it; but, whatever we do in this respect, nothing will avail if the act of obedience be withheld. Till the world does this, submits to the law, no matter what fine speeches it may make, what noble sentiments it may indulge, what just convictions it may entertain, or what rich offerings it may bring to the altar, it is at enmity with God, and peace between it and Rome is impossible.

God is in Christ reconciling the world to himself, but there can be no reconciliation without submission. God cannot change, and the world must. No humiliating conditions are imposed on it, but it must acknowledge that it has been wrong, and that the law it has resisted is just and right, and, above all, obligatory. This is the hardship the world complains of. But what reason has it to complain? What is demanded of it not for its good, or that is not demanded by the very law of life itself? The world demands liberty, but what avails a false and impracticable liberty? True liberty is founded in justice, is a right, and supported by law. We have shown, time and again, that the church suppresses no real liberty, and asserts and maintains for all men all the liberty that can fall to the lot of any created being. It demands the free exercise of human reason. In what respect does the church restrain freedom of thought? Can reason operate freely without principles, without data, without light, without any support, or any thing on which to rest? What is the mind without truth, or intelligence in which nothing real is grasped? We know only so far as we know truth, and our opinions and convictions are worth nothing in so far as they are false, or not in accordance with the truth that we neither make nor can unmake, which is independent of us, independent of all men, and of all created intellects. What harm, then, does the church do us when she presents us infallibly that truth which the mind needs for its support, and reason for its free operation? Society needs law, and how does the church harm it by

teaching the law of God, without which it cannot subsist? Men need government. What harm does the church do in declaring the supreme law of God, from which all human laws derive their force as laws, and which defines and guaranties both authority and liberty, protects the prince from the turbulence of the mob, and the people from the tyranny of the prince?

As sure as that man is God's creature and bound to obey God, there is for him no good independent of obedience to the law of God; and equally sure is it that obedience to that law secures to him all the good compatible with his condition as a created existence. The mystery of the Incarnation, in which God assumes human nature to be his own nature, gives him the promise of even participating in the happiness of God himself. This happiness or beatitude with God in eternity is the end for which man was created, and is included in the creative act of which it is the completion or fulfilment. In estimating the good which is sure to us by conformity to the divine order and obedience to the divine law, we must take into the account our whole existence from its inception to its completion in Christ in glory, and include in that good not only the joys and consolations of this life, but that eternal beatitude which God through his superabundant goodness has provided for us, and remember that all this we forfeit by obeying the law of death rather than the law of life. We can fulfil our destiny, attain to the stature of full-grown men, or complete our existence only by conforming to the divine order, by adhering to the truth, and obeying the law of life. Instead, then, of regarding the church as our enemy, as opposed to our real good, we should regard her as our true friend, and see in her a most striking proof of the loving-kindness of our God. In her he gives us precisely what we need to teach us his will, to make known to us the truth as it is in him, and to declare to us in all the vicissitudes and complexities of life the requirements of the law, and to be the medium of the gracious assistance we need to fulfil them.

No good thing will God withhold from them that love him. And he gives us all good in giving us, as he does, himself. Nor does he give us only the goods of the soul. He that will lose his life in God shall find it. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things"—the things which the gentiles seek after—"shall be added to you." They who lay up the most abundant treasures in

heaven have the most abundant treasures on earth. The true principle of political economy, which the old French Economists and Adam Smith never knew, is self-denial, is in living for God and not for the world, as a Louvain professor has amply proved with a depth of thought, a profound philosophy, and a knowledge of the laws of production, distribution, and consumption seldom equalled. "I have been young, and now I am old, but never have I seen the righteous forsaken, or his seed begging bread." No people are more industrious or more bent on accumulating wealth, than our own, but so little is their self-denial and so great is their extravagance that the mass of them are, notwithstanding appearances, really poor. The realized capital of the country is not sufficient to pay its debts. We have expended the surplus earnings of the country for half a century or more, and the wealth of the nation is rapidly passing into the hands of a few money-lenders and soulless mammoth corporations, already too strong to be controlled by the government, whether state or general. If it had not been for the vast quantities of cheap unoccupied lands easy of access, we should have seen a poverty and distress in this country to be found in no other. The mercantile and industrial system inaugurated by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, and which is regarded as the crowning glory of the modern world, has added nothing to the real wealth of nations. But this is a theme foreign to our present purpose, and has already carried us too far. We will only add that the true Christian has the promise of this life and of that which is to come.

Now, no one can estimate the advantage to men and nations that must have been derived and continue to be derived from the church placed in the world to assert at every point the divine sovereignty, and to proclaim constantly in a clear and ringing voice that the Lord God omnipotent reigneth, and his law is the law of life, of progress, and of happiness both here and hereafter, the great truth which the world is ever prone to forget or to deny. We ought, therefore, to regard her existence with the most profound gratitude. She has done this work from the first, and continues to do it with unabated strength, in spite of so many sad defections and the opposition of kings and peoples. Never has she had more numerous, more violent, more subtle, or more powerful enemies than during the pontificate of our present Holy Father, Pius IX. Never have her

enemies seemed nearer obtaining a final triumph over her, and they have felt that at last she is prostrate, helpless, in her agony. Yet do they reckon without their host. The magnificent spectacle at Rome on the 29th of last June of more than five hundred bishops, and thousands of priests from all parts of the world, from every tongue and nation on the earth, gathered round their chief, and joining with him in celebrating the eighteen-hundredth anniversary of the glorious martyrdom of Peter, the prince of the apostles, whose succession in the government of the church has never failed, proves that their exultation is premature, that her veins are still full of life, and that she is as fresh and vigorous as when she first went forth from Jerusalem on her divine mission to win the world to her Lord. The indication by the Holy Father of his resolve at a near day to convoke a universal council, a grand assembly of the princes of the church, proves also that she is still a fact, a living power on the earth, though not of it, with whom the princes of this world must count. Before her united voice, assisted by the Holy Ghost, her enemies will be struck dumb, and to it the nations must listen with awe and conviction, and most of the errors we have spoken of will shrink back from the face of day into darkness and silence. Faith will be reinvigorated, the hearts of the faithful made glad, and civilization resume its march, so long and so painfully interrupted by heresy, infidelity, and the almost constant revolutions of states and empires. We venture to predict for the church new and brilliant victories over the world.

Heresy has well-nigh run its course. It is inherently sophistical, and is too much for infidelity and too little for religion. In no country has it ever been able to stand alone, and it acquires no strength by age. The thinking men of all civilized nations have come, or are rapidly coming, to the conclusion that the alternative is either Rome or no religion, or, as they express it, "Rome or Reason," which we have shown is by no means the true formula. The real formula of the age is, Rome or no religion, God or Satan. The attempt to support any thing worthy of the name of religion on human authority, whether of the individual or of the state, of private judgment or of the Scriptures interpreted by the private judgment of the learned, has notoriously, we might say confessedly, failed. Old-established heresies will no doubt linger yet longer, and offer their opposition to Rome; but their days are numbered,

and, save as they may be placed in the forefront of the battle with the church, the active non-Catholic thought of the age makes no account of them, and respects them far less than it does Rome herself. They live only a galvanized life.

We are far from regarding the battle that must be fought with the scientific no-religion or dry and cold unbelief of the age as a light affair. In many respects the world is a more formidable enemy than heresy, and the gentilism of the nineteenth century is less manageable than that of the first, for it retains fewer elements of truth, and far less respect for authority and law. It has carried the spirit of revolt further, and holds nothing as sacred and inviolable. But it is always some gain when the issue is fairly presented, and the real question is fairly and distinctly stated in its appropriate terms; when there is no longer any disguise or subterfuge possible; and when the respective forces are fairly arrayed against each other, each under its own flag, and shouting its own war-cry. The battle will be long and arduous, for every article in the creed, from *Patrem omnipotentem* to *vitam æternam*, has been successively denied; but we cannot doubt to which side victory will finally incline.

Tertullian says, "the human heart is naturally Christian," and men cannot be contented to remain long in mere vegetable existence without some sort of religion. They will, when they have nothing else to worship, evoke the spirits of the dead, and institute an illusory demon-worship, as we see in modern spiritism. The Christian religion as presented by Rome, though it flatters not human pride, and is offensive to depraved appetite or passion, is yet adapted to the needs of human nature, and satisfies the purer and nobler aspirations of the soul. There is, as we have more than once shown, a natural want in man which it only can meet, and, we may almost say, a natural aptitude to receive it. Hence, we conclude that, when men see before them no alternative but Rome or no religion, downright naturalism able to satisfy nobody, they will, after some hesitation, submit to Rome and rejoice in Catholicity. Nature is very well; we have not a word to say against it when normally developed; but this world is too bleak and wintry for men to walk about in the nakedness of nature; they must have clothing of some sort, and, when they are fully convinced that they can find proper garments only in the wardrobe of

the church, they cannot, it seems to us, long hold out against Rome or refuse submission to the law of life.

We here close our very inadequate discussion of the great subject we have opened. Our remarks are only supplementary to the article on *Rome or Reason*, and are intended to guard against any false inferences that some might be disposed to draw from the doctrine we there set forth. We hold, as a Catholic, the dogma of original sin, and that our nature has been disordered by the fall and averted from God. We have not wished this fact to be overlooked, or ourselves to be understood as if we recognized no antagonism between this fallen or averted nature and Rome. Our nature is not totally depraved. Understanding and will, if the former has been darkened and the latter attenuated by the fall, yet remain, and retain their essential character; but disorder has been introduced into our nature, and the flesh inclines to sin; its face is turned away from God, and it stands in need of being converted or turned to him. The church brings to this disordered and averted nature whatever is needed to convert it, heal its wounds, and elevate it to the plane of its destiny. But after conversion, after regeneration, the flesh, "the carnal mind," remains, as the council of Trent teaches, and, as long as it remains, there must be a combat, a warfare. This combat, or warfare, is not, indeed, between reason and faith, revelation and science, nor between nature and grace, but between the law of God accepted and observed by the judgment and will, by the inner man, and the law of sin in our members, the struggle between holiness and sin, an internal struggle, of which every one is conscious who attempts to lead a holy life. We have not only wished to recognize the fact of this struggle as an interior struggle in the individual, but also as passing from the individual to society, and manifesting itself in the perpetual struggle between Rome and the world, which ceases, and can cease, only in proportion as men and society become converted to God, and voluntarily submissive to his law.

NATURE AND GRACE.

[From the Catholic World for January, 1868.]

In the article on *Rome and the World* it was shown that there is an irrepressible conflict between the spirit which dominates in the world and that which reigns in the church, or the antagonism which there is and must be between Christ and Satan, the law of life and the law of death; and every one who has attempted to live in strict obedience to the law of God has found that he has to sustain an unceasing warfare between the spirit and the flesh, between the law of the mind and the law in the members. We see the right, we approve it, we resolve to do it, and do it not. We are drawn away from it by the seductions of the flesh, our appetites, passions, and carnal affections, so that the good we would do, we do not, and the evil we would not, that we do. This, which is really a struggle in our own bosom between the higher nature and the lower, is sometimes regarded as a struggle between nature and grace, and taken as a proof that our nature is evil, and that between it and grace there is an inherent antagonism which can be removed only by the destruction either of nature by grace, or of grace by nature.

Antagonism there certainly is between the spirit of Christ and the spirit of the world, and in the bosom of the individual between the spirit and the flesh. This antagonism must last as long as this life lasts, for the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be; but this implies no antagonism between the law of grace and the law of nature; for there is, as St. Paul assures us, "no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh." (Rom. viii. 1.) Nor does this struggle imply that our nature is evil or has been corrupted by the fall; for the council of Trent has defined that the flesh indeed inclines to sin, but is not itself sin. It remains even after baptism, and renders the combat necessary through life; but they who resist it and walk after the spirit are not sinners because they retain it, feel its motions, and are exposed to its seductions. All evil originates in the abuse of good, for God has never made any thing evil. We

have suffered and suffer from original sin; we have lost innocence, the original righteousness in which we were constituted, the gifts originally added thereto, or the integrity of our nature—as immunity from disease and death, the subjection of the body to the soul, the inferior soul to the higher—and fallen into a disordered or abnormal state; but our nature has undergone no entitative or physical change or corruption, and it is essentially now what it was before the fall. It retains all its original faculties, and these all retain their original nature. The understanding lacks the supernatural light that illumined it in the state of innocence; but it is still understanding, and still operates and can operate only *ad veritatem;* free-will, as the council of Trent defines, has been enfeebled, attenuated, either positively in itself by being despoiled of its integrity and of its supernatural endowment, or negatively by the greater obstacles in the appetites and passions it has to overcome; but it is free-will still, and operates and can operate only *propter bonum.* We can will only good, or things only in the respect that they are good, and only for the reason they are good. We do not and cannot will evil as evil, or for the sake of evil. The object and only object of the intellect is truth, the object and only object of the will is good, as it was before the prevarication of Adam or original sin.

Even our lower nature, *concupiscentia*, in which is the *fomes peccati*, is still entitatively good, and the due satisfaction of all its tendencies is useful and necessary in the economy of human life. Food and drink are necessary to supply the waste of the body and to maintain its health and strength. Every natural affection, passion, appetite, or tendency points to a good of some sort, which cannot be neglected without greater or less injury; nor is the sensible pleasure that accompanies the gratification of our nature in itself evil, or without a good and necessary end. Where, then, is the evil, and in what consists the damage done to our nature by original sin? The damage, aside from the *culpa*, or sin and consequent loss of communion with God, is in the disorder introduced, the abnormal development of the flesh or the appetites and passions consequent on their escape from the control of reason, their fall under satanic influence, and the ignoble slavery, when they became dominant, to which they reduce reason and free-will as ministers of their pleasure. All the tendencies of our nature have each its special end, which each seeks without respect for

the special ends of the others; and hence, if not restrained by reason within the bounds of moderation and sobriety, they run athwart one another, and introduce into the bosom of the individual disorder and anarchy, whence proceed the disorder and anarchy, the tyranny and oppression, the wars and fightings in society. The appetites and passions are all despotic and destitute of reason, each seeking blindly and with all its force its special gratification; and the evil is in the struggle of each for the mastery of the others, and in their tendency to make reason and free-will their servants, or to bring the superior soul into bondage to the inferior, as is said, when we say of a man, "He is the slave of his appetites," or "the slave of his passions;" so that we are led to prefer a present and temporary good, though smaller, to a distant future and eternal beatitude, though infinitely greater. Hence, under their control we not only are afflicted with internal disorder and anarchy, but we come to regard the pleasure that accompanies the gratification of our sensitive appetites and passions as the real and true end of life. We eat and drink, not in order to live, but we live in order to eat and drink. We make sensual pleasure our end, the motive of our activity, and the measure of our progress. Hence we are carnal men, sold under sin, follow the carnal mind, which is antagonistic to the spiritual mind, or to reason and will, which, though they do in the carnal man the bidding of the flesh, never approve it, nor mistake what the flesh craves for the true end of man.

The antagonism here is antagonism between the spirit and the flesh, not an antagonism between nature and grace —certainly not between the law of nature and the law of grace. The law of nature is something very different from the natural laws of the physicists, which are simply physical laws. Transcendentalists, humanitarians, and naturalists confound these physical laws with what theologians call the natural law as distinguished from the revealed law, and take as their rule of morals the maxim, "Follow nature," that is, follow one's own inclinations and tendencies. They recognize no real difference between the law of obedience and the law of gravitation, and allow no distinction between physical laws and moral law. Hence for them there is a physical, but no moral order. The law of nature, as recognized by theologians and moralists, is a moral law, not a physical law, a law which is addressed to reason and free-will, and demands motives, not simply a mover. It is called

natural because it is promulgated by the supreme Lawgiver through natural reason, instead of supernatural revelation, and is, at least in a measure, known to all men ; for all men have reason, and a natural sense of right and wrong, and, therefore, a conscience.

Natural reason is able to attain to the full knowledge of the natural law, but, as St. Thomas maintains, only in the *élite* of the race. For the bulk of mankind a revelation is necessary to give them an adequate knowledge even of the precepts of the natural law ; but as in some men it can be known by reason alone, it is within the reach of our natural faculties, and therefore properly called natural. Not that nature is the source from which it derives its legal character, but the medium of its promulgation.

The law of grace or the revealed law presupposes the natural law—*gratia supponit naturam*—and however much or little it contains that surpasses it, it contains nothing that contradicts, abrogates, or overrides it. The natural law itself requires that all our natural appetites, passions, and tendencies be restrained within the bounds of moderation, and subordinated to a moral end or the true end of man, the great purpose of his existence ; and even Epicurus, who makes pleasure the end of our existence, our supreme good, requires, at least theoretically, the lower nature to be indulged only with sobriety and moderation. His error is not so much in the indulgence he allowed to the sensual or carnal nature, which he was as well aware as others, needs the restraints of reason and will, as in placing the supreme good in the pleasure that accompanies the gratification of nature, and in giving as the reason or motive of the restraint, not the will of God, but the greater amount and security of natural pleasure. The natural law not only commands the restraint, but forbids us to make the pleasure the supreme good, or the motive of the restraint. It places the supreme good in the fulfilment of the real purpose of our existence, makes the proper motive justice or right, not pleasure, and commands us to subordinate inclination to duty as determined by reason or the law itself. It requires the lower nature to move in subordination to the higher, and the higher to act always in reference to the ultimate end of man, which, we know even from reason itself, is God, the final as well as the first cause of all things. The revealed law and the natural law here perfectly coincide, and there is no discrepancy between them. If, then, we

understand by nature the law of nature, natural justice and equity, or what we know or may know naturally is reasonable and just, there is no contrariety between nature and grace, for grace demands only what nature herself demands. The supposed war of grace against nature is only the war of reason and free-will against appetite, passion, and inclination, which can be safely followed only when restrained within proper bounds. The crucifixion or annihilation of nature, which Christian asceticism enjoins, is a moral, not a physical crucifixion or annihilation; the destruction of pleasure as our motive or end. No physical destruction of any thing natural, nor physical change in any thing natural, is demanded by grace or Christian perfection. The law of grace neither forbids nor diminishes the pleasure that accompanies the satisfaction of nature; it only forbids our making it our good, an end to be lived for. When the saints mortify the flesh, chastise the body, or sprinkle with ashes their mess of bitter herbs, it is to maintain inward freedom, to prevent pleasure from gaining a mastery over them, and becoming a motive of action, or perhaps oftener from a love of sacrifice, and the desire to share with Christ in his sufferings to redeem the world. We all of us, if we have any sympathies, feel an invincible repugnance to feasting and making merry when our friends, those we tenderly love, are suffering near us, and the saints see always the suffering Redeemer, Christ in his agony in the garden and on the cross, before their eyes, him whom they love deeply, tenderly, with their whole heart and soul.

But though the law of nature and the law of grace really coincide, we have so suffered from original sin, that we cannot, by our unassisted natural strength, perfectly keep even the law of nature. The law of nature requires us to love God with our whole heart and with our whole soul, and with all our strength and with all our mind, and our neighbour as ourselves. This law, though not above our powers in integral nature, is above them in our fallen or abnormal state. Grace is the supernatural assistance given us through Jesus Christ to deliver us from the bondage of Satan and the flesh, and to enable us to fulfil this great law. This is what is sometimes called medicinal grace; and however antagonistic it may be to the moral disorder introduced by original sin and aggravated by actual sin, it is no more antagonistic to nature itself than is the medicine administered by the physician to the body to enable it to throw off

a disease too strong for it, and to recover its health. What assists nature, aids it to keep the law and attain to freedom and normal development, cannot be opposed to nature or in any manner hurtful to it.

Moreover, grace is not merely medicinal, nor simply restricted to repairing the damage done by original sin. Where sin abounded, grace superabounds. Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate or not is a question which we need not raise here, any more than the question whether God could or could not, congruously with his known attributes, have created man in what the theologians call the state of pure nature, as he is now born, *seclusa ratione culpæ et pœnæ*, and therefore for a natural beatitude; for it is agreed on all hands that he did not so create him and that the Incarnation is not restricted in its intention or effect to the simple redemption of man from sin, original or actual, and his restoration to the integrity of his nature, lost by the prevarication of Adam. All schools teach that as a matter of fact the Incarnation looks higher and further, and is intended to elevate man to a supernatural order of spiritual life, and to secure him a supernatural beatitude, a life and beatitude to which his nature alone is not adequate.

Man regarded in the present decree of God has not only his origin in the supernatural, but also his last end or final cause. He proceeds from God as first cause, and returns to him as final cause. The oriental religions, the Egyptian, Hindoo, Chinese, Buddhist, &c., all say as much, but fall into the error of making him proceed from God by way of emanation, generation, formation, or development, and his return to him as final cause, absorption in him, as the stream in the fountain, or the total loss of individuality, which, instead of being perfect beatitude in God, is abolute personal annihilation. But these religions have originated in a truth which they misapprehend, pervert, or travesty. Man, both Christian faith and sound philosophy teach us, proceeds from God as first cause by way of creation proper, and returns to him as final cause without absorption in him or loss of individuality. God creates man, not indeed an independent, but a substantive existence, capable of acting from his own centre as a second cause; and however intimate may be his relation with God, he is always distinguishable from him, and can no more be confounded with him as his final cause than he can be confounded with him as his first

cause. Not only the race but the individual man returns to God, and finds in him his supreme good, and individually united to him through the Word made flesh, enjoys personally in him an infinite beatitude.

God alike as first cause and as final cause is supernatural. And man therefore can neither exist nor find his beatitude without the intervention of the supernatural. He can no more rise to a supernatural beatitude or beatitude in God without the supernatural act of God, than he could begin to exist without that act. The natural is created and finite, and can be no medium of the infinite or supernatural. Man, as he is in the present decree of God, cannot obtain his end, rise to his supreme good or beatitude, without a supernatural medium. This medium in relation to the end, or in the teleological order, is the Word made flesh, God incarnate, Jesus Christ, the only mediator between God and men. Jesus Christ is not only the medium of our redemption from sin and the consequences of the fall, but of our elevation to the plane of a supernatural destiny, and perfect beatitude in the intimate and eternal possession of God, who is both our good and the Good in itself. This is a higher, an infinitely greater good than man could ever have attained to by his natural powers even in a state of integral nature, or if he had not sinned, and had had no need of a Redeemer; and hence the apostle tells us where sin abounded grace superabounded, and the church sings on Holy Saturday, *O felix culpa.* The incarnate Word is the medium of this superabounding good, as the Father is its principle and the Holy Ghost its consummator.

Whether grace is something created, as St. Thomas maintains, and as would seem to follow from the doctrine of infused virtues asserted by the council of Trent, or the direct action of the Holy Ghost within us, as was held by Petrus Lombardus, the Master of Sentences, it is certain that the medium of all grace given to enable us to attain to beatitude is the Incarnation, and hence is termed by theologians *gratia Christi*, and distinguishable from the simple *gratia Dei*, which is bestowed on man in the initial order, or order of genesis, commonly called the natural order, because its explication is by natural generation, and not as the teleological order, by the election of grace. The grace of Christ by which our nature is elevated to the plane of the supernatural, and enabled to attain to a supernatural end or beatitude, cannot be opposed to nature, or in any sense antagonistic to

nature. Nature is not denied or injured because its author prepares for it a greater, an infinitely greater than a natural or created good, to which no created nature by its own powers, however exalted, could ever attain. Men may doubt if such a good remains for those who love our Lord Jesus Christ and by his grace follow him in the regeneration, but nobody can pretend that the proffer of such good, and the gift of the means to attain it, can be any injury or slight to nature.

There is no doubt that the flesh resists grace, because grace would subordinate it to reason and free-will, but this, though the practical difficulty, is not the real dialectic difficulty which men feel in the way of accepting the Christian doctrine of grace. Men object to it on the ground that it substitutes grace for nature, and renders nature good for nothing in the Christian or teleological order—the order of return to God as our last end or final cause. We have anticipated and refuted this objection in condemning the pantheistic doctrine of the Orientals, and by maintaining that the return to God is without absorption in him, or loss of our individuality or distinct personality.

The beatitude which the regenerate soul attains to in God by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is the beatitude of that very individual soul that proceeds, by way of creation, from God. The saints by being blest in God are not lost in him, but retain in glory their original human nature and their identical personal existence. This the church plainly teaches in her *cultus sanctorum*. She invokes the saints in heaven, and honors them as individuals distinct from God, and as distinct personalities; and hence, she teaches us that the saints are sons of God only by adoption, and, though living by and in the Incarnate Word, are not themselves Christ, or the Word made flesh. In the Incarnation, the human personality was absorbed or superseded by the divine personality, so that the human nature assumed had a divine but no human personality. The Word assumed human nature, not a human person. Hence the error of the Nestorians and adoptionists, and also of those who in our own times are willing to call Mary the mother of Christ, but shrink from calling her *Θεοτόκος*, or the Mother of God. But in the saints, who are not hypostatically united to the Word, human nature not only remains unchanged, but retains its human personality; and the saints are as really men, as really human persons in glory, as they were while

in the flesh, and are the same human persons that they were before either regeneration or glorification. The church, by her *cultus sanctorum*, teaches us to regard the glorified saints as still human persons, and to honor them as human persons, who by the aid of grace have merited the honor we give them. We undoubtedly honor God in his saints as well as in all his works of nature or of grace; but this honor of God in his works is that of *latria*, and is not that which is rendered to the saints. In the *cultus sanctorum*, we not only honor him in his works, but we also honor the saints themselves for their own personal worth, acquired not, indeed, without grace, but still acquired by them, and is as much theirs as if it had been acquired by their unassisted natural powers; for our natural powers are from God as first cause, no less than grace itself, only grace is from him through the Incarnation. You say, it is objected, that grace supposes nature, *gratia supponit naturam*, yet St. Paul calls the regeneration a new creation, and the regenerated soul a new creature. Very true; yet he says this not because the nature given in generation is destroyed or superseded in regeneration, but because regeneration no more than generation can be initiated or sustained without the divine creative act; because generation can never become of itself regeneration, or make the first motion toward it. Without the divine regenerative act we cannot enter upon our teleological or spiritual life, but must remain for ever in the order of generation, and infinitely below our destiny, as is the case with the reprobate or those who die unregenerate. But it is the person born of Adam that is regenerated, that is translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son, and that is the recipient of regenerating, persevering, and glorifying grace. This is the point we insist on; for, if so, the objection that grace destroys or supersedes nature is refuted. The whole of Catholic theology teaches that grace assists nature, but does not create or substitute a new nature, as is evident from the fact that it teaches that in regeneration even we must concur with grace, that we can resist it, and after regeneration lose all that grace confers, apostatize from the faith, and fall even below the condition of the unregenerate. This would be impossible, if we did not retain our nature as active in and after regeneration. In this life it is certain that regeneration is a moral, a spiritual, not a physical change, and that our reason and will are emancipated from the bondage of sin, and are

simply enabled to act from a higher plane and gain a higher end than they could unassisted; but it is the natural person that is enabled and that acts in gaining the higher end. Grace, then, does not in this life destroy or supersede nature, and the authorized *cultus* of the saints proves that it does not in the glorified saint or life to come.

The same conclusion follows from the fact that regeneration only fulfils generation. "I am not come," said our Lord, "to destroy, but to fulfil." The creative act, completed, as to the order of procession of existences from God, in the Incarnation or hypostatic union, which closes the initial order and institutes the teleological, includes both the procession of existences from God and their return to him. It is completed, fulfilled, and consummated only in regeneration and glorification. If the nature that proceeds from God is changed or superseded by grace, the creative act is not fulfilled, for that which proceeds from God does not return to him. The initial man must himself return, or with regard to him the creative act remains initial and incomplete. In the first order, man is only initial or inchoate, and is a complete, a perfect man only when he has returned to God as his final cause. To maintain that it is not this initial man that returns, but, if the supposition be possible, another than he, or something substituted for him, and that has not by way of creation proceeded from God, would deny the very purpose and end of the Incarnation, and the very idea of redemption, regeneration, and glorification, the grace of Christ, and leave man without any means of redemption or deliverance from sin, or of fulfilling his destiny—the doom of the damned in hell. The destruction or change of man's nature is the destruction of man himself, the destruction of his identity, his human personality; yet St. Paul teaches, (Rom. viii. 30), that the persons called are they who are redeemed and glorified: "Whom he predestinated, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he justified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified."

We can, indeed, do nothing in relation to our end without the grace of Christ; but, with that grace freely given and strengthening us, it is equally certain that we can work, and work even meritoriously, or else how could heaven be promised us as a reward? Yet it is so promised: "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is the rewarder of them that seek him." (Heb. xi. 6.) Moses "looked to

the reward;" David had respect to the divine "retributions;" and all Christians, as nearly all heathen, believe in a future state of rewards and punishments. We are exhorted to flee to Christ and obey him that we may escape hell and gain heaven. The grace by which we are born again and are enabled to merit is unquestionably gratuitous, for grace is always gratuitous, *omnino gratis*, as say the theologians, and we can do nothing to merit it, no more than we could do something to merit our creation from nothing; but though gratuitous, a free gift of God, grace is bestowed on or infused into a subject already existing in the order of generation or natural order, and we can act by it, and can and do, if faithful to it, merit heaven or eternal life. Hence says the apostle, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do, or to accomplish." (Philip. ii. 12, 13.) But this no more implies that the willing and doing in the order of regeneration are not ours than that our acting in the order of nature is not ours because we can even in that order act, whether for good or for evil, only by the divine concurrence.

The heterodox confound the gift of grace by which we are able to merit the reward with the reward itself; hence they maintain, because we can merit nothing without grace, that we can merit nothing even with it, and that we are justified by faith alone, which is the free gift of God, conferred on whom he wills, and that grace is irresistible, and once in grace we are always in grace. But St. James tells us that we are "justified by our works, and not by faith only, for faith without works is dead." (St. James ii. 14, 25.) Are we who work by grace and merit the reward the same *we* that prior to regeneration sinned and were under wrath? Is it we who by the aid of grace merit the reward, or is it the grace in us? If the grace itself, how can it be said that *we* are rewarded? If the reward is given not to us who sinned, but to the new person or new nature into which grace is said to change us, how can it be said that *we* either merit or are rewarded? Man has his specific nature, and if you destroy or change that specific nature, you annihilate him as man, instead of aiding his return to God as his final cause. The theologians treat grace not as a new nature, or a new faculty bestowed on nature, but as a *habitus*, or habit, an infused habit indeed, not an acquired habit, but none the less a habit on that account, which changes not, transforms not nature, but

gives it, as do all habits, a power or facility of doing what without it would exceed its strength. The subject of the habit is the human soul, and that which acts by, under, or with the habit is also the human soul, not the habit. The soul, as before receiving it, is the actor, but it acts with an increased strength, and does what before it could not; yet its nature is simply strengthened, not changed. The general idea of *habit* must be preserved throughout. The personality is not in the habit, but in the rational nature of him into whom the habit is infused by the Holy Ghost. In our Lord there are the two natures; but in him the divine personality assumes the human nature, and is always the subject acting, whether acting in the human nature or in the divine. In the regenerated there are also the human and the divine; but the human, if we may so speak, assumes the divine, and retains from first to last its own personality, as is implied in the return to God without absorption in him or loss of personal individuality, and in the fact that, though without grace, we cannot concur with grace, yet by the aid of grace we can and must concur with it the moment we come to the use of reason, or it is not effectual. The sacraments are, indeed, efficacious *ex opere operato*, not by the faith or virtue of the recipient, but only in case the will, as in infants, opposes no obstacle to the grace they signify. Yet even in infants the concurrence of the will is required when they come to the use of reason, and the refusal to elicit the act loses the habit infused by baptism. The baptized infant must concur with grace as soon as capable of a rational act.

The heterodox who are exclusive supernaturalists, because we cannot without grace concur with grace, deny that the concurrence is needed, and assert that grace is irresistible and overcomes all resistance, and, as *gratia victrix*, subjects the will. Hence they hold that, in faith, regeneration, justification, sanctification, nature does nothing, and all that is done is done by sovereign grace even in spite of nature; but the fact on which they rely is not sufficient to sustain their theory. The schoolmen, for the convenience of teaching, divide and subdivide grace till we are in danger of losing sight of its essential unity. They tell us of prevenient grace, or the grace that goes before and excites the will; of assisting grace, the grace that aids the will when excited to elect to concur with grace; and efficacious grace, the grace that renders the act of concurrence effectual. But

these three graces are really one and the same grace, and the *gratia præveniens*, when not resisted, becomes immediately *gratia adjuvans*, and aids the will to concur with grace, and, if concurred with, it becomes, *ipso facto* and immediately, *gratia efficax*. It needs no grace to resist grace, and none, it would seem to follow from the freedom of the will, *not* to resist it. Freedom of the will, according to the decision of the church in the case of the *gratia victrix* of the Jansenists, implies the power to will the contrary, and, if free to resist it, why not free not to resist? There is, it seems to us, a real distinction between not willing to resist and willing to concur. Nothing in nature compels or forces the will to resist, for its natural operation is to the good, as that of the intellect is to the true. The grace excites it to action, and, if it do not will to resist, the grace is present to assist it to elect to comply. If this be tenable, and we see not why it is not, both the aid of grace and the freedom and activity of the will are asserted, are saved, are harmonized, and the soul is elevated into the order of regeneration without any derogation either from nature or from grace, or lesion to either.

We are well aware of the old question debated in Catholic schools, whether grace is to be regarded as *auxilium quod* or as *auxilium quo;* but it is not necessary either to inquire what was the precise sense of the question debated, or to enter into any discussion of its merits, for both schools held the Catholic faith, which asserts the freedom of the will, and both held that grace is *auxilium*, and therefore an aid given to nature, not its destruction, nor its change into something else. The word *auxilium*, or aid, says of itself all that we are contending for. St. Paul says, indeed, when reluctantly comparing his labors with those of the other apostles, that he had labored more abundantly than they all, but adds, "Yet not I, but the grace of God with me." But he recognizes himself, for he says, "grace with *me;*" and his sense is easily explained by what he says in a passage already quoted, namely, "Work out your own salvation; for it is God that worketh in you to will and to do," or to accomplish, and also by what he says in the text itself. (1 Cor. xv. 10,) "By the grace of God, I am what I am;" which has primary reference to his calling to be an apostle. God by his grace works in us to will and to do, and we can will or do nothing in relation to our final end, as has been explained, without his grace; but, nevertheless, it is *we* who

will and do. Hence St. Paul could say to St. Timothy, "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. For the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will render to me at that day: and not to me only, but to them also that love his coming." (2 Tim. iv. 7, 8.) Here St. Paul speaks of himself as the actor and as the recipient of the crown. St. Augustine says that God, in crowning the saints, "crowns his own gifts," but evidently means that he crowns them for what they have become by his gifts; and, as it is only by virtue of his gifts that they have become worthy of crowns, their glory redounds primarily to him, and only in a subordinate sense to themselves. There is, in exclusive supernaturalists and exaggerated ascetics, an unsuspected pantheism, no less sophistical and uncatholic than the pantheism of our pseudo-ontologists. The characteristic mark of pantheism is not simply the denial of creation, but the denial of the creation of substances capable of acting as second causes. In the order of regeneration as in the order of generation we are not indeed primary, but are really secondary causes; and the denial of this fact, and the assertion of God as the direct and immediate actor from first to last, is pure pantheism. This is as true in the order of regeneration as in the order of generation, though in the order of grace it is thought to be a proof of piety, when, in fact, it denies the very subject that can be pious. Count de Maistre somewhere says, "The worst error against grace is that of asserting too much grace." We must exist, and exist as second causes, to be the recipients of grace, or to be able even with grace to be pious toward God, or the subject of any other virtue. In the regeneration we *do* by the aid of grace, but we are, nevertheless, the doers, whence it follows that regeneration no more than generation is wholly supernatural. Regeneration supposes generation, takes it up to itself and completes it, otherwise the first Adam would have no relation to the second Adam, and man would find no place in the order of regeneration, which would be the more surprising since the order itself originates in the Incarnation, in the God-Man, who is its Alpha and Omega, its beginning and end.

Many people are, perhaps, misled on this subject by the habit of restricting the word *natural* exclusively to the procession of existences from God and what pertains to the initial order of creation, and the word *supernatural* to the

return of existences to God as their last end, and the means by which they return or attain that end and complete the cycle of existence or the creative act. The procession is initial, the return is teleological. The initial is called natural, because it is developed and carried on by natural generation; the telological is called supernatural, because it is developed and carried on by grace, and the election by grace takes the place of natural descent. This is well enough, except when we have to deal with persons who insist on separating—not simply distinguishing, but separating, the natural and supernatural, and on denying either the one or the other. But, in reality, what we ordinarily call the natural is not wholly natural, nor what we call the supernatural is wholly supernatural. Strictly speaking, the supernatural is God himself and what he does with no other medium than his own eternal Word, that is, without any created medium or agency of second causes; the natural is that which is created and what God does through the medium of second causes or created agencies, called by physicists natural laws. Thus, creation is a supernatural fact, because effected immediately by God himself; generation is a natural fact, because effected by God mediately by natural laws or second causes; the hypostatic union, or the assumption of flesh by the Word, which completes the creative act in the initial order and institutes the teleological or final order, is supernatural; all the operations of grace are supernatural, though operations in and with nature; the sacraments are supernatural, for they are effective *ex opere operato*, and the natural parts are only the signs of grace, not its natural medium. The water used in baptism is not a natural medium of the grace of regeneration; it is made by the divine will the sign, though an appropriate sign, of it; the grace itself is communicated by the direct action of the Holy Ghost, which is supernatural. Regeneration, as well as its complement, glorification, is supernatural, for it cannot be naturally developed from generation, and regeneration does not necessarily carry with it glorification; for it does not of itself, as St. Augustine teaches, insure the grace of perseverance, since grace is *omnino gratis*, and only he that perseveres to the end will be glorified. Hence, even in the teleological order, the natural, that is, the human reason and will have their share, and without their activity the end would not and could not be gained. Revelation demands the active reception of reason, or else it might as well be made to an ox or a

horse as to a man; and the will that perseveres to the end is the human will, though the human will be regenerated by grace. Wherever you see the action of the creature as second cause you see the natural, and wherever you see the direct action of God, whether as sustaining the creature or immediately producing the effect, you see the supernatural.

The fact that God works in us to will and to do, or that we can do nothing in the order of regeneration without grace moving and assisting us, no more denies the presence and activity of nature than does the analogous fact that we can do nothing even in the order of generation without the supernatural presence and concurrence of the Creator. We are as apt to forget that God has any hand in the action of nature as we are to deny that where God acts nature can ever coöperate; we are apt to conclude that the action of the one excludes that of the other, and to run either into Pelagianism on the one hand, or into Calvinism or Jansenism on the other; and we find a difficulty in harmonizing in our minds the divine sovereignty of God and human liberty. We cannot, on this occasion, enter fully into the question of their conciliation. Catholic faith requires us to assert both, whether we can or cannot see how they can coexist. We think, however, that we can see a distinction between the divine government of a free active subject and of an inanimate and passive subject. God governs each subject according to the nature he has given it; and, if he has given man a free nature, his government, although absolute, must leave human freedom intact, and to man the capacity of exercising his own free activity, without running athwart the divine sovereignty. How this can be done, we do not undertake to say.

But be this as it may, there is no act even in the natural order that is or can be performed without the assistance of the supernatural; for we are absolutely dependent on the creative act of God in every thing, in those very acts in which we act most freely. The grace of God is as necessary as the grace of Christ. God has not created a universe, and made it, when once created, capable of going alone as a self-moving machine. He creates substances, indeed, capable of acting as second causes; but these substances can do nothing, are nothing as separated from the creative act of God that produces them, upholds them, is present in them, and active in all their acts, even in the most free determinations of the will. Without this divine presence, always an

efficient presence, and this divine activity in all created activities, there is and can be no natural activity or action, any more than, in relation to our last end, there can be the first motion toward grace without grace. The principle of action in both orders is strictly analogous, and our acting with grace or by the assistance of grace in the order of regeneration is as natural as is our acting by the divine presence and concurrence in the order of generation. The human activity in either order is equally natural, and in neither is it possible or explicable without the constant presence and activity of the supernatural. The two orders, the initial and the teleological, then, are not antagonistical to each other, are not based on two mutually destructive principles, but are really two distinct parts, as we so often say, of one dialectic whole.

The Holy Scriptures, since God is *causa eminens*, the cause of causes, the first-cause operative in all second causes speak of God as doing this or that, without always taking special note of the fact that, though he really does it, he does it through the agency of second causes or the activity of creatures. This is frequently the case in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and sometimes, though less frequently, in the New Testament, though never in either without something to indicate whether it is the direct and immediate or the indirect and mediate action of God that is meant. Paying no attention to this, many overlook the distinction altogether, and fall into a sort of pantheistic fatalism, and practically deny the freedom and activity of second causes, as is the case with Calvin when he declares God to be the author of sin, which on his own principles is absurd, for he makes the will of God the criterion of right, and therefore whatever God does must be right, and nothing that is right can be sin. On the other hand, men, fixing their attention on the agency of second causes, overlook the constant presence and activity of the first cause, treat second causes as independent causes, or as if they were themselves first cause, and fall into pure naturalism, which is only another name for atheism. The universe is not a clock or a watch, but even a clock or a watch generates not its own motive power; the maker in either has only so constructed it as to utilize for his purpose a motive power that exists and operates independently both of him and of his mechanism.

Men speak of nature as supernaturalized in regeneration, and hence assume that grace transforms nature; but in this

there must be some misunderstanding or exaggeration. In regeneration we are born into the order of the end, or started, so to speak, on our return to God as our final cause. The principle of this new birth, which is grace, and the end, which is God, are supernatural; but our nature is not changed except as to its motives and the assistance it receives, though it receives in baptism an indelible mark not easy to explain. This follows from the Incarnation. In the Incarnation our nature is raised to be the nature of God, and yet remains human nature, as is evident from the condemnation by the church of the monophysites and the monothelites. Catholic faith requires us to hold that the two natures, the human and the divine, remain for ever distinct in the one divine person of the Word. Some prelates thought to save their orthodoxy by maintaining that, after his resurrection, the two natures of our Lord became fused or transformed into one theandric nature; but they did not succeed, and were condemned and deposed. The monothelites asserted that there were in Christ two natures indeed, but only one will, or that his human will was absorbed in the divine. But they also were condemned as heretics. Our Lord, addressing the Father, says, "Not my will, but thine be done," thus plainly implying a human will distinct from, though not contrary to, the divine will. Can we suppose that the grace of regeneration or even of glorification works a greater change of nature in us than the grace of union worked in our nature as assumed by the Word? If human nature and human will remain in Christ after the hypostatic union, so that to regard him after his resurrection as having but one will or one theandric nature is a heresy, how can we hold without heresy that grace, which flows from that union, either destroys our nature or transforms it into a theandric or supernaturalized nature?

Let us understand, then, that grace neither annihilates nor supersedes or transforms our nature. It is our nature that is redeemed or delivered from the bondage of sin, our nature that is translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light, our nature that is reborn, that is justified, that by the help of grace perseveres to the end, that is rewarded, that is glorified, and enters into the glory of our Lord. It then persists in regeneration and glorification as one and the same human nature, with its human reason, its human will, its human personality, its human activity, only assisted by grace to act from a supernatural principle

to or for a supernatural end. The assistance is supernatural, and so is the end; but that which receives the assistance, profits by it, and attains the end, is human nature, the man that was born of Adam as well as reborn of Christ, the second Adam.

We have dwelt long, perhaps to tediousness, upon this point, because we have wished to efface entirely the fatal impression that nature and grace are mutually antagonistic, and to make it appear that the two orders, commonly called the natural and the supernatural, are both mutually consistent parts of one whole; that grace simply completes nature; and that Christianity is no anomaly, no after-thought, or succedaneum, in the original design of creation.

The heterodox, with their doctrine of total depravity, and the essential corruption or evil of nature, and their doctrine, growing out of this assumed depravity or corruption, of irresistible grace, and the inactivity or passivity of man in faith and justification, obscure this great fact, and make men regard nature as a failure, and that to save some God had to supplant it and create a new nature in its place. A more immoral doctrine, or one more fatal to all human activity, is not conceivable, if it could be really and seriously believed and acted on prior to regeneration, which is impossible. The heterodox are better than their system. The system teaches that all our works before regeneration are sins; even our prayers are unacceptable, some say, an abomination to the Lord, and consequently, there is no use in striving to be virtuous. After regeneration there is no need of our activity, for grace is inamissible, and if really born again, sin as much as we will, our salvation is sure, for the sins of the regenerated are not reputed to them or counted as sins. There is no telling how many souls this exclusive and exaggerated supernaturalism (which we owe to the reformers of the sixteenth century) has destroyed, or how many persons it has deterred from returning to the Catholic church by the common impression, that, since she asserts original sin and the necessity of grace, she holds and teaches the same frightful system. Men who are able to think, and accustomed to sober reflection, find themselves unable to embrace Calvinism, and, confounding Calvinism with Christianity, reject Christianity itself, and fall into a meagre rationism, a naked naturalism, or, worst of all, an unreasoning indifferentism; yet there is no greater mistake than to suppose that the church holds it or has the slightest sympa-

thy with it. We have wished to mark clearly the difference between it and her teaching. Christian asceticism, when rightly understood, is not based on the assumption that nature is evil, and needs to be destroyed, repressed, or changed. It is based on two great ideas, liberty and sacrifice. It is directed not to the destruction of the flesh or the body, for in the creed we profess to believe in the "resurrection of the flesh." Our Lord assumed flesh in the womb of the Virgin; he had a real body, ascended into heaven with it, and in it sitteth at the right hand of the Father Almighty. He feeds and nourishes us with it in Holy Communion; and it is by eating his flesh and drinking his blood that our spiritual life is sustained and strengthened. Our own bodies shall rise again, and, spiritualized after the manner of Christ's glorious body, shall, reunited to the soul, live for ever. We show that this is our belief by the honor we pay to the relics of the saints. This sacred flesh, these sacred bones, which we cherish with so much tender piety, shall live again, and re-enter the glorified body of the saint. Matter is not evil, as the Platonists teach, and as the false asceticism of the heathen assumes, with which Christian asceticism has no affinity, though many who ought to know better pretend to the contrary. The Christian ascetic aims, indeed, at a moral victory over the flesh, labors by the help of grace to liberate the soul from its bondage, to gain the command of himself, to be at all times free to maintain the truth, and to keep the commandments of God; to bring his body into subjection to the soul, to reduce the appetites and passions under the control of his reason and will, but never to destroy them or in any manner to injure his material body. Far less does he seek to abnegate, destroy, or repress either will or reason, in order to give grace freer and fuller scope; he only labors to purify and strengthen both by grace. Nature is less abnormal, purer, stronger, more active, more energetic in the true ascetic than in those who take no pains to train and purify it under the influence of divine grace.

The principle of all sacrifice is love. It was because God so loved men that he gave his only-begotten Son to die for them that they might not perish, but have everlasting life. It was love that died on the cross for our redemption. Nothing is hard or difficult to love, and there is nothing love will not do or sacrifice for the object loved. The saint can never make for his Lord a sacrifice great enough to satisfy

his love, and gives up for him the most precious things he has, not because they are evil or it would be sin in him to retain them; not because his Lord needs them, but because they are the most costly sacrifice he can make, and he in making the sacrifice can give some proof of his love. The chief basis of monastic life is sacrifice. The modern notion that monastic institutions were designed to be a sort of hospital for infirm souls is essentially false. As a rule, a virtue that cannot sustain itself in the world will hardly acquire firmness and strength in a monastery. The first monks did not retire from the world because unfit to live in it, but because the world restrained their liberty, and because it afforded them no adequate field for the heroic sacrifices to which they aspired. Their austerities, which we, so little robust as Christians, accustomed to pamper our bodies, and to deny ourselves nothing, regard as sublime folly, if not with a shudder of horror, were heroic sacrifices to the Spouse of the soul, for whom they wished to give up every thing but their love. They rejoiced in affliction for his sake, and they wished to share, as we have already said, with him in the passion and cross which he endured for our sake, so as to be as like him as possible. There are saints to-day in monasteries, and out of monasteries in the world, living in our midst, whom we know not or little heed, who understand the meaning of this word *sacrifice*, and make as great and as pure sacrifices, though perhaps in other forms, and as thoroughly forego their own pleasure, and as cheerfully give up what costs them the most to give up, as did the old fathers of the desert. But, if we know them not, God knows them and loves them.

Yet we pretend not to deny that many went into monasteries from other motives, from weakness, disappointed affection, disgust of the world, and some to hide their shame, and to expiate their sins by a life of penance; but, if the monastery often sheltered such as these, it was not for such that it was originally designed. In process of time, monastic institutions when they became rich, were abused, as often the priesthood itself, and treated by the nobles as a provision for younger sons or portionless daughters. We may at times detect in ascetics an exaggeration of the supernatural element and an underrating, if not a neglect of the natural; we may find, chiefly in modern times, a tendency amongst the pious and devout to overlook the fact that manliness, robustness, and energy of mind and character enter as an

important element in the Christian life; but the tendency in this direction is not catholic, though observed to some extent among Catholics. It originates in the same causes that originated the Calvinistic or Jansenistic heresy, and has been strengthened by the exaggerated assertion of the human and natural elements caused by the reaction of the human mind against an exclusive and exaggerated supernaturalism. The rationalism and humanitarianism of the last century and the present are only the reaction of human nature against the exaggerated supernaturalism of the reformers and their descendants, the Jansenists, who labored to demolish nature to make way for grace, and to annihilate man in order to assert God. Each has an element of truth, but, neither having the whole truth, each makes war on the other, and alternately gains a victory and undergoes a defeat. Unhappily, neither will listen to the church who accepts the truth and rejects the exclusiveness of each, and harmonizes and completes the truth of both in the unity and catholicity of the faith once delivered to the saints. The Catholic faith is the reconciler of all opposites. These alternate victories and defeats go on in the world outside of the church; but it would be strange if they did not have some echo among Catholics, living, as they do, in the midst of the combatants, and in constant literary and intellectual intercourse with them. They create some practical difficulties for Catholics which are not always properly appreciated. We cannot assert the natural, rational, and human element of the church without helping, more or less, the exclusive rationalists or naturalists who deny the supernatural; and we can hardly oppose them with the necessary vigor and determination without seeming at least to favor their opponents, the exclusive supernaturalists, who reject reason and deny the natural. It is this fact very likely that has kept Catholics for the most part during the last century and the present on the defensive; and as, during this period, the anti-supernaturalists have been the most formidable enemy of the church, it is no wonder if the mass of devout Catholics have shown some tendency to exaggerate the supernatural, and been shy of asserting as fully as faith warrants the importance of the rational and the natural, or if they have paid less attention to the cultivation of the human side of religion than is desirable.

Some allowance must be made for the new position in which Catholics for a century or more have been placed,

and it would be very wrong to censure them with severity, even if we found them failing to show themselves all at once equal to the new duties imposed upon them. The breaking up of old governments and institutions, founded by Catholic ancestors, the political, social, and industrial revolutions that have been and still are going on, must have, to some extent, displaced the Catholic mind, and required it, so to speak, to ease itself, or to take a new and difficult observation, and determine its future course. Catholics to-day stand between the old, which was theirs, and which is passing away, and the new, which is rising, and which is not yet theirs. They must needs be partially paralyzed, and at a momentary loss to know what course to take. Naturally conservative, as all men are who have something to lose or on which to rely, their sympathies are with the past, they have not been able as yet to accept the new state of things, and convert regrets into hopes. A certain hesitation marks their conduct, as if in doubt whether to stand out against the new at all hazards, and, if need be, fall martys to a lost cause, or to accept it and do the best they can with it. In this country, where Catholicity is not associated with any sort of political institutions, and Catholics have no old civilization to retain or any new order to resist, we, unless educated abroad, are hardly able to appreciate the doubts, hesitations, and discouragements of Catholics in the old world, and to make the proper allowances if at times they seem to attach as Catholics undue importance to the political and social changes going on around them, to be too despondent, and more disposed to cry out against the wickedness of the age, to fold their hands, and wait for Providence to rearrange all things for them without their coöperation, than to look the changes events have produced full in the face, and to exert themselves, with the help of grace, to bring order out of the new chaos, as their brave old ancestors did out of the chaos that followed the irruption of the northern barbarians, and the breaking up of the Græco-Roman civilization. It is no light thing to see the social and political world in which we have lived, and with which we have been accustomed to associate the interests of religion and society falling in ruins under our very eyes, and we must be pardoned if for a moment we feel that all is gone or going.

But Catholic energy can never be long paralyzed, and already the Catholics of Europe are arousing themselves from their apathy, recovering their courage, and beginning

to feel aware that the church depends on nothing temporary, is identified with no political or social organization, and can survive all the mutations of the world around her. Leading Catholics in Europe, instead of wasting their strength in vain regrets for a past that is gone, or in vainer efforts to restore what can no longer be restored, are beginning to adjust themselves to the present, and to labor to command the future. They are leaving the dead to bury their dead, and preparing to follow their Lord in the new work to be done for the new and turbulent times in which their lot is cast. "All these things are against me," said the patriarch Jacob, and yet they proved to be all for him and his family. Who knows but the untoward events of the last century and the present will turn out for the interests of religion, and that another Joseph may be able to say to their authors, "Ye meant it for evil, but God meant it for good?"

In all great political and social revolutions there must always be a moment when men may reasonably doubt whether duty calls them to labor to retain what is passing away, or whether they shall suffer it to be buried with honor, and betake themselves with faith and hope and courage to what has supplanted it. That moment has passed in the Old World, and nothing remains but to make the best of the present, and to labor to reconstruct the future in the best way possible. Happily for us, the church, though she may lose province after province, nation after nation, and be driven to take refuge in the catacombs, cannot be broken up, or her divine strength and energy impaired. While she remains, we have God with us, and our case can never be desperate. The church has seen darker days than any she now experiences; civilization has been much nearer its ruin than it is now in Europe, and Catholics have now all the means to surmount present difficulties, which sufficed them once to conquer the world. There is no sense in despondency. Cannot the millions of Catholics do to-day what twelve fishermen of Galilee did? Is the successor of Peter to-day more helpless than was Peter himself, when he entered Rome with his staff to preach in the proud capitol of heathendom the crucified Redeemer? The same God that was with Peter, and gave efficacy to his preaching, is with his successor; and we who live to-day have, if we seek it, all the divine support, and more than all the human means, that those Catholics had who subdued the barbarians and laid the foundation of Christian Europe. What they did

we may do, if, with confidence in God, we set earnestly about doing it. The world is not so bad now as it was in the first century or in the sixth century; and there is as strong faith, as ardent piety, in this age, as in any age that has gone before it. Never say, "We have fallen on evil times." All times are evil to the weak, the cowardly, the despondent; and all times are good to the strong, the brave, the hopeful, who dare use the means God puts into their hands, and are prepared to do first the duty that lies nearest them.

We see many movements that indicate that our European brethren are regaining their courage, and, counting the past, so glorious for Catholics, as beyond recovery, are endeavoring to do what they can in and for the present, quietly, calmly, without noise or ostentation; and they will not need to labor long before they will see the "truths crushed to the earth rise again," and a new order, Phœnix-like, rising from the ashes of the old, more resplendent in beauty and worth, more in harmony with the divine spirit of the church, and more favorable to the freedom and dignity of man. Truth dies never. "The eternal years of God are hers." The Omnipotent reigns, and thus far in the history of the church, what seemed her defeat, has proved for her a new and more brilliant victory. The church never grows old, and we can afford to be patient though earnest in her service. The spirit of God never ceases to hover over the chaos, and order, though disturbed for a time, is sure, soon or late, to reappear.

We feel that we have very inadequately discussed the great question of nature and grace, the adequate discussion of which is far beyond the reach of such feeble abilities and such limited theological attainments as ours; but we have aimed to set forth as clearly and as simply as we could what we have been taught by our Catholic masters on the relation of the natural to the supernatural; and if we have succeeded in showing that there is no antagonism between nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural, the divine sovereignty and human liberty, and that we can be at once pious and manly, energetic as men, and humble and devout as Christians, or if we have thrown out any suggestions that will aid others in showing it to the intelligence of our age, and if we have been able to speak a word of comfort and hope to our brethren who find themselves in a position in which it is difficult to determine how to act, our purpose will have

been accomplished, and we shall have done no great but some slight service to the cause to which we feel that we are devoted heart and soul. We have aimed to avoid saying any thing that could wound the susceptibilities of any Catholic school of theology, and to touch as lightly as possible on matters debated among Catholics. We hope we have succeeded; for these are times in which Catholics need to be united in action as well as in faith.

ARGYLL'S REIGN OF LAW.*

[From the Catholic World for February, 1868.]

THERE is much in this work that we hold to be true and important, when considered by itself, without reference to the general views or doctrines of the author; but they are so interwoven with other things, that to us are evidently unscientific or untrue, that they lose nearly all their practical value. The author certainly does not lack ability, and is apparently learned in the sciences; but, unhappily for such a work as he appears to have meditated, he is no theologian and no philosopher. There is such a want of distinctness in his principles, and of clearness and precision in his statements, that, with the best intentions in the world to understand him, we are unable to make out to our own satisfaction what he is driving at, or for what purpose he has written his book.

The topics treated are: 1. The supernatural; 2. Law—its definitions; 3. Contrivance, a necessity arising out of the reign of law; 4. Apparent exceptions to the supremacy of purpose; 5. Creation by law; 6. Law in the realm of mind; 7. Law in politics. These are great topics, and are intimately connected with theology and philosophy, faith and religion. But what has the author proposed to himself in treating them? What general view of religion or of science does he seek to bring out, illustrate, or establish? We can

---

* *The Reign of Law.* By the Duke of Argyll. London: 1867.

find in his book no satisfactory answer to either of these questions. He is a *savant*, not a philosopher, and there seems to be in his mind and in his book the same want of unity and wholeness, the same tendency to lose itself in details, that there is and must be in the special or inductive sciences when not subordinated to a general or a superior science, to be supplied only by theology or philosophy, which deals with the ideal, the universal, and the necessary; and we find it impossible to harmonize the several special views which he takes, integrate them in any general view which it can be supposed that he accepts, or which he is not found, first or last, directly or indirectly impugning. We understand well enough his language, which is simple and clear, so far as the words and sentences go; we understand, too, the parts of his book taken separately; but we frankly confess our inability to put the several parts together and understand them as a whole.

Our first impression, on looking through the work, was that the author wished to harmonize the sciences with the great primary truths of religion, by showing that the universe in all its departments, laws, facts, and phenomena proceeds from a productive will under the direction of mind or intelligence, for a purpose or end. In this view the laws of nature, producing effects in their order, could be carried up for their first cause to the divine will, or that will itself using the instrumentality of laws or means it had itself created. To harmonize the sciences with faith, or to render them compatible with faith, all that would need to be done would be to show that since the so-called natural laws themselves depend wholly on God, they can never restrain his freedom, or compel him to act through them, and only through them. We will not say that he has not had something of the sort in view; but, certainly, not uniformly and steadily.

We thought, again, that having the same end in view, he wished to show that all things are produced according to one and the same dialectic law, and, therefore, that viewed as a whole, in its principle, medium, and end, as the external expression of the Holy Trinity, which God is in himself, the universe must be really dialectic, and strictly logical in all its parts. Creation is the external word of God, as the Son is his internal word or expression. As the Creator is in himself the supreme logic, ὁ λόγος, logic itself, creation as his expression *ad extra*, or external image, must be as a

whole and in all its parts strictly logical, as St. Thomas implies when he says, "God is the similitude of all things," *similitudo rerum omnium.* Not that the type of God is in the creature, as the noble duke more than once implies; but that the type of the creature, of creation, is in God. Hence there can be no anomalies, no sophisms in the Creator's works; nothing arbitrary, capricious; but order must run through all, and all must be subjected to the law of order, implied in the doctrine of Scripture, "God hath made all things by weight and measure." The author, then, might be understood as attempting, by his knowledge of the physical sciences, to prove *a posteriori* that this is true, and to show that this law of order reigns in the world of matter and in the realm of mind, in the plant and in the animal, in science and in faith, in religion and in politics, as the universal law of creation. Hence, the possibility and reality of science, which consists in recognizing this law and tracing it in all things, little or great.

Some things, the author says, may be construed in favor of such a purpose, but he seems sometimes to be asserting the universal reign of law and at others to be censuring those who do assert it, and refuting those who maintain that life is the product of law; plainly showing that he does not understand law in the sense supposed, nor always in the same sense. His definitions of law also prove that he is a stranger to the view we suggest, and has his mind fixed on something quite different. The "root idea" of law, he says, is that of force; and he defines law to be in its primary sense "will enforcing itself with power"—a very erroneous definition, by the way, for law is will directed by reason. He also understands by it the means, medium, or instrument by which will creates, for he does not seem to hold that God creates from nothing, or without means distinguishable from himself; so we are thrown back, and again puzzled to determine what he really does mean. We ask ourselves if he is not a really profound theologian, master of the deepest Christian philosophy, and simply endeavoring to translate it into the language of the *savants*, or if he is not totally ignorant of that philosophy, suggesting to those who know it far more than he has ever dreamed of himself? Something almost inclines us to think the former; but upon the whole we incline to the latter, and conclude that the less profound in philosophy and theology we regard him, the greater the justice we shall do him.

The author, as near as we can come at his meaning, holds that all action of the divine will is by law, and that law is the means or instrument by which it acts and produces its effects; or, in other words, God always and everywhere makes use of natural laws or forces to affect his purposes. The definition he has given of law in its primary sense, "will enforcing itself with power," would seem to identify it with God himself, or at least with God willing and effecting his purpose; but he says: "Law is taken in certain derivative senses, in which hardly a trace of the primary sense is retained: 1. Law as applied simply to an observed order of facts. 2. To that order as involving the action of some force or forces, of which nothing more may be known. 3. As applied to individual forces the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined or ascertained. 4. As applied to those combinations of force which have reference to the fulfilment of purpose or the discharge of function. 5. As applied to the abstract conceptions of mind, not corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought necessary to our understanding of them—not merely to an order of facts, but to an order of thought." (Pp. 64, 65.) The last sense given to law proves clearly enough that the author knows nothing of philosophy, for it supposes the ideal or the intelligible is an abstract mental conception deduced from sensible phenomena, and therefore is objectively nothing, instead of being an objective reality affirmed to and apprehended by the mind. He is one who places the type of his God in the creature, not the type of the creature in God, and represents God to himself as the creature fulfilled or perfected, as do all inductive philosophers. But we will pass over this, as having been already amply discussed by us.

We confess that we find very little that is definite in these pretended definitions of law. They tell us to what classes of facts law is applied, but do not tell us what law is, or define whether it is the force which produces the facts to which it is applied or simply the rule according to which they are produced; whether it designates the order of their production or is simply their classification. The author may reply that it is applied in all these senses and several more, but that defines nothing. What is it in itself, apart from its application, or the manner of its use? A word, and nothing more? Then it is nothing, is unreal, a nullity, and how then can it ever be a force, or even an instrument

of force? "These great leading significations of the word law," he continues, "all circle round the three great questions which science asks of nature, the What, the How, and the Why: 1. What are the facts in their established order? 2. How, that is, from what physical causes, does that order come to be? 3. Why have those causes been so combined? What relation do they bear to purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to the discharge of function?" (P. 65.) This would be very well, if the sciences raised no questions beyond the order of second causes, but this is not the case. The author himself brings in other than physical causes. Will is not, in the ordinary sense of the word, physical; and he defines law to be, in its primary sense, will enforcing itself with power; and the question comes up, If these facts of nature are the product of will, of whose will? Does nature will or act from will? Is it by its will fire melts wax, the winds propel the ship at sea, or the lightning rends the oak? The author speaks of the *facts* of nature. *Fact* is something done, and implies a doer; what or who, then, is the doer? Here is a great question which the author raises, and which his definitions of law exclude. The whence is as important as the what, the how, or the why. Moreover, the author mistakes the sense of the how. The answer to the question, how? is not the question, from or by what cause or causes, but in what mode or manner. Law in "these great leading significations" which circle round the what, the how, and the why, does in no sense answer the question whence, or from what or by what cause, and leaves, by the way, both the first cause and the medial cause, the principle and medium of the facts observed and analyzed. How then can he assert the universal reign of law? As far as we can collect from the senses of the word given, law does not reign at all; it lies in the order of natural facts, and simply marks the order, manner, and purpose of their existence in nature, or their arrangement or classification in our scientific systems. Nothing more.

Yet his grace means more than this. He means, sometimes at least, that to arrange facts under their law is to reduce them to their physical cause or principle of production. Such and such facts owe their existence to such and such a law, that is, to such or such a natural cause or productive force. And his doctrine is that all causes are natural, and that there is no real distinction between natural and supernatural. "The truth is," he says, pp. 46–47, "that

there is no such distinction between what we find in nature, and what we are called upon to believe in religion, as men pretend to draw between the natural and the supernatural. *It is a distinction purely artificial, arbitrary, unreal.* Nature presents to our intelligence, the more clearly the more we search her, the designs, ideas, and intentions of some

> 'Living will that shall endure,
> When all that seems shall suffer shock.'"

But, does nature when she presents the designs, the ideas, intentions, present the will whose they are? And if so, does she present it as her own will, or as a will above herself? Undoubtedly, the will presented by religion is the same will that is operative in nature, but religion presents that will not as nature, but as above nature, therefore as supernatural, for nothing can be both itself and above itself. Nobody pretends, certainly no theologian pretends, that the will presented by religion is above the will that is operative in nature, and calls it for that reason supernatural. The will in both is one and the same, but religion asserts that it is alike supernatural whether in religion or nature. That will is the will of the Creator; and does the author mean to assert that the distinction between the Creator and the creature is unreal? Certainly not. Then he must be mistaken in asserting that the distinction between the natural and supernatural is "purely artificial, arbitrary, unreal," and also in controverting, as he does, the assertion of M. Guizot that "a belief in the supernatural is essential to all positive religion." He himself admits, p. 48, that M. Guizot's affirmation is true in the special sense that "belief in the existence of a living will, of a personal God, is indeed a requisite condition," and we will not be so unjust as to suppose that he either identifies this living will, this personal God with nature, or denies that he is above nature, its first and final cause, its principle, medium, and end, its sovereign proprietor and supreme ruler; for this lies at the very threshold of all true religion, is a truth of reason, and a necessary preamble to faith.

"But," the author continues, "the intellectual yoke, in the common idea of the supernatural, is a yoke which men impose upon themselves. Obscure thought and confused language are the main source of the difficulty." In the case of the noble duke, perhaps so; but if he had been familiar

with the clear thought and distinct language of the theologians, he probably would have experienced no difficulty in the case. What he really denies is not the *super*natural, but, if we may so speak, the *contra*natural, which is a very different thing, and which all real theologians are as ready and as earnest to deny as any one is or can be; for they all hold grace is supernatural, and yet adopt the maxim, *gratia supponit naturam*, as we have shown in the article on *Nature and Grace*. The author very conclusively shows that the contradictory of what is true in nature cannot be true in religion. Some pretended philosophers in the time of Pope Leo X. maintained that the immortality of the soul is true in theology, but false in philosophy. The pope condemned their doctrine and vindicated common sense, which teaches every one that what is true in theology cannot be false in philosophy, or what is true in philosophy cannot be false in theology. Truth is truth always and everywhere, and never is or can be in contradiction with itself. But we cannot agree with the author that "the common idea" of the supernatural is that it is something antagonistic to nature. There may be some heterodox theologians that so teach, or seem to teach, and many men who are devoted to the study of the natural sciences suppose that approved theologians assert the supernatural in the same sense, and this is one reason why they take such a dislike to theology and become averse to faith in supernatural revelation. But we hold them mistaken; at least we are not accustomed to see the supernatural presented by learned and orthodox theologians as opposed to the natural. If such is the teaching of the heterodox, it is very unfortunate for the author that he has taken their teaching to be that of the Christian church, or the faith of orthodox believers.

But the author's difficulty about the supernatural has its principal origin in his theology, not in his science. We do not like his habit of speaking of the divine action in nature as the action of will, for God never acts as mere will. We may distinguish in relation to our mode of apprehending him, between his essence and attributes, and between one attribute and another; indeed we must do so, for our powers are too feeble to form an adequate conception of the Divine being; but we must never forget that the distinctions we make in our mode of apprehending have no real existence in God himself. He is one, and acts always as one, in the unity of his being, and his action is always identically

the action of reason, love, wisdom, will, power. When we speak of him as living will, we are apt to divide or mutilate him in our thought, and to forget that he never acts or produces effects by any one attribute alone. But pass over this —though we cannot approve it, for God is eternal reason as really and as fully as he is eternal will; the noble duke, following his theology, makes in reality this one living will the only actor in nature, the direct and immediate cause of all the effects produced in the universe. He thus denies second causes, as Calvin did when he asserted that "God is the author of sin." Taking this view, what is nature? Nature is only the Divine will and its direct effects, or the one living will enforcing itself with power, using what are called natural laws or forces, not as second causes, but as means or instruments for effecting its purpose or purposes. Recognizing no created or second causes, and therefore no *causa eminens* or *causa causarum*, but only one direct and immediate cause, he can of course find no ground for a distinction between natural and supernatural. All is natural or all is supernatural, for all is identical, one and the same. Hence, denying very properly all contrariety or antagonism between natural and supernatural, the author can accept miracles only in the sense of superhuman and supermaterial events. They are not supernatural, as men commonly suppose: they are wrought by the one invincible will at work in every department of nature, are in nature, and as natural as the most ordinary events that occur—only they are the effects of more recondite laws, which come into play only on extraordinary occasions, and for special purposes. They belong to what Carlyle, in the *Sartor Resartus*, calls, "natural-supernaturalism," which is no real supernaturalism at all. The author's theology, which resolves God into pure will and power, has forced him to adopt his conclusion. His theology hardly admits, though it may profess not to deny, that God creates second causes, capable of acting from their own centre, and in their own order producing effects of their own. The difficulty he finds in admitting and understanding miracles as real supernatural facts, arises precisely from his not distinguishing between the First Cause and second causes. His failure to make this distinction is caused by his misconception or confused conception of the real character of the Divine creative act. Indeed, he hardly recognizes the fact of creation at all, as we might infer from his reducing the whole matter of science to the questions of the what,

the how, and the why, omitting entirely the whence. His science deals solely with facts of the secondary order, and omits or rejects the ideal, in which all things have their origin and cause, as unknowable, imaginary, unreal.

The author speaks frequently of creation, and we are far from supposing that he means to deny it; but if we understand him, he does deny that the Divine will creates without natural means or instrumentalities, and this appears to be what he means by "creation by law." He asks, p. 14, "By supernatural power do we not mean power independent of the use of means, as distinguished from power depending on knowledge, even infinite knowledge of the means proper to be employed?" We think his question is not well put; certainly we never heard before of such a definition of the supernatural, unless by means is meant natural means; but as he denies all supernatural power as operating independent of the use of natural means he must be understood as denying all creation from nothing, or that God creates all things by the word of his power, with no other means or medium than what is contained in himself. "The real difficulty," he says, "lies in the idea of will exercised without the use of means, not in the exercise of will through means which are beyond our knowledge." But what means were there through which the will could operate when nothing besides itself existed? Does the scientific author not see, unless he admits the eternal existence of something besides God, that on his ground creation must precede creation as the condition or means of creation? In the chapter on *Creation by Law*, pp. 280, 281, he says: "I do not know on what authority it is that we so often speak of creation as if it were not creation unless it works from nothing as its material, and by nothing as its means. We know that out of the 'dust of the ground,' that is out of the ordinary elements of nature are our bodies formed, and the bodies of all living things." But out of what was the "dust of the ground" or "the ordinary elements of nature" formed? He continues: "Nor is there any thing which should shock us in the idea that the creation of new forms, any more than their propagation, has been brought about by the instrumentality of means. In a theological point of view it matters nothing what those means have been." It, however, matters something in a theological point of view whether we assert that God creates without other means than is contained in his own divine being, or only by working with

preëxisting materials, which are independent of him, and eternal like himself.

The author professes not to know on what authority creation is denied to be creation unless from nothing as its materials, and by nothing as its means; but he must have said this without well weighing the words he uses. A man makes a watch out of materials which are supplied to his hand, and by availing himself of a motive force which exists and operates independently of him; but nobody calls him the creator of the watch. Man has, strictly speaking, no creative powers, because he can operate only on and with materials furnished him by God or nature, and cannot himself originate his own powers nor the powers he uses. He can form, fashion, utilize, to a limited extent, what already exists, but he cannot originate a new law nor a new force. The gentile philosophers finding in man no proper creative power, concluded that there is no proper creative power in God, and hence they substituted in their systems for creation emanation, generation, or formation; and you will search in vain through Plato or even Aristotle for the recognition of the fact of creation. Holding that God cannot, any more than man, work without materials, even the soundest of the gentile philosophers, say Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, asserted the eternity of matter, and explained the origin of things by supposing that God impresses on this eternal matter, as the seal on wax, or in some way unites with it, the ideas or forms eternal in his own mind. Here is no creation, for though there is combination of the preëxisting, there is no production of something where nothing was before; yet we cannot go beyond them, if we deny that creation proper is creation from nothing, or, as we have explained, that God creates without any material, means, or medium distinguishable from himself.

Yet no theologian pretends that God, in creating, works without means. No work, no act is possible or conceivable without principle, medium, and end. God can no more create without a medial cause than man can build a house without materials; but if the author had meditated on the significance of the dogma of the Trinity, he would have understood that God has the means or medium in himself, in his own eternal Word, by whom all things are made, and without whom was made nothing that was made. God in himself, in the unity of his own being, the mystery of the Trinity teaches us, is eternally and indissolubly, principle,

medium, and end, in three distinct persons. The Father is principle, the Son or Word is medium, and the Holy Ghost is end or consummator. Hence God is complete, being in its plenitude, in himself, most pure act, as say the theologians, and, therefore, able to do what he wills without going out of himself, or using means not in himself. The medium of creation is the Word who was in the beginning, who was with God, and who is God. Hence not only by and for God, but also in him "we live and move and have our being." To suppose otherwise is, as we have seen, to suppose God does not and cannot create by himself alone, or without the aid of something exterior to and distinguishable from himself, and nothing is distinguishable from him and his own creatures, but another being in some sort eternal like himself, which philosophy, as well as theology, denies.

Rectifying the noble author's mistake as to the creative act, and bearing in mind that God creates existences by himself alone, and creates them substances or second causes, capable of producing effects in the secondary order, we are able to assert a very real and a very intelligible distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Nature is the name for all that is created, the whole order of second causes, and as God creates and sustains nature, he must be himself supernatural. God has, or at least may have, two modes of acting; the one directly, immediately, with no medium but the medium he is in himself, and this mode of acting is supernatural; the other mode is acting in and through nature, in the law according to which he has constituted nature, or the forces which he has given her, called natural laws, and this mode is natural, because in it nature acts as second cause. God himself is above this order of nature, but is always present in it by his creative act, for the universe, neither as a whole nor in any of its parts, can stand save as upheld by the Creator. A miracle is a sensible fact not explicable by the laws of nature, and, therefore, a fact that can be explained only by being referred to the direct and immediate or supernatural action of God. Whether a miracle is ever wrought is simply a question of fact, to be determined by the testimony or evidence in the case. That God can work miracles may be inferred from the fact that creation does not exhaust him, and from the fact, the noble duke has amply proved, that the natural laws do not bind him to act only through them, or in any way restrain his freedom or liberty of action. In working a miracle, God

does not contravene or violate the natural laws, or the order of second causes, that is, the order of nature; he simply acts above it, and the fact is not contranatural, but supernatural. It does not destroy nature; for if it did, there would be no nature below it, and it would, therefore, not be supernatural.

The author very properly rejects the origin of species in development, at least in the higher forms of organic life, and shows that Darwin's theory of the formation of new species by natural selection does not form new species, but only selects the most vigorous of preëxisting species, such as survive the struggle for life. Old species indeed become extinct and new species spring into existence; but those new species or new forms of life which science discovers are not developments, but new creations. Creation, he holds, has a history, and is successive, continually going on. We doubt whether science is in a condition to say with absolute certainty that any species that once existed are now extinct, or that new species have successively sprung into existence; but assuming the fact to be as alleged, and we certainly are unable to deny it, we cannot accept the author's explanation. We agree with him that the creative will is as present and as active as it was in the beginning, or that creation is always a present act; but for this very reason, if for no other, we should deny that it is successive, or resolvable into successive acts, since that would imply that it is past or future as well as present. Regarded on the side of God, there can be no succession in the creative act. Succession is in time; but God dwells not in time, he inhabiteth eternity. His act on his side must be complete from the instant he wills to create, and can be successive only as externized in time. Individuals and species when they have served their purpose disappear, and others come forward and take their places, not by a new creation from nothing, but because in the one creative act the appointed time and place for their external appearance have come. It is rather we who come successively to the knowledge of creation than creation that is itself successive. The creative act is one, but its externization is successive. The divine act effecting the hypostatic union of human nature with the divine person of the Word was included in the one creative act, and in relation to God and his act was complete from the first; but as a fact of time it did not take place till long after the creation of the world. It is very possible then to accept fully all the facts

with regard to the appearance of new species that science discovers, without asserting successive creations; they are only the successive manifestations of the original creative act, revealing to us what we had not before seen in it.

In point of fact the author does not, though he thinks he does, assert successive creations, for he contends that the new are in some way made out of the old. He supposes the creative will prepares in what goes before for what comes after, and that the forms of life about to be extinguished approach close to and almost overlap the forms that are coming to be, and are in some way used in the creation of the new forms or species. This, as we have seen, is not creation, but formation or development, and hardly differs in substance from the doctrine of development that was held by some naturalists prior to Darwin's theory of natural selection. It supposes the material of the new creation, the *causa materialis*, is in the old, and the development theory only supposes that the material exists in the old in the form of a germ of the new. The difference, if any, is not worth noticing. The development again can, on any theory, go on only under the presence and constant action of the cause to which nature owes her existence, constitution, and powers.

For ourselves, we have no quarrel with the developmentists when they do not deny the conditions without which there can be no development, or understand by development what is not development, but really creation. There is no development where there is no germ to be developed, and that is not development which places something different in kind from the nature of the germ. In the lower forms of organic life, of plants and animals, where the differences of species are indistinct or feebly marked, there may be, for aught we know, a natural development of new species or what appears to be new species, that is, organic forms not before brought out, or not perceived to be wrapped up in the forms examined; but in the higher forms of life, where the types are distinct and strongly marked, as in the mammalia, this cannot be the case, for there is no germ in one species of another. We object also to the doctrine that the higher forms of life are developed from the lower forms. Grant, what is possible, perhaps probable, but which every naturalist knows has not scientifically been made out, that there is a gradual ascent without break from the lowest forms of organic life to the highest, it would by no means follow that the higher form but develops and completes

the lower. Science has not proved it, and cannot from any facts in its possession even begin to prove it. The law of gradation is very distinguishable from the law of production, and it is a grave blunder in logic to confound them; yet it seems to us that this is what the noble author does, only substituting the term natural creation for that of natural development. He seems to us to mean by the universal reign of law, which he seeks to establish, that through all nature the divine will educes the higher from the lower, or at least makes the lower the stepping-stone of the higher; yet all that science can assert is that the lower in some form subserves the higher, but not that it is its *fons*, or principle, or the germ from which it is developed.

On the side of God, who is its principle, medium, and end, creation is complete, consummated, both as a whole and in all its parts; but as externized, it is incomplete, imperfect, in part potential, not actual, and is completed by development in time. Looked at from our side or the point of view of the creature, we may say that it was created in germ, or with unrealized possibilities. Hence development, not from one species to another, but of each species in its own order, and of each individual according to its species; hence progress, about which we hear so much, in realizing the unrealized possibilities of nature, or in reducing what is potential in the created order to act, is not only possible, but necessary to the complete externization of the creative act. This development or this progress is effected by Providence acting through natural laws or natural forces, that is, second or created causes, and also, as the Christian holds, by grace, which is supernatural, and which, without destroying, superseding, or changing nature, assists it to attain an end above and beyond the reach of nature, as we have shown in the article on *Nature and Grace*.

We, as well as the author, assert the universal reign of law, but we do not accept his definition of law, as "will enforcing itself with power," whether we speak of human law or the divine law, for that is precisely the definition we give to will or power acting without law, or from mere arbitrariness. The duke of Argyll is a citizen of a constitutional state, and professes to be a liberal statesman; he should not then adopt a definition of law which makes might the measure of right, or denies to right any principle, type, or foundation in the Divine nature. We have already suggested the true definition of law—will directed by rea-

son; and God's will is always law, because in him his eternal will and his eternal reason are inseparable, and in him really indistinguishable. His will is, indeed, always law, because it is the will of God, our creator; but if it were possible to conceive him willing without his eternal reason, his will would not and could not bind, though it might compel. The law is not in will alone, or in reason alone, but really in the synthetic action of both. Hence St. Augustine tells us that unjust laws are violences rather than laws, and all jurists, as distinguished from mere legists, tell us that all legislative acts that directly contravene the law of God, or the law of natural justice, do not bind, and are null and void from the beginning.

Law in the other senses the author notes, and has written his work, in part at least, to elucidate and defend, in so far as the natural or inductive sciences, without theology or philosophy, that is, so-called metaphysics, can go, is not law at all, but a mere fact, or classification of facts, and simply marks the order of co-existence or of succession of the various facts and phenomena of the natural world. The so-called law of gravitation states to the physicist simply an order or series of facts, not the cause or force producing them, as Hume, Kant, the positivists, J. Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and virtually even Sir William Hamilton and his disciple Mr. Mansel, who exclude the ontological element from science, have amply proved. The idea of cause, of force, is not an empirical idea, but is given *a priori*.

There are several other points in the work before us on which we intended to comment, but we are obliged by our diminishing space to pass them over. The author says many true and important things, and says them well too; but we think in his effort to reconcile theology and science he fails, in consequence of being not so well versed in theology as he is in the sciences. He does not take note of the fact that the sciences are special, and deal only with facts of a secondary order, and are, therefore, incomplete without the science of the first cause, or theology. He does not keep sufficiently before his mind the distinction between God, as first cause, and nature, as second cause; and hence when he asserts the divine action he inclines to pantheism, and when he asserts the action of nature he inclines to naturalism. Yet his aim has been good, and we feel assured that he has wished to serve the cause of religion as well as that of science.

For ourselves, we hold, and have heretofore proved, that theology is the queen of the sciences, *scientia scientiarum*, but we have a profound regard for the men of real science, and should be sorry to be found warring against them. There is nothing established by any of the sciences that conflicts with our theology, which is that of the church of Christ; and we have remarked that the quarrels between the *savants* and the theologians are, for the most part, not quarrels between science and theology, but between different schools of science. The professors of natural science, who had long taught the geocentric theory, and associated it with their faith, when Galileo brought forward the heliocentric theory, opposed it, and found it easier to denounce him as a heretic than to refute him scientifically. A quarrel arose, and the church was appealed to, and, for the sake of peace, she imposed silence on Galileo, which she might well do, since his theory was not received in the schools, and was not then scientifically established; and when he broke silence against orders, she slightly punished him. But the dispute really turned on a purely scientific question, and faith was by no means necessarily implicated, for faith can adjust itself to either theory. Men of science oppose the supernatural not because they have any scientific facts that militate against it, but because it appears to militate against the theory of the fixedness of natural laws, or of the order of nature. The quarrel is really between a heterodox theology, or erroneous interpretation of the supernatural on the one side, and the misinterpretation of the natural order on the other, that is, between two opinions. A reference to orthodox theology would soon settle the dispute, by showing that neither militates against the other, when both are rightly understood. There is no conflict between theology, as taught by the church, and any thing that science has really established with regard to the order of nature.

We cannot accept all the theories of the noble duke, but we can accept all the scientific facts he adduces, and find ourselves instructed and edified by them. It is time the quarrel between theologians and *savants* should end. It is of recent origin. Till the revival of letters in the fifteenth century, there was no such quarrel—not that men did not begin to think till then, or were ignorant till then of the true method of studying nature—and there need be none, and would be none now, if the theologians never added or substituted for the teaching of revelation unauthorized specula-

tions of their own, and if the *savants* would never put forward, as science, what is not science. The blame, we are willing to admit, has not been all on one side. Theologians in their zeal have cried out against scientific theories before ascertaining whether they really do or do not conflict with faith, and *savants* have too often concluded their scientific discoveries conflict with faith, and therefore said, Let faith go, before ascertaining whether they do so or not. There should, for the sake of truth, be a better mutual understanding, for both may work together in harmony.

AN IMAGINARY CONTRADICTION.*

[From the Catholic World for October, 1867.]

We notice in this Review the article on the *Spirit of Romanism* for a single point only, which it makes, for as a whole it is not worth considering. Father Hecker asserts in his *Aspirations of Nature*, that, "Endowed with reason, man has no right to surrender his judgment; endowed with free-will, man has no right to yield up his liberty. Reason and free-will constitute man a responsible being, and he has no right to abdicate his independence." To this and several other extracts from the same work to the same effect, the *Christian Quarterly* opposes what is conceded by Father Hecker and held by every Catholic, that every one is bound to believe whatever the church believes and teaches. But bound as a Catholic to submit his reason and will to the authority of the church, how can one assert that he is free to exercise his own reason, and has no right to surrender it, or to abdicate his own independence? Father Hecker says, "Religion is a question between the soul and God; no human authority has, therefore, any right to enter its sacred sphere." Yet he maintains that he is bound to obey the authority of the church, and has no right to believe or think contrary to her teachings and definitions. How can he maintain both propositions?

---

* *The Christian Quarter* Cincinnati, July, 1869. Art. IV. Spirit of Romanism

What Father Hecker asserts is that man has reason and free-will, and that he has no right to forego the exercise of these faculties, or to surrender them to any human authority whatever. Between this proposition and that of the plenary authority of the church in all matters of faith or pertaining to faith and sound doctrine, as asserted by the Council of Trent and Pius IX. in the *Syllabus*, the *Christian Quarterly* thinks it sees a glaring contradiction. Father Hecker, it is presumed, sees none, and we certainly see none. Father Hecker maintains that no *human* authority has any right to enter the sacred sphere of religion, that man is accountable to no man or body of men for his religion or his faith; but he does not say that he is not responsible to God for the use he makes of his faculties, whether of reason or free-will, or that God has no right to enter the sacred sphere of religion, and tell him even authoritatively what is truth and what he is bound to believe and do. When we believe and obey a human authority in matters of religion, we abdicate our own reason; but when we believe and obey God, we preserve it, follow it, do precisely what reason itself tells us we ought to do. There is no contradiction, then, between believing and obeying God, and the free and full exercise of reason and free-will. Our Cincinnati contemporary seems to have overlooked this very obvious fact, and has therefore imagined a contradiction where there is none at all, but perfect logical consistency. Our contemporary is no doubt very able, a great logician, but he is here grappling with a subject which he has not studied, and of which he knows less than nothing.

It is a very general impression with rationalists and rationalizing Protestants, that whoso asserts the free exercise of reason denies the authority of the church, and that whoso recognizes the authority of the church necessarily denies reason and abdicates his own manhood, which is as much as to say that whoso asserts man denies God, and whoso asserts God denies man. These people forget that the best of all possible reasons for believing any thing is the word, that is, the authority of God, and that the highest possible exercise of one's manhood is in humble and willing obedience to the law or will of God. All belief, as distinguished from knowledge, is on authority of some sort, and the only question to be asked in any case is, Is the authority sufficient? We believe there were such persons as Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, Charlemagne, Louis XIV., Robes-

pierre, and George Washington, on the authority of history, the last two, also, on the testimony of eye-witnesses, or persons who have assured us that they had seen and known them personally; yet in the case of them all, our belief is belief on authority. On authority we believe the great events recorded in sacred and profane history, the building of the Temple of Jerusalem in the reign of Solomon, the captivity of the Jews, their return to Judea under the kings of Persia, the building of the second temple, the conquest of Jerusalem by Titus and the Roman army, the invasion of the Roman empire by the northern barbarians, who finally overthrew it, the event called the reformation, the thirty years' war, &c. Nothing is more unreasonable or more insane than to believe any thing on no authority; that is, with no reason for believing it. To believe without authority for believing is to believe without reason, and practically a denial of reason itself.

Catholics, in fact, are the only people in the world who do, can, or dare reason in matters of religion. Indeed, they are the only people who have a reasonable faith, and who believe only what they have adequate reasons for believing. They are also the only people who recognize no human authority, not even one's own, in matters of Christian faith and conscience. Sectarians and rationalists claim to be free, and to reason freely, because, as they pretend, they are bound by no human authority, and recognize no authority in faith but their own reason. Yet why should your reason be for you or any one else better authority for believing than ours? Your authority is as human as ours, and if ours is not a sufficient reason for our faith, how can yours suffice, which is no better, perhaps not so good? As a fact, no man is less free than he who has for his faith no authority but his own reason; for he is, if he thinks at all, necessarily always in doubt as to what he ought or ought not to believe; and no man who is in doubt, who is unable to determine what he is or is not required to believe in order to believe the truth, is or can be mentally free. From this doubt only the Catholic is free; for he only has the authority of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, for his faith.

It is a great mistake to suppose that the Catholic believes what the church believes and teaches on any human authority. To assume it begs the whole question. The act of faith the Catholic makes is, "O my God! I believe all the sacred truths the Holy Catholic Church believes and teaches,

because thou hast revealed them, who canst neither deceive nor be deceived." The church can declare to be of faith only what God has revealed, and her authority in faith is the authority not of the law-maker, but of the witness and interpreter of the law. In faith we believe the word of God, we believe God on his word; in the last analysis, that God is true, *Deus est verax.* Better authority than the word of God there is not and cannot be, and nothing is or can be more reasonable than to believe that God is true, or to believe God on his word, without a voucher.

That the church is a competent and credible witness in the case, or an adequate authority for believing that God has revealed what she believes and teaches as his word, can be as conclusively proved as the competency and credibility of a witness in any case in court whatever. She was an eye and ear-witness of the life, works, death, and resurrection of our Lord, who is at once perfect God and perfect man; she received the divine word directly from him, and is the contemporary and living witness of what he taught and commanded. The church has never for a moment ceased to exist, but has continued from Christ to us as one identical living body that suffers no decay and knows no succession of years; with her nothing has been forgotten, for nothing has fallen into the past. The whole revelation of God is continually present to her mind and heart. She is, then, a competent witness; for she knows all the facts to which she is required to testify. She is a credible witness; for God himself has appointed, commissioned, authorized her to bear witness for him to all nations and ages, even unto the consummation of the world, and has promised to be with her, and to send to her assistance the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth, who should recall to her mind whatsoever he had taught her, and lead her into all truth. The divine commission or authorization to teach carries with it the pledge of infallibility in teaching; for God cannot be the accomplice of a false teacher, or one who is even liable to err. What surrender is there of one's reason, judgment, free-will, manhood, in believing the testimony of a competent and credible witness?

In point of fact, the case is even stronger than we put it. The church is the body of Christ, and in her dwelleth the Holy Ghost. She is human in her members, no doubt; but she is divine as well as human in her head. The human and divine natures, though for ever distinct, are united in

one divine person by the hypostatic union. This one divine Person, the Word that was made flesh, or assumed flesh, for our redemption and glorification, is the person of the church, who through him lives a divine as well as a human life. It is God who speaks in her voice as it was God who spoke in the voice of the Son of Mary, that died on the cross, that rose from the dead, and ascended into heaven, whence he shall come again to judge the quick and the dead. Hence, we have not only the word of God as the authority for believing his revelation, but his authority in the witness to the fact that it is his revelation or his word we believe. We may even go further still, and state that the Holy Ghost beareth witness within us with our spirits in concurrence with the external witness to the same fact, so that it may be strengthened by the mouth of two witnesses. More ample means of attesting the truth and leaving the unbeliever without excuse are not possible in the nature of things.

It is not, then, the Catholic who contradicts himself; for between the free exercise of reason and complete submission to the authority of the church, as both are understood by Catholics, there is no contradiction, no contrariety even. Faith, by the fact that it is faith, differs necessarily from science. It is not intuitive or discursive knowledge, but simply analogical knowledge. But reason in itself cannot go beyond what is intuitively apprehended, or discursively obtained, that is, obtained from intuitive *data*, either by way of deduction or induction. In either case, what is apprehended or obtained is knowledge, not belief or faith. To believe and to know are not one and the same thing; and whatever reason by itself can judge of comes under the head of science, not faith; whence it follows that reason can never judge of the intrinsic truth or falsehood of the matter of faith; for if it could, faith would be sight, and in no sense faith. If we recognize such a thing as faith at all, we must recognize something which transcends or does not fall under the direct cognizance of reason; and therefore that which reason does not know, and can affirm only as accredited by some authority distinct from reason. The Catholic asserts faith on authority, certainly, but on an authority which reason herself holds to be sufficient. True, he does not submit the question of its truth or falsehood to the judgment of reason; for that would imply a contradiction—that faith is not faith, but

sight or knowledge. This is the mistake of sectarians and rationalists, who deny authority in matters of faith. They practically deny reason, by demanding of it what exceeds its powers; and faith, by insisting on submitting it to the judgment of reason, and denying that we have or can have any reason for believing what transcends reason. It ill becomes them, therefore, to accuse Catholics of contradicting themselves, when they assert the rights of reason in its own order, and the necessity of authority in matters of faith, or matters that transcend reason. They themselves, according to their own principles, have, and can have no authority for believing; and therefore, if they believe at all, they do and must believe without reason; and belief without reason is simple fancy, caprice, whim, prejudice, opinion, not faith.

But the *Christian Quarterly* is not alone in imagining a contradiction between reason and authority. The whole modern mind assumes it, and imagines a contradiction wherever it finds two extremes, or two opposites. It has lost the middle term that brings them together and unites them in a logical synthesis. To it, natural and supernatural, nature and grace, reason and faith, science and revelation, liberty and authority, church and state, heaven and earth, God and man—are irreconcilable extremes; and not two extremes only, but downright contradictions, which necessarily exclude each other. It does not, even if it accepts both terms, accept them as reconciled, or united as two parts of one whole; but each as exclusive, and warring against the other, and each doing its best to destroy the other.

Hence the modern mind is, so to speak, bisected by a painful dualism, which weakens its power, lowers its character, and destroys the unity and efficiency of intellectual life. We meet every day men who, on one side, assert supernatural faith, revelation, grace, authority, and, on the other, pure naturalism, which excludes every thing supernatural or divine. On the one side of their intelligence, nothing but God and grace, and on the other, nothing but man and nature. Indeed, the contradiction runs through nearly the whole modern intellectual world, and is not encountered among the heterodox only. We find even men who mean to be orthodox, think they are orthodox, and are sincerely devoted to the interests of religion, who yet see no real or logical connection between their faith as Catholics and their principles as statesmen, or their theories as scientists.

The two terms, or series of terms, of course, must be

accepted, and neither can be denied without equally denying the other. The objection is not that both are asserted, but that they are asserted as contradictories; for no contradiction in the real world, which is the world of truth, is admissible. The creator of the world is the Logos, is logic in itself, and therefore, as the Scripture saith, makes all things by number, weight, and measure. All his works are dialectic, and form a self-consistent whole; for, as St. Thomas says, he is the type of all things—*Deus est similitudo rerum omnium.* There must then be, somewhere, the mediator, or middle term which unites the two extremes, and in which their apparent contradiction is lost, and they are opposed only as two parts of one uniform whole. The defect of the modern mind is that it has lost this middle term, and men retain in their life the dualism we have pointed out, because they do not see that the conflicting elements are not harmonizable in their intelligence; or, because they have lost the conception of reality, and are false to the true principle of things.

In the early ages of the church, the fathers had no occasion to take care that reason and nature should be preserved, for no one dreamed of denying them. All their efforts were needed to bring out and vindicate the other series of terms, God, the supernatural, revelation, grace, faith, which were denied or perverted by the world they had to war against. The ascetic writers, again, having for their object the right disciplining of human nature through grace, which includes revelation and faith, as well as the elevation and assistance of nature and reason, had just as little occasion to assert reason and nature, for they assumed them, and their very labors implied them. Grace, or the supernatural, was rarely exaggerated or set forth as exclusive. The danger came chiefly from the opposite quarter, from Pelagianism, or the assertion of the sufficiency of nature without grace.

When, however, the reformers appeared, the danger shifted sides. The doctrines of the reformation, the doctrines of grace, as they are called by evangelicals, were an exaggerated and exclusive supernaturalism. The reformers did not merely assert the insufficiency of reason and nature, but went further, and asserted their total depravity, and utter worthlessness in the Christian life. They made man not merely passive under grace, but actively and necessarily opposed to it, resisting it always with all his might, and to be overcome only by sovereign grace, the *gratia victrix* of the Jansenists. The church met this and its kindred errors in

the holy council of Trent, and while affirming the supernatural element, and defining the sphere and office of grace, rescued nature and reaffirmed its part in the work of life. But error has no principle and is bound to no consistency, and the Catholic has ever since had to defend nature against the exclusive supernaturalists, and grace against the exclusive naturalists; reason, for instance, against the traditionalists, and revelation and authority against the rationalists. To do this, it has been and still is necessary to distinguish between the two orders, nature and grace, natural and supernatural, reason and faith.

But we find a very considerable number of men who are not exclusively supernaturalists, nor exclusively rationalists, but who are syncretists, or both at once. They accept both orders in their mutual exclusiveness, and alternately, rather, simultaneously, assert exclusive supernaturalism, and exclusive rationalism. This is the case with the great mass of Protestants, who retain any reminiscences of grace, and even with some Catholics in countries where Jansenism once had its stronghold, and where traces of its influence may still be detected with people who deny its formally heretical propositions, and accept the papal constitutions condemning them. The two extremes are seen, and both are accepted; but the mediator between them, or the truth which conciliates or harmonizes them, seems to be overlooked or not understood. Of course, Catholic theology asserts it, and is in reality based on it; but, some how or other, the age does not seize it, and the prevailing philosophy does not recognize it.

The problem for our age, it seems to us, is to revive it, and show the conciliation of the two extremes. The labor of theologians and philosophers is not, indeed, to find a new and unknown truth or medium of reconciliation, as so many pretend, but to bring out to the dull and enfeebled understanding of our times the great truth, always asserted by Catholic theology, which conciliates all extremes by presenting the real and living synthesis of things.

There can be no question that the dominant philosophy, especially with the heterodox, does not present the conditions of solving this problem, and the scholastic philosophy, as taught in Catholic schools, needs to be somewhat differently developed and expressed before the age can see in it the solution demanded. According to the philosophy generally received since Descartes, the natural and supernatural are not only distinct, but separate orders, and reason

without any aid from revelation is competent to construct from her own materials a complete science of the rational order. It supposes the two orders to be independent each of the other, and each complete in itself. Reason has nothing to do with faith, and faith has nothing to do with reason. The church has no jurisdiction in philosophy, the sciences, politics, or natural society; philosophers, physicists, statesmen, seculars, so long as they keep in the rational order, are independent of the spiritual authority, are under no obligation to consult revelation, or to conform to the teachings of faith. Hence the dual life men live, and the absurdity of maintaining in one order what they contradict in another.

This, we need not say, is all wrong. The two orders are distinct, not separate and mutually independent orders, nor parallel orders with no real or logical relation between them. They are, in reality, only two parts of one and the same whole. We do not undertake to say what God could or could not have done had he chosen. If he could have created man and left him in a state of pure nature, as he has the animals, we know he has not done so. He has created man for a supernatural destiny, and placed him under a supernatural or gracious providence, so that, as a fact, man is never in a state of pure nature. He aspires to a supernatural reward, and is liable to a supernatural punishment. His life is always above pure nature, or below it. The highest natural virtue is imperfect, and no sin is simply a sin against the natural law. The natural is not the supernatural, but was never intended to subsist without it. The supernatural is not an interpolation in the divine plan of creation, nor something superinduced upon it, but is a necessary complement of the natural, which never is or can be completed in the natural alone. In the divine plan, the two orders are coeval, always coexist, and operate simultaneously to one and the same end, as integral parts of one whole. The natural, endowed with reason and free-will, may resist the supernatural, or refuse to co-operate with it; but if it does so, it must remain inchoate, incomplete, an existence commenced yet remaining for ever unfulfilled, which is the condition of the reprobate. A true and adequate philosophy explains man's origin, medium, and end; and no such philosophy can be constructed by reason alone; for these are supernatural, and are fully known only through a supernatural revelation.

The natural demands the supernatural; so also does the

supernatural demand the natural. If there were no nature, there could be nothing above nature; there would be nothing for grace to operate on, to assist, or complete. If man had no reason, he could receive no revelation; if he had no free-will, he could have no virtue, no sanctity; if not generated, he could not be regenerated, if not regenerated, he could not be glorified, or attain to the end for which he is intended. To deny nature is to deny the creative act of God, and to fall into pantheism—a sophism, for pantheism is denied in its very assertion. Its assertion implies the assertor, and therefore something capable of acting, and therefore a substantive existence, distinguishable from God. The denial of God, as creator, is the denial alike of man, the natural, and the supernatural. To solve the problem, and remove the dualism which bisects the modern mind, it is necessary to study the Creator's works in the light of the Creator's plan, and as a whole, in the whole course or itinerary of their existence, or in their procession from him as first cause, to their return to him as final cause, and not piecemeal, as isolated or unrelated facts. If we know not this plan, which no study of the works themselves can reveal to us, we can never get at the meaning of a single the smallest part, far less attain to any thing like the science of the universe; for the meaning of each part is in its relation to the whole. What is the meaning of this grain of sand on the sea-shore, or this mosquito, this gnat, these animalculæ invisible to the naked eye? Have they no meaning, no purpose in the Creator's plan? What can you, by reason, know of that purpose or meaning, if you know not that plan? Your physical sciences, without a knowledge of that plan, are no sciences at all, and give you no more conception of the universe than a specimen brick from its walls can give you of the city of Babylon.

Though that plan is and can be known only as revealed by God himself, yet when once known we may see analogies and proofs of it in all the Creator's works, and study with profit the several parts of the universe, and attain to real science of them; for then we can study them in their synthesis, or their relation to the whole. We may then have rational science, not built on revelation, but constructed by reason in the light of revelation. We do not make revelation the basis of the natural sciences. They are all constructed by reason, acting with its own power, but under the supervision, so to speak, of faith, which reveals to it the plan or purpose of creation, to which it must conform in its

deductions and inductions, if they are to have any scientific value. If it operates in disregard of revelation, without the light radiating from the Creator's plan, reason can know objects only in their isolation, as separate and unrelated facts or phenomena, and therefore never know them, as they really are, or in their real significance; because nothing in the universe exists in a state of isolation, or by and for itself alone; but every thing that exists, exists and is significant only in its relation to the whole. It is a mistake then, to assume that the church, the witness, guardian, and interpreter of the faith or revelation, has nothing to say to philosophy, or to the physical sciences, cosmogony, geology, physiology, history, or even political science. None of them are or can be true sciences, any further than they present the several classes of facts and phenomena of which they treat in their respective relations and subordination to the divine plan of creation, known only by the revelation committed to the church.

The principle of the solution of the problem, or the middle term that unites the two extremes, or the natural and the supernatural, in a real and living synthesis, or reconciles all opposites, is the creative act of God. The supernatural is God himself, and what he does immediately without using any natural agencies; the natural is what God creates with the power to act as second cause, and what he does only through second causes, or so-called natural laws. Nothing is natural that is not explicable by natural laws, and nothing so explicable is properly supernatural, though it may be superhuman. A miracle is an effect of which God is the immediate cause, and which can be referred to no natural or second cause; a natural event is one of which God is not the direct and immediate cause, but only first cause—*Causa eminens*, or cause of its direct and immediate cause. The copula or *nexus* that unites the natural and supernatural in one dialectic whole, is the creative act of the supernatural, or God, which produces the natural and holds it joined to its cause. Creatures are not separable from their Creator; for in him they live and move and are, or have their being; and were he to separate himself from them, or suspend his creative act, they would instantly drop into the nothing they were before he produced them. The relation between them and him is their relation of entire dependence on him for all they are, all they have, and all they can do. There is, then, no ground of antagonism between him and them.

If man aspires to act independently of God, he simply aspires to be himself God, and becomes—nothing.

But we have not exhausted the creative act. God creates all things for an end, and this end is himself; not that he may gain something for himself, or increase his own beatitude, which is eternally complete, and can be neither augmented nor diminished, but that he may communicate of his beatitude to creatures which he has called into existence. Hence God is first cause and final cause. We proceed from him as first cause, and return to him as final cause, as we have shown again and again with all the necessary proofs.

Between God as final cause, and his creatures, the mediator is the Incarnate Word, or the man Christ Jesus, the only mediator between God and men. In Christ Jesus is hypostatically united in one divine person the divine nature and the human, which, however, remain for ever distinct, without intermixture or confusion. This union is effected by the creative act, which in it is carried to its summit. The hypostatic union completes the first cycle or procession of existences from God as first cause, and initiates their return to him as final cause. It completes generation and initiates the regeneration, or palingenesiac order, which has its completion or fulfilment in glorification, the intuitive vision of God by the light of glory, or, as say the schoolmen, *ens supernaturale.*

Theologians understand usually, by the supernatural order, the order founded by the Incarnation or hypostatic union, the regeneration propagated by the election of grace, instead of natural generation. But between the natural and the supernatural, in this sense, the *nexus* or middle term is the creative act effecting the hypostatic union, or God himself mediating in his human nature. The Incarnation unites God and man, without intermixture or confusion, in one and the same divine Person, and also the order of generation with the order of regeneration, of which glorification is the crown. But as the two natures remain for ever distinct but inseparable in one person, so, in the order of regeneration, the natural and the supernatural are each preserved in its distinctive though inseparable activity.

These three terms, generation, regeneration, glorification, one in the creative act of God, cover the entire life of man, and in each the natural and supernatural, distinct but inseparable, remain and co-operate and act. There is no dualism in the world of reality, and none is apparent—except the

distinction between God and creature—when the Creator's works are seen as a whole, in their real relation and synthesis. The dualism results in the mind from studying the Creator's works in their analytic divisions, instead of their synthetic relations; especially from taking the first cycle or order of generation as an independent order, complete in itself, demanding nothing beyond itself, and constituting the whole life of man, instead of taking it, as it really is, only as the beginning, the initial, or the inchoate stage of life, subordinated to the second cycle, the teleological order, or regeneration and glorification, in which alone is its complement, perfection, ultimate end, for which it has been created, and exists. Our age falls into its heresies, unbeliefs, and intellectual anarchy and confusion, because it undertakes to separate what God has joined together—philosophy from theology, reason from faith, science from revelation, nature from grace—and refuses to study the works and providence of God in their synthetic relations, in which alone is their true meaning.

The positivists understand very well the anarchy that reigns in the modern intellectual world, and the need of a doctrine which can unite in one all the scattered and broken rays of intelligence and command the adhesion of all minds. The church, they say, once had such a doctrine, and for a thousand years led the progress of science and society. Protestants, they assert, have never had, and never, as Protestants, can have any doctrine of the sort, and the church has it no longer. It is nowhere set forth except in the writings of Auguste Comte, who obtains it not from revelation, theology, or metaphysics, but from the sciences, or the positive facts of nature studied in their synthetic relations. But unhappily, though right in asserting the necessity of a grand synthetic doctrine which shall embrace all the knowable and all the real, they forget that facts cannot be studied in their synthetic relations unless the mind is previously in possession of the grand synthetic doctrine which embraces and explains them, while the doctrine itself cannot be had till they are so studied. They must take the end as the means of gaining the end! This is a hard case, for till they get the synthetic formula they can only have unrelated facts, hypotheses, and conjectures, with no means of verifying them. They are not likely to succeed. Starting from anarchy, they can only arrive at anarchy. Only God can

move by his Spirit over chaos, and bring order out of confusion and light out of darkness.

Moreover, the positivists do not reconcile the conflicting elements; for they suppress one of the two series of terms, and relegate God, the supernatural, principles, causes, and supersensible relations into the region of the unknowable, and include in their grand synthesis only positive sensible facts or phenomena and their physical laws. They thus restrict man's existence to the first cycle, and exclude the second or palingenesiac order, in which alone reigns the moral law. The first or initial cycle does not contain the word of the *œnigma*. It does not exist for itself, and therefore is not and cannot be intelligible in or by itself. If they could succeed in removing the anarchy complained of, they would do so by ignorance, not science, and harmonize all intelligences only by annihilating them.

Nor is it true that the church has lost or abandoned her grand synthetic doctrine, or that her synthesis has ceased to be complete, or sufficiently comprehensive. Her doctrine is Christianity; and Christianity leaves out no ancient or modern science; has not been and cannot be outgrown by any actual or possible progress of intelligence; for it embraces at once all the real and all the knowable, *reale omne et scibile*. If the church fails to command the adhesion of all minds, it is not because any minds have advanced in science beyond her, or have attained to any truth or virtue she has not; but because they have fallen below her, have become too contracted and grovelling in their views to grasp the elevation and universality of her doctrine. She still leads the civilized world, and commands the faith and love of the really enlightened portion of mankind. The reason why so many in our age refuse her their adhesion is not because her doctrine or mode or manner of presenting it is defective, but because they are engrossed with the development and application of the physical or natural laws, or with the first or initial cycle, and exhaust themselves in the production, exchange, and accumulation of physical goods, which, however attractive to the inchoate or physical man, are of no moral or religious value. The cause is not in the church but in them; in the fact that their minds and hearts are set on those things only after which the heathen seek; and they have no relish for any truth that pertains to the teleological or moral order.

The church does not object to the study of the natural or

physical sciences, nor to the accumulation of material wealth; but she does object to making the initial order the teleological, and to the cultivation of the sciences or study of the physical laws for their own sake; for, with her, not knowledge but wisdom is the principal thing. She requires the physical and psychological sciences to be cultivated for the sake of the ultimate end of man, and in subordination to the Christian law which that end prescribes. So of material wealth; she does not censure its production, its exchange, or its accumulation, if honestly done, and in subordination to the end for which man is created. What she demands of us is that we conform to the Creator's plan, and esteem things according to their true order and place in that plan. She tolerates no falsehood in thought, word, or deed.

The natural is not suppressed or injured by being subordinated to the supernatural, for it can be fulfilled only in the supernatural. We find the indications of this in nature herself. There are, indeed, theologians who talk of a natural beatitude; but whether possible or not, God has not so made us that we can find our beatitude in nature; that is, in the creature or a created good. He has made us for himself, and the soul can be satisfied with nothing less. This is the great fact elaborated by Father Hecker in his *Questions of the Soul*, and his *Aspirations of Nature*. In the first work, he shows that the soul asks questions which nature cannot answer, but which are answered in the supernatural; in the second, he shows that nature desires, craves, aspires to, and has a capacity for, the supernatural; that the soul is conscious of wants which only the supernatural can fill. Man has, as St. Thomas teaches, a natural desire to see God in the beatific vision; that is, to see him as he is in himself; to be like him, to partake of his divine nature, to possess him, and be filled with him. This alone can satisfy the soul, and hence holy Job says, "I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness."

There can be no real antagonism between the natural and the supernatural; for there can be none between nature and its Creator, and equally none between it and its fulfilment, or supreme good. There is none, we have shown, between reason and faith, any more than there is between the eye and the telescope, which extends its range of vision, and enables it to see what it could not see without it. There can be none between science and revelation; when the science is real science and is cultivated not for itself alone,

but as a means to the true end of man; and there can be none between earth and heaven, when the earth is regarded solely as a medium and not confounded with the end. There can be none between liberty and authority; for man can be man, possess himself, be himself and free, only by living in conformity to the law of his existence, or according to the plan of the Creator; and finally there can be none between church and state, if the state remembers that it is in the teleological order, and under the moral law, therefore subordinated to the spiritual order.

We have passed over a great number of important questions, several of which, on starting, we intended to consider, and some of which we may take up hereafter; but we have given, we think, the principle that solves the problem of the age, and shows that the dualism which runs through and disturbs so many minds has no foundation either in the teaching of the church or in the real order. The Creator's works all hang together, are all parts of one uniform plan, and the realization *ad extra* of one divine thought, of which the archetype is in his own infinite, eternal, and ineffable essence. The trouble with men is, that many of them do not see that the church is catholic, even when professing to believe it; because their own minds are not catholic. They often suppose they are broader than the church, because they are too narrow to see her breadth. They also fancy that there are fields of science which they may cultivate which lie beyond her catholicity, and concerning which they are under no obligation to consult her. This shows that they understand neither her catholicity nor the nature, conditions, and end of science. They contract the church to their own narrow dimensions.

We conclude by saying that the men who undertake to criticise the church, and to unchurch her, are men who want breadth, depth, and elevation. They are mole-eyed, and have slender claims to be regarded as really enlightened, large-minded, large-hearted men.

FREE RELIGION.*

[From the Catholic World for November, 1869.]

This Free Religious Association appears to be composed of men and women who, some thirty years ago, were, or would have been, called *come-outers* in Boston and its vicinity, but who are now generally called radicals, a name which they seem quite willing to accept. They are universal agitators, and see or imagine grievances everywhere, and make it a point wherever they see or can invent a grievance, to hit it; at least, to strike at it. They were conspicuous in the late abolition movement, are strenuous advocates for negro equality—or, rather, negro superiority—stanch women's rights men, in a word, reformers in general. They claim to have a pure and universal religion; and though some of them are downright atheists, they profess to be more Christian than Christianity itself, and their aim would seem to be to get rid of all special religion, so as to have only religion in general. They say, in the first article of their constitution:

"This association shall be called the Free Religious Association—its objects being to promote the interests of pure religion, to encourage the scientific study of theology, and to increase fellowship in the spirit; and to this end all persons interested in these objects are cordially invited to its membership."

Nothing can be fairer or broader, so far as words go. Ordinary mortals, however, may be puzzled to make out what this religion in general, and no religion in particular, really is; and also to understand how there can be pure religion and scientific theology without God. Our radical friends are not puzzled at all. They have only to call man God, and the scientific study of the physiological and psychological laws of human nature, the scientific study of theology, and every difficulty vanishes. Whoever believes in himself believes in God, and whoever can stand poised on himself has in himself the very essence of religion. According to them, the great error of the past has been in supposing that religion consists in the recognition, the love, and the service

* *Proceedings at the Second Annual Meeting of the Free Religious Association, held in Boston, May 27th and 28th, 1869.* Boston: 1869.

of a superior power; but the merit of free religion is, that it emancipates mankind from this mother error, discards the notion that they owe obedience to any power above humanity, and teaches that man is subject only to himself. Hence the Emersonian maxim, Obey thyself, which, translated into plain English, is, Live as thou listest.

The aim of the association, the president—whom we remember as a handsome, light-complexioned, bright-eyed school-boy—tells us in his opening address is Unity. He says:

"Our aim, let it be understood, is *unity;* not division, discord, conflict—but unity. We are not controversialists. We carry no sword in our hands. We wear no weapons concealed about our person. Our one word is peace—the word which is always most heartily responded to by earnest men. Religion means unity; the very definition of it signifies the power that binds men together; that binds all souls to the divine. The communion of saints—that is the religious phrase; and yet you will pardon me if I say that religion at present is the one word that means division. As interpreted by the religious world, it means war and discord. Subjects are debated on other platforms—social questions, political questions; they are debated and dismissed. In the religious world the discussion goes on more persistently, more bitterly than on any other field; but the issues are always the same, the venue is never changed, conclusions are never reached, and we lack the benefit that comes from the reconciliation of perpetual discussion.

"Religion as organized is organized division. The communion is a communion-table, the Christ is a symbol of the sects, the unity is a unity made up of separate departments and families. The ancient religions of the world still hold their own. Buddhism, Brahminism, the religion of Zoroaster, the religion of Confucius, Judaism, fetichism, Sabaism—all stand where they did. All gather in their population; all have their organized activities, as they ever had. No one of them has materially changed its front; not one of them has been disorganized; not one of them has retreated from the ground that from time immemorial it has occupied. They have stormed at each other, they have been mortal enemies; but still they stand where they stood. There is no superstition, however degrading, that does not exist to-day; and Christian missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, have gone out with hearts of flame and tongues of fire, and souls that were all one solid single piece of consecration, and have dashed themselves in hosts with the utmost heroism against those ancient lines of faith; and their weapons have dropped harmless at their foot. Here and there a few hundred, or a few thousand, or a few tens of hundreds or thousands, may have shifted from one faith to the other; but the solid substance of these great religions still endures. The vast aggregates of millions and tens of millions are unaf-

fected. Christianity holds its own, and no more. Buddhism and Brahminism hold their own, and as much. What shall we say to this? Does religion mean unity? The world cannot be all of one form of religion. Religion is deeper than all its several forms. One religion cannot dislodge another; one faith cannot supplant another faith. Put Christianity in the place of Brahminism and Buddhism, and people would not be Christians. They might change their name—they would not change their nature. The inhabitants of countries that have been under the sway of those great faiths do not become Christian men by becoming Christian peoples. The Turks in European Turkey are better men than the Greek Christians in European Turkey. The religions, as such, must hold their places essentially undisturbed. Harmony is not possible at present on that ground—on any sectarian ground.

"Christianity itself is a bundle of religions. There is the vast Greek Church, with its patriarchs; there is the enormous Catholic Church, with its pope; here are all the families of the Protestant Church, with their clergy. They hold the same relative position. Protestantism does not subdue Romanism; Romanism will never subdue Protestantism. The Protestant Church and Roman Church have stood face to face for centuries; and thus they will continue to stand, as long as the populations have the genius that God gave them. What is Christendom but an army divided against herself? What is Protestantism but a mingling of warring sects?—each sect falling in pieces the moment it becomes organized for work. Unitarianism does not gain on Orthodoxy; Orthodoxy does not gain on Unitarianism. Each sect takes up the little portion that belongs to it, and must rest contented; and all the power of propagandism, of sectarian zeal, of fire and earnestness, does but cause the little flame to burn up more brightly for an instant on the local altar; and, when it dies down, the ashes remain on that altar still.

"Our word, then, is Unity. But how shall we get it? Not by becoming Catholics; not by making another order of Protestants; not by instituting another sect; but by going down below all the sects—going down to faith. For faith, hope, aspiration, charity, love, worship, we believe, are inherent, profound, indestructible elements of human nature." (Pp. 7–9.)

The rhetoric is not bad; but in what does the unity aimed at consist, and how is it to be obtained? Religion, by the speakers who addressed the association, is assumed to be a sentiment, and faith and hope and charity are, we are told, indestructible elements of human nature; then since human nature is one, what unity can the free religionists aspire to that they and all men have not already, or have not always had? Pass over this; whence and by what means is the unity, whatever it consists in, to be obtained? The answer to this question is not very definite, but it would seem the

association expect it from below, not from above; for the president says, we are to obtain it only by "going down below all sects—going down to faith." A Catholic would have said, We attain to unity only by rising above all sects, to a faith which is one and universal, and which the sects rend and divide among themselves. But the radicals have outgrown Catholicity, outgrown Christianity, and very properly look for faith and unity from below. But when they get down, down to the lowest deep, will they find them? What faith or unity will they find in the lowest depths of humanity in addition to what all men have always had? If, notwithstanding the unity of nature, sects and divisions prevail, and always have prevailed, how, with nothing above nature or in addition to it, do you expect to get rid of them, and establish practical unity, or to obtain the charity that springs from unity?

The radicals deny that they are destructives, that they have only negations, or that they make war on any existing church, religion, sect, or denomination; they will pardon us, then, if we are unable to conceive what they mean by unity, or what unity, except the physical unity of nature, there is or can be among those who divide on every subject in which they feel any interest. Does the association propose to get rid of diversity by indifference, and of divisions simply by bringing all men to agree to differ? We certainly find only unity in denying among the individuals associated, who agree in nothing except that each one holds himself or herself alone responsible for his or her own personal views and utterances. Some of them would retain the Christian name, and others would reject it. Mr. Francis Ellingwood Abbott argues that it is not honest to hold on to the name after having rejected the thing. By professing to be a Christian a man binds himself to accept Christianity; and whoso accepts Christianity, binds himself to accept the Catholic church, which embodies and expresses it. We make an extract from his address:

"As I look abroad in the community, I see two extreme types of religious faith. One is represented in the Roman Church, the great principle of authority. That church has been, and, I think, will always be, the grandest and the greatest embodiment of Christianity in social life. It is worthy of profound respect; and I, for one, yield it profound respect. It took an infidel, Auguste Comte, to portray fairly the service done to the world by the Christian Church—the great Catholic Church—of the middle ages; and we radicals are false to our principles, if we do

not do homage to every thing that is great and good and serviceable in its season, although we think its day of usefulness may have passed. The fundamental principle of the Roman Church is authority, pure and simple. The theology of Rome carries that principle out to the extremest degree. Its hierarchy embodies it in an institution; and, from beginning to end, from centre to periphery, the Roman Catholic Church is consistent with itself in the development of that one idea in spiritual and social and ecclesiastical life.

"At the other pole of human thought and experience, I see a very few persons—indeed, so few that I might, perhaps almost count them on the fingers of one hand—who plant themselves on the principle of liberty alone; who want nothing else; who stand without dogma, without creed, without priesthood, without Bible, without Christ, without any thing but the Almighty God working in their hearts. These two principles of authority and freedom have thus worked out for themselves, at last, consistent expression. Here are the two extremes—Romish Christianity and free religion; and between these two extremes we see a compromise, Protestant Christianity—the compromise between Catholicism and free religion. Every compromise is weak, because it contains conflicting elements. Protestant Christianity is like the image with head of gold and feet of clay. It cannot stand for ever. Either Christianity, as embodied in the Roman Church, is right, or else free religion is right. Have we not learned yet to give up these combinations of opposites, contraries, and incompatibles? Has the war taught us nothing? Are we still trying to make some chimerical mixture, some impossible union of freedom and slavery? I trust not. For my own part, I stand pledged to liberty, pure and simple; and I have come to view all compromises alike, and to cast them utterly away, whether they clothe themselves in the garments of Geneva, or in the last expression of Dr. Bellows and the Unitarian Church." (Pp. 32–33.)

Mr. Abbott is not quite exact in his phraseology, and does not state the Catholic principle correctly. The principle on which the church rests, and out of which grow all her doctrines and precepts, is not authority, but the mystery of the Incarnation, or the assumption of human nature by the Word. Nor is he himself quite honest according to his own test of honesty. To be consistent with himself, he must reject not only the term *Christian*, but also the term *religion*, and put the alternative, Either Catholicity or no religion. The word religion—from *religare*—means either intensively to bind more firmly, or iteratively, to bind again, to bind man morally to God as his last end, in addition to his being physically bound to God as his first cause. *Free religion* is a contradiction in terms, as much so as free bondage. Religion is always a bond, a law that binds.

Ralph Waldo Emerson differs from Mr. Abbott, and would retain the name Christian, though without the reality. We quote a long passage from his not very remarkable speech, out of deference to his rank as one of the originators of the movement:

"We have had, not long since, presented to us by Max Müller a valuable paragraph from St. Augustine, not at all extraordinary in itself, but only as coming from that eminent father in the church, and at that age in which St. Augustine writes: 'That which is now called the Christian religion existed among the ancients, and never did not exist from the planting of the human race until Christ came in the flesh, at which time the true religion, which already subsisted, began to be called Christianity.' I believe that not only Christianity is as old as the creation—not only every sentiment and precept of Christianity can be paralleled in other religious writings—but more, that a man of religious susceptibility, and one at the same time conversant with many men—say a much travelled man—can find the same idea in numberless conversations. The religious find religion wherever they associate. When I find in people narrow religion, I find also in them narrow reading.

"I object, of course, to the claim of miraculous dispensation—certainly not to the doctrine of Christianity. This claim impairs, to my mind, the soundness of him who makes it, and indisposes us to his communion. This comes the wrong way; it comes from without, not within. This positive, historical, authoritative scheme is not consistent with our experience or our expectations. It is something not in nature, it is contrary to that law of nature which all wise men recognized, namely, never to require a larger cause than is necessary to the effect. George Fox, the Quaker, said that, though he read of Christ and God, he knew them only from the like spirit in his own soul. We want all the aids to our moral training. We cannot spare the vision nor the virtue of the saints; but let it be by pure sympathy, not with any personal or official claim. If you are childish and exhibit your saint as a worker of wonders, a thaumaturgist, I am repelled. That claim takes his teachings out of logic and out of nature, and permits official and arbitrary senses to be grafted on the teachings. It is the praise of our New Testament that its teachings go to the honor and benefit of humanity—that no better lesson has been taught or incarnated. Let it stand, beautiful and wholesome, with whatever is most like it in the teaching and practice of men; but do not attempt to elevate it out of humanity by saying, 'This was not a man,' for then you confound it with the fables of every popular religion; and my distrust of the story makes me distrust the doctrine as soon as it differs from my own belief. Whoever thinks a story gains by the prodigious, by adding something out of nature, robs it more than he adds. It is no longer an example, a model; no longer a heart-stirring hero, but an exhibition, a wonder, an anomaly, removed out of the range of influence with thoughtful men." (Pp. 42–44.)

Mr. Emerson cannot be very deeply read in patristic literature, if he is obliged to go to Max Müller for a quotation from St. Augustine, and he proves by his deductions from the language of this great doctor and father that he knows little of the Catholic church. St. Augustine was a Catholic, and taught that, though times vary, faith does not vary, and that as believed the patriarchs so believe we, only they believed in the Christ who was to come, and we in the Christ who has come; and the church teaches through her doctors that there has been only one revelation, that this was made, in substance, to our first parents in the garden. She teaches us that Christianity is not only as old, but even older than creation; for creation with all it contains was created in reference to Christ the incarnate Word, and consequently Christianity, founded in the Incarnation, is really the supreme law according to which the universe was created and exists. It precedes all other religions, and the various heathen or pagan religions and mythologies are only traditions, corruptions, perversions, or travesties of it. To the question, "How is the church catholic?" the very child's catechism answers, "Because she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." How otherwise could she be Catholic?

That "every sentiment [doctrine?] and precept of Christianity can be paralleled in other religious writings" (religions, for Christianity is not a writing) may be true in part, if taken separately and in an unchristian sense; but certainly not as a connected and self-consistent system, in its unity and integrity. But suppose it, what then? It would only prove that all religions have retained more or less of the primitive revelation, which all men held in common before the gentile apostasy and the dispersion of the race consequent on the attempt to build the Tower of Babel; not that all religions have had a common origin in human nature. What we actually find in pagan religions and mythologies that is like Christianity, is no more than we should expect on the supposition of a primitive revelation held out of unity, and interpreted by pride, folly, and ignorance, the characteristics of every pagan people. But Mr. Emerson is true to the old doctrine which he chanted years ago in *The Dial:*

> "Out from the heart of nature rolled
> The burdens of the Bible old;
> The litanies of nations came
> Like the volcano's tongue of flame,
> Up from the burning core below—
> The canticles of love and woe."

Nothing can roll out of the heart of nature but nature itself; and hence, in order to derive Christianity from within, Mr. Emerson eliminates whatever is supernatural and external and reduces it to simple nature, which every man from the beginning to the end of the world carries within him, and of which he cannot divest himself. He unchristianizes Christianity, makes it an element of human nature, confounds it with the natural laws of the physicists, and then tells us it is as old as creation, which is about as much as telling us man is as old as—man, or nature is as old as—nature. Well may Mr. Emerson be called the Sage of Concord, and be listened to as an oracle.

All the speakers, with three exceptions, seemed anxious to have it understood that the Free Religious Association has some great affirmative truth which is destined to redeem and save the world. Colonel Higginson, the successor of Theodore Parker, tells us with great earnestness:

"If this movement of ours means any thing, it means not a little petty denial, not a little criticism, not a textual discussion, not a sum in addition or subtraction, like Bishop Colenso's books, not a bit of historical analysis, like Strauss or Renan. These are trivial things; these do not touch people; these do not reach the universal heart. The universe needs an affirmation, not a denial; and the religious movement that has not for its centre the assertion of something, would be condemned already to degenerate into a sect by the time it had the misfortune to get fairly born." (P. 58.)

And again:

"Affirmation! There is no affirmation except the belief in universa natural religion; all else is narrowness and sectarianism, though it call itself by the grandest name, compared with that. It impoverishes a man; it keeps his sympathy in one line of religious communication; it takes all the spiritual life of the race, and says, 'All of this that was not an effluence from Jesus you must set aside;' and so it makes you a member in full standing of some little sect, all of whose ideas, all of whose thoughts, revolved in the mind of some narrow-minded theologian who founded it. It shuts you up there, and you die, suffocated for want of God's free air outside." (P. 59.)

But the reverend colonel here affirms nothing not affirmed by Christianity, nor any thing more than belongs to all men. Natural religion is simply the natural law, the moral law, prescribed to every man through his reason by the end for which he is created, and is included in the Christian religion as essential to the Christian character. What the free religionist does is not to affirm any thing not universally

insisted on by the Catholic church, but to deny all religion but universal natural religion; that is, he simply denies supernatural revelation, and the supernatural order, or that there is any reality broader than nature or above it. Free religion, as such, is, then, not affirmative, but purely negative; the negation of all religions in so far as they assert the supernatural. The real thought and design of the men and women composing the association is to get rid of every thing in every religion that transcends or professes to transcend nature. They make no direct war on the church or even on the sects, we concede; for they take it for granted that when people are once fully persuaded that nature is all, and that only natural religion is or can be true, all else will gradually die out of itself.

Mrs. Lucy Stone agrees in this with the others, and does not disguise her thought. She says:

"We come into the world, I believe, every one of us, with all that is needful in ourselves, if we will only trust it—all that is needful to help us on and up to the very highest heights to which a human being can ever climb; but we have covered it over by dogma and creed and sectarian theory, and by our own misdeeds, until these angel voices that are in us cease to be heard; not totally cease—I do not believe they ever totally cease—but they become less and less audible to us. But if we learn to heed their faintest whisper, reverently and obediently, I believe that there is no path where the soul asks you to go that you may not safely tread. It may carry you to the burning, fiery furnace, but you will come out, and the smell of fire even will not be on your garments. It may compel you into the lion's den, but the wild beast's mouth will be shut. You may walk where scorpions are in the way of duty, and you will not be hurt. It is this 'inner light;' it is not a text, it is not a creed, but it is this in ourselves which, if trusted, will lead us into all truth.

"I said I did not believe this voice was ever lost in the human soul. I do not forget that men grow very wicked, and women too, for that matter; I do not forget that men and women sometimes appear to us so lost and fallen that it seems as if no power in themselves, or any human power, could help them up; and yet to these worst men and women, in some hallowed moment, is the word given, 'This is the way: walk ye in it.' And if, at the side of this man or woman, at that very moment, is some helping hand, some voice wise enough to counsel, he or she may be started to walk in that way." (P. 100.)

If Mr. Abbott is the logician of the association, Mrs. Julia Ward Howe is decidedly the wit. In the essay she read to the meeting, she, with her keen woman's wit and her

hard common sense, shows up in admirable style the ridiculousness and absurdity of the whole movement. She is not herself indeed free from all taint of radicalism, and much she says may be due to her facility in detecting and satirizing the follies and absurdities of her friends rather than those of her foes; but her essay proves that she has a soul, and knows that it has aspirations that go beyond nature, and wants which only a supernatural religion can satisfy. She evidently has glimpses of a truth higher, deeper, broader, than any recognized by any other radical who spoke. She disposes of free religion in a single sentence, "He is not religious who does not recognize the *obligations* of religion." We have space only for the concluding paragraph of her not very logical, self-consistent, but witty, shrewd, and satirical essay on *Freedom and Restraint in Religion:*

"But, friends, a sudden reaction comes over me. I determine to profess and practise the new religion. I have learned at the free religious club that I possess the first requisite for this, having never studied any theology at all. The ex-divines whom I have met there have so bewailed the artificial ignorance which they acquired in their divinity-school training, that I presume my natural knowledge to be its proper and desired antithesis. I have read the Bhavadgheeta and Mr. Emerson's poems, the psalms and gospel of the new faith. To be no Christian is the next important desideratum; and I believe that I shall find this, as most people do, easier than not. My first rule will be, 'Brahmins, beware of intercourse with Pariahs!' The three hundred incarnations of Vishnu, far more imposing in number than the single excarnation of which the old theology has made so much, shall be preached by me both as precept and example. The Confucian moralities, as illustrated by Californian experience, shall replace the Decalogue. Mr. Emerson's crowning sentence, that he who commits a crime hurts himself, will, of course, suffice to convert a whole society of criminals and reprobates. I will introduce the Joss into prisons, and give the myth of the Celestial Empire a literal interpretation. Our railroad and steamboat system will greatly facilitate the offering of children to the river, with the further advantage of offering the parents too. The strangling of female infants will relieve the present excess of female population in New England, and postpone the pressure of woman suffrage. The burning of widows alone will save the country no small outlay in pensions. Lastly, since the Turkish ethics are coming so much into favor, I should advise a more than Mormon application of them in our midst. Coöperative house-keeping could then be begun on the most immediate and harmonious footing. And so we will reconvert and transreform, and true progress shall consist in regress.

"But, as Archimedes asked to get out of the world in order to move it, we shall be forced to go outside of Christendom in order to accom-

plish this revolution. And if I may believe my friends of the Free Religious Association, the surest way to do this will be to keep closely in their midst. For, elsewhere, between steamboats and missionaries, we cannot be sure of meeting people who shall be sure of not being Christians.

"Perish the jest, and let the jester perish, if in aught but saddest earnest she exchanged the serious for the comic mask. Laughter is sometimes made to convey pathos that lies too deep for tears. I have but faintly sketched the scene-painting that would have to be done to-day, if religion could slip back and miss the sacred and indispensable mediation of Christianity. Take back the English language beyond the noble building of Shakespeare and Milton; take back philosophy beyond the labor of the Germans and the intuition of the Greeks; take back mathematics beyond Laplace and Newton; take back politics from the enlargement of republican experience—you will have yet a harder task when you shall carry religion back to its ante-Christian status and interpretation.

"Lastly, and to sum up. The freedom of religion is the satisfaction of obeying the innermost and highest impulses of the human soul, to the disregard of all secondary powers and considerations. I find this freedom inseparable from the constraint which obliges the man toward this highest effort, as the laws of the tidal flow force the wave to high-water mark. Our human dignity consists in the assertion of this freedom, the acknowledgment of this obligation. Intellectual freedom is found in study and the progress of thought, which is ever substituting enlarged and improved for rude and narrow processes. But the liberal heart precedes the liberal mind, and conditions it. To be careless as to authority and rash in conclusions, is not to be free; to be strict in logic and scrupulous in derivation, is not to be unfree. Let me end my discursive remarks with one phrase from a dear, melancholy, Calvinistic poet, who passed his life in damning himself and blessing others, repenting of a thousand sins he was never able to commit:

> 'He is the freeman whom the truth makes free,
> And all are slaves beside.'"

(Pp. 53-57.)

A stranger, who gave his name as Gustave Watson, made a brief, modest, sensible speech, which fully refuted the radical pretensions. He told them that he had listened in vain to hear pronounced the great affirmative truth the speakers professed to have. An evangelical minister, a Rev. Jesse H. Jones, took up the defence of Christianity, but was too ignorant of the Christian faith, and too far gone himself in radicalism, to be able to effect much. He took up the weakest line of defence possible, and labored chiefly to show the novelty of Christianity against St. Augustine, and its identity, under one of its aspects, with carnal Judaism or mod-

ern socialism. An orthodox Jew sent an essay and a liberal Jew spoke. A professor of spiritism made a speech, and several radicals spoke whose speeches we are obliged to pass over, though as good as those we have noticed.

We have refrained as far as possible from ridiculing the proceedings of the association, which is no association at all, since it is founded on the principle of free individualism; for we wish to treat all men and women with the respect due to ourselves, if not to themselves. The chief actors in the movement we have formerly known, and some of them intimately. We have no doubt of their sincerity and earnestness; but we must be permitted to say that we have found nothing new or striking in their speeches, and we cannot remember the time when we were not perfectly familiar with all their doctrines and pretensions. Their views and aims were set forth in the New England metropolis nearly forty years ago, if with less mental refinement and polish, with an originality and freshness, a force and energy, which they can hardly hope to rival. They were embodied in 1836, and attempted to be realized in the *Society for Christian Union and Progress*, which its founder abandoned because he would not suffer it to grow into a sect, because he saw his movement was leading no-whither, and could accomplish nothing for the glory of God or the good of mankind here or hereafter, and because, through the grace and mercy of God, he became convinced of the truth and sanctity of the Catholic church against which the Protestant reformers in the sixteenth century rebelled. He may not now be very proud of these radicals, but they are, to a great extent, the product of a movement of which he and Ralph Waldo Emerson were the earliest and principal leaders in Boston.

We readily acknowledge that the pretensions of these radical men and women are very great, but they show no great intellectual ability, and are painfully narrow and superficial. The ministers and ex-ministers who figured on the occasion exhibited neither depth nor breadth of view, neither strength nor energy of mind. They proved themselves passable rhetoricians, but deplorably ignorant of the past and the present, of the religions they believed themselves to have outgrown, and especially of human nature and the wants of the human soul. They appeared to know only their own theories projected from themselves, and which are as frail and as attenuated as any spider's web ever rendered visible by the morning dew. They pretend to have

studied, mastered, and exhausted all the past systems, religions, and mythologies; they pride themselves on the universality of their knowledge, and their having lost all bigotry, intolerance, or severity toward any sect or denomination. They speak even patronizingly of the church, and are quite ready to concede that she was good and useful to humanity in her day, in barbarous times, and in the infancy of the race; but humanity, having attained its majority, has outgrown her, and demands now a more manly and robust, a purer and broader and a more living and life-giving religion—a religion, in a word, more Christian than Christianity, more Catholic than Catholicity. Ignorant, or worse than ignorant, of the lowest elements of Catholic teaching, they fancy they have outgrown it, as the adult man has outgrown the garments of his childhood. Their self-conceit is sublime. Why, they are not large enough to wear the fig-leaf aprons fabricated by the reformers of the sixteenth century with which to cover their nakedness. The tallest and stoutest among them is a dwarf by the side of a Luther or a Calvin, or even of the stern old puritan founders of New England; nay, they cannot bear an intellectual comparison even with the originators of New England unitarianism.

Take the Reverend Colonel Higginson, a man of good birth and rich natural gifts, one who, if he had been trained in a Christian school, and had had his mind elevated and expanded by the study of Christian dogmas, could hardly have failed to be one of the great men, if not the greatest man, of his age. He has naturally true nobility of soul, rare intellectual power, and genius of a high order; yet he is so blinded, and so dwarfed in mind by his radicalism, that he can seriously say, "There is no affirmation except the belief in universal natural religion; all else is narrowness and sectarianism." He has, then, no views broader than nature, no aspirations that rise higher than nature, and labors under the delusion that men, reduced to nature alone, would really be elevated and ennobled. He has never learned that nature is not self-sufficing—is dependent; that it has both its origin and end as well as its medium in the supernatural, and could not act or subsist a moment without it—a truth which the Catholic child has learned before a dozen years old, and which is a simple commonplace with the Christian; so much so, that he rarely thinks it necessary to assert it, far less to prove it.

This utterance of the reverend colonel is accepted by all

the radicals. None of them get above second causes; for them all God and nature appear to be identical and indistinguishable; and this appears to be their grand and all-reconciling doctrine. Hence the religion which they propose has no higher origin than man, and no higher end than the natural development and well being of man, individual and social, in this earthly life. It is the religion of humanity, not the religion of God, and man, not God, is obeyed and worshipped in it; yet it seems never to occur to these wise men and women that nature either separated from, or identified with God vanishes into nothing, and their religion with it. But is a religion that is simply evolved from humanity, that has no element above the human, and is necessarily restricted to man in this life, and that contemplates neither fore nor after, higher, deeper, and more universal than Christianity which asserts for us the nature and essence of God, teaches us the origin and end of all things, the real relations of man to his Maker and to universal nature through all the degrees and stages of his existence? No; it is your naturalism that is "narrowness and sectarianism."

Radicalism has heard of the mystery of the Incarnation, and interprets it to mean not the union of two for ever distinct natures, the divine and human, in one divine person, but one divine nature in all human persons. Hence, while the person is human, circumscribed, and transitory, nature in all men is divine, is God himself, permanent, universal, infinite, immortal. This is what the Christian mystery, according to them, really means, though the ignorant, narrow-minded, and blundering apostles never knew it, never understood its profound significance. The church took the narrow and shallow view of the apostles; and hence our radicals have outgrown the church, and instead of looking back or without, above or beyond themselves, they look only within, down into their own divine nature, whence emanates the universe, and in which is all virtue, all good, all truth, all force, all reality. The aim of all moral and religious discipline must be to get rid of all personal distinction, all circumscription, and to sink all individuality in the divine nature, which is the real man, the "one man," "the over-soul" of which Mr. Emerson in his silvery tones formerly discoursed so eloquently and captivated so many charming Boston girls, who understood him by sympathy with their hearts, not their heads, though what he said

seemed little better than transcendental nonsense to the elder, graver, and less susceptible of both sexes. Impersonal nature is divine; hence the less of persons we are the more divine we are, and the more we act from the promptings of impersonal nature the more god-like our acts. Hence instinct, which is impersonal, is a safer guide than reason, which is personal; the logic of the heart is preferable to the logic of the head, and fools and madmen superior to the wise and the sane. Hence are fools and madmen profoundly reverenced by Turks and Arabs.

But impersonal nature is one and identical in all men, and identical, too, with the divine nature. There are no distinct, specific, or individual natures; there is only one nature in all men and things; for all individuality, all difference or distinction, is in the personality. Hence when you get rid of personality, which, after all, has no real subsistence, and sink back into impersonal nature, you attain at once to absolute unity, always and ever present under all the diversity of beliefs, views, or persons. Men and women are mere bubbles floating on the face of the ocean, and nothing distinguishes them from the ocean underlying them but their bubbleosity. Destroy that, and they are the ocean itself. Get rid of personality, sink back into impersonal nature, and all men and women become one, and identical in the one universal nature. Vulgar radicals and reformers seek to reform society by laboring to ameliorate the condition of men and women as persons, and are less profitably employed than the boy blowing soap-bubbles; for the reality is in the ocean on the face of which the bubble floats, not in the bubbleosity. The true radicals, who radicalize in satin slippers and kid gloves, seek not to ameliorate the bubbleosity which is unreal, an unveracity, a mere apparition, a sense-show, but to ameliorate man and society by sinking it, and all differences with it, in universal impersonal nature.

Yet what amelioration is possible except personal? If you get rid of men and women as persons, you annihilate them in every sense in which they are distinguishable from the one universal nature; and suppose you succeed in doing it, your reform, your amelioration would be the annihilation of man and society; for you can have neither without men and women as individuals—that is, as persons. To reform or ameliorate them in their impersonal nature is both impossible and unnecessary; for in their impersonal nature they

are identical with universal nature, and universal nature is God, infinite, immutable, immortal, incapable of being augmented or diminished. Nothing can be done for or against impersonal nature. We see, then, nothing that these refined and accomplished radicals can propose as the object of their labors but the making all men and women, as far as possible, talk and act like fools and madmen. This would seem to be their grand discovery, and the proof of their having outgrown the church.

But we should be ourselves the fool and madman if we attempted to reason with them. They discard logic, reject reason, and count the understanding as one of the poorest of our faculties; as mean, narrow, personal. Reason and understanding are personal; and all truth, all knowledge, all wisdom, all that is real is impersonal. Is not the impersonality of God, that is, of nature, a primary article of their creed? How, then, reason with them or expect them to listen to the voice of reason? Reason is too strait for them, and they have outgrown it, as they have outgrown the church! They do not even pretend to be logically consistent with themselves. No one holds himself bound by his own utterances, any more than he does by the utterances of another. They are free religionists, and scorn to be bound even by the truth.

But suppose they wish to retain men and women—or women and men, for with them woman is the superior—as persons, how do they expect by restricting, as they do, their knowledge to this life, and making their happiness consist in the goods of this world alone, to effect their individual amelioration? Socialism secures always its own defeat. The happiness of this life is attainable only by living for another. Restricted to this life and this world, man has play for only his animal instincts, propensities, and powers. There is no object on which his higher or peculiarly human affections and faculties can be exerted, and his moral, religious, rational nature must stagnate and rot, or render him unspeakably miserable by his hungering and thirsting after a spiritual good which he has not, and which is nowhere to be had. The happiness of this life comes from living for a supernatural end, the true end of man, in obedience to the law it prescribes. When we make this life or this world our end, or assume, with Mr. Emerson, that we have it within, in our own impersonal nature, we deny the very condition of

either individual or social happiness, take falsehood for truth; and no good ever does or can come from falsehood.

It will be observed by our readers, from the extracts we have made, that the radicals not only confine their views to humanity and to this life, but proceed on the assumption of the sufficiency of man's nature for itself. They appear to have, with the exception of Mrs. Howe, no sense of the need of any supernatural help. They have no sense of the incompleteness and insufficiency of nature, as they have no compassion for its weakness. They never stumble, never fall, never sin, are never baffled, are never in need of assistance. It is not so with ordinary mortals. We find nature insufficient for us, our own strength inadequate; and, voyaging over the stormy ocean of life, we are often wrecked, and compelled to cry out in agony of soul, "Lord, save, or we perish." Whosoever has received any religious instruction knows that it is not in ourselves but in God that we live and move and have our being, and that not without supernatural assistance can we attain true beatitude.

In conclusion, we may say, these radical men and women set forth nothing not familiar to us before the late Theodore Parker was an unfledged student of the Divinity school, Cambridge, and even before most of them were born. We know their views and aims better than they themselves know them, and we have lived long enough to learn that they are narrow and superficial, false and vain. We have in the church the freedom we sighed for but found not, and which is not to be found, in radicalism. God is more than man, more than nature, and never faileth; Christ the God-man, at once perfect God and perfect man, two distinct natures in one divine person, is the way, the truth, and the life; and out of him there is no salvation, no true life, no beatitude. We do not expect these radicals to believe us; they are worshippers of man and nature, and joined to their idols. Esteeming themselves wise, they become fools; ever learning, they are never able to come to the knowledge of the truth, any more than the child is able to grasp the rainbow.

EMERSON'S PROSE WORKS.*

[From the Catholic World for May, 1870.]

Mr. Emerson's literary reputation is established, and placed beyond the reach of criticism. No living writer surpasses him in his mastery of pure and classic English, or equals him in the exquisite delicacy and finish of his chiselled sentences, or the metallic ring of his style. It is only as a thinker and teacher that we can venture any inquiry into his merits; and as such we cannot suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by his oracular manner, nor by the apparent originality either of his views or his expressions.

Mr. Emerson has had a swarm both of admirers and of detractors. With many he is a philosopher and sage, almost a god; while with others he is regarded as an unintelligible mystic, babbling nonsense just fitted to captivate beardless young men and silly maidens with pretty curls, who constituted years ago the great body of his hearers and worshippers. We rank ourselves in neither class, though we regard him as no ordinary man, and as one of the deepest thinkers, as well as one of the first poets, of our country. We know him as a polished gentleman, a genial companion, and a warm-hearted friend, whose kindness does not pass over individuals and waste itself in a vague philanthropy. So much, at least, we can say of the man, and from former personal acquaintance as well as from the study of his writings.

Mr. Emerson is no theorist, and is rather of a practical than of a speculative turn of mind. What he has sought all his life, and perhaps is still seeking, is the real, the universal, and the permanent in the events of life and the objects of experience. The son of a Protestant minister, brought up in a Protestant community, and himself for some years a Protestant minister, he early learned that the real, the universal, and permanent are not to be found in Protestantism; and assuming that Protestantism, in some or all its forms, is the truest exponent of the Christian religion, he very naturally came to the conclusion that they are not to be found in Christianity. He saw that Protestantism

**The Prose Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson.* New and revised edition. Boston: 1870.

is narrow, hollow, unreal, a sham, a humbug, and, ignorant of the Catholic church and her teaching, he considered that she must have less of reality, be even more of a sham or humbug, than Protestantism itself. He passed then naturally to the conclusion that all pretensions to a supernaturally revealed religion are founded only in ignorance or craft, and rejected all of all religions, except what may be found in them that accords with the soul or the natural reason of all men. This may be gathered from his brief essay, entitled *Nature*, first published in 1836. We quote a few paragraphs from the introduction :

"Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we through their eyes. Why should not we enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and a philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not a history of theirs ? . . . The sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and flax in the fields. There are new lands, new men, new thoughts. Let us demand our own works, and laws, and worship.

"Undoubtedly we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable. We must trust the perfection of creation so far as to believe that whatever curiosity the order of things has awakened in our minds, the order of things can satisfy. Every man's condition is a solution in hieroglyphic to those inquiries he would put. He acts it as life before he apprehends it as truth. In like manner, nature is already, in its forms and tendencies, describing its own design. Let us interrogate the great apparition that shines so peacefully around us. Let us inquire, To what end is nature ?

"All science has one aim, to find a theory of nature. We have theories of races and of functions, but scarcely yet a remote approach to an idea of creation. We are now so far from the road to truth that religious teachers dispute and hate each other, and speculative men are deemed unsound and frivolous. But to a sound judgment, the most abstract truth is the most practical. Whenever a true theory appears, it will be its own evidence. Its test is, that it will explain all phenomena. Now many are thought not only unexplained, but inexplicable—as language, sleep, madness, dreams, beasts, sex." (Vol. i. pp. 5, 6.)

These extracts give us the key to Mr. Emerson's thought, which runs through all his writings, whether in prose or poetry; though more fully mastered and better defined in his later productions, essays, and lectures, than it was in his earliest production from which we have quoted. In studying these volumes, we are convinced that what the

writer is after is reality, which this outward, visible universe, both as a whole and in all its parts, symbolizes. He seeks life, not death; the living present, not the corpse of the past. Under this visible world, its various and ever-varying phenomena, lies the real world, one, identical, universal, and immutable, which it copies, mimics, or symbolizes. He agrees with Plato that the real thing is in the methexis, not in the mimesis; that is, in the idea, not in the individual and the sensible, the variable and the perishable. He wants unity and catholicity, and the science that does not attain to them is no real science at all. But as the mimesis, in his language the hieroglyphic, copies or imitates the methexic, we can, by studying it, arrive at the methexic, the reality copied or imitated.

We do not pretend to understand Plato throughout, nor to reconcile him always with himself; but as far as we do understand him, the reality, what must be known in order to have real science, is the idea, and it is only by ideas that real science is attained. Ideas are, then, both the object and the medium of knowledge. As the medium of knowledge, the idea may be regarded as the image it impresses on the mimetic, or the individual and the sensible, as the seal on the wax. This image or impression is an exact *fac-simile* of the idea as object. Hence by studying it we arrive at the exact knowledge of the idea, or what is real, invariable, universal, and permanent in the object we would know. The lower copies and reveals the next higher, and thus we may rise, step by step, from the lowest to the highest, to "the first good and the first fair," to the good, the beautiful, or Being that is being in itself. Thus is it in science. But the soul has two wings on which it soars to the empyrean, intelligence and love. The lowest form or stage of love is that of the sexes, a love of the senses only; but this lowest love symbolizes a higher or ideal love, rising stage by stage to the pure ideal, or the love of absolute beauty, the beautiful in itself, the love to which the sage aspires, and the only love in which he can rest or find repose.

We do not say that Mr. Emerson follows Plato in all respects; for he occasionally deviates from him, sometimes for the better, and sometimes for the worse; but no one not tolerably well versed in the Platonic philosophy can understand him. In his two essays on Plato, in his second volume, he calls him the Philosopher, and asserts that all

who talk philosophy talk Plato. He also maintains that Plato represented all the ages that went before him, possessed all the science of his contemporaries, and that none who have come after him have been able to add any thing new to what he taught. He includes Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism in Plato, who is far broader and more comprehensive than them all. Plato of all men born of woman stood nearest the truth of things, and in his intellectual and moral doctrines surpassed all who went before or have come after him.

We find many things in Plato that we like, and we entirely agree with him that the ideal is real; but we do not agree with Mr. Emerson, that nothing in science has been added to the Platonic doctrine. We think Aristotle made an important addition in his doctrine of entelechia; Leibnitz, in his definition of substance, making it a *vis activa*, and thus exploding the notion of passive or inert substances; and finally, Gioberti, by his doctrine of creation as a doctrine, or rather principle, of science. Plato had no conception of the creative act asserted by Moses in the first verse of *Genesis*. Plato never rose above the conception of the production of existences by way of formation, or the operation of the plastic force on a preëxisting and often intractable matter. He never conceived of the creation of existences from nothing by the sole energy or power of the creator. He held to the eternal existence of spirit and matter, and we owe to him principally the dualism and antagonism that have originated the false asceticism which many attribute to Christian teaching; but which Christianity rejects, as is evident from its doctrine of the Incarnation and that of the resurrection of the flesh. Gioberti has shown, that creation is no less a scientific principle than a Christian dogma. He has shown that the creative act is the nexus between being and existences, and that it enters as the copula into the *primum philosophicum*, without which there could be no human mind, and consequently no human science. There are various other instances we might adduce in which people talk very good sense, even profound philosophical and theological truth, and yet do not talk Plato. We hardly think Mr. Emerson himself will accept all the moral doctrines of Plato's *Republic*, especially those relating to marriage and the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes; for Plato goes a little beyond what our free-lovers have as yet proposed.

Aristotle gives us, undoubtedly, a philosophy, such as it is, and a philosophy that enters largely into modern modes of thought and expression; but we can hardly say as much of Plato. He has profound thoughts, no doubt, and many glimpses of a high—if you will, the highest order of truth; but only when he avowedly follows tradition, and speaks according to the wisdom of the ancients. He seems to us to give us a method rather than a philosophy, and very little of our modern philosophical language is derived from him. Several of the Greek fathers, and St. Augustine among the Latins, incline to Platonism; but none of them, so far as we are acquainted with them, followed him throughout. The mediæval doctors, though not ignorant of Plato, almost without an exception prefer Aristotle. The revival of Platonism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought with it a revival of heathenism; and Plato has since been held in much higher esteem with the heterodox and makers of fanciful systems than with the orthodox and simple believers. We trace his influence in what the romancers call chivalry, which is of pagan origin, though some people are ill-informed enough to accredit it to the church; and we trace to his doctrine of love, so attractive to many writers not in other respects without merit, the modern babble about "the heart," the confusion of charity with philanthropy, and the immoral doctrines of free love, which strike at Christian marriage and the Christian family. The "heart," in the language of the Holy Scriptures, means the affections of the will, and the love they enjoin as the fulfilment of the law, and the bond of perfection is charity, a supernatural virtue, in which both the will and the understanding are operative, not a simple, natural sentiment, or affection of the sensibility, or the love of the beautiful, dependent on the imagination.

Mr. Emerson is right enough in making the sensible copy or imitate the intelligible, what there is true in Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondences; but wrong in making the mimetic purely phenomenal, unreal, a mere sense-show. The mimetic, the mimesis, by which Plato means the individual and the sensible, the variable and the transitory, is not the only real, nor the highest real, as sensists and materialists hold; but is as real in its order and degree as the methexic or ideal. Hence, St. Thomas is able to maintain that the sensible species, or accidents, as he calls them, can subsist without their subject, or, as we would say, the sen-

sible body without the intelligible body; and therefore, that the doctrine of transubstantiation involves no contradiction; for it is not pretended that the sensible body undergoes any change, or that the sensible body of our Lord is present in the blessed Eucharist. So St. Augustine distinguishes the visible—the sensible—body and the spiritual—intelligible—body, and holds both to be real. The individual is as real as the species—the *socratitas*, in the language of the schoolmen, as *humanitas*—for neither is possible without the other. The sort of idealism, as it is called, that resolves the individual into the species, or the sensible into the intelligible, and thus denies the external world, is as unphilosophical as the opposite doctrine, that resolves the species into the individual and the intelligible into the sensible. Even Plato, the supposed father of idealism, does not make the mimesis absolutely unreal. For, to say nothing of the preëxistent matter, the image, picture, which is the exact copy of its ideal prototype, is a real image, picture, or copy.

But Mr. Emerson, if he recognizes the methexis at all, either confounds it with real and necessary being, or makes it purely phenomenal, and therefore unreal, as distinguished from real and necessary being. Methexis is a Greek word, and means, etymologically and as used by Plato, participation. Plato's doctrine is, that all inferior existences exist by participation of the higher, through the medium of what he calls the plastic soul, whence the Demiourgos of the Gnostics. His error was in making the plastic soul, instead of the creative act of God, the medium of the participation. Still, Plato made it the participation of ideas or the ideal, and, in the last analysis, of him who is being in himself. Hence, he made a distinction, if not the proper distinction, between the methexis and God, or being by participation and the absolute underived being, or being in itself.

Mr. Emerson recognizes no real participation, and either excludes the methexis or identifies it with God, or absolute being. He thus reduces the categories, as does Cousin, to being and phenomenon, or, in the only barbarism in language he permits himself, the ME—*le moi*—and the NOT-ME—*le non moi*—the root-error, so to speak, of Fichte. He takes himself as the central force, and holds it to be the reality expressed in the NOT-ME. The NOT-ME being purely phenomenal, only the ME is real. By the ME he, of course, does not mean his own personality, but the reality which

underlies and expresses itself in it. The absolute Ich, or ego, of Fichte is identical in all men, is the real man, the "one man," as Emerson says; and this "one man" is the reality, the being, the substance, the force of the whole phenomenal universe. There is, then, no methexis imitated, copied, or mimicked by the mimesis, or the individual and sensible universe. The mimesis copies not a participated or created intelligible, but, however it may be diversified by degrees, it copies directly God himself, the one real being and only substance of all things. If we regard ourselves as phenomenal, we are unreal, and therefore nothing; if as real, as substantive, as force, we do not participate, *mediante* the creative act, of real being, but are identically it, or identical with it; which makes the author not only a pantheist, but a more unmitigated pantheist than Plato himself.

Neither Plato nor Mr. Emerson recognizes any causative force in the mimesis. Plato recognizes causative force only in ideas, though he concedes a power of resistance to the preëxistent matter, and finds in its intractableness the cause of evil; Mr. Emerson recognizes causative or productive force only in the absolute, and therefore denies the existence of second causes, as he does all distinction between first cause and final cause; which is the very essence of pantheism, which Gioberti rightly terms the "supreme sophism."

We have used the Greek terms *methexis* and *mimesis* after Plato, as Gioberti has done in his posthumous works, but not precisely in Gioberti's sense. Gioberti identifies the methexis with the plastic soul asserted by Plato, and revived by old Ralph Cudworth, an Anglican divine of the seventeenth century; but though we make the methexis causative in the order of second causes, we do not make it productive of the mimesis. It means what are called genera and species; but even in the order of second causes, genera are generative or productive only as specificated, and species only as individuated. God must have created the genus specificated and the species individuated before either could be active or productive as second cause. The genus does not and cannot exist without specification, nor the species without individuation, any more than the individual can exist without the species, or the species without the genus. For instance, man is the species, according to the schoolmen, the genus is animal, the *differentia* is

reason, and hence man is defined a rational animal. But the genus animal, though necessary to its existence, cannot generate the species man, any more than it could have generated itself. The species can exist only as immediately individuated by the first cause, and hence the pretence of some scientists—more properly sciolists,—that new species are formed either by development or by natural selection, is simply absurd, as has been well shown by the Duke of Argyll. God creates the species as well as the genera; and it is fairly inferred from the Scriptures that he creates all things in their genera and species "after their kind." Furthermore, if God had not created the human species individuated in Adam, male and female, there could have been no men by natural generation, any more than if there had been no human species at all.

This, as we understand it, excludes alike the plastic soul of the Platonists and the Demiourgos of the Gnostics, and teaches that the mimesis is as directly created by God himself as the methexis. Mr. Emerson, indeed, uses neither of these Platonic terms, though if he had, he would, with his knowledge of the Christian doctrine of creation, have detected the error of Plato, and most likely have escaped his own. The term *methexis*—participation—excludes the old error that God generates the universe, which is rather favored by the terms genera and species. We use the term *mimesis* because it serves to us to express the fact that the lower copies or imitates the higher, and therefore the doctrine of St. Thomas, that *Deus est similitudo rerum omnium*, or that God is himself the type or model after which the universe is created, and which each and every existence in its own order and degree strives to copy or represent. The error of Plato is, that he makes the methexis an emanation rather than a creature, and the plastic power that produces the mimesis; the error of Mr. Emerson, as we view the matter, is, that he makes the mimetic purely phenomenal, therefore unreal, sinks it in the methexic, and the methexis itself in God, as the one only being or substance, the *natura naturans* of Spinoza.

With Plato, the mimesis is the product of the methexic, but is itself passive, and the sooner the soul is emancipated from it the better; though what is the soul in his system of ideas we understand not. With Mr. Emerson, it is neither active nor passive, for it is purely phenomenal, therefore nothing. With us it is real, and, like all real existences, it

is active, and is not a simple image or copy of the methexic or the ideal, but it is in its order and degree a *vis activa*, and copies or imitates actively the divine type or the *idea exemplaris* in the divine mind, after which it is created.

Mr. Emerson says, in the introduction to his essay on *Nature*, "Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of nature and soul." But all activity is in the soul, and what is distinguishable from the soul is purely phenomenal, and, if we may take his essay on the *Over-soul*, not republished in these volumes, is but the soul's own projection of itself. The soul alone is active, productive, and it is one's self, one's own ego; not indeed in its personal limitations and feebleness, but in its absoluteness, as the absolute or impersonal *Ich* of Fichte, and identically God, who is the great, the absolute I AM.

The error is obvious. It consists in the denial or in the overlookings of the fact that God creates substances, and that every substance is, as Leibnitz defines it, a force, a *vis activa*, acting always from its own centre outward. Whatever actually exists is active, and there is and can be no passivity in nature. Hence, Aristotle and the schoolmen after him call God, who is being and being in its plenitude, *actus purissimus*, or most pure act, in whom there are no possibilities to be actualized. Mr. Emerson errs in his first principles, in not recognizing the fact that God creates substances, and that every substance is in activity, therefore causative either *ad intra* or *ad extra*, and that every created substance is causative in the order of second causes. What we maintain in opposition both to him and Plato is, that these created substances are at once methexic and mimetic in their activity.

It were an easy task to show that whatever errors there may be, or may be supposed to be, in Mr. Emerson's works grow out of the two fundamental errors we have indicated—the identification of soul, freed from its personal limitations, as in Adam, John, and Richard, with God, or the real being, substance, force, or activity, and the assumption that whatever is distinguishable from God is purely phenomenal, an apparition, a sense-show, a mere bubble on the surface of the ocean of being, as we pointed out in our comments on the proceedings of the Free Religionists, to which we beg leave to refer our readers.

Yet, though we have known Mr. Emerson personally ever since 1836, have held more than one conversation with him,

listened to several courses of lectures from him, and read and even studied the greater part, if not all of his works, as they issued from the press, we must confess that, in reperusing them preparatory to writing this brief notice, we have been struck, as we never were before, with the depth and breadth of his thought, as well as with the singular force and beauty of his expression. We appreciate him much higher both as a thinker and as an observer, and we give him credit for a depth of feeling, an honesty of purpose, an earnest seeking after truth, we had not previously awarded him in so great a degree, either publicly or privately. We are also struck with his near approach to the truth as we are taught it. He seems to us to come as near to the truth as one can who is so unhappy as to miss it.

We consider it as Mr. Emerson's great misfortune, that his early Protestant training led him to regard the Catholic question as *res adjugicata*, and to take Protestantism, in some one or all of its forms, as the truest and best exponent of Christianity. Protestantism is narrow, superficial, unintellectual, vague, indefinite, sectarian, and it was easy for a mind like his to pierce through its hollow pretensions, to discover its unspiritual character, its want of life, its formality, and its emptiness. It was not difficult to comprehend that it was only a dead corse, and a mutilated corse at that. The Christian mysteries it professed to retain, as it held them, were lifeless dogmas, with no practical bearing on life, and no reason in the world for believing them. Such a system, having no relation with the living and moving world, and no reason in the nature or constitution of things, could not satisfy a living and thinking man, in downright earnest for a truth at least as broad and as living as his own soul. It was too little, too insignificant, too *mesquine*, too much of a dead and putrefying body to satisfy either his intellect or his heart. If that is the true exponent of Christianity, and the most enlightened portion of mankind say it is, why shall he belie his own understanding, his own better nature, by professing to believe and reverence it? No; let him be a man, be true to himself, to his own reason and instincts, not a miserable time-server or a contemptible hypocrite.

If Mr. Emerson had not been led to regard the Catholic question as closed, except to the dwellers among tombs, and to the ignorant and superstitious, and had studied the church with half the diligence he has Plato, Mohammed, or

Swedenborg, it is possible that he would have found in Christianity the life and truth, the reality, unity, and catholicity he has so long and so earnestly sought elsewhere and found not. Certain it is, that whatever affirmative truth he holds is held and taught by the church in its proper place, its real relations, and in its integrity. The church does not live in the past nor dwell only among tombs; she is an ever-present and ever-living church, and presents to us not a dead historical Christ, but the ever-living and ever-present Christ, as really and truly present to us as he was to the disciples and apostles with whom he conversed when he went about in Judea doing good, without having where to lay his head, and not more veiled from our sight now than he was then from theirs. Does she not hold the sublime mystery of the Real Presence, which, if an individual fact, is also a universal principle?

The Christian system, if we may so speak, is not an afterthought in creation, or something superinduced on the Creator's works. It has its ground and reason in the very constitution of things. All the mysteries taught or dogmas enjoined by the church are universal principles; they are truly catholic, the very principles according to which the universe, visible or invisible, is constructed, and not one of them can be denied without denying a first principle of life and of science. Mr. Emerson says, in a passage we have quoted, "All science has one aim, namely, to find a theory of nature," and seems to concede that it has not yet succeeded in finding it. The church goes beyond even the aim of science, and gives, at least professes to give, not a theory of truth, but the truth itself; she is not a method, but that to which the true method leads. She is the body of him who is "the way, the truth, and the life;" she gives us, not as the philosophers, her views of the truth, but the truth itself, in its reality, its unity, its integrity, its universality, its immutability. At least such is her profession; for the faith she teaches is the substance—hypostasis—of the things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen—*Sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium.*

Such being her profession, made long before Protestantism was born, and continued to be made since with no stammering tongue or abatement of confidence, the pretence that judgment has gone against her is unfounded. Many have condemned her, as the Jewish Sanhedrim condemned

our Lord, and called on the Roman procurator to execute judgment against him; but she has no more staid condemned than he staid confined in the new tomb hewn from the rock in which his body was laid, and far more are they who admit her professions among the enlightened and civilized than they who deny them. No man has a right to be regarded as a philosopher or sage who has not at least thoroughly examined her titles, and made up his mind with a full knowledge of the cause.

In the Catholic church we have found the real presence, and unity, and catholicity which we sought long and earnestly, and could find nowhere else, and which Mr. Emerson, after a still longer and equally earnest search, has not found at all. He looks not beyond nature, and nature is not catholic, universal, or the whole. It is not one, but manifold and variable. It cannot tell its origin, medium, or end. With all the light Mr. Emerson has derived from nature, or from nature and soul united, there is infinite darkness behind, infinite darkness before, and infinite darkness all around him. He says, "Every man's condition is a solution in hieroglyphic of those inquiries he would put." Suppose it is so, what avail is that to him who has lost or never had the key to the hieroglyph? Knows he to interpret the hieroglyph in which the solution is concealed? Can he read the riddle of the sphinx? He has tried his hand at it in his poem of the Sphinx, and has only been able to answer that

"Each answer is a lie."

It avails us little to be told where the solution is, if we are not told what it is, or if only told that every solution is false as soon as told. Hear him; to man he says,

"Thou art the unanswered question; couldst see thy proper eye,
Alway it asketh, asketh; and each answer is a lie:
So take thy quest through nature, it through a thousand natures ply;
Ask on, thou clothed eternity; time is the false reply."

The answer, if it means any thing, means that man is "a clothed eternity," whatever that may mean, eternally seeking an answer to the mystery of his own being, and each answer he can obtain is a lie; for only eternity can comprehend eternity and tell what it is. Whence has he learned that man, the man-child, is "a clothed eternity," and therefore God, who only is eternal?

Now, eternity is above time, and above the world of time, consequently above nature. Catholicity, by the very force of the term, must include all truth, and therefore the truth of the supernatural as well as of the natural. But Mr. Emerson denies the supernatural, and does not, of course, even profess to have any knowledge that transcends nature. How, then, can he pretend to have attained to catholic truth? He himself restricts nature to the external universe, which is phenomenal, and to soul, by which he means himself. But are there no phenomena without being or substance which appears or which shows itself in them? Is this being or substance the soul, or, in the barbarism he adopts, the ME? If so, the NOT-ME is only the phenomena of the ME, and of course identical with himself, as he implies in what he says of the "one man." Then in himself, and emanating from himself, are all men, and the whole of nature. How does he know this? Does he learn it from nature?

Of course, Mr. Emerson means not this, even if his various utterances imply it. He uses the word *creation*, and we suppose he intends, notwithstanding his systematic views, if such he has, contradict it, to use it in its proper sense. Then he must hold the universe, including, according to his division, nature and soul, has been created, and if created, it has a creator. The creator must be superior, above nature and soul, and therefore in the strictest sense of the word supernatural; and as reason is the highest faculty of the soul, the supernatural must also be supra-rational.

Does the creator create for a purpose, for an end? and if so, what is that end or purpose, and the medium or means of fulfilling it, whether on his part or on the part of the creature? Here, then, we have the assertion of a whole order of truth, very real and very important to be known, which transcends the truth Mr. Emerson professes to have, and which is not included in it. We say again, then, that he has not attained to catholicity, and we also say that, by the only method he admits, he cannot attain to it. How can he pretend to have attained to catholicity, and that he has already a truth more universal than Christianity reveals, when he must confess that without the knowledge of a supernatural and supra-rational truth he cannot explain his origin or end, or know the conditions of his existence, or the means of gaining his end?

Mr. Emerson says, as we have quoted him,

"Undoubtedly we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable. We must trust the perfection of the creation so far as to believe that whatever curiosity the order of things has awakened in our minds, the order of things can satisfy."

'Alway it asketh, asketh, and each answer is a lie."

There is here a grand mistake. If he had said the Creator instead of creation, there would have been truth and great propriety in the author's assertion. Nature—and we mean by nature the whole created order—excites us to ask many very troublesome questions, which nature is quite incompetent to answer. The fact that nature is created, proves that she is, both as a whole and in all her parts, dependent, not independent, and therefore does not and cannot suffice for herself. Unable to suffice for herself, she cannot suffice for the science of herself; for science must be of that which is, not of that which is not.

Mr. Emerson, we presume, struck with the narrowness and inconsistencies of all the religions he had studied, and finding that they are all variable and transitory in their forms, yet thought that he also discovered something in them, or underlying them all, which is universal, invariable, and permanent, and which they are all honest efforts of the great soul to realize. He therefore came to the conclusion that the sage can accept none of these narrow, variable, and transitory forms, and yet can reject none of them as to the great, invariable, and underlying principles, which in fact is all they have that is real or profitable. To distinguish between the transient and permanent in religion was the common aim of the Boston movement from 1830 to 1841, when we ourselves began to turn our own mind, though very timidly and at a great distance, toward the church. Mr. Emerson, Miss Margaret Fuller, A. Bronson Alcott, and Mr. Theodore Parker regarded the permanent elements of all religions as the natural patrimony or products of human nature. We differed from them, by ascribing their origin to supernatural revelation made to our first parents in the garden, universally diffused by the dispersion of the race, and transmitted to us by the traditions of all nations. Following out this view, the grace of God moving and assisting, we found our way to the Catholic church, in which the form and the invariable and permanent principle, or rather, the form growing out of the principle, are inseparable, and are fitted by the divine hand to each other.

The others, falling back on a sort of transcendental illuminism, sunk into pure naturalism, where such of them as are still living, and a whole brood of young disciples who have sprung up since, remain, and, like the old Gnostics, suppose themselves spiritual men and women in possession of the secret of the universe. There was much life, mental activity, and honest purpose in the movement; but those who had the most influence in directing its course could not believe that any thing good could come out of Nazareth, and so turned their backs on the church. They thought they could find something deeper, broader, and more living than Christianity, and have lost not only the transient, but even the permanent in religion.

UNION WITH THE CHURCH.*

[From the Catholic World for October, 1870.]

The *Mercersburg Review*, the well-known organ of what is called the Mercersburg theology, is one of the ablest and, to us, most interesting theological publications received at this office. The writers are members of the (German) Reformed church, and occupy in relation to their own denomination about the same position that the Puseyites, Anglo-Catholics, or ritualists do in relation to theirs, though they are profounder theologians and, if we may say so, understand far better the philosophy of the church—its relation to the Incarnation, its position in the divine economy, and its office in the work of salvation. In their church theory they approach the Catholic doctrine, and too nearly, it seems to us, for them to be excusable in remaining in a Protestant sect.

The article we have referred to in the July number of the *Mercersburg Review* discusses the question of union

---

*1. *Union with the Church the Solemn Duty and Blessed Privilege of all who would be Saved.* By Rev. H. Harbaugh, D. D. Fourth edition.
2. *Where is the City?* Boston: Second edition. 1868.
3. *The Mercersburg Review.* New Series. Art. III.: "Union with the Church." July, 1870. Philadelphia: Quarterly.

with the church, and reviews with great fairness and ability the two works, the titles of which we have cited in our foot-note. The reviewer, Rev. J. W. Santee, says of them:

"The authors of these two volumes represent two tendencies in religion; these are wholly diverse, and may be regarded as types of different systems of thought, as well as of Christianity. The first one is a practical treatise on union with the church, and moves in the sphere of Christianity, as apprehended in former ages, and now, to a great extent, in the German Reformed church, and makes earnest of the church of Christ, as a real order of grace, into the bosom of which souls are to be born—reared—nourished and prepared for heaven. The second moves in an order of thought altogether different, which sees nothing special in the church—nothing in her heaven-ordained means, but seems to regard the church only as a place of safe keeping for the soul, after the work of conversion—the new birth—has taken place, there to be kept safe, until God calls it into another world. The one regards the church as the 'mother of us all'; the other, as a place where nothing is to be had for spiritual support, in the way of growth, but only a place of safety. This may be seen from the following: 'It would be a difficult and almost endless task to exhibit all the good effects which will result to you from a right connection with the church. They are as extensive and various as the influences of religion itself, which it is the great aim and end of the church to beget and unfold in the heart and life of all. Many of its influences are so silent that they cannot be traced in their details. Gently as the dew do its cheering, refreshing, and life-giving influences distil on the heart; and it is because these influences are so gentle and silent, that they are so difficult fully to appreciate.' Hosea xiv. 5, 6, 7. (*Union with the Church*, pp. 110, 111.) Now turn to the other volume, and there you have another theory, as the following shows: 'Israel Knight opened his Bible at Ez. xlviii. 35, reading, "And the name of the city from that day shall be, *The Lord is There.*" Closing the book, he reflected. At length he said, "Oh that I might find the city with that name." Israel Knight had come to this recognition. . . . *Somewhere, there is a church, a peculiar people, whose name is rightly, "The Lord is There."*' Being a youth who lacked little of his majority, he addressed to his guardian the following:

"'RESPECTED SIR: I hope I am a Christian. As I have had but little experience, and have examined but few books except those used in my classes, I am undecided what church I had better select with which to connect myself. Please advise me upon this important subject, and oblige, yours obediently,

"'ISRAEL KNIGHT.

"'He received this reply:—MY DEAR YOUNG FRIEND: I hope you are a true disciple of Christ. He that doeth his will will know of the doctrine. Love the Lord your God with all your heart, and your neigh-

bor as yourself, and you will find the truth. An old man like myself sees through different spectacles from those used by young eyes. God is good. He gives wisdom to all who seek it with a humble mind. Therefore, look for yourself; but my advice is—*look on all sides before you cleave to any.* Be cautious about starting to make your jar, lest, like the one you found in Horace, as the wheel goes round, it turns out an insignificant pitcher. Yours truly,

"'EPHRAIM STEARNS.

(*Where is the City?* pp. 7, 8.)

"Now, here is a soul, a Christian, all right in its own estimation, hunting the church, and is encouraged, not to cleave to any one until he has seen on all sides, that is to say, that soul found all in the sphere of nature that it needed, and on that plane is to fight the battle of life in the world, and in some way, neither he nor his guardian could tell, is to make his way to heaven. Here are two distinct schemes—distinct theories of the church—of our Christian life set forth, which affect the life and condition, everything of importance which has a bearing on this and on the future life. This last scheme is modern, and it has, to a great extent, supplanted the faith of early Christianity, which faith is found, partially, in a few branches of the church of the Reformation. The larger portion of our Protestantism has succumbed and is moulded by this scheme, and has very little in common with the maxim imprinted on the title-page of the little volume by Dr. Harbaugh, while this ancient faith recognized the church as a divine order of grace—a real institute from heaven to men, for the salvation of souls. The theory of Christianity—of the church—which we find in the volume, '*Where is the City?*' is the one prevailing generally in New England, radiating from thence into all parts where New England influence and theology extend, moulding the Christian life, conditioning society, and even reaching over to the state. The *Bibliotheca Sacra* stands in the same stream, for in the notice it gave of this strange book, there was no intimation of dissent, and its theory and position were accepted as seemingly right, sound, and proper. As German Reformed, trained in the system of religion represented by Dr. Harbaugh, a book with tendencies like that '*Where is the City?*' cannot be safely recommended as suitable reading, especially for the young baptized members of the church of Christ. There is no doubt but that the tendency and influence of the book are of the low, humanitarian order, which have been and ever will be pernicious to true vital piety, and the less paper and ink are wasted in the production of such books, the better for society and the church: whereas, a book like that of Dr. Harbaugh will live and go on its mission for good, pointing the reader to Christian responsibilities and duties, and directing him to the way which leads to a spiritual home, where food for the soul is found—where it may grow in grace—where it may live and prepare for a better life." (*Mercersburg Review*, pp. 374–376.)

Israel Knight believes himself already a Christian, though the member of no church, when he starts out on his hunt after the church. But if he is already a Christian without the church, what need has he of the church? If one is a Christian, is not that enough? Nevertheless, the author conducts him through the Baptist sect, the Congregationalist, the Methodist, the Episcopal, the Universalist, the Swedenborgian, the Spiritualist [Spiritist], the Unitarian —virtually the whole round of Protestant sects—in pursuit of the city, that is, the church. Israel, after a thorough examination of all these, and unable of course to find the church in any one of them, comes to the conclusion that the church is nowhere or anywhere. We give the conclusion as cited by the reviewer, with his comments;

"He is a Christian, and with this impression he starts out in his search, and a weary, long hunt he has of it, turning out in the end that his effort was fruitless, that he found '*The Lord is there*' inscribed nowhere, but . . . Israel said, 'There is peril in my thus halting between opinions. Henceforth I will seek to be a disciple of Christ. I shall love all men though they love me not. In whatever place I find a true worker for the good of his fellow-man, I will be to him a brother. And with this simple, yet sublime faith in his heart, he went forth again into the world, no longer seeking the city. He had found it, and over all the gates on either side he read this inscription: *Therefore, thou art inexcusable, O, man, whosoever thou art that judgest.* (Pp. 348, 349.) And was this the city Israel Knight found; and after all, what is it? Where does it differ from the ancient heathen? Wherein is it better than that of Seneca and hundreds of others? No, that is not the city to which the apostle points; it is not the kingdom of God, that was at hand in the person of Jesus Christ. Who could recommend such reading to the young or to any one? We have had too much of this same kind of milk-and-water trash, from which we are suffering, and such books, with such humanitarian tendencies, deserve the severest condemnation."—(*Mercersburg Review*, pp. 378, 379.)

The reviewer's comments are very true and just, but we cannot agree with him that the no-churchism of *Where is the City?* is peculiar to New England theology, or that it is any thing but the strict logical as well as practical conclusion from the principles of the Protestant movement, or so-called reformation, in the sixteenth century. We know that Dr. Schaff attempted, in a work published some years since, to maintain that the current of Christian life flows out from Christ through the church of the apostles, down through the church of the fathers and the church of the mediæval

doctors in communion with the see of Rome, and then, since the sixteenth century, down through the church or churches of the reformation, and therefore that Protestantism is the true and legitimate continuation and development, without any break, of the church of the ages prior to the reformers. This is mere theory, suggested by German nationalism, and ridiculed in a conversation with the writer of this article by Dr. Nevin himself, the founder of the Mercersburg school, or, as the (*German*) *Reformed Monthly* calls it, Nevinism, and now abandoned, we presume, by the author himself. It is a theory which has not a single fact in its support, and which was never dreamed of either by the reformers themselves, or by their opponents. The reformers sought not to continue the church of the middle ages, but to break with it, to discard it, and restore what they called "primitive Christianity," which had for a thousand years been overlaid by popery. They believed in corruption, not in development or progress.

Protestantism in its original and essential character is a revolt, not simply against the authority of the pope and councils, nor simply against abuses and corruptions alleged to have crept into the church during the dark ages, but against the whole church system as understood by the fathers and mediæval doctors. The Protestant movement in the sixteenth century was a movement against the entire Christian priesthood, a protest against the whole system of mediatorial or sacramental grace, and the assertion of pure immediatism. Protestants have no priests, no altar, no victim, no sacrifice, no sacraments; they have only ministers, a table, and ordinances, and recognize no medium of grace. Some of them indeed practise baptism, and commemorate what they call the Lord's Supper, but as rights or ordinances, not as sacraments conferring the grace they signify, not as effective *ex opere operato*, but at best only *ex opere suscipientis*. No doubt, the reformers retained many reminiscences of Christian truth, as taught by the church, not reconcilable with their protests and denials, and which certain Protestants, like our friends of the Mercersburg school, and the Ritualists among Anglicans, seize upon and insist are the real principles of the reformation, and that what among Protestants cannot be harmonized with them should be eliminated; but the whole ἦθος, the whole spirit, current, or tendency of the Protestant world repudiates them. Undoubtedly, they are more Christian, but they are less

true Protestants than the Evangelicals, who reject their teachings as figments of Romanism and themselves as papists in disguise.

The authentic Protestant doctrine of the church is not that the church is an organic body vitally united to Christ, but the association or aggregation of individuals who are personally united to Christ as their invisible head. The church is not, in the Protestant sense, the medium of the union of the individual with Christ, but the creature or result of such union. It is the union of Christians that makes the church, not the union with the church that makes Christians. Presbyterians, Congregationalists, the Dutch Reformed, the German Reformed, Baptists, Methodists, and others, before admitting a candidate to their church, examine him to see if he gives satisfactory evidences, not simply of a right disposition and belief, but of having been "hopefully converted," or regenerated by the direct and immediate action of the Holy Ghost. Comparatively few Protestants hold what is called baptismal regeneration, and no Protestant can consistently hold it, for every consistent Protestant denies supernaturally infused virtues, or habits of faith and sanctity, and holds that one is justified by faith alone. Some Episcopalians hold that infants are regenerated in baptism, but in so far as they so hold, they are not sound Protestants, and we find that the Anglicans who are faithful, like our neighbor the *Protestant Churchman*, to the Protestant movement, hold nothing of the sort, stigmatize the doctrine as a relic of popery, and are laboring to expunge it from the Book of Common Prayer.

Protestants may be divided into two great families: the supernaturalists and the naturalists or rationalists. With the latter we have at present nothing to do, for they hardly pretend to be Christians, and see in the church only a voluntary association of individuals for mutual edification and assistance. The former class recognize the necessity of regeneration or the new birth, indeed, but they hold that it is effected by the immediate and direct operation of the Holy Ghost on the soul, without the visible sacrament as a medium, and must be effected before one can rightfully be admitted to church membership. The conclusion, then, follows necessarily, that one not only can be, but must be a Christian, if a Christian at all in the sense of one born anew of Christ, without the sacrament of regeneration or union with the church, and as the condition precedent of

such union. Israel Knight is, then, only a true and consistent Protestant in assuming that he is, though the member of no church, a Christian, and that he can live the life of Christ without union with any church organization.

The Mercersburg reviewer is quite right in asking, by way of objection, if one can be a Christian without union with the church, what is the use of the church? but he condemns the reformation in doing so. For ourselves, we confess that we have never been able to see, on Protestant principles, any necessity or use for the church; and so long as we remained a Protestant, we were avowedly a no-church-man. When one has attained the end, one does not need the means. Our first step in the passage from Protestantism to Catholicity was the conviction that without the church we could not be united to Christ and live his life. Indeed, no consistent Protestant can admit the church idea; and Protestantism is essentially and inevitably the denial of the church as a medium of the Christian life. The church, if she exists at all as the medium of union with Christ, in whom alone there is salvation, must be instituted by God himself through his supernatural action; but none of the so-called Protestant churches have been so instituted; none of them have had, it is historically certain, a divine origin; and they have all been instituted by men whose names we know, and who have had from God no commission to found a church or churches. Consequently, those churches so called have and can have no Christian character of their own, and none at all, unless they derive it from their individual members. They are, then, really no churches, but simply associations of individuals who call themselves Christians. There is and can be no Protestant church; there are and can be only Protestant associations or societies; and therefore there really is no church in the Protestant world with which one can unite, or with which union is necessary as the medium of union with Christ.

Dr. Harbaugh professes, indeed, to differ from the doctrine of Mr. Israel Knight, but is not as firm in denying, as is the Mercersburg reviewer, that one can be a Christian outside of the church; nor does he explicitly assert that union with the church is *absolutely* necessary to the Christian life or to salvation. His doctrine is that "union with the church is a solemn duty and a blessed privilege." He indeed asserts, in his fourth argument, p. 87, that "it is necessary to be united with the church because, according

to the Scriptures, we *are united to Christ through the church.*" The Mercersburg reviewer argues from this that Dr. Harbaugh holds that one can be united to Christ *only* by being united with the church. This may be Dr. Harbaugh's meaning, but he does not unequivocally say it; and if he means it, his other eight arguments for uniting with the church are quite superfluous. Once let it be settled that there is no salvation without union with Christ, and no union with Christ without union with the church, and no additional argument is needed to convince any one who loves his own soul and desires salvation that he ought to become a true and living member of the church, the living body of Christ. The one argument is enough.

Yet assuming that Dr. Harbaugh does mean all that the Mercersburg reviewer alleges, he fails, as does the reviewer himself, to recognize the indestructible unity of the church. Both concede that the church is divided, and both contend that it suffices to be united to some one of the many parts or divisions into which it is divided. "We freely confess," says Dr. Harbaugh, pp. 11, 12, "that *the church is divided into many parts*, and we mourn over it. *It is a great evil;* and those who are the means of dividing it are certainly very guilty before God. Christ instituted only *one* church, and it is his will that there should be but one fold, as there is also but one shepherd—one body as there is but one head. . . . . Grant that the church is divided, and that this is a great evil; it does not destroy it. The church still exists; divided as the branches, yet still one as the tree. The church can exist, does exist, and is still one church, under all these divisions."

The tree includes its living branches in its organic unity, and there is no division unless the branches are severed from the trunk or parent stem, in which case they are dead branches, and are no longer any part of the living tree. If the church exists in her organic unity, and the branch churches are in living union with her, there is no division of the church at all, and the Mercersburg school is quite wrong in assuming that there is, and that "it is a great evil." In such case there are no divisions of the church to be regretted or mourned over. The variety and number of branches are only proofs of her vigorous life and growth. But if the branches are divided from the trunk, severed from the tree, they are dead, not living branches, and union with them is not and cannot be a medium of union with Christ, or of living his life.

But our Mercersburg friends, while they hold that "the church is divided into many parts," maintain that her unity is still preserved. "She is still one church under all these divisions." We cannot understand this. We cannot understand how unity can be divided—and if not divided, the church is not divided—and yet remain undivided. To our old-fashioned way of thinking, the division of unity is its destruction. The branches of a tree may wither, be severed from the trunk and burned, and yet its organic unity remain intact; but we cannot understand how branches divided from the tree, and no longer in communion with its root, are still living branches, and one with it.

Our friends of the Mercersburg school, under the lead of Dr. Nevin, have conclusively shown that the church of the apostles' creed is an organic body, growing out of the Incarnation, vitally united to Christ the incarnate Word, and living by and in his life. It is the living body of Christ, and therefore necessarily one and indivisible, as he is one and indivisible. How, then, can this church be divided and still exist as one body? or how can it exist as one organic body under the several sectarian divisions, which are none of them included in its unity and integrity, and all of which are separate bodies, independent one of another? What organic union is there between the German Reformed church and the Protestant Episcopal church, or between either of these and the Roman church? The unity to be asserted is the unity of the church, not as an invisible spirit or as a doctrine or theory, but as an organic, therefore a visible, body. None of the parts into which Dr. Harbaugh says she is divided can be included in her unity, unless visibly united to her as the branch to the trunk, or, for instance, as the see of New York is visibly united to the apostolic see of Rome, from which it holds. There is no such visible union between the divisions in question. The Roman church communes or is united with no Protestant sect, and the Protestant sects as organic bodies do not inter-commune with one another. They are mutually independent bodies, and are no more one body, or parts of one body, than France and Prussia, Great Britain and the United States, are one, or parts of one empire, kingdom, or commonwealth. Each is complete in itself, with its own constitution and laws, its own centre of authority, its own legislature, executive, and judiciary, subordinate to and dependent on no other body or organism whatever. So much is

undeniable. How, then, can they be parts or divisions of one organic whole, with which they have no visible connection, and be made one in its unity? The supposition is absurd on its very face.

It will not do to say that, though these parts or divisons are united in one body by no visible bond of unity, and are externally separate and mutually independent bodies, they are yet united by an invisible bond, and therefore are really parts, divisions, branches of the one holy Catholic church; for that would imply that the church is simply an invisible church, not a visible organic body, as it is conceded she is. Doubtless the church is both visible and invisible; but the invisible is the *forma* of the visible, as the soul is the *forma* or informing principle of the body. The invisible is Christ himself, or, rather, the Holy Ghost, who dwells in the visible, and applies to the regeneration and sanctification of souls the grace purchased by the Word made flesh, the one Mediator of God and men. Union with the invisible church is the end sought by union with the visible church; and, if that union is possible without union with the visible body, we must accept Mr. Israel Knight's conclusion that there is Christianity outside of the church, and that one can be united to Christ and live his life without being a member of any church organization, which the Mercersburg reviewer denies and ably refutes.

The question raised by the works before us is as to union with the church as an organic body as the necessary medium of union with Christ, and of living his life. A union of the sects in doctrine, in usages, in spirit and intention, avails nothing, unless they are in vital union with this organic body, the one body of Christ. This is the great fact that catholicizing as well as other Protestants overlook. After all their talk, they forget that the bond of unity must be visible since the body is visible; and hence St. Cyprian, in his *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*, argues that, though all the apostles were equal, our Lord conferred the pre-eminence on one, and established one cathedra, whence unity should be seen to take its rise. Overlooking this, Protestants are able to assert only an invisible Catholic church, which is simply no organic body at all, and leaves Christ without a body through which we can be united to him, or a pure disembodied spirit, and as strictly so as if the Word had never been made flesh and dwelt among us. Our Mercersburg friends see and admit it. We ask them, then, is or is not this

organic body divided? If so divided that the several parts or divisions have no longer a visible bond of unity as one organic body, unity is destroyed, the church has failed, and the gates of hell have prevailed against her; if not, if the unity of the living organic body remains, then no union with any body not in visible communion with this one organic body is or can be union with the holy Catholic church of the creed, or the medium of union with Christ. We do not here misrepresent the Mercersburg school. The reviewer himself says:

"*The church is one, as there is but one body,* and this fact was maintained for sixteen centuries, troublers were silenced, and branded as heretics, and some of the reformers felt the force of this indisputable fact, and there was manifested a spirit of compromise, which, however, could not succeed, and presently the Reformation divided into two confessions, coming down to our days. Not only this, but these divided and subdivided, running into endless divisions, and not the most exact rules of calculus can calculate how small the fragments may become, or where the divisions will end; and what is worse than all, these now live on each other—prey on each other—attempt to devour each other, as the lean and fat kine, so that it is true and cannot be gainsaid, Protestantism, with its divided interests, engages not in fighting the world and the devil, but fighting itself. This surely is a blot which the warmest friends of the system can neither justify nor defend, and it is equally true that this very fact stands in the way of many, as an opposing barrier, and keeps many (inexcusably) from a duty which they solemnly owe to God and to their own souls; namely, a consecration to the service of God, in soul and body. How long this unfortunate condition will continue, no human eye can see. It must ever lie heavy on the Christian heart longing for unity. In this confusion, where sects multiply so rapidly, we have always a want of unity. The church, however, cannot be divided as our modern Protestantism presents the case. The faith of the church cannot be so uncertain nor unwavering as it is presented; if it be so, it becomes of all things most uncertain." (*Mercersburg Review*, p. 390.)

The reviewer also expressly approves Dr. Harbaugh's church theory:

"The tract of Dr. Harbaugh regards the church as a divine institution, for the purposes of salvation—an order instituted by Jesus Christ, in the bosom of which the healing of the nations is to be accomplished—an institution having means and forces to do all that is proposed. Here is the home of the Christian—in her he is born—in her nurtured, and here grows to be prepared, by her blessed means, for heaven. Here is a door of entrace; entering her are found means to carry forward the great work of preparation, and in her the baptized soul realizes the fact only, 'that in life and in death, in soul and in body, I am not my own, but

belong unto my faithful Saviour, Jesus Christ.' It falls in with the ancient creeds—with the faith, *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*" (*Mercersburg Review*, p. 386.)

The plain logic of all this is that the church as an organic body subsists always undivided in her unity and integrity, and that all bodies organically divided from her or not organically united with her are aliens from Christ, without any church character or Christian life, and union with any one of them is not union with the Catholic church, out of which there is no salvation. But neither our Mercersburg friends nor our ritualistic friends are willing to admit this plain logical conclusion, and indeed cannot do it without unchurching the bodies of which they are members, and consequently not without unchristianizing themselves and their associates. Here is the stick. Unwilling to deny that the Christian life can be lived and has been lived in their respective bodies, they try to find out some ground on which bodies which are united to the church and to one another by no visible bond, and are even visibly disunited and separate organic bodies, may yet be vitally united to the one organic body, the one holy Catholic church, out of which German Reformed, Episcopalian, Anglican, and Presbyterian alike admit there is no salvation. Unhappily for their wishes, no such ground can be discovered, for it would imply a contradiction in terms; and as no one of the Protestant sects does or dares assert itself alone as the one holy Catholic church, and as no one of them is organically united with any body but itself, they are forced to stand self-condemned, and each to confess itself a body separated from Christ, and therefore without the means of salvation. Men seldom fail to fall into self-contradictions and gross absurdities when they attempt to follow their feelings or affections instead of the inexorable logic of principles. Error is never self-consistent.

Our catholicizing Protestant friends, that is, Protestants who profess to hold the Catholic doctrine of the church and yet fancy themselves or would like to believe themselves safe while remaining in the communion of their respective sects, have, after all, little confidence in their theory of branch churches, and fall back for safety on their real or supposed baptism. Baptism, by whomsoever administered, makes the baptized members of Christ's body, and hence all baptized infants dying in infancy are saved; yet it by no means follows that all who receive what purports to be baptism among the sects are validly baptized. In fact, the

Catholic clergy place so little confidence in the sectarian administration of baptism that converts to the church are almost always baptized conditionally.

The sacrament is indeed efficacious *ex opere operato*, but only they who, as infants, interpose no obstacle to the inflowing grace are actually regenerated. They who have not the proper disposition of mind and heart, who lack belief in Christ, or have a false belief, do oppose such obstacles, and receive not the fruits of the sacrament till they repent of their sins, and come to believe the truth, and the truth as the church teaches it. Then, again, the habit of faith infused in baptism may be lost; and the union with Christ is severed, if the infant on coming to years of discretion makes an act of infidelity, or, what is the same thing, refuses or omits to make an act of faith. Under some one or all of these heads a great portion of adult Protestants must be classed, and we see, therefore, no solid ground to hope for their salvation, unless before they die they are converted and gathered into the communion of the holy Catholic church. Theologians, no doubt, distinguish between the soul of the church and the body of the church, but this does not help those who are aliens from the body of the church. Certainly no one who does not belong to the soul of the church is in the way of salvation, and all who do belong to the soul are in the way, and, if they persevere to the end, will certainly be saved; but union with the body is the only means of union with the soul of the church, and hence out of the church as the body of Christ there is no salvation. There is no logical alternative between this conclusion and the no-churchism of Mr. Israel Knight.

Union with the church as the medium of union with Christ is no arbitrary condition, any more than is the condition that to be a man one must be born of the race of Adam. To be a Christian one must be born by the election of grace of Christ, as one to be a man must be born of Adam by natural generation; and for one not born of Christ to complain that he is not in the way of salvation is as unreasonable, as absurd, as for a horse to complain that he is not born a man; nay, even more so, for, if any man is not born of Christ, and, therefore, is excluded from the elect or regenerated race, it is his own fault. It was ordained before the foundation of the world, in the self-same decree by which the world was created, that man should be redeemed and saved, or enabled to attain the end of his existence, through

the Incarnation of the Word, that is, through Christ, and through him alone. The church originates in the Incarnation, and is in the order of regeneration or grace, in relation to Christ, what the human race in the order of natural generation is to Adam; and hence Christ is called in prophecy "the Father of the coming age," and by St. Paul, "the second Adam, the Lord from heaven." The church is elect or regenerated mankind. Under another aspect, she not only includes all who are born of Christ as their progenitor in the order of grace, but is his bride, his spouse, through whom souls are begotten and born of him; and hence St. Cyprian says, "He cannot have God for his father who has not the church for his mother."

It is not ours to say what God could or could not have done; but we may and do say that the Christian order, or the church founded by the Incarnation, is the teleological law of the universe, without which it cannot be perfected, completed, or attain to its end or final cause, but would remain for ever inchoate or initial, as we have frequently shown. All things are created and ordered in reference to the glory of the incarnate Word, and it is only in the Incarnation, the Word made flesh, that we have the key to the meaning of the universe and the significance of the facts or events of history, both sacred and profane. Read the first fourteen verses of St. John's Gospel, and, if you understand them, you will see that we only assert the central truth, the informing principle, of what it has pleased God to reveal as the teleological law of his creation. Christ is the Lamb slain from the foundation or origin of the world; he is the resurrection and the life, and he only could open the gates of heaven.

Nothing is more unphilosophical as well as unchristian than to look upon the Incarnation as an accident or an anomaly in providence or the divine econony of creation, or as an afterthought in the mind of the Creator. It is the creative act itself raised to its apex and completed. Hence the profound sense of the words *Consummatum est* which our Lord pronounced on the cross. Christianity, the church, is only the evolution and application to the regeneration, sanctification, and glorification of souls of the Incarnation, is only Christ himself in his mediatorial work fulfilling, completing, perfecting the work of creation. It is easy, therefore, to understand the place and purpose of the Incarnation, and also why union with the church as the medium of

union with the incarnate Word is an indispensable condition of salvation or of attaining to the beatitude for which we are created. It is easy also to see how little they comprehend of the profound philosophy of the Gospel who deny or attempt to explain away the Catholic dogma.

It will not be difficult now to comprehend the real character of Protestantism, and to understand why it is and must be so offensive to the Christian soul. It is a protest against the whole teleological order of the universe. By its no-churchism, it reduces Christianity to a naked abstraction, therefore to a nullity; rejects Christ himself as the living Christ and perpetual Mediator of God and men; denies his present and continuous mediatorial work; deprives the soul of all the gracious means and helps without which it cannot live and persevere in the Christian life; and it reverses the whole order of the divine economy of creation and providence, as well as of grace. It is not simply a misapprehension, but a total rejection of the whole Christian order. It does not ordinarily, indeed, reject Christ in name; but it rejects all visible medium of union with him, and renders nugatory the Incarnation in the work of salvation and glorification. It recognizes no order of grace. It indeed calls upon us to come to Christ or to submit to Christ, but it tells us not how we can come to him, what is the way to him, what we must do in order to come to him, or to have him come to us and abide with us. It says, Be Christians, and—you will be Christians; be ye filled, be ye warmed, and be ye clothed, and ye will be no longer hungry, cold, or naked — which is but bitter mockery.

When one feels himself dead in trespasses and sins, and cries out from the depths of his agony, What shall I *do* to be saved? it is to insult his misery to tell him, Come to Christ, and you will be saved. You might as well tell him, Be saved, and you—will be saved; if you show him not some visible and practicable way of coming to him, and being one with him, or if you deny all visible medium of salvation. Christ as simply invisible or disembodied spirit is practically no Christ at all, and there is for the sinner no means of salvation, no means of beatitude for the soul, any more than there would have been if the Word had not been "made flesh, and dwelt among us." We are no better off than we should have been under the law of nature. Christianity would afford us no aid or help, and would

leave us as naked, destitute, as helpless, as under paganism; for prayer, the only means of communion with the invisible Protestantism recognizes, is as open to the pagan as to the Christian.

We do not by this mean to deny the honesty and worth of large numbers of those outside of the church or in sectarian communities; yet we have seen no instance among them of a virtue surpassing the natural strength of a man who has simple human faith in the great truths of the Gospel, and strives to practise the moral precepts of Christianity, or superior to many instances of exalted human virtue to be found among the gentiles. We find among them men of rare intellectual powers and great natural virtues, but no greater among those counted church members than among those who are connected as members with no church organization. There is much that is excellent in many of the Protestant Sisters of Mercy and Charity, organized in imitation of Catholic sisterhoods of the same name, and we readily acknowledge the worth of a Howard, a Florence Nightingale, a Caroline Fry, and other noble-minded men and women who have devoted themselves to the mitigation of human suffering, to the succor and the consolation of the sick and dying, or to the recovery of the fallen and the reformation of the erring. We also honor the liberal bequests and donations of wealthy Protestants to found or endow colleges, institutions of learning and science, hospitals, infirmaries, and institutions for the deaf and blind, the poor and destitute; but we see nothing in any of them that transcends the natural order, or that is not possible without regeneration. Men and women with the Christian ideal intellectually apprehended, even imperfectly, from reading the Scriptures, the example of the church always in the world, and reminiscences of the Catholic instruction received by their ancestors, all traces of which have not yet been lost in the non-Catholic world, can, by the diligent exercise of their natural powers, reach to the highest virtue of these Protestant saints, without that grace which elevates the Christian above the order of nature, and translates him into the order of the regeneration, joins him to Christ as his head, and makes him an heir and joint-heir with him of the kingdom of God. Perhaps no class of Protestants have exhibited virtues superior to those exhibited by the Friends, or Quakers, and they are not Christians at all, for they are not baptized, and therefore not regenerated, or born of

Christ. Nature instructed by revelation, or even imperfect reminiscences of revelation, may go very far.

We find among the heathen and among protestants rare human or natural virtues which really are virtues in their order, and to be approved by all; but we do not find among them the supernatural virtues or the heroic sanctity of the Christian. We find philanthropy, benevolence, kindness of heart, sympathy with suffering, but we do not find charity in the Christian sense; we find belief in many of the principles and doctrines of Christianity, but not the theological virtue of faith, which excludes all doubt or uncertainty, and is, as St. Paul says, *sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium*, the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen. We find a Socrates, a Scipio, a Howard, an Oberlin, a Florence Nightingale; but we do not find a St. Francis of Assisi, a St. John of God, a St. Vincent de Paul, a St. Agnes, a St. Catherine, a St. Elizabeth of Hungary, a St. Jane Frances de Chantal, nor even a Fénelon or a Mother Seton. Protestant novelists, when they would present a man or woman of rare heroic virtue, are obliged to draw on the imagination, or, like Mrs. Beecher Stowe in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, to borrow from the lives of Catholic saints, and in neither case do they come up to the Catholic reality.

We know that some classes of Protestants insist on the new birth, or regeneration, what they call a change of heart, and they have protracted meetings, prayer-meetings, inquiry meetings, and much ingenious machinery to effect it; but all the change effected can easily be explained on natural principles, without supposing the supernatural operations of the Holy Ghost. It rarely proves to be a real change of life beyond that of substituting a new vice for an old one; and, what is equally to the purpose, we find the converts who are gathered into the Protestant churches in seasons of revivals, and assumed to be in grace, often surpassed in virtue by those who have undergone no process of Protestant conversion, and who belong to no church, but are, in the slang of the day, nothingarians. The best people among Protestants are rarely their church-members. We find, also, from the statement in the Boston *Congregationalist and Record*, that only about one-fourth of those who undergo the process of conversion and are received into the Congregational churches remain pious and active members;

and experience proves that they who fall away become many degrees worse than they were before being converted.

It is not ours to judge, but we see among Protestants, no more than among the heathen any indication that they are supernaturally joined to Christ as the father and head of the elect or regenerated humanity, and therefore none that they inherit the promise of eternal life or the beatific vision of God, the reward of the true Christian life. They have their virtues, and no virtue ever misses its reward; but their virtues being in the natural order are, like those of the old Romans of whom St. Augustine speaks, entitled only to temporal rewards, or rewards in this life. One must be born into the kingdom of Christ before one can live the life of Christ, or reign with him in glory.

We can now see that the Mercersburg school and the ritualists, though approaching very near in their church doctrines to Catholicity, yet not being joined to the body of Christ, and adhering to bodies alien from the church, have no better-grounded hopes of salvation or eternal life than any other class of Protestants. We can also understand the significance of the Evangelical Alliance, which was to have held a grand conference in this city last month, but was postponed on account of the war between France and Prussia. Protestants are well aware of the disadvantages they labor under in their war against the church by their division into a great variety of jarring sects; and, despairing of unity, they seek to obviate the evil by forming themselves into a sort of confederation, or an offensive and defensive alliance. Hence the Evangelical Alliance, intended to embrace all Evangelical Protestant sects. The very term *alliance* proves that they are not one body or one church, but several bodies. These several mutually independent bodies have effected or are trying to effect a union for certain purposes, or an agreement to act in concert against their common enemy, the Catholic church. There being no Christianity outside the one Catholic church, which they evidently are not, since they are many, not one, the alliance is, of course, no *Christian* alliance, but really an alliance of bodies, falsely calling themselves Christian, against the Christian church, against Christianity itself. The alliance is not a co-worker with Christ, but really with Satan against Christ in his church. Such is the meaning and such the position of the so-called Evangelical Alliance.

No one who understands the Evangelical Alliance of this and other countries, whatever protests it may issue against rationalism and infidelity, or pretensions to Christian faith it may put forth, can doubt that it is formed expressly against the Catholic church, which it calls Babylon, and whose supreme pontiff it denounces as "the man of sin." It is antipapal, antichurch, antichristian, in spirit Antichrist, and marks that "falling away" of which St. Paul speaks.

It is not easy to explain the hostility of this Evangelical Alliance to the church, except on the same principle that we explain that of the old carnal Jews to our Lord himself, whom they crucified between two theives. It cannot be concern for the souls of Catholics that moves it, for Protestants themselves do not pretend that the Christian life cannot be lived and salvation secured in the communion of the church. Their greatest champions do not attempt to prove that Catholicity is an unsafe way, but, like Chillingworth, limit themselves to the attempt to prove that "Protestantism is a safe way of salvation." Even they being judges, we are at least as safe and as sure of eternal life as they are. The alliance, then, has and can have no *Christian* motive for its hostility to the church, and therefore can have only a human or satanic motive for seeking her destruction. Protestants say she is a corrupt, a superstitious church, and keeps her members in gross ignorance, and enslaved to a degrading despotism; but they practically unsay this when they concede that salvation is possible in her communion. They cannot seek to destroy the church, then, in the interest of the soul in the world to come.

It can then be only in the interest of this world. But as the chief interest, as it should be the chief business, of man in this world is to make sure of the world to come, it is hardly worth while to war against the church for the sake of this life only, especially if there should be danger by living for the earthly life alone of losing eternal life. It would be decidedly a bad speculation, and altogether unprofitable, and more silly than the exchange of his golden armor by Glaucus for the brazen armor of Diomed. As for society, it is very certain, from experience, that the success of the alliance would prove its ruin, as it has already well-nigh done.

All the temporal governments of the world, without a single exception, have withdrawn themselves from the authority of the church in spirituals as well as in temporals,

and the nations, both civilized and uncivilized, without exception, are now governed by Protestants, Jews, infidels, schismatics, or such lukewarm and worldly-minded Catholics as place the interests of time above those of eternity; yet at no epoch since the downfall of heathen Rome has society been less secure, or its very existence in greater danger; never have wars on the most gigantic scale been so frequent, so expensive, or so destructive to human life, as in the last century and the present. We are still startled at the terrible wars that grew out of the French revolution of 1789, not yet ended; we have hardly begun to recover from our own fearful civil war, in which citizen was armed against citizen, neighbor against neighbor, and brother against brother, to the loss of half a million of lives, and at the cost of ten thousand millions of dollars to the country, counting both North and South, before we are called upon to witness the opening of a war between France and Prussia, not unlikely in its progress to envelop all Europe in flames, and the end or result of which no man can now foresee. The great mass of the people have for nearly a century been living for this world alone, and are to-day in a fair way to lose it as well as the world to come. Material wealth, perhaps, has been augmented by modern inventions, but in a less ratio than men's wants have been developed, and both worldly happiness and the means of securing it have diminished. Vice and crime were never more rampant, and are increasing in Great Britain and our own country at a fearful rate, while the public conscience loses daily more and more of its sensitiveness.

Nothing is more evident to the observer than that in losing the *magisterium* of the church society has lost its balance-wheel, rejected the very law of its moral existence and normal development. Society must rest on a moral basis, and be under a moral law and a spiritual government, as well as a civil government, or it tends inevitably to dissolution. Since their emancipation from the church, the nations have been under no spiritual government; they have recognized no power competent to declare the moral law of their existence and growth, much less to enforce it by spiritual pains and penalties. They have in consequence lost all reverence for authority in the civil order, as well as in the spiritual order, and tend, under pretence of establishing popular liberty, to no-governmentism, to downright anarchy. In our country, the most advanced of all in the direction the

age is tending, we have hardly any government at all, in the proper sense of the word; we have only national and state agencies for taxing the people to advance the private interests of business men or of huge business corporations. We have tampered with the judiciary till we have well-nigh destroyed it, and the maintenance of justice between man and man is left pretty much to chance. Fraud, peculation, theft, robbery, murder, stalk abroad at noonday, and go in a great measure unwhipt of justice. The English system has ripened with us and brings forth its legitimate fruits. In warring against the church, and seeking to destroy her power and influence over society, the alliance is warring against the true interests of this world as well as of the next. The sects, the creatures of opinion, without any support in God, are too weak, however commendable their intentions, to withstand popular opinion, popular errors, popular passions, or popular tendencies, and must always go on with the world, or it will go on without them.

A slight experience of the sects united in the alliance, and a slight analysis of their principles and tendencies, are sufficient to convince any one not judicially blinded that they are prompted in their war against the church only by those three old enemies of our Lord, the world, the flesh, and the devil—enemies which the church must always and everywhere in this world combat with all her supernatural powers. These sects do not believe it, and many in them, no doubt, believe that they are doing battle on the side of God and his Christ. But this is because they know not what they do, and are laboring under the strong delusions of which St. Paul speaks to the Thessalonians. But this does not excuse them. The Jews who crucified our Lord knew not what they did, yet were they not free from guilt, for they might and should have known. No man labors under a strong delusion against what is good and true but through his own fault, and no man is carried away by satanic delusions, unless already a captive to Satan, unless he already hates the truth and has pleasure in iniquity. The ignorance and delusions of the alliance in the present case are only an aggravation of its guilt, for the claims of the church are as evident as the light, and can no more be hidden that a city set on a hill, or the sun in the heavens. The church has in the sects, or their representatives in the Evangelical Alliance, only her old enemies, more powerful just now than at some former periods; but he whose spouse she is, is might-

ier than they, and never mightier than when men fancy he is vanquished, and the only thing for us to grieve over is that they are causing so many precious souls for whom Christ has died to perish.

For ourselves, we are not, like Israel Knight, obliged to inquire, Where is the city, or the church? to discuss the question, whether it is necessary to join the church or not; nor are we called upon, like our Mercersburg friends, to consider whether we are vitally joined to the church, and through her to Christ, while we remain members of a Protestant sect. We Catholics know which and where is the church, and we know that we are members of the body of Christ. We have for ourselves no question of this sort to ask or answer. All Catholics are members of the one church of Christ. We know the truth, we have all the means and helps we need to live the life of Christ, and to reign with him in glory. The only question for us to ask is, are we *of* the church as well as *in* the church? It will in the last day avail us nothing to have been *in* if not *of* the church. The mere union with the external body of the church will avail us nothing, if we have not made it the medium of union with the internal, with Christ himself.

It would, perhaps, be well for all Catholics to consider their responsibilities to those who are without, for whose salvation we are bound in charity to labor. One of the greatest obstacles to the conversion of those without is the misconduct, carelessness and indifference of Catholics. If all Catholics lived as good practical Catholics, the combinations against the church might still be formed, but they would be shorn of much of their power, and conversions would be facilitated. Yet we must not forget that it is the truth and sanctity of the church that give the greatest offence.

BEECHERISM AND ITS TENDENCIES.*

[From the Catholic World for January, 1871.]

It was said by somebody of *Ecce Homo*, an anonymous book which made some noise a few years ago, that it must have been written either by a man rising from rationalism to faith, or by a man falling from faith to rationalism. But, though it requires a nice eye to distinguish the twilight of the coming from that of the parting day, we hazard little in treating the twilight of these volumes as the evening not the morning crepuscule, and in regarding the Beechers as deepening into the darkness of unbelief, not as opening into the light of faith. We must, therefore, as our rule, interpret in all doubtful cases their language in a rationalistic or naturalistic sense, and not in a Christian sense.

Mr. Thomas K. Beecher, who is more frank and outspoken than his cunninger, more cautious, and more timid brother, after recognizing what he regards as the distinctive excellences of each of "Our Seven Churches"—that is, the Roman Catholic, the Presbyterian, the Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, the Baptist, the Congregational, and the Liberal Christian—tells us very plainly that, abstractly considered, all churches are equally good or equally bad, and that the best church for a man is that in which he feels most at his ease, or which best satisfies him, or suits his peculiar constitution and temperament. "When thus he has tried all churches within his reach," he says, "then let him come back to any one that may *seem* best for him, and ask for the lowest place among its members. As he enters and is enrolled, let him say to every one that asks: I cannot tell whether this is the best church in the world, still less whether it is the true church. Of one thing only am I certain, it is the best church *for me*. In it I am as contented as a partly sanctified man can be this side of the general assembly of the first-born in heaven" (*Our Seven Churches*, p. 142).

---

* 1. *The Sermons of Henry Ward Beecher in Plymouth Church.* From verbatim reports by T. J. Ellinwood. First, Second, and Third Series, from September, 1869, to March, 1870. New York, 1870.

2. *Our Seven Churches.* By Thomas K. Beecher. New York, 1870.

Yet this same writer had (p. 8) pronounced the doctrine and ritual of the Catholic church throughout the world excellent, and had especially commended her (pp. 9, 10) for her exclusiveness or denial of the pretentions of all other churches, and for maintaining that there is no salvation out of her communion! This Beecher can swallow any number of contradictions without making a wry face; for he seems to hold that whatever *seems* to a man to be true is true for him, and that it matters not however false it may be if he esteemeth it true and is contented with it. For him, *seeming* is as good as *being*. Poor man, he seems never to have heard, at least never to have heeded, what the Scripture saith, that "There is a way that seemeth to a man just, but the ends thereof lead to death" (Prov. xiv. 12). The fact probably is that he believes in nothing, unless perchance himself, and looks upon truth as a mere *seeming*, a pure illusion of the senses or the imagination, or as a purely subjective conviction without objective reality.

It perhaps would not be fair to judge Brother Henry by the utterances of Brother Tom, but the Beecher family are singularly united, and all seem to regard brother Henry as their chief. No one of the family, unless it be Edward, the eldest brother, is very likely to put forth any views decidedly different from his, or which he decidedly disapproves. They all move in the same direction, though some of them may lag behind him while others may be in advance of him.

Although we have no difficulty in ascertaining for ourselves what Mr. Ward Beecher holds, so far as he holds any thing, yet we do not find it always easy to adduce decisive proofs that we rightly understand him. His language, apparently plain and direct, is singularly indefinite; his statements are seldom clear and certain, and have a marvellous elasticity, and may at need be stretched so as to take in the highest and broadest Protestant orthodoxy, or contracted so as to exclude every thing but the most narrow, meagre, and shallow rationalism. They are an india-rubber band. You see clearly enough what he is driving at, but you cannot catch and hold him. His statements are so supple or so elastic that he can give them any meaning that may suit the exigencies of the moment. This comes, we presume, not from calculation or design, but from his loose manner of thinking, and from his total want of fixed and definite principles. His mind is uncertain, impetuous, and confused.

Beecherism, as we understand it, errs chiefly not in asserting what is absolutely false, but in mistiming or misapplying the truth, and in presenting a particular aspect of truth for the whole truth. Its leading thought is, as Freeman Clarke's, that Christianity is a life to be lived, not a doctrine or creed to be believed; and being a life, it cannot be drawn out and presented in distinct and definite statements for the understanding. One is a Christian not because he believes this or that doctrine, but because he has come into personal relations or sympathy with Christ, and lives his life. Its error is in what it denies, not in what it asserts, and its chief defect is in not telling who Christ is, what it is to come into personal relations with him, what is the way or means of coming into such relations, and in discarding or making no account of the activity of the intellect or understanding in living the Christian life. Undoubtedly Christianity is a life to be lived, and we live it only by coming into intimate relations individually with Christ himself, as the church holds, only by being literally joined to him, born of him by the Holy Ghost, and living his life in the regeneration, as in natural generation we are born of and live the life of Adam. But Beecherism means not this, and, in fact, has no conception of it. It simply means that we must be personally in sympathy with Christ, and act from the stimulus of such sympathy. But this is no more than the boldest rationalism might say, for it implies no higher life than our Adamic life itself.

If by doctrine is meant only a view, theory, or "a philosophy" of truth, which is all that Beecherism can hold it to be, we agree that Christianity is not a doctrine to be believed; but the creed is not a view or theory of truth, but the truth itself. In believing it, it is the truth itself, not a view or theory of truth, that we believe. Christ is the truth, as well as the way and the life, and he must be received by faith as well as by love; for we not only cannot love what we do not intellectually apprehend, but Christ is supernatural, and can be apprehended only by faith and not by science. Christ is the Word—the Logos—made flesh, and his life must then be primarily the life of intelligence, and therefore we can enter upon it only by faith. Christianity is a religion for the intellect, whose object is truth, as well as a religion for the heart, or our appetitive nature, whose object is good. Beecherism overlooks this fact, and places Christianity, religion, in love.

Love, it says—and says truly, when by love is meant the supernatural virtue of charity, *charitas*—is the end or perfection of the law; but it forgets that the understanding must precede the love and present the object, or nothing is loved. What Beecherism calls love is simply a subjective want, a blind craving of the soul for what it has not and knows not. Even Plato, high as is the rank which he assigns to love or our appetitive nature, as St. Thomas calls it, does not hold that love alone suffices. According to him, it is only on the two wings, intelligence and love, that the soul soars to the empyrean, to "the first good and the first fair."

There is no love without science, and the science must always precede the love and present its object. Our Lord even includes love in the science or knowledge, for he says, in addressing his Father, "This is everlasting life, that they may *know* thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" (St. John xvii. 3). All through the New Testament love is connected with knowledge or faith, and the knowledge of the truth is connected with salvation. "The truth shall make you free," *Veritas liberabit vos*, says St. John. "God will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth," says St. Paul, who also says to the Corinthians, "Brethren, do not become children in understanding, albeit in malice be children, but in understanding be perfect," or "be men" (1 Cor. xiv. 20).

It is the grave fault of Protestantism itself, especially in our times, that it makes little or no account of intelligence. It is essentially unintellectual, illogical, and irrational, and its tendency is to place religion almost entirely in the emotions, sentiments, and affections, which are in themselves blind and worthless, are even worse, if not enlightened and restrained by truth intellectually apprehended by faith. When not so enlightened and restrained, they become fanaticism. Beecherism is even more unintellectual than the Protestantism of the reformers themselves. It divorces our sympathetic nature from our intellectual nature, and would fain persuade us that it is our higher nature. This is bad psychology, and to its prevalence is due the incapacity of Protestants to apprehend the higher and profounder truths of the spiritual order. The affections are either affections of the sensitive soul or affections of the rational soul. If affections of the rational soul, they are rational in their origin and principle, and impossible with-

out intelligence. If affections of the sensitive soul, they have no moral or religious character, though they incline to sin; but are, when they escape the control of reason, that very "flesh," or concupiscence, the Christian struggles against. Beecherism, in reality, makes the flesh our higher nature, and requires us to walk after the flesh, not after the spirit, as do and must all systems that place religion in sympathy or love without intelligence. All the affections of our nature not enlightened by intelligence and informed by reason or faith are affections not of our higher but of our lower nature, and when strong or dominant become destructive passions.

Beecherism, in rejecting intelligence or in making light of all dogmatic Christianity or objective faith, and substituting a purely subjective faith, only follows the inevitable tendency of all Protestantism emancipated from the civil power; for Protestantism recognizes no authority competent to enjoin dogmas, or to present or define the object of faith. It can give for a creed only opinions. It could not, in abandoning the church, if left to itself, avoid in its free development eliminating from Christianity the entire creed, all dogmas, doctrines, or statements, which are credible only when made on an infallible authority, which no Protestants have or can have. Protestantism is, therefore, in its developments obliged either to become open, undisguised infidelity, or to resolve Christianity into a purely subjective religion—a religion consisting in and depending solely on our interior emotional, sentimental, or affectional nature, and incapable of intellectual or objective statement, and needing none. The tendency of all Protestantism must always be either to religious indifferentism or to religious fanaticism.

We do not find from the sermons before us that Beecherism, which is a new but not improved edition of Bushnellism adopted by Mr. T. K. Beecher, explicitly denies the Christian mysteries; neither do we find that it explicitly recognizes them; while it is not doubtful that the whole current of its thought excludes them. What are its views of God, and especially of the person and nature of our Lord, we are not distinctly told, but evidently it has no conception of the tri-personality of the one divine being, the personality of the Holy Ghost, or the two for ever distinct natures, the human and the divine, hypostatically united in the one divine person of Christ. As far as we can ascer-

tain, it recognizes no distinction of person and nature, and is unaware of the fact that the Word, who is God, took to himself, in the Incarnation, human nature, and made it as really and as truly his own nature, without its ceasing to be human nature, as our human nature joined to our personality is our nature. It would seem to hold that Christ is God or the divine nature clothed with a human body without a human soul, or, rather, that Christ is God humanly represented or personated.

In a sermon on the "Consolations of the Sufferings of Christ," Mr. Ward Beecher seems to regard Christ, who was tempted and suffered in his divine nature, yet without sin, in all points as we are tempted and suffer, as suffering in his divine nature, and from that fact he argues that his sufferings were absolutely infinite. But he asks:

"Can a Divine Being suffer? I should rather put the question, Can one be a Divine Being in such a world and over such a world as this, and not suffer? If we carve in our imagination a perfect God, with the idea that perfectness must be that which is relative to himself alone, that he must be perfect to himself in intelligence, perfect to himself in moral character, perfect to himself in beauty, and in transcendent elevation above all those vicissitudes and troubles which arise from imperfection—if thus we make our God, and in no way *give him roots in humanity*, in no way lead him to have sympathy with infirmity, then we have not a perfect God. We have a carved selfishness embellished. We have a being that cannot be Father to any thought that springs from the human heart. . . .

"A God that cannot suffer, and suffer in his *Godship nature*, can scarcely be presented to the human soul, in all its weaknesses and trials and wants, so that *it* shall be acceptable. We need a suffering God. It was the *very ministration of Christ to develop that side of the Divine Being*—the susceptibility of God to suffer through sympathy, as the instrument and channel of benevolence by which to rescue them that suffer through sin" (*Third Series*, p. 38).

We had supposed that man has his roots in God, not God his roots in man, and that the ministration of Christ was to redeem, elevate, and perfect man, not to develop and perfect or fulfil the divine being; but we had done so without consulting the Beechers. If the divine being on any side needs, ever needed, or ever could need, to be developed, the divine being is not eternally perfect, is not perfect being in itself, or being in its plenitude; consequently, God is not eternally self-existent, independent, self-sufficing being, as theologians maintain, and therefore is not God, or, in other words, there is no God; and then nothing is

or can be. We must in our charity suppose the preacher either says he knows not what, or that he does not mean what he says. It is not our business to rede the Beecher riddles; but probably, if it was, Bushnellism might help us. Dr. Bushnell, with a slight tincture of Swendenborgianism, regards Christ not precisely as God or man, but as a scenic display, as the representation or personation under a human form and human relations to our senses, feelings, sympathies, and imagination, of what the divine being really is, not in himself, but in regard to man. But this, though it might explain, would not save Beecherism from the charge of making Christ an anthropomorphous representation of God, not God himself, or the Word made flesh; nor from that of maintaining that God is passible in his divine nature, "his Godship nature." The Word or Son is indeed the express image of God and the brightness of his glory, yet in the divine not the human form; for the Word is God, and eternally, and it is only as made flesh that he has a human form and human relations; but in this sense he is man, not a representation of God humanly related. No man who believes in the tri-personality of the divine being, or in the hypostatic union of the two natures in the one divine person of the Word, could ever use the expressions we have quoted, or regard Christ as a scenic representation or personation of the divine being.

Beecherism undeniably anthropomorphizes God, and regards him, as does Swedenborg, as the great or perfect Man, or as man carried up to infinity. It supposes the attributes of God are the attributes of man infinitely magnified. This is what it means, we suppose, by saying God has his "roots in humanity." Being man infinitely developed and perfected, God knows and loves us by sympathy, and is able to share our joys and sorrows, and suffer in all the vicissitudes and troubles which spring from our imperfections, for he has in himself, in its infinitude, all that we have or experience in ourselves. This supposes that God is made in the image and likeness of man, not man in the image and likeness of God. The type and principle of man are indeed in God, and his works copy his divine essence, but not he them. God cannot suffer in his divine nature, for all suffering arises from imperfection, and he is perfect being in its plenitude; therefore impassible, and necessarily, from the fulness of his own nature, eternally and infinitely

blessed. He knows not us from his likeness to us, nor from an experience like ours, but in himself, from his own perfect knowledge of himself, in whose essence is our type and principle, and whose own act is the cause of all we are, can do, or become. He knows us not by sympathy with us, for he is the adequate object of his own intelligence, and cannot depend on his creatures, or any thing out of himself, for any knowledge or perfection whatever. He knows and feels all we do or suffer in himself, in his own essence and act creating and sustaining us. He loves us in himself, and in the same act, because he has created us from his own super-abounding goodness, and because we live and move and have our being in him, not because he feels with us, as Beecherism would have us believe. No attribute of the divine nature does or can depend for its exercise or perfection on us, or on any thing exterior to or distinct from his own divine being. Yet as we are his creatures, sustained by his creative act, and as that act is the free act of infinite goodness or love—*charitas*—his love in that act surrounds, pervades, our entire existence in a manner infinitely more tender and touching to us, and effects in us and for us infinitely more than the closest and most sympathetic human love or kindness. We are held in the very arms of infinite love, live and breathe in infinite goodness, and we are nothing without it.

God is perfect being in himself; consequently, always the adequate object of his own activity, whether of intelligence or love, as we are taught in the mystery of the Trinity. It is in himself, in his own essence, in which is the type or principle of our existence, and whose decree or act is the cause of all we are, can be, do, or suffer, that he knows and loves us, has compassion on our infirmities, forgives us our sins, works out our salvation, and enables us to participate in his own beatitude, and, when glorified, even in his own divine nature (2 Pet. i. 4). His love is wonderful, and past finding out; it is too high, too broad, too tender, and its riches are too great for us to be able to comprehend it. To be able to comprehend it, we should need to be able to comprehend God himself, in his own infinite being; for his very being is love and goodness, *Deus est Caritas*, as says the blessed apostle. No man knoweth the Father save the Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him. The error of Beecherism here, as well as of many other *isms*, is in assuming that the type

of God and his attributes is in man, not the type of man in God, which anthropomorphizes the divine being.

Yet it is perfectly allowable to say that God suffers and is tempted in all points as we are, though without sin, if we speak of Jesus Christ the incarnate God. The Word or Son is God; the person of our Lord in the divine nature or being is strictly divine; and as it is always the person that acts or suffers, whatever Christ does or suffers, God does or suffers; for in Christ there is human nature, but no human person, But God cannot suffer in his divine nature, and hence, if our Lord had had only the one divine nature—which he always had and has in its fulness—he never could have suffered and died on the cross to redeem and save us. Beecherism, which regards Christ as the representation of the divine being under a human form and to our human sympathies and affections, denies the very possibility of his making any real atonement for man, for he has of his own no nature at all. He is not himself real being that suffers, but its representation or personation; and therefore his sufferings are representative, as the sufferings and death represented on the stage. Hence, it transfers to the divine being; to God in his divine nature, who cannot suffer, whatever suffering is represented in the person and life of our Lord. But our Lord is not a representative being, but the divine being himself, and he does not personate the divine nature —he is it. He does not in the Incarnation part with his divine nature, but takes human nature up into hypostatic or substantial union with his divine person. As the divine being is one divine nature, being, or essence, in three persons, so is Christ one divine person in two natures. Being at once perfect God and perfect man, and having a human as well as a divine nature, he could be tempted as we are, could sympathize with us, share our sorrows, bear our griefs, be obedient to his Father, suffer, even die on the cross for us; but in his human nature only, not in his divine nature. His sufferings could not be infinite in the sense Beecherism asserts; for the human nature even of God is finite; but his sufferings and obedience have an infinite value, because the sufferings and obedience of an infinite person.

Beecherism gives us no clear or satisfactory account of what our Lord is. All we can say is, that it does not treat his person as the Second Person of the Godhead nor as the Word made flesh; but holds him, as far as we can get at its thought, as a representative person, as Bushnellism does,

representing or personating God or the divine being, as we have said more than once, under a human form and in human relations. But it not only eliminates the Word or Son from the Godhead; it eliminates, also, the Third Person, by denying with certain ancient heretics the personality of the Holy Ghost. In the sermon on "The Holy Spirit," we read:

"The Divine Being is not merely a person, superlative, infinite, who sits enshrined and, as it were, hidden in the centre of his vast domain. We are taught that there is an effluence of spirit power, and that the Holy Spirit pervades the universe. It is to the *personality* of God what the light and heat are to the sun itself. For, though the sun is in a definite sphere and position, and has its own globular mass, yet it is felt through myriads and myriads of leagues of space, and is therefore present by its effects and power. And *though God is not present* and heaven is the place where he dwells, yet the divine influence pervades the universe. [The divine influence wider than the Divine Being!] The mental power, the thought-power, the Spirit-power, impletes the rational universe." (*Third Series*, p. 87.)

In this extract, personality and nature are not distinguished, and the personality of God is assumed to be one, as his being, nature, or essence is one, which excludes both the Holy Ghost and the Son as persons from the Godhead. The Holy Ghost, instead of being represented as the Third Person of the ever-blessed Trinity, is denied to be a person at all, and defined to be simply an effluence or influence of the one person of God; or to be to the personality of God what the light and heat of the sun are to the sun itself. An effluence, an emanation, or an influence is not a personal distinction in the divine being, and Mr. Beecher evidently does not so regard it; for he speaks of it as *it*, not as *him*, and makes it not the actor, but the effect of the person acting. Light and heat are not distinctions *in* the sun, as the divine persons are in the divine being; but are, in so far as not the sun itself, distinguishable *from* it, as the effect is distinguishable from the cause. The divine *persons* are distinguishable from one another, we grant, and we regard the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end; but they are distinctions in God, not *from* God; or distinctions in the divine being, not from it. Obviously, then, whatever else Beecherism may accept of the Christian faith, it does not accept the mystery of the ever-blessed Trinity, but really denies it. The Beechers, perhaps, are

not theologians enough to know it, but the denial of the Trinity is the denial of God as living God, by reducing the divine being, with the old Eleatics, to a dead and unproductive unity, as do also all Unitarians as distinguished from Trinitarians. He who denies the Trinity, if he knows what he does, denies God as much as does the avowed atheist. Unitarianism that excludes the tri-personality of God is really atheism, and the God it professes to recognize is only an abstraction.

It is also evident that Beecherism does not accept the mystery of the Incarnation, out of which grows the whole distinctively Christian order, without which man cannot fulfil his existence and attain the end or beatitude for which he is created. It is impossible to assert the Incarnation when the three persons of the ever-blessed Trinity are denied, for it supposes them and depends on them. Christ, according to Beecherism, is, as with Bushnellism and Swedenborgianism, not the Second Person or Word of God assuming human nature; but the manifestation, personation, or representation of the divine being under a human form and relations, which is simply no Incarnation at all. Rejecting or not accepting the Incarnation, Beecherism loses Jesus Christ himself, and with him the whole teleological order, which is founded by the Word made flesh, and without which creation cannot be fulfilled, and must remain for ever incipient or incomplete, and fail of its final cause; man must then for ever remain below his destiny, craving beatitude but never gaining it—the doom or hell of the reprobate.

Beecherism is far from having penetrated the depth of the Christian order, and understands little of the relations and reasons of the Christian dispensation. It sees nothing of the profound truths brought to light by the Christian faith. It sees no reason why St. Peter, speaking of the Lord Jesus Christ by inspiration of the Holy Ghost, could say: "There is no other name under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved." (Acts iv. 12.) It conceives of no reason in the very order and nature of created things why it should be so. But how could man exist but by proceeding from God through the divine act creating him? and how could he fulfil his existence but by returning to God, without absorption in him, as his final cause or supreme good? How could he return without the teleological order? or how could there be a teleological order without Christ, or the Word made flesh? Nothing is more shallow, more

meagre, or more insignificant than the Beecher Christianity. It does well to depreciate the intellect, for there is nothing in it for the intellect to apprehend.

Nor less does Beecherism misapprehend and misrepresent the Christian doctrine of the new birth or regeneration. It attaches no meaning, as far as we have been able to perceive, to the palingenesia of which both our Lord and St. Paul speak. Our Lord says expressly (St. John iii. 3), "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Beecherism, in very properly rejecting the Methodistic process of "getting religion," and the Calvinistic process of "obtaining a hope," goes further, and denies the necessity of regeneration itself, and seems to suppose man can return to God without a teleological order, or being born into the teleological life. It assumes that every one is born by natural generation on the plane of his destiny, and may by proper training and education fulfil his existence, and attain beatitude. Nothing more than the proper development and training of one's natural powers or faculties, it teaches, is necessary to make one an heir of the kingdom of God. This is the hobby of the feminine Beechers, and perhaps not less so of the masculine Beechers. But the full development and right training of our natural faculties do not raise us above the order of generation, and only enable us to attain at best a natural or a created beatitude, which is simply no beatitude at all for a rational existence; for it is finite, and nothing finite can satisfy the rational soul. The soul craves, hungers, and thrists for an unbounded good, and demands an infinite beatitude, the only beatitude there is or can be for it.

But the only unbounded good, the only infinite beatitude, is God; for God alone is infinite. All that is not God is creature, and all that is creature is finite. God, then, is our final cause as well as our first cause. We proceed from God through creation developed by generation, and we return to him through regeneration by grace as our supreme good. Yet God, alike as our first cause and as our last end is supernatural, above nature, above every thing created. The natural, that is, the creature, cannot in the nature of things be the medium of the supernatural. We must then have a supernatural medium of return to God as our last end or beatitude, or not return at all, but remain forever below our destiny, and for ever suffer the misery of an unfulfilled existence. Faith teaches us that this medium is the man Christ

Jesus, or the Word made flesh, the only mediator of God and men. Christianity is simply Christ himself, and the means he institutes or provides through the Holy Ghost to enable us to rise to him, live his life, and return to God, our supreme good, who is our supreme good because he is the supreme good himself, and the only real good.

Christ cannot be our medium except as we are united to him and live his life. Live his life we cannot unless united to him, and united to him we cannot be unless born of him in the order of regeneration, as we are born of Adam in the order of generation. Hence our Lord says, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." We can no more live the teleological life of Christ without being born of him, than we can the initial Adamic life without being born of Adam. As we had no faculties by the exercise of which we could attain to birth of Adam into the order of generation, so by no exercise or development of our natural powers can we be born of Christ in the order of regeneration. Or, as we could not generate ourselves, neither can we regenerate ourselves. We can of ourselves alone no more enter the teleological order than we could the initial order. This entrance into the teleological order St. Paul calls even a "new creation," and the one who has entered "a new creature," and we need not say that one cannot become a new creation or a new creature by development, education, or training.

Now, whatever Beecherism may pretend, it recognizes no new birth at all. It is necessary, it concedes, that the soul should come into personal relations with Jesus Christ, and that we should live his life, but we grow into his life and live his life by love; and to be in personal relations with him means only to be in sympathy with him. Just begin to love Christ, it says, and then you will learn what his life is, and will love him more and more, and grow more and more into sympathy with him. But one might as well say to the child not yet born, or conceived even, "Just begin to live the life of Adam, and then you will be able by continued effort and perseverance to grow to be a man," as to say to a man not born of Christ through the Holy Ghost, "Just begin to live the life of Christ, and you will be able to live it," or, "Just enter the teleological order, or kingdom of heaven and you will be in it." *Cest le premier pas qui coûte.* Once get into sympathy with Christ, and you are—in sympathy with him. All very true; but how take that

first step? How *begin* to live without being born? "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Beecherism must require one to act before being born, or else it must deny the teleological or Christian order altogether.

Since it professes to be Christian, Beecherism cannot well overlook the action of the Holy Ghost in the Christian life; but it does not, through any action of the Holy Spirit which it recognizes, get the new birth or regeneration. The Holy Ghost, we have seen, it resolves into a divine effluence, or the spirit-power of God, not a personal distinction in God, and this effluence only stimulates or excites our natural life.

"This divine and universal effluence," it says, "is the peculiar element in which the soul is destined to live, and find its inspiration and its true food. For although we find man first in this world, and he receives his first food here, because he begins at a low point, yet as he develops and goes up step by step, higher faculties, requiring a higher kind of stimulus or food, are developed; and he reaches manhood at that point in which he begins to act from the influences that are divine and spiritual, and that flow directly from God. Up to that point he lives as an animal, and beyond that point as a man.

"This divine Spirit, or, if I may so say, the diffusive mind of God, which pervades all the realms of intelligent beings, and which is the atmosphere the soul is to breathe, the medium of its light, the stimulus of its life, acts in the first place as a *general excitement.* It develops the whole nature of a man, by rousing it to life. We are familiar with the gradations of this excitement."

These gradations are: 1, *Nervous* excitement, produced by physical *stimuli;* 2, *Mesmeric* excitement, produced by the action of men on one another; 3, *Æsthetic* excitement, which gives rise to genius, art, and philosophy; and, 4, The *highest* or *divine* excitement. After describing these several degrees of excitement, produced by the divine effluence, it proceeds to ask and answer the question—

"What is the result of this supernatural divine stimulus upon man's nature? It seems to act on the sensuous and physical nature only indirectly, by acting upon the higher life. It is, in general, an *awakening* of the faculties. It fires men. It develops their latent forces. We go all our life long with iron in the soil under our feet, and do not know that it is hidden there; and we go all our life long carrying gold in the mountains of our souls without knowing that it is there. We carry in us ranges of power that we know very little of.

"And the divine Spirit, in so far as *it* acts upon the human soul, or is permitted to awaken it, *develops* its latent forces. It carries forward a

man's nature, opening in it, often, faculties which have been absolutely dormant. There are many men who have eyes that they have never opened, and that are capable of seeing truths which they never have seen. They are therefore called *blind*. And they begin to see only when the divine Spirit acts upon their souls; because there are certain faculties which will not act except when they are brought under the divine influence. Then it is that these faculties begin life, as it were." (*Third Series*, pp. 87–89.)

Thus far it is certain that there is no new birth asserted; there is only an awakening into activity, under the stimulus of the divine effluence, of natural forces hitherto latent, or the higher faculties of the soul hitherto dormant, and which without it are not, perhaps cannot be, awakened, developed, or excited to act. This means that the soul rises to its higher life, or the exercise of its higher faculties, only under the influence of supernatural stimulants, but not that it is translated from the natural order of life into the supernatural. The divine stimulants only develop what is already in the soul. The divine influences create or infuse nothing into the soul; they only excite to activity what is latent or dormant in the soul, and therefore do not lift it into a higher order of life; and it is only the soul living in the supernatural order that can assimilate supernatural food or stimulants.

Yet Beecherism would seem, we confess, to go a little further. It continues:

"It is, however, still beyond this that . . . the divine Spirit seems to act upon the human mind, by *imparting to it a fineness of susceptibility and moral sympathy*, by which the soul is brought into immediate conscious and personal communion with God, and from which the most illustrious events in man's history are deduced." (*ib.* p. 89.)

But, since the Beechers are on the downward track, this must be taken as an effort to explain away, while seeming to retain, the mystery of regeneration. All that is imparted—better say, produced—is a finer sensibility and a higher moral sympathy; no new principle is imparted or infused into the soul that elevates it to the plane of the supernatural. It is only the highest degree of that general excitement, varying in degree, from the lowest point to the highest, which Beecherism defines the effect of the divine effluence on the soul to be. The true doctrine of the Holy Ghost, we are told on the same page, is "that it is the influence of the divine mind, of the whole being of God, as it were, sent down into the realm of rational creatures, hover-

ing above them as a stimulating atmosphere and food for the soul; and that when men *rise into* this atmosphere, which is the nature of God diffused in the world, they come to a higher condition of faculties." Yes, when they *rise* into it. Always the same difficulty of the first step. When men have risen into this stimulating atmosphere, they can breathe it; but how are they to rise into it? Begin to love God a little, and you will be stimulated to love him more and more, till you love him perfectly. No doubt of it. But how begin? The atmosphere of God is hovering above us, and Beecherism not only requires us, but assumes that we are able of ourselves, without the infusion of new life, and even without the stimulating atmosphere itself, to lift ourselves up to it, and henceforth to live and breathe in it, and assimilate it as food for the soul.

The illustrations prove it. On the same page again, it is said of the men who have risen to this atmosphere, that "they find whereas their heart was like a tree in the far north, which, although it could blossom a little, could never ripen its fruit, because the summer is so short, now their heart is like that *same tree* carried down toward the equator, where it brings its fruit to ripeness." But here is implied only a change in the exterior conditions; the seminal principle, the principle of life and fecundity, was in the tree when in "the far north" not less than it was when "carried down toward the equator." Whatever "fineness of susceptibility and moral sympathy" the divine effluence in its action on the soul may impart, it certainly does not, on the Beecher theory, infuse into the soul or beget in it the principle of a new and higher life than our natural life, which is what is necessary in order to assert the new birth.

Beecherism is not, we presume, intentionally warring against the Christian mystery of regeneration, for it is not likely that it knows any thing about it. What moves it is hostility to the Methodistic and Evangelical cant about "experiencing religion," "getting religion," "obtaining hope," "being hopefully converted," in a sort of moral cataclysm, prior to which all one's acts, even one's prayers and offerings, are sins, hateful to God. The Beechers, brought up in the Evangelical school, have become thoroughly disgusted with this feature of it, and have simply aimed to get rid of it, and to find a regular way by which the child can grow up as a Christian. Rejecting with all Protestants sacramental grace, infused virtues, and baptis-

mal regeneration, they have had no alternative but either to accept the moral cataclysm produced by the immediate and irresistible inrushing of the Holy Ghost, as all Evangelicalism asserts, or else to maintain that our natural life, properly developed and directed, grows of itself into the true life of Christ, and suffices to secure our beatitude. They do well to reject the Evangelical doctrine of conversion, but, knowing no other alternative, they in doing so bring Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Christian or teleological order of life, and man's beatitude, down to the order of natural generation, lose the palingenesia, and of course every thing distinctively Christian.

Dr. Bellows, a well-known Unitarian minister in this city, commenting not long since on a sermon by Henry Ward Beecher, said it was "as good Unitarianism as he wanted," and we do not think that, in saying so, he wronged either Beecherism or Unitarianism. Certain it is that Beecherism rejects in substance, if not in so many words, the mystery of the ever-blessed Trinity or the tri-personality of God; the mystery of the Word made flesh, or the Incarnation; the mystery of redemption; the mystery of regeneration and of mediatorial or sacramental grace; and what more could any Unitarian ask of it? It would be easy to show that the Beechers make no account of the *gratia Christi*, and assign to Christ no office in man's redemption, salvation, or beatitude. The influence of the divine spirit that Beecherism asserts is supernatural only in the sense that the creative act of God producing us from nothing is supernatural. It is the nature of God that pervades the world, and is only what theologians call the divine presence in all his works sustaining and developing them in the natural order, or the divine concurrence in every act of every one of them. It is supernatural, for God is supernatural, and all his acts and influences are supernatural, but creating no supernatural order of life. Nay, hardly so much as this; for we are told that God is not everywhere present, and his influence or effluence, being inseparable from himself, cannot be more universal than his being or extend beyond it; and hence there may, if Beecherism is right, be existences where God is not.

After this, it can hardly be necessary to descend to further details; for, if Christianity be any thing more than the order of genesis, or pure naturalism, the Beechers have no Christian standing, even in simple human faith. They know nothing of mediatorial grace; and these sermons make

as light of the sacrament of orders as their author, in the Astor House scandal, did of the sacrament of matrimony. The language of Scripture, however plain and express, has no authority for him. He admits that one has no authority to preach the Gospel unless he descends from the apostles, but holds that every one who is able to preach it with zeal and effect does descend from them. He has his orders and mission in the inward anointing of the Holy Ghost—in whom, by the way, he does not believe—although the Scripture teaches that it is through "the laying on of the hands of the presbytery" that one receives the power—that is, the Holy Ghost; and the mission is given in a regular way, through those already ordained and authorized by our Lord himself to confer jurisdiction. Ward Beecher goes on the principle that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," but if the pudding happens to be poisoned or unwholesome, the proof comes too late after the eating. Prudent persons would require some guaranty before eating that the pudding is not poisoned or unwholesome, but is what it is said to be. Ward Beecher is no doubt a very respectable cook in his way, but we have yet to learn that the Plymouth congregation receives much spiritual nutriment from his cooking.

It may be a question whether they who die in sin, or under the penalty of sin, are or are not doomed to a hell of literal fire; there also may be questions raised as to the degree or intensity of the sufferings of the damned, and perhaps as to the principle on which their sufferings are inflicted and are reconcilable with the infinite power and goodness of the Creator; but among intelligent believers in Christ as the mediator of God and men, and the founder and principle of the teleological order, there can be none as to the fact that the suffering is and must be everlasting. Every one capable of suffering must suffer as long as he remains unperfected and below his destiny. The damned, whatever else may be said of them, are those who have failed, through their own fault or that of their superiors, to fulfil their existence or attain their end, and thus are inchoate, incomplete, or unperfected existences, and therefore necessarily suffer all the miseries that spring from unsatisfied or unfulfilled nature. As at death men pass from the world of time to eternity, in which there is no succession and no change, the damned must necessarily remain for ever in the state in which they die, and, therefore, their sufferings must be everlasting.

Yet Beecherism, without explicitly affirming universal salvation, decidedly doubts that the sufferings of the damned, if any damned there are, will be everlasting, as we may see in *The Minister's Wooing*, and in the *Defence of Lady Byron*, by Mrs. Beecher Stowe, as well as from a recent sermon by Mr. Henry Ward Beecher, if correctly reported; although a more logical conclusion from its premises would be the everlasting misery of all men, for it makes no provision for their redemption and return through Christ the mediator to God as their final cause or beatitude. From some things we read, we infer that Beecherism inclines to spiritism, as it certainly does to mesmerism, which is only incipient or tentative spiritism, and it probably accepts in substance the doctrine of the spirits—the doctrine of devils?—that there is very little change in passing from this world to the next, which, like this, is a world of time and change, in which the development begun here may be continued, and the spirits rise or sink from circle to circle according to the progress they make or fail to make; but always free and able, if they choose, to better their condition, and enter higher and higher circles up to the highest. Lady Byron, who appears to have been a spiritist, and who regarded her husband, Lord Byron, as the most execrable of men, still expected, if we may believe Mrs. Beecher Stowe, to meet him in the spirit-world wholly purified, and a beatified saint, standing near the throne of the Highest! Great theologians and philosophers are the spirits!

Beecherism jumps astride every popular movement, or what appears to it likely to be a popular movement, of the day. It went in for abolition, negro suffrage, and negro eligibility, and now goes in for negro equality, in all the relations of society, female suffrage and eligibility, and reversing the laws of God, so as to make the woman the head of the man, not man the head of the woman. Henry Ward Beecher is at the head of the woman's rights movement, so earnestly defended by his lackey of the *Independent*. Beecherism goes in also for liberty of divorce, and virtually for polygamy and concubinage or free love, and free religion, while it retains enough of its original Calvinistic spirit to require the state to take charge of our private morals, and determine by statute what we may or may not eat, drink, or wear, when we may go to bed or get up; that is it would clothe the magistrate with authority to enforce with civil pains and penalties whatever it may for the moment hold to

be for the interest of private and social morals, and to prohibit in like manner whatever it holds to be against them to-day, though it may hold the contrary to-morrow. The Beecher tendency is to throw off all dogmatic faith; to reject or to make no account of the Christian mysteries; to remove all restraints on the emotions, affections, and passions; to place the essence of marriage not in the free consent of the contracting parties, but in the sentiment or passion of love, obligatory, and lawful even, only so long as the love lasts; to regard all authority as tyrannical that would restrain one from holding and uttering the most false, dangerous, and blasphemous theories; and at the same time, in the true Calvinistic spirit, to demand that the magistrate shall repress whatever it, in the exercise of its liberty, judges to be wrong, and enforce with the strong hand whatever it holds to-day to be enjoined by humanity, though directly contrary to what it held yesterday. It substitutes change for stability, passion for reason, opinion for faith, desire for hope, philanthropy for charity, fanaticism for piety, humanity for God, and, in the end, demonism for humanity, since man, as he renounces God, inevitably comes under the power of Satan.

That Beecherism has reached this extreme point we do not allege, but we think we have shown that this is the point to which it tends. But the Beechers are a representative family, and represent the spirit and tendency of their age and country. The spirit of the age moves and agitates them, the current of the modern unchristian civilization flows through them, and their heart feels and responds to every vibration of the popular heart. "They are of the world, and the world heareth them," and sustains them, let them do what they will. Mrs. Beecher Stowe's *Byronics*, though assailed and refuted by the leading journals and periodicals of the old world and the new, have not damaged her reputation, and she, perhaps, is more popular than ever. The world cannot spare its most faithful feminine representative. Henry Ward Beecher survives the Astor House scandal without loss of prestige, and proves that the dominant sentiment of the American people makes as light of the marriage bond as he did, and holds it is no more an offence against Christian principles for a man to marry another man's wife than he does. He only represented the popular sentiment respecting marriage and divorce. He in fact gained credit, instead of losing it, by an act which shocked

every man and woman who believes that marriage is sacred and inviolable, and that what God has joined together no human authority can sunder. Henry Ward Beecher is probably the most popular preacher, as Mrs. Beecher Stowe is the most popular novelist, in the country.

The Beecher family, we grant, are a gifted family, but not more so than thousands of others. They have talent, but not genius, and are not above mediocrity in learning, science, taste, or refinement. The sermons before us are marked by a certain rough energy, or a certain degree of earnestness and directness, but they indicate a sad lack of theological erudition, of varied knowledge, breadth of view, and depth of thought. They rarely if ever rise above commonplace, never go beneath the surface, are loose, vague, indefinite in expression, unpolished, and not seldom even vulgar in style, and have only a stump-orator sort of eloquence. The Beecher popularity and influence cannot then be ascribed to the personal character or qualities of the Beecher family, and can be explained only by the fact that they are in harmony with the spirit of the Evangelical world and represent its dominant tendencies.

In the Beecher family, then, we may read the inevitable course and tendency of Evangelical Protestantism, whither it is going, and in what it must end at last. The Beechers never defend a decidedly unpopular cause; they are incapable of being martyrs to either lost or incipient causes; they never join a movement till they feel that it is destined to be popular; they were never known as abolitionists till it was clear that the success of abolition was only a question of time; and we should not see Henry Ward Beecher at the head of the woman's rights movement if he did not see or believe that it has sufficient vitality to succeed without him. Yet the Beechers are shrewd, and usually keep just a step in advance of the point the public has reached to-day, but which the signs of the times assure them the public will have reached to-morrow; so that they may always appear as public leaders, and gain the credit of having declared themselves, before success was known. We cannot, therefore, assume that the world they appear to lead is actually up to the point where they stand, but we may feel very certain that where they stand is where the world they represent will stand to-morrow. They are a day, but only a day, ahead of their world.

The Beechers are Protestants of the Calvinistic stamp,

and Calvinism, Evangelically developed, is the only living form of Protestantism. All other forms had for their organic principle the external authority of princes, have borne their fruit, died, are dead, and should be buried; but Calvinism had for its organic principle the subjective nature of man, in the emotions, sentiments, and affections of the heart, and can change as they change, and live as long as they live. This is what the Abbé Martin has in his mind when he says, "Protestantism is imperishable." Calvinism can lose the support of the civil government, all objective faith, all distinctive doctrines, and still retain its identity, its vitality, and its power of development. Indeed, it has lost all that, and yet it survives in all its strength in what is called Evangelicalism, and which is confined to no particular sect, but comprehends or accepts all that is living in any or all the sects. It is the living, active, energizing Protestantism of the day; that which inspires all the grand philanthropic, moral and social reform, missionary, educational, and the thousand-and-one other enterprises in which the Protestant world engages with so much zeal, and for which it collects and spends so many millions annually; that holds world's conventions, forms alliances of sect with sect, and leagues with socialists, revolutionists, and avowed infidels to carry on its war to the death against the church of Christ and especially against his infallible vicar. Evangelicalism is bound to no creed, obliged to defend no doctrine, is sufficiently elastic to take in every heresy and to sympathize with any and every movement that is not a movement in the direction of the church of God. It is, to borrow a figure from St. Augustine, the proud and gorgeous city of the world set over against the city of God, which it attacks by storm and siege with all the world's forces and all the world's engines of destruction. Whoso thinks it is not a formidable power, or that it can be easily vanquished, reckons without his host; only God is mightier than it, and only God can defeat it, and bring it to naught.

We do not say that Evangelicalism has yet advanced—or descended, rather—so far as to leave absolutely behind all objective doctrines; it still clings to a fading reminiscence of them, and chooses to express its subjective religion in the language of faith, to put its new wine into its old bottles, or, however the emotions, sentiments, affections, passions may change, to call them by a Christian name. In this, Beecherism humors its fancy, and lures it on in its downward career.

Any one of the masculine Beechers is as little of a Christian as was Theodore Parker or Margaret Fuller, or as is Ralph Waldo Emerson or Ellingwood Abbot, John Weiss or O. B. Frothingham; but the Beecher holds from Evangelicalism, retains its spirit and much of its language, and, instead of breaking with it as the Unitarians did, he continues its legitimate development, and keeps up the family connection. He may keep just in advance of it, but he does not deviate from the line of its march. Unitarians are beginning to see their blunder, and are striving daily to repair it.

Beecherism is by no means the last word of Evangelicalism. It probably does not itself understand that word, nor is it able to foretell what it will be. It represents the subjective or emotional side of Evangelicalism; but Evangelicalism holds from Calvinism, and Calvinism, along with its subjective principle, fully developed in the Beechers, asserts the theocratic principle—a true principle when not misapprehended or misapplied, or when represented and applied by the infallible church divinely commissioned to declare and apply the law of God, but a most dangerous, odious principle when applied by an unauthorized body, like the early Calvinists in Geneva, Scotland, and the New England colonies, as experience abundantly proves. As Calvinism develops and becomes Evangelicalism, humanity takes the place of God, and the theocratic principle becomes the anthropocratic principle, or the supremacy of humanity; and of course the absolute right of Evangelicals, philanthropists, the representatives, or those who claim to be the representatives of humanity, to govern mankind in all things spiritual and temporal—in practice, of those who can best succeed in carrying the people with them, or, those vulgarly called demagogues. Evangelicalism is developing in a humanitarian direction, affects to be democratic, and is in reality nothing but Jacobinism, socialism, Mazzinism, with a long face, clad in a pious robe, and speaking in deep, guttural tones.

But this is not all. The Calvinistic spirit is not changed any more than the identity of Calvinism is lost by the changes in our emotional nature, by the transformation of the theocratic principle into the anthropocratic. It is always and everywhere, in religion and politics, in society and the family, the spirit of despotism. At first it said: "I represent God; do as I bid you, or die in your rebellion against God." Now it says: "I represent humanity,

and humanity is supreme; I am the people; the people are sovereign; their will is the supreme law; therefore, obey my will, or die as the enemies of humanity." Let Evangelicalism once become dominant in a republic, be the belief or spirit of the people, and it can easily and will establish the most odious civil and religious despotism, even while it imagines that it is laboring solely in the interests of humanity. It has cast off God and his law in the name of religion, reduced religion to the emotions, passions, and affections of human nature, in the name of piety. As every one of these is exclusive and despotic in its tendency, nothing is more simple than to cast off all liberty, justice, equity, in the name of God and humanity. All government holding from humanity or the people as its ultimate principle, is and must be intolerant and tyrannical with all the intolerance and despotism of human passions or sentiments. The only possible security for any kind of liberty is in the subjection of the people, collectively as well as individually—or man's emotional, affective, or passional nature—to the law of God, the very law of liberty, because the very law of justice and equality.

We may see what Evangelicalism would do by observing what Jacobinism did in France. There it was supreme for a time, and its government is known in history as the Reign of Terror. Its spirit was, "Stranger, embrace me as your brother, or I will kill you." We see what it would do if it had full sway in what it attempts everywhere in the way of political, social, and moral reform. When it sees what it regards as an evil, public or private, it seeks by denunciation and a fanatical agitation to bring public opinion to bear against it, and then to get the legislature to pass a statute against it and suppress it by the strong arm of power. Whatever it would suppress, it seeks to make unpopular, and then to legislate it down. It appeals to public opinion, and popularity and unpopularity are its measure of right and wrong. It hates the church, and is doing all it can to form public opinion against her by decrying and calumniating her—to form a public opinion that will, in the very name of equality, deny her equal rights with the sects—and to enact laws for the suppression of the freedom of her discipline and of her worship as fast as it can be done prudently. We see it in the Evangelical hostility to our equal rights in the public schools, and its legislation on marriage and divorce. Its acts enforcing negro equality, to legislate

men into temperance, &c., are all signs of what it would do if it could. It would not legislate against the same things now, or under the same pretence, that Calvin did in Geneva, or our Puritan fathers did in the colonies of Massachusetts and Connecticut, but it would legislate in the same spirit, and in a direction equally against all true liberty. It opposes the church because she opposes Jacobinism and exerts all her power in favor of stable government, wise and just laws; and it encourages everywhere the Jacobinical revolution, as giving it the power to suppress all liberty but its liberty to enforce, by public opinion and civil pains and penalties, its own constantly shifting notions of the public good or the interests of humanity.

The Unitarians, we have said, made a blunder in breaking with Evangelicalism. Beecherism shows them how they may repair it, and assists them to do it. Only keep clear of explicit denials, preserve a few Evangelical phrases, profess to be in earnest for "heart-religion," which means no religion at all, and peace is made, and Satan has his forces united against the Lord and his annointed, against both civil and religious liberty, and for the emancipation of society from the supremacy of the divine law.

BARING-GOULD ON CHRISTIANITY.

[From the Catholic World for March, 1871.]

Mr. Baring-Gould is a man of some learning, of more than ordinary ability, and writes in a style well adapted to the subjects he treats. We have seldom read a book in which we have found more that is true and at the same time so much that is untrue. The author is a contradiction, and a contradiction is his work. He assumes scarcely a position that he does not reject, or reject a proposition that he does not first or last defend. He accepts the principle of private judgment, and rejects it; adopts Protestantism in principle, and yet gives one of the best refutations of it

---

* *The Origin and Development of Religious Belief.* By S. Baring-Gould, M. A. Part II. *Christianity.* New York: 1870.

that has recently been written; he holds Christianity is catholic, that it reconciles all antinomies, contraries, or opposites, solves all problems, and yet he leaves us in doubt whether he believes in an immaterial soul, or even in the existence of God—in any thing or in nothing.

We have done our best to understand the author, and to interpret him in this second part consistently with himself; but we have found it impossible by any logic we possess to discover any relation between his premises and his conclusions, or to understand how the superstructure he professes to erect does or can rest on the foundation he would seem to lay. In his preface, he says:

"Starting from the facts of human nature and the laws they reveal to us, as they spread out before us in history, can we attain to the existence of God, to immortality, and to the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, the Incarnation?

"Hitherto Christianity has leaned, or has been represented as leaning, on authority—on the authority of an infallible text, or of an inerrable church. The inadequacy of either support has been repeatedly demonstrated, and as the props have been withdrawn, the faith of many has fallen with a crash. The religious history of the church exhibits three phases. The first when dogma appealed to men and met with a ready response, the second when dogma was forced on man by an authoritative society, and the third when dogma was insisted on, upon the authority of an infallible text. Men revolted against the church, opposing the text against it: men revolt now against the text, and on what does dogma stand?

"To this question I offer an answer in this volume. Unless theology can be based on facts anterior to text or society, to facts in our own nature, ever new, but also ever old, it can never be placed in an unassailable position. For if Christianity be true, it must be true to human nature and to human thought. It must supply that to which both turn, but which they cannot, unassisted, attain." (Pp. vii., viii.)

Here is clearly stated his problem and the principle of the solution he adopts. He is restricted, by the very terms in which he states the problem, for his solution to the facts of human nature, and consequently can propose no solution not warranted by an induction from those facts. But he himself maintains expressly, over and over again, that induction does not and cannot give certainty, and gives at best only a probable hypothesis. This in the outset casts suspicion on his solution, whatever it may be. "If Christianity be true, it must be true to human nature and to human thought. It must supply that to which both turn."

But suppose that it does theoretically, that is, meet and respond to all the facts or wants of human nature, that does not prove it true; it only proves that, if true, it would satisfy human nature. But that it is true, must be proved *aliunde*, or not be proved at all.

Does the author mean to teach that religious belief originates in the facts of human nature, in the cravings of the human soul, and the efforts of the human understanding to obtain their satisfaction? This seems both to be and not to be his doctrine. One while, he reasons as if it were, and other times, as if it were not. If it be his doctrine, it cannot be true; for there are no facts of human nature that could have originated religious belief. No conceptions we can form of ourselves without religion can suggest religion. We readily concede that the heathen religions, which were wholly under human control, received their various forms and developments from the special views and wants of those who adopted them, but not the essential religious belief itself. Men must believe in religion, in the Divinity, and the obligation to worship him, before they can invent or develop a religion or a particular form of religion. Then such or such a particular form or development of religion would be only the creation or evolution of men, of particular men or of a particular nation, and would bear no mark of universality, nor have any authority for reason or conscience.

But however this may be, the author certainly means that the facts or wants of human nature are the test, measure, or criterion of religious as of all other truth. He maintains throughout that man is himself or has in himself the measure of truth, is himself his own yard-stick. We know this doctrine very well; it is an old acquaintance of ours. If it is meant that man, in order to be the recipient of religious truth, must be a rational creature capable of knowing or apprehending truth that lies in his own plane, when it is presented to him, he says little more than a truism. To know is to know, and one cannot know unless able to know; but this is nothing to the purpose. What the author means is that the human mind has the mould of truth in itself, and that there is and can be for man no truth that he cannot and does not cast in that mould. As the mould in no man is large enough to take in the whole truth, and as the mould in size and shape differs with every individual and is the same in no two men, that only is true for each individual which he judges

to be true. What each one thus judges to be true is by no means the whole truth, but merely a special aspect of truth, —truth as beheld from each one's own special point of view; and to get the whole truth we must gather together all these special aspects, and mould or co-ordinate them into one harmonious whole.

This is the author's real doctrine, if doctrine he has, and it shows that man is a very inadequate measure of truth. If the mind grasps a special aspect of truth, and is so far a true measure, it still leaves the greater part of truth unapprehended and unmeasured, and therefore is far more false than true. Moreover, the author's doctrine has the slight disadvantage of disproving itself; for, while it asserts that man is the measure or criterion of truth, it, by making truth purely relative, varying with each individual, really asserts that he is no such measure or criterion at all, and has in himself no power of distinguishing between truth and falsehood. Truth itself is invariable, always and everywhere the same; most certainly, if we accept the author's definition that "truth is what is," that is, being, and consequently cannot vary as men's views of it vary. Then, again, if the author is right, the human mind never grasps the truth itself, and has at best only a *view* of truth, and that a view of it only under a partial and special aspect. A partial view of truth, and only under a special or particular aspect, is precisely the definition of error as distinguishable from simple falsehood. Hence, by making man his own yardstick, the author loses all means of distinguishing truth from error; indeed, denies that they are distinguishable, or that there is any difference between them. How, then, maintain that man is or has in himself the measure of truth? All that can be said is, man is the measure of the truth he receives, or, in the language of mortals, man can receive only the truth he is able to receive, and can know only what he can know, which, we grant, is indisputable.

As this point is fundamental with the author, and is just now the fashionable doctrine with those who have not the truth, we will dwell on it a moment longer. That, the author tells us and others also tell us, which we judge to be true is true for us, that which we feel is beautiful is beautiful for us, and that which we esteem to be good is good for us, though it may be false, ugly, and evil for another. This is the language of folly or despair. Grant, without conceding, that thought is the measure or criterion of the

truth we recognize and are able to hold, as Mr Baring-Gould asserts over and over again ; we must still bear in mind that thought is only on one side a fact of human nature or the act of man. Mr. Baring-Gould, after Cousin, says that thought embraces three elements—the subject, object, and their relation or form. The subject cannot think without the object, nor unless the two are in immediate relation. The thought, then, is the joint product of the subject and object. No man has in himself or can be his own object, otherwise man would be God, both intelligible and intelligent in himself. Descartes said, *Cogito, ergo sum*, a paralogism, of course ; for one's own existence is as much affirmed in *cogito*, I think or am thinking, as in *sum*, I am ; but passing over this, and assuming that he meant, as, when hard pressed, he said he meant, simply that in the act or fact of thinking he learns or becomes conscious of his existence ; he becomes conscious of his own existence no more than he does of the existence of something which is not himself, but is distinguishable from himself. We cannot think without thinking something ; that which is thought is always distinguishable from him who thinks. The subject is never the object, nor the object the subject.

It is not, as they against whom we are reasoning pretend, the subject, but the object that determines the form of the thought, otherwise language would have no sense, be no medium of communication between man and man, and men could never understand one another or hold any truth in common. The fact that men have language, that they do understand one another, or can and do communicate their thoughts one to another, is a proof that truth does not vary with every individual ; that to a certain extent, at least, they think the same object, and that the object imposes upon their thought the same form. Hence, what is truth to the one is equally the truth to the many. It is on this fact that the possibility of instruction depends, and the mutual intercourse of men in society, nay, society itself.

Descartes knew not what he did when he pretended, from the simple fact of the consciousness of his own existence, to deduce, after the manner of the geometricians, the existence of God and the universe ; for nothing can be deduced from an existence that is not contained in it as the part in the whole, the property in the essence, or the effect in the cause. Hence the mistake of those who attempt, like the author to deduce from what they call the facts or

phenomena of human nature the great truths of religion—the being of God, the immortality of the soul, and the liberty of man. They assume that the facts of consciousness are facts of human nature alone, and argue from them as such; whereas, the facts they detect in the human consciousness, and on which they really base their reasoning, are not subjective, but really objective. The argument of Descartes for the being of God, or rather of St. Anselm, from whom Descartes directly or indirectly borrowed it, based on the fact that we have present to our minds the idea of the most perfect being, than who none can be greater, is a good and valid argument; for such an idea is objective and, therefore, real, not subjective or formed by the mind itself, though Descartes erred in calling it innate instead of intuitive. The analysis of consciousness, that is, of thought, detects objective elements, which conduct to God or the whole ontological order. The error of Cousin was not in proving the being of God from facts which he discovered in the field of consciousness, but in supposing these facts, or principles rather, are purely psychological. Supposing them to be psychological in their nature and origin, the God obtained by way of induction from them was and could be only a generalization or an abstraction, as is the God attained by induction from any other class of facts, as Mr. Baring-Gould clearly shows in his volume on *Christianity*.

Thought connotes the object as well as the subject, and, the object determining the form of the thought, thought is true not relatively only to the thinker, as our author contends, which simply means that it is true the subject thinks as he thinks, but true objectively, and is what all minds must think that think the same object. Hence the truth thought is objective, and, as far as the thought goes, true absolutely. We, therefore, dismiss the fundamental assumption of the author as repugnant to the truth.

Mr. Baring-Gould is apparently an eclectic in theology, whatever he may be in philosophy. "That which mankind wanted, and wants still," he says in his preface, p. ix., "is not new truths, but the co-ordination of all aspects of the truth. In every religion of the world is to be found distorted or exaggerated some great truth, otherwise it would never have obtained a foothold: every religious revolution has been the struggle of thought to gain another step in the ladder that reaches to heaven." Was not the reformation, so-called, in the sixteenth century, that gave birth to

the various Protestant sects, a religious revolution? Was that a struggle of thought to gain another step in the ladder that leads to heaven? Certainly not, if we may believe the author, for he contends that Protestantism added nothing to the stock of truth always held by the church—was purely negative. Thus he says:

"In like manner, Catholicism contains all the positive ideas enunciated by the sects. If, from the standpoint of the Ideal, nothing exists, and nothing can exist, outside of Catholicism, if it is of the essence of Catholicism to be all that is and all that can be, that is to say, to comprehend in itself all that man can love, know, and practise, Catholicism must contain every thing that heretical and schismatical bodies believe and affirm. It will, however, affirm in totality what they affirm in part; it will believe all that they admit, but it will believe a great deal more besides.

"This fundamental notion of the Ideal of Catholicism has been thus expressed by de Maistre in his 'Letter to a Protestant Lady.' 'It is now,' he says, 'eighteen hundred and nine years that a Catholic Church has been in the world, and has always believed what it believes now. Your doctors will tell you a thousand times that we have innovated; but if we have innovated, it seems strange that it needs such long books to demonstrate it; whereas to prove that you have varied—and you are only of yesterday—no trouble is needed.

"'But let us consider an epoch anterior to all the schisms that now divide the world. At the commencement of the tenth century, there was but one faith in Europe. Consider this faith as an assemblage of positive dogmas—the Unity of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Real Presence, etc.; and, to simplify our idea, let us suppose the number of positive dogmas to amount to fifty. The Greek Church, having denied the procession of the Holy Ghost and the Supremacy of the Pope, has therefore only forty-eight points of belief; thus, you see, we believe all that she believes, although she denies two things that we hold. Your sixteenth century sects pushed matters much further and denied a host of other dogmas; but those which they retained are common to us. Finally, the Catholic religion includes all that the sects believe—this is incontestable.

"'The sects, be they what they may, are not *religions*, they are *negations*, that is to say, they are nothing in themselves, for directly they affirm any thing they are Catholic.

"'It follows as a consequence of the most perfect certainty, that the Catholic who passes into a sect apostatizes veritably, for he changes his belief, by denying to-day what he believed yesterday; but the sectary who passes into the church abdicates no dogma, he denies nothing that he believed; on the contrary, he begins to believe what previously he had denied.

"'He that passes out of a Christian sect into the Mother Church is not required to renounce any dogma, but only to avow that beside the dogmas which he believed, and which we believed every whit as truly as he, there are other verities of which he was ignorant, but which nevertheless exist.'

"Let us illustrate this truth in the same way that we illustrated it in reference to philosophy.

"Catholicism proclaims the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. Arianism appeared, and, abandoning more or less completely the first of these two terms, it reproduced the second alone. What did Arianism affirm? The humanity of Christ. Catholicism equally affirms this, it believes all that Arianism believed. What did Arianism add to that article of faith? A negation of the first term, *i. e.*, Nothing.

"Catholicism proclaims the co-existence of grace and free-will, that is to say, of divine and human action, the first the initiative of the second, as the increate is necessarily the origin of the create. Pelagianism started up and left on one side, more or less formally, the first of these two terms, and reproduced the second alone. What did it affirm? The existence of human liberty. Catholicism had affirmed it long before, and believed in all that Pelagianism held. What, then, did Pelagianism add to this article of belief? A negation of the first term, *i. e.*, Nothing.

"Catholicism proclaims the double necessity of faith and good works. Luther arose, and, omitting the second of these two points, admitted the former alone. What did he affirm? The necessity of faith. Catholicism has insisted on this with unchanging voice. What did Luther add? A negation of the second point, *i. e.*, Nothing.

"Finally, Catholicism proclaims the Sacraments, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, the Real Presence, etc. Protestants reject these; in other terms, they substitute for them simple negations, which are nothing.

"As every heretical or schismatical sect retains this or that verity which suits it, to the exclusion of other truths, and as this process takes place from a thousand different points of view, it is sufficient to add together the articles separately admitted by these communions, mutually antagonistic, to arrive at the sum of all Catholic verities.

"Also, it is sufficient to strike out the points which each rejects, or to subtract them from the total, to arrive at zero, and thus to show that there is no one phase of truth which they do not deny.

"In the first case, they conclude directly for Catholicism, which is the entirety of which they are the fragments; in the second, they conclude indirectly, by showing that outside of Catholicism is nothing but a process of disintegration of all belief." (Pp. 163–166.)

It would seem from this that a religious revolution may be a struggle of thought to take another step down and not up the ladder that reaches to heaven, and spring from the perversity of men's minds and hearts as well as from their

love of truth or aspirations to God. But pass over this. Suppose that every heterodox religion or sect fastens upon some aspect of truth which it distorts or exaggerates, and that, if the special aspects of all are brought together and co-ordinated, we should have the truth under all its aspects. We should still have only an aggregate of special or particular views of truth, not truth itself in its living unity and universality.

The author tells us that every sect retains as the centre of its organism a fragment of truth. This is not strictly correct, for truth itself is one and irrefragable. The sect has not a fragment of truth, for the body of truth is not broken and scattered as was the body of the Egyptian god Osiris; it has only a particular or fragmentary view of truth, or truth under a particular aspect, which it falsely takes to be truth in its unity and universality. Were we, then, to collect and co-ordinate the particular or special views of all the various sects and heterodox religions of the world, we should have not the truth, but simply a human view or theory of truth, which, being only a view or theory, is abstract, lifeless, impotent, and of no value. But how, and by whom, is this collection of the special or particular truths, or views of truth, to be made? The author professes to have subjected them all to his impartial judgment, but in them all, according to him, there is a part that is true and a part that is false. By what principle, rule, or criterion, then, does he judge them, and determine what in them accords with the true and what is untrue? He himself is, and, according to his own principles, must be, his standard, and only standard, of judgment, or, as we say, his own yard-stick, by which he measures them. But he can, he himself insists, determine only what is true to him, or from his point of view, not the true in itself or the true universally. He can, at best, give only his views of truth, which, like those of all other men, will necessarily be only relative, only views of some special aspect of truth, and consequently must necessarily, on his own principles, be as partial, as one-sided, or as inadequate as the religions or sects he attempts to judge. His judgment settles nothing, and the result of all his efforts would be not the attainment of Catholic truth, unmixed with error or falsehood, but at best only the founding of a new sect against all sects, yet as much a sect as any of them.

It is the fault of Mr. Baring-Gould, and all writers of his class, to assume to summon all religions,—Christianity,

Judaism, and the various forms of gentilism,—before them, and to judge them as if they had a universal and infallible standard of judgment to which all must conform or be condemned, and which the founders of these religions and their followers had or have not. They disdain to speak as the advocate, and always affect to speak from the bench as the judge; and yet they judge by no law or standard but that of their own minds, and really pronounce but their own private judgment. They judge by themselves as their own rule of judgment, and, consequently, as they are fallible and variable as all men are, their judgments are only their personal opinions, standing on the same level with the opinions of those they judge, and worth at best no more. The only man who could examine all sects and heterodox religions, and determine what in them is true and what is false, is the Catholic, who has in the teaching of the church the whole truth, the truth under all its aspects, and in its unity and universality. He has in her doctrine an objective rule or standard of judgment to which he and they are alike amenable, the infallible touchstone of truth, and therefore is able to take from each sect or heterodox religion its part of truth and reject its part of error. But he has no need for himself to do it, for he has already the whole truth —all, and probably a great deal more than all, he could obtain by doing it. He who has not the whole truth, the truth in its living unity and catholicity, cannot do it; and he who has it has no need to do it. The eclecticism Mr. Baring-Gould proposes is, therefore, either impracticable or unnecessary.

The author does not precisely say with the fool in his heart, "God is not;" but he says that his being cannot be demonstrated. He calls the existence of God "an irrational verity," and says, if we admit his existence at all, we must take it on trust as an axiom. That the being of God is an axiom as well as a theorem, and cannot be demonstrated syllogistically, we concede, for God is the universal, and there is no truth more universal than he to serve as the major premise; but that does not prove that his existence is "an irrational verity," and taken simply on trust. It is a false psychology that restricts reason, as the author does, to ratiocination or discursion. It is our universal faculty of knowing. The axioms of the mathematician are indemonstrable, but not therefore irrational. They simply need no demonstration, and are as really apprehended by the

reason or rational faculty as are the conclusions obtained by demonstration or reasoning from them.

Mr. Baring-Gould is right in assuming that reason can operate only from principles—not *facts*, as he says—and therefore in asserting that the principles are indemonstrable; but he is wrong in regarding the first principles of reason as beliefs. Beliefs are matters that are received on authority or extrinsic evidence, that is, extrinsic both to the mind believing and the matter believed. But the first principles are of all matters those which we know best, for we know them by immediate intuition, and they are matters not of belief but of science, and the basis of all science. They undoubtedly must be given to the reason or intellect, and not obtained by it; but they are given intuitively by the author of reason, which is nothing without them, and is constituted by them. The assent of the mind to them is immediate, direct, intuitive, and is knowledge or science, not belief. The author forgets that to know is to know, and that to know is to know that we know. To know, nothing is needed but the intelligent subject and the intelligible object in immediate relation. Demonstration is not knowing, but only a means or condition of knowing what is not immediately intelligible, is simply stripping the object of its envelopes, and presenting it in direct relation to the intelligent subject, which assents or dissents intuitively. In the longest chain of reasoning, the cognition of each link is immediate and intuitive. Either, then, we know not at all, or we know the first principles of reason, and nothing is more rational or less irrational than the constituent principles of reason, which Reid strangely obscured by calling them primitive *beliefs*.

Understanding this, the existence of God is not only a truth, but a rational truth, even if indemonstrable; for it is a truth of science as well as of faith or revelation; and so far from reposing on faith, it is the basis of all faith as of all science. Nor is it true, as Mr. Baring-Gould contends, that the divine being, though not syllogistically demonstrable, is not provable, and as really known as any truth is or can be. It is demonstrable even *ex consequentiis*, or from the consequences that would follow from denying it. The denial of God is necessarily the denial of being, the only object intelligible *per se*, therefore, of all knowledge, all existence, and the assertion of universal nescience and universal nihilism. But no one can carry his denial so far as to deny the exist.

ence of the denier; and if any one or any thing exists, there must be a God.

But we do not agree with the author that men have originated the idea of God by meditating on their own personality or on the facts or phenomena of nature. Men started with the knowledge that God is; they were taught it by God himself; and those imperfect conceptions of God to which Mr. Baring-Gould refers as the beginnings of such knowledge, and which reason and sentiment develop and complete, are reminiscences, and simply mark the deterioration or the loss of that knowledge in the human mind. The savage is the degenerate man, not the type of the primeval man. As men commenced with the belief in God, it is for those who deny his existence to prove that he is not. We shall not undertake to refute them. An atheist is not to be reasoned with, since, if his denial be true, he has neither reason nor existence, and is simply a nonentity, and nonentities are not susceptible of being refuted.

Mr. Baring-Gould considers that the world is composed of antinomies, or contraries, such as reason and sentiment, faith and reason, authority and liberty, God and the universe, the infinite and the finite, time and eternity, and that the great problem to be solved is to find the middle term that unites and reconciles these and other antinomies without destroying either term. What is this middle term, or this universal reconciler of the two extremes? Here the author grows obscure or misty, and we have some difficulty in following him; but, as far as we are able to understand him, this middle term, or universal mediator, is the human personality. He seems to adopt, in substance, the doctrine taught by Fichte, of a two-fold Ego—the one absolute, the other relative. Thus he says:

"Religion and philosophy are not two contradictory systems, but are the positive and negative poles, of which the axis uniting and conciliating them is the idea of the indefinite, which, expressing two complex terms, the body and the spirit, the finite and the infinite, represents the constitutive and fundamental nature of man.

"The idea of the indefinite at once *supposes* and *excludes* limitation. The consciousness man has of his own personality distinguishes him to himself from every thing else. This consciousness implies, whilst it denies, limitation. It is what I call the sentiment of the indefinite. When he affirms himself, he distinguishes himself from another. To recognize another is to place a limit at which his own personality halts and finishes. But although his personality halts and finishes at a limit

through relation to others, it is in itself unlimited ; and though having a beginning, it is, or conceives itself to be, without end. To conceive the annihilation of the conscious self is simply impossible. If you doubt this, make the experiment." (P. 24.)

The middle term is, then, the sentiment or idea "of the infinite, which at once *supposes* and *excludes* limitation." "The consciousness man has of his own personality distinguishes him to himself from every thing else." It "implies, whilst it denies, limitation." But this limitation is only in relation to others; "it is in itself unlimited;" that is, infinite, the infinite God. The human person is, then, both limited and unlimited, finite and infinite, and hence assumed to be the mean between the two extremes. The universal reconciler is therefore the vague sentiment or idea of the indefinite furnished by our consciousness of our own personality. The antinomy would reappear if we were to fix our eyes on either extreme, and disappears only so long as we are contented to dwell in the vague, and do not attempt to determine whether we ourselves are infinite or finite! This may be very satisfactory to the author; but we who ask for clear and definite ideas would be very much obliged to him if he would tell us how a subjective idea or sentiment can remove an antinomy which exists objectively, or *a parte rei*. It is one thing to reconcile antinomies in idea or sentiment, and another thing to reconcile them *in re*, and to bring them into a real dialectic harmony.

The author confirms our interpretation in the following passage:

"Man will never be truly known either by examining him in his finite aspect as a creature, one of the animated atoms of the world, or by investigating him in his infinite aspect as a spiritual force, an active intellect. The animals are limited: they find their life, their repose, their happiness, within limits; but limitation stifles man. Let him try to abstract himself from limits, and, like the Buddhist ascetic, he falls into Nirvana, which is zero, a simple negation. Limitation is requisite to constitute his personality; illimitation is necessary to make that personality progressive.

"But whence does man obtain his unlimited personality? It cannot have been given him by any thing that he touches, that surrounds him, for all matter is by its nature limited. This is the problem which religion solves, by laying down as a fundamental axiom the absolute existence of God, the source and author of the existence of man. *Man created by God is placed between the infinite and the finite; he is the middle term uniting them through his conscience of the indefinite.* Obedient to his

true nature, bounded on all sides and in his own faculties, he inclines toward the indefinite; and transpiercing all limits, as electricity penetrates all bodies, he rises by a progression without term toward the infinite." (P. 26.)

Man, we venture to assert, is not placed by the creative act of God between the infinite and the finite, as if participating of both, for this would imply the existence of the finite is independent of that creative act. Besides, there is and can be no existence between the infinite and the finite. The indefinite has no real existence. Man is the mean not between the infinite and finite, but between the infinite and nothing, and the nexus that unites him to the infinite, or the *medius terminus*, is the creative act of God, without which he would be the nothing from which he is created. Man is not a middle term between the infinite and the finite, for he is himself finite in body, soul, and spirit, and lives and makes progress only by virtue of the creative act of God, which is manent in him, as the cause of his existence, of his faculties, his power of progression, his activity, whether of body or mind.

From Fichte the author passes to Hegel, whose method he professes to follow. He attempts to show that by the Hegelian method all antinomies, or opposites, are conciliated. But how is this done? It is done, he has said, by the human personality, the Ego, whose existence, revealed by consciousness, is the connecting link between the infinite and the finite, which is, as we have seen, not the fact. The human personality is a connecting link, by virtue of the divine creative act, between the infinite and nothing, the true idea of the finite. The sense or idea of the indefinite conciliates nothing, for the simple reason that there is no indefinite in the world of reality. Whatever is or exists is either infinite or finite. Either the antinomies are real or they are unreal. If unreal, they are nothing, and there is nothing to be conciliated; if real, they can be conciliated only by a middle term as real as themselves, which cannot be said of either the idea or sentiment of the indefinite, for it is only our ignorance or want of a more complete knowledge that causes any thing to appear as indefinite. Indeed, we deny the alleged antinomies themselves, in the sense of contradictions, save in our imperfect science. Could we comprehend the whole, all things as they stand in the divine mind or decree, we should understand that all the works of God are dialectic,

as the works of the supreme Logic, or Logic itself, must be and also that there is no antinomy between the Creator and creature. There are two terms, indeed, but no antinomy, because there is a real middle term, the creative act of the first term, which conciliates them—a real *copula* which unites them as subject and predicate in a single indissoluble judgment. The human personality, the Ego, I-myself, may or may not apprehend this real copula; but it is absurd to pretend that it is it, or that it can supply it by any conceptions it forms of itself. Mr. Baring-Gould's philosophy, as that of Hegel, is rugged enough in form, all bristling with abstractions, and constructed and understood not without much hard labor; but it is not very profound, and when mastered is seen to be very superficial. No really profound philosopher could have written, "The act which affirms the relation between the divine type of absolute perfection and us, is *ourselves* in our liberty and free-will judging according to our reason, our will, and our sentiment" (p. 37). That is, it is an act on our part of free will, which we may either perform or not as we choose; and, morever, the act is ourselves, which supposes the act and the actor to be identical. The fact is the reverse, and it is the act of God that affirms the relation, not our act, for God himself creates the relation, and we cannot deny it even in thought, or frame a form of words that does not imply it.

The author, after having told us over and over again that the conciliating term is Ego or the consciousness of our personality, giving us the idea or sentiment of the indefinite, tells us finally that it is the Incarnation, which he rightly asserts is the great central fact of Christianity, from which all in our holy religion radiates or is logically deducible; but so little does he know of theology and its history that he supposes this is a grand discovery of Hegel, destined to effect a theological revolution. But what does he understand by the Incarnation? Evidently nothing more nor less than the Ego, or our personality, which is, according to him, the middle term between the finite and the infinite, and participating of both.

But before getting at the Incarnation, which reconciles all antinomies, the author entertains us with various speculations on God and creation. He concedes the "hypothesis" that God is, and is the Creator of all things, but maintains that God is not God till he creates the world, and that

he creates for the creature's sake alone, not, as Christianity teaches, for himself as final cause. He rejects, not improperly, the doctrine that composes God of the attributes of our own nature carried up to infinity, or that he is the perfection of what is inchoate and incomplete in us, which supposes him to be only a generalization; yet, as we are made after the image and likeness of God, and in our nature copy him, in the sense that he is, as St. Thomas says, *similitudo rerum omnium*, we can, of course, appeal to the attributes of our nature, of our soul, as illustrative of his, or as helping us in a fuller degree to apprehend his perfections. But Mr. Baring-Gould, following Hegel, denies to God, or, as he says, the Absolute, all attributes, all qualities, and all activity in himself of any sort, on the ground that they imply relation, and no relation is predicable of the Absolute. We let him speak for himself:

"But this conception of God is entirely humanistic. To say that he is infinitely powerful, infinitely wise, infinitely just, infinitely holy, is but the raising of human qualities to the n^{th} power.

"These qualities are simply inconceivable apart from the existence of the world and man. If we give him these qualities, save for the sake of bringing his existence within the scope of our faculties, we must allow that before the world was, they were not; because, apart from the existence of the world and man, these qualities are simply inconceivable.

"Power is the exercise of superior force against a body that resists. Suppress the idea of resistance, and the idea of power disappears. Wisdom is inconceivable apart from something about which it can be called into operation. Goodness implies something toward which it can be shown. Justice cannot be exerted in a vacuum where there is neither good nor evil, right nor wrong. Can God do wrong? Impossible. Then it is as unsuitable to apply to him the term holy, as it is to employ it of stick or stone, which also cannot do what is wrong.

"We pass, then, to the second stage of rationalizing on God.

"The God that we have been considering is personal, and an ideal of perfection, with infinite attributes.

"But this conception is defective, if not wrong; for it has been formed out of our empirical faculties, the imagination and the sentiment, and is simply an hypothesis dressed up in borrowed human attributes.

"The idea of infinity which rejects every limitation, leads to the denial of attributes to God. For, if his intelligence be infinite, he does not pass from one idea to another, but knows all perfectly and instantaneously; to him the past, the present, and the future are not; therefore, he can neither remember nor foresee. He can neither generalize nor analyze; for, if he were to do so, there would be some detail in things the conception of which would be wanting to him; he cannot

reason, for reasoning is the passage from two terms to a third; and he has no need of a middle term to perceive the relation of a principle to its consequence. He cannot think, for to think is to allow of succession in ideas.

"He is, therefore, immutable in his essence; in him are neither thoughts, feelings, nor will. Indeed, it is an abuse of words to speak of being, feeling, willing, in connection with God, for these words have a sense limited to finite ideas, and are therefore inadmissible when treating of the Absolute.

"The vulgar idea of God is not one that the reason can admit. He is neither infinite, nor absolute, necessary, universal, nor perfect.

"He is not infinite; for God is infinite only on condition of being All. But a God meeting his limitation in nature, the world, and humanity, is not All. Also, if he be a person, he will be *a* being, and not merely being.

"He is not absolute; for how can he be conceived apart from all relations? If he be a person, he feels, thinks, wishes, and here we have relations, conditions imposed on the Absolute, and he ceases to be absolute.

"He is not necessary; the idea representing him as necessary is the result of a psychological induction; but induction cannot confer on the ideas it discovers the character of necessity.

"He is not universal; for an individual, however great, extended, powerful, and perfect, cannot be universal. What is individual is particular, and the particular cannot be the All.

"He is not perfect; for how can he be perfect to whom the universe is added? It was necessary, or it was not necessary; if necessary, he was imperfect without it; if not necessary, he is imperfect with it." (Pp. 100–102.)

When theologians ascribe distinct attributes to God, they never regard them as something added to the being or essence of God, or as distinguishable from it, or from one another, except in our mode of apprehending them, proceeding from our inability to comprehend him. There is in God no distinction between his essence and his attributes, and none between one attribute and another; God is under no relation exterior to himself, but he is in himself, in his own essence, the principle of all real and all possible relations. He does not think or reason as we do, but that does not prevent him from being infinitely intelligent, nor from being the adequate object of his own intelligence. He may know all things without any succession of ideas; all at once, for all are present to him in his own ideas and in his own decree. "Indeed, it is an abuse of words to speak of

being, feeling, willing, in connection with God, for these words have a sense limited to finite ideas." Very true when applied to finite existences, but not necessarily when applied to the infinite being or being in its plenitude. Being is the proper term to apply to God, for he reveals himself to Moses as I AM THAT AM. The term of *absolute*, which the author uses after his German masters, is badly chosen, for it is an abstract term, and expresses only an abstract idea, obtained only by our mental operation. God is no abstraction, for if he were he would exist only in our mind. There are no abstractions in the real, and God is the infinitely real. "He is not infinite, for God is infinite only on condition of being All." Is he not all that is? Nature, the world, humanity, do not limit him, for he is their Creator, and their being is in him. They add nothing to him, for they are his acts, and simply show forth his power. It is idle to pretend that the exercise of power is the limitation of power. In the same way the other objections urged are answerable.

The author denies power to God, because "power is the exercise of superior force against a body that resists. Suppress the idea of resistance, and the idea of power disappears." Of one sort of power, perhaps; but is there no power where there is no resistance? If not, what is there for body to resist? It is not the resistance that creates the force; and if there were not, prior to it, power inherent in the subject of the force, there would be nothing for the resisting body to resist. Why, the author has not mastered the very rudiments of the science he professes to teach. We do not pretend to comprehend God, or that any created mind can form an adequate idea or conception of him. All our conceptions of him are inadequate, and seem to impose on him the limitations of our own finite minds; but these limitations of our thought do not really limit him, or prevent him from being in himself unlimited, infinite, perfect being.

We continue our citations from the author:

"The rational conception of God is that he is; nothing more. To give him an attribute is to make him a relative God.

"The sentimental conception of God is that he is the perfection of relations; the tendency of sentimentalism is to deny that he is absolute.

"Both are true and both are false; both are true in their positive assertions, both are false in their negations

"Before the world was, God was the Absolute, inconceivable save as being. We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter.

"Properly speaking, the name of God is not to be given to the Absolute before creation; the Absolute is the only philosophical name admissible, and that is unsatisfactory, for it is negative; but the idea of God before matter was must be incomprehensible by material beings.

"This transcendent principle, superior to the world and to all thought, is the fixed, immanent, immutable *being*, force *in vacuum*, *unrealized*, *unrevealed*.

"By love, the Absolute calls the world into being, and *becomes God*, that is—let me be clearly understood—he is at once absolute and relative, and as relative, he is God, and clothes himself in attributes. Toward creation he is good, wise, just; nay, the perfection of goodness, wisdom, and justice, the Ideal of the heart.

"The creation is the first step, the Incarnation is the second. The first leads necessarily to the second; it is the passage from relations simple to relations perfect; it is the bringing within the range of man's vision the Divine Personality." (Pp. 112, 113.)

Here we have very pure Hegelism. Hegel's tricomity, or Trinity, is, first, God as pure being, of which we can predicate nothing except that it is; the second term is the Word, or Idea, in which are contained all possibilities; the third term is the Holy Ghost, the realization of the possible, or its progressive reduction of the Idea, to actual existence. God, considered in himself as *das reine Seyn*, inasmuch as he has no predicate, is infinite void, or emptiness, in which sense he is the equivalent of not-being—*das Nicht-seyn*—or, as Mr. Baring-Gould says, "equivalent to zero." The second moment in his being or life is the Word, or the development of the Idea, or possible world—*das Ideen*. The third moment is the consummation of the Idea, or the production of the actual world—*das Wesen*. Does Hegel mean that this is the real *processus*, or only that it is by these three moments we form our conceptions of God and creation?—that is, is it an ontological or simply a psychological process? We are not familiar enough with Hegel to answer positively, and our author, who professes to understand him, leaves us in doubt whether it is the one or the other, if, indeed, he recognizes any distinction between the two. Mr. Baring-Gould is a pure psychologist, as is, in fact, Hegel himself, since he uses the term *absolute*, which, as abstract, can have only a psychological sense. He, as we understand him, like Schelling, holds the ontological and the psychological to be identical, and the development of thought as

indistinguishable from the development of God and the universe. All the German schools of philosophy that pretend to be ontological are really psychological, and find their principle and starting-point in the *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes.

But, however this may be, it is clear that our author regards God, before or without creation, as the Byssos of the Gnostic schools and the *Void* of the Buddhists, and becoming Plenum or Pleroma only in the act of creation, or in realizing the Idea or Word in the production of the universe. "Before the world was, God was the Absolute, inconceivable save as being." "We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter (substance?)." "Properly speaking, the name of God is not to be given to the Absolute *before creation*." "This transcendent principle, superior to the world and to all thought, is the fixed, immanent, immutable Being, [has he not said the word *being* is abused when applied to the Absolute?] force in vacuum, *unrealized*, unrevealed." If before creation the Absolute is unrealized, it is unreal—no real being at all; a mere possible being, at best; an absolute abstraction; therefore, nothing, and rightly said to be the equivalent of zero, or to equal *das Nicht-seyn*.

But "by love the Absolute calls the world into being, and BECOMES God." This is conclusive. Yet there are some difficulties to be cleared up. How can the Absolute love, since the author declares over and over again that love implies relation, and the Absolute excludes all relation? Then how can an abstraction, a mere possible but no actual God, generate the idea or word, and call the world into being? The absolute admits no predicates, we are told, and is the equivalent of zero, that is, is nothing. Nothing cannot act, and nothing cannot make itself something, nor *void* of itself become *plenum*. Even an imperfect existence cannot become perfect or complete itself but by the power or assistance of another. The possible cannot make itself actual. How, then, say the Absolute *becomes* God by creating, and attains to reality in his own productions?

Certain it is that the Hegelian tricomity is not the ineffable Christian trinity. The Christian doctrine is the reverse of the Hegelian. Christian theology does not conceive God first as possible, then as idea, and then as actual, but conceives him in and of himself, as *Ens necessarium et reale*, and holds him to be *actus purissimus*, and that he eternally is, not as our author

regards him, as a Becoming—*das Werden*. The Hegelian tricomity is cosmic; the Christian Trinity is theistic, a distinction of persons in God—distinction *ad intra*, not *ad extra*. A great part of the difficulties the author encounters grow out of his ignorance or misconception of the Christian mystery. He says God in himself has no relations, and has them at all only when the universe has been produced, and, therefore, terms implying relation cannot be applied to him. God has no object for the manifestation of any attribute except an exterior object in the universe; and, of course, his knowledge, wisdom, love, and power begin and end with the universe, which is finite. He therefore conceives him as an abstract unity or infinity. But God is complete in himself, according to Christian theology, because he is triune in his very being. He is his own object as well as subject. He has in the unity of his own being the distinction of three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. His intelligence generates the Word, the exact image of himself and the adequate object of his infinite intelligence, and the Father and the Son find in each other the adequate object of their love, and from the spiration of their mutual and infinite love proceeds the Holy Ghost. God has, then, eternally in himself the adequate object of his infinite intelligence and love, and, therefore, needs to go out of himself for no relation, quality, or perfection.

The author, by denying or misconceiving the distinctions of persons in God, has in his system reduced God avowedly to nothing. Men may not always know it; but such is the fact, that he who denies the Trinity really denies God, or, which is the same thing, makes him a dead unity.

The author speaks of the Word or Idea, but what does he mean by it? We do not know, and have not been able to ascertain. We cannot decide whether he regards it as idea in the divine mind or simply as an idea in the human mind. He tries to escape pantheism, at least tries to persuade us that he does, and he would have us believe that Hegel was not a pantheist, but a Christian. This is absurd. According to Hegel, God and the universe form a whole; and there is an unbroken progression from the mineral, the plant, the animal, man, up to God, and God goes through all these several grades of existence: is mineral in the mineral, plant in the plant, animal in the animal, and first attains to self-consciousness in man—that is, first becomes conscious of himself, or that he is, in our consciousness of our own exist-

ence. It is idle to pretend that this is not pantheism of a very decided sort. It is true, Mr. Baring-Gould identifies the Word or Idea with God himself, but it is with God *becoming* conscious of himself in the human consciousness. Therefore, the Word or Idea is generated not by the divine being in himself, or his own mind, but in ours, which makes it our word as well as his.

Now, what can the author mean by the Incarnation? He is careful not to tell us, though he makes the conciliation of the universal antinomy depend on it. He would have us take it for granted that he understands it in an orthodox Christian sense. Certain is it that he does not himself understand by it that the Word, the second Person in the ever-blessed Trinity, took flesh in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, was made man, and dwelt among us. As far as we can make out his meaning, which, it would seem, he purposely leaves indefinite, it is that the Absolute embodies the idea in creation, and especially in human nature, or in man. This, as the idea is the indefinite, touching the infinite on the one hand, and the finite on the other, would conciliate the two extremes, and all antinomies for the intellect. But this would only mean that God creates all things after his own *idea exemplaris*, eternal in his own essence, and therefore dialectically, and consequently, that the antinomy exists only in our apprehension, and because we see the extremes without taking note of the middle term which unites and conciliates them. This, we believe, is true; but it hardly merits the name of being a new discovery by Hegel. The same idea is embodied or expressed in human nature, and being in our personality, it conciliates the two extremes for the sentiment, and presents itself to the human sentiment as its ideal. This would simply mean that man is dialectically constituted, and has in his ideal the perfection of his nature. We are not disposed to dispute it, but it bears less resemblance to the Christian mystery of the Incarnation than Harry of Monmouth bore to Alexander, or Wales to Macedon.

The author is excessively vague and indefinite in stating what he means by the Incarnation. But he says:

"If we rise from the mathematical point, the sole possible expression of matter in its condition of absolute indivisibility, to the immensity of the sidereal universe, from the ultimate chemical atom through all degrees of the mineral reign, from the first vegetable embryo to the most complete animal: if, passing onward to man, we follow him from a

whimpering babe to the conception of his unlimited personality in God through Christ, tracing the laborious stages of the progressive development of humanity in history, what does this magnificent panorama of creation exhibit to us but the marvellous ascension of the finite under the form of the indefinite toward God, the Infinite? Christ is to humanity not merely the Son of Mary, but the veritable Son of Man, resuming in himself the entire creation, of which he is the protoplast and the archetype. Thus, this conception of the whole visible universe in its projection toward the infinite, from the atom and the germ to the Man-God, is the complete equation of the infinite; and from this point of view Christ is the Ideal of creation; whilst from the divine point of view he is the Idea of the creation. By him the Idea was realized in creation, and by him creation is raised toward the Infinite." (Pp. 125, 126.)

"Christ is to humanity not merely the Son of Mary, but the veritable Son of Man, resuming in himself the entire creation, of which he is the protoplast and the archetype." It is pretty evident from this that the author understands by the Incarnation not the assumption of flesh by the Word, but the Word uniting in himself the infinite and the finite, producing the entire universe, and constituting himself the ideal to which the human race aspires. He evidently, in whatever sense he understood the Incarnation, holds that it is coeval with creation, or with the procession of the Absolute from the idea to the actual, and that not the Word in his divinity alone, but the Word incarnate, is he by whom all things are made, and who is the protoplast and archetype of creation. This certainly is not the Christian doctrine, for that teaches us that it was by the eternal Word that all things were made, by the infinite and eternal Word, who was in the beginning with God, and who was God, not by the Word incarnate, for the Word became incarnate after the world was created, and, according to the common reckoning, only 1871 years ago. Besides, he became incarnate of the Virgin Mary, and he could not well have done so before she was born or had an actual existence.

We owe the author no thanks for his pretended advocacy of the Incarnation, which he only distorts from the sense in which the Scriptures present it and the church holds and teaches it. We judge no man's heart; but we say this, that if it had been Mr. Baring-Gould's design to destroy all faith in the Incarnation, to explain away the whole central mystery of Christianity while seeming to accept and defend it, he could not have set himself more cunningly to

work to do it. After having substituted the orthodox doctrine by another bearing, except in name, no resemblance to it, he deduces, seemingly from it, but really from the orthodox doctrine itself, several very true and important conclusions. Has he done so in order to deceive the unwary and induce them to accept a false theology and a deadly error? Or is he deceived himself,—blinded or bewildered by the abstractions of modern heterodox philosophy? We know not which it is, but we do know that his book is admirably contrived to deceive and mislead all persons not more than ordinarily well instructed in the Christian faith and theology who may be tempted to read it. Its real character is well disguised from ordinary readers.

It is a notable fact that the author, while he insists on what he calls "the hypothesis of the Incarnation," as the medium of conciliating all intellectual and sentimental antinomies or contraries, nowhere speaks of it as the medium of redemption and salvation. The opinion that, if man had not sinned, the Word would nevertheless have become incarnate to complete the creative act by raising it to the highest pitch, ennobling man and elevating him to union of nature with God, is an opinion which may be held; but the more common doctrine, St. Thomas assures us, is, that he would not, which seems to be favored by the Holy Scriptures and by the *O Felix Culpa* which the church sings on Holy Saturday; and that the triumph over Satan is in this —that through redemption in Christ man is exalted to a higher glory, a nobler destiny, than he would have attained to if he had not sinned; so that, where sin abounded, grace much more abounded. But, whichever be the sounder opinion, it is certain that Christ came to redeem and save man from sin and its penalty; to make satisfaction for sin; to be the propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. Hence it was said to Mary: "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins;" and hence the Baptist said to his disciples: "Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world." We find nothing of this in Mr. Baring-Gould's theory in connection with the Incarnation. He seems not to be very deeply impressed with the fact that man has sinned and fallen under the power of Satan, and needs deliverance. He, perhaps, has reached that last infirmity of unbelief, not to believe there is a devil. He is intent only on removing

certain dialectical and sentimental difficulties. This is suspicious.

The evidence the author adduces of the "hypothesis of the Incarnation" is of the feeblest kind—too feeble to satisfy even a thorough-going scientist. He discredits the Gospel narratives, rejects the miracles, denies the applicability of the prophecies usually relied on, and will not admit the authority either of the church or of the sacred text. He knocks from under the doctrine all its supports, and avowedly accepts it, as an "irrational verity," on trust. True, he intimates that it must be taken on authority, but admits no authority on which to take it but one's own private judgment. Such a writer has far more the appearance of being an enemy than a friend, and not an open, manly enemy at that. We, at least, cannot take his doctrine on trust.

The author appears to us to be a man not wanting in natural ability, who has dabbled somewhat in the physical and so-called exact sciences, and has read several modern heterodox philosophers, and one or two books of Catholic theology, none of which has he mastered or digested, and has jumbled together in his mind, and thrown out in his book, matters of the most heterogeneous character, which no mortal man can mould into consistency. He advances very little that is original or that is new to those passably familiar with the topics he treats. What is original is not true, and what is true is so misplaced and so mixed up with errors of all sorts, that it is none too severe to judge the work, as a whole, to be practically false. Yet some of the details we would except, if found anywhere else, especially his chapter on *The Basis of Right*, which is sound.

More we might say; but having, as we think, sufficiently refuted the principles on which the author's theory is founded, it is hardly worth one's while to attack the baseless edifice, which must soon fall of itself. We have taken no pleasure in reading or reviewing this pretentious book. It is one of a class of books which are becoming quite numerous, and which are all the more dangerous because they treat religion and the church with a certain apparent courtesy, and express their atheism or pantheism and their hostility to true religion in Christian phraseology. They are books which the faithful should eschew. They are pervaded throughout by a subtle but deadly poison.

WHAT IS THE NEED OF REVELATION?

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1873.]

You ask me, my Felix, with a triumphant air, what is the need of Revelation, if, as I maintain, reason is infallible? You also seem to hold that reason and revelation must necessarily be mutually antagonistic, and that we cannot assert the one without denying the other. But I beg you to bear in mind that I assert that reason is infallible only in her own sphere, which she may well be without being able to take cognizance of all reality. My eye may see truly the oak before my door, without therefore being able to see all the objects disclosed either by the telescope or the microscope.

The sphere of reason is limited, and by no means includes all spheres or all reality. Reason asserts, without hesitation, her own limitation, and is perfectly assured that there is or exists more than she does, or, by her natural powers, can, know. Very young or very conceited persons may imagine that the horizon that bounds their vision bounds the universe, and that there is nothing beyond it; but modest men, men of wide experience, of ripe intellect, and of real science, always feel themselves confronted with the unknown, and, so far as their natural powers extend, the unknowable. What that unknown or unknowable is the soul by her own light does not know, but that it is and is real, she is as certain as she is of any thing: so much the cosmic philosophers themselves are forced to admit. Gioberti attempts to explain this mysterious fact, by asserting for the soul a purely subjective faculty, which he calls the faculty of *superintelligence;* not, indeed, a faculty of knowing the superintelligible, but of knowing, by her own need of it, that it is. It is less a faculty proper, than the soul's apprehension of her own impotence and capacity of becoming more than she is, or her need of the superintelligible to fulfil or complete her existence. In this mysterious faculty,—at once, a want and a prophecy,—he finds, or thinks he finds, the connecting link between the natural and supernatural, and the soul's aptitude or capacity to receive a supernatural revelation, and to know by faith the supra-rational, or the world that trans-

cends her natural powers. Be this as it may, this much is certain, that the soul knows, however she knows it, that she is limited, is imperfect, finite, yet with a capacity that only the infinite can fill, and that there is an infinite reality above her natural powers to know. I do not call it a faculty, but I regard the soul as competent by her reason to distinguish herself as finite from the infinite.

Here, then, is a very satisfactory answer to your question. The need of revelation, conceding reason to be infallible in her own sphere, is in the need we have for the right and intelligent conduct of life, of knowing this supra-rational order of reality, our relations to it, its demands of us, and the light and strength to be derived from it to enable us to fulfil the purpose of our existence, and to attain to our supreme good or beatitude.

We know by our natural powers that our origin, as well as our last end, is supernatural. We know that God is, and that God, both as first cause and final cause, is necessarily supernatural, as is also whatever he does immediately by his own power alone, without using the agency of second or created causes, as the natural is what he does mediately, as *causa causarum*, through causes which he himself has created, and is therefore explicable by what the scientists call natural laws, or, as I prefer to say, by second causes. We know that we proceed from God by way of creation from nothing, and that our destiny is to return to him, without being absorbed or losing our individuality in him, as our last end, supreme good, or beatitude.

All this is demonstrable or provable by reason. There are, then, in this life of creatures, and, consequently, in the life of man, two movements, the initial or inchoate, and the teleological, or their procession, by the divine creative act, from God, and their return to him as their final cause, fulfilment, or perfection. The teleological movement fulfils or perfects the initial or inchoate. Into the initial order, we are born by natural generation from Adam, which is thence called the natural or Adamic order. But how, or by what means, do we enter the teleological order, or order of perfection? Certainly not by natural generation, which only introduces us into the natural order, and the natural is and must be inadequate to a supernatural end. Now, how can you know, without revelation, the means by which the soul can enter the teleological order, be elevated to the plane of

a supernatural destiny, and enabled to gain her supreme good or beatitude?

Do you deny that our beatitude or last end is supernatural, and maintain that it lies in the natural order? God, no doubt, could create and has created existences for a natural end; as he has created the lower orders for man, and for himself only through man, but not one of them is man or a rational soul. They are all irrational, and exist only for the rational which has dominion over them. They act only *ad finem*, as the winds blow, the lightnings flash, the rains fall, or the storm beats; not *propter finem*, or for an end foreseen and willed, as do all rational existences. The rational soul cannot find its beatitude in the natural order, for whatever is natural is created, and whatever is created is finite, and the soul craves an unbounded good, and can be satisfied with nothing less than the infinite. Nothing created can satisfy the soul; and those theologians who hold that God, though man is actually incapable of being satisfied with any created good, might, if he had so willed, have created him to be satisfied with the knowledge and love of his Creator attainable by his natural light and strength, seem to me to forget that such being, if possible, would not have been man. The soul has all this knowledge and love even now, and yet is far from being satisfied or content. The soul would know all things, would know the very essence of God, see and know God as he is in itself, which is naturally possible to no created intelligence, however high in the scale of existence. The soul's craving to love and to be loved, can never be satisfied with any natural love. Hence, however charming may be the love of husband and wife, parents and children, friends and neighbors, it never fills the soul: and the expectation of the young and inexperienced that it will, is never realized, and if they have placed their hopes in it, they are sure to be disappointed. Hence spring the chief miseries of domestic life. Such love satisfies only when its object is loved in God. The soul craves to see and love God as he is in himself, and to give herself wholly and unreservedly to him, and to have him give himself wholly and unreservedly to her, and can be satisfied with nothing less. Nothing less can fill the void in the soul, or appease her infinite craving to love and to be loved. How then dream of a natural beatitude for the soul? Such is man as he actually is. Would a creature, that could be satisfied with the natural love and knowledge of God, be *man?*

You ask me again why God, when he made man and gave him reason, did not give him a reason sufficient for his entire knowledge and guidance in all things in relation to his end? This is only asking me in other words, why God did not create man for a natural beatitude. He could not do so and make him what he is. To do that, he must make him of a lower order of existences, of a less noble nature, and for a less sublime destiny. He has seen proper to make man for himself, and for a loftier or better end he could not make him, for God is the supreme good, the *good* in itself. He could not give man a more perfect happiness, than he gives him in giving him himself. Having resolved to give himself to man as his last end or beatitude, he could not make his natural powers adequate to his end, or place him by nature on the plane of his destiny. Since God is supernatural, it would imply a contradiction in terms, or it would suppose the natural can be adequate to the supernatural, that the creature can be the equal of the creator! To have given man a reason adequate to his end, God must have made reason omniscient, or endowed him naturally with his own reason, made him literally God in his own personality, which is absurd. Man, according to the Gospel, becomes God indeed, but in the divine person of the Word, not in his own human or created person. How God does or can raise man to the level of his destiny, and enable the natural to gain a supernatural beatitude, no created reason, no reason but the divine reason,—the infinite reason of God,—can know, or even conceive.

Your doctrine of the mutual antagonism of reason and revelation is of Protestant, not Catholic, origin. The reformers held that by the prevarication of Adam man lost both reason and free will, and became corrupt in his entire moral or spiritual nature, so that henceforth he could not think a true thought, or do a single good act. Hence they taught that all the works of infidels or the unregenerate are sins and offensive to God, and that all their thoughts and the motions of their hearts are evil—unless, perchance, such as relate to purely material interests—only evil, and that continually. They did not, it is true, assert any antagonism between reason and revelation, or nature and grace prior to the fall, or in the state of innocence, and it is only in man's fallen state that, according to them, the antagonism exists. In the regenerate, if reason is not restored to its primitive state, its place or office is supplied by grace and the infal-

lible inward teaching and guidance of the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the hearts of the faithful whom he has begotten anew in Christ Jesus. The antagonism asserted did not exist before the prevarication of Adam, and is the result of original sin.

In this doctrine of the reformers there is an exaggeration of the effects of the fall, and a misapprehension of the real relation of natural and supernatural, as well as of the necessity and work of grace. Man did not by the fall lose his spiritual faculties, that is, reason and free will; for if he had he would, after the fall, have ceased to be a moral agent, and the unregenerate would be as incapable of sin as they are said to be of virtue. If those whom Protestants call the unregenerate, the ungodly, or sinners, lost by the fall reason and free will, the ability to do or think what is morally good, they must have lost equally the ability to do or think what is morally evil. They may be doomed to suffer the penalty of original sin, but they cannot share in it as sin, and can no more sin than can the beasts that perish. By the fall, no doubt, the understanding became darkened and free will attenuated, the lower nature, the appetites and passions, became loosened from the restraints of reason and free will, and man fell under the dominion of the flesh and the power of Satan; but we lost no spiritual faculty, and our spiritual nature underwent no *physical* deterioration or change. We lost by the fall the original justice in which Adam was established, and the integrity of our nature annexed thereto; but that original justice was supernatural, and that integrity, though in the order of nature, was something superadded to nature, rather than essential to its existence as human nature, and therefore called by theologians *indebita*. Our nature suffered, was wounded by being violently despoiled by sin of the supernatural and its annexes, but remained after the fall substantially or physically what it was before, and was only morally turned away from God, and internally disordered. Hence it is only in a moral sense that is to be understood the denial or crucifixion of nature, demanded by Christian asceticism.

The reformers never understood the real relation of the natural and the supernatural, or that the reason or necessity of the supernatural was and is, that it is needed to fulfil or perfect the natural. Their doctrine required them to hold, either that nature before the fall stood on the plane of the supernatural, or that man's beatitude was originally in the

natural order; and the supernatural,—the order of grace founded by the Incarnation,—is necessary simply to repair or to overcome the damage done to nature by the fall. They do not appear ever to have understood that the natural is initial, and the supernatural teleological, and was always necessary to fulfil or perfect the natural, as is implied in the fact that the original justice in which Adam was established, and which placed him on the plane of his beatitude, was supernatural, not natural. If Adam before the fall had stood naturally on the plane of his destiny, original justice would have been natural, not supernatural. That he did so stand, appears to have been the opinion of the reformers, certainly of Baius, as implied in his 55th proposition: "God could not have created man from the beginning, *ab initio*, such as he is now born;"—condemned by Pope St. Pius V, though in some sense, *aliquo pacto*, true; yet, in the sense of Baius or the assertors, as false and heretical. The exact contradictory, that God could *ab initio* have created man such as he is now born, maintained by some theologians, is true, only when we add or understand, *seclusa ratione peccati et pœnæ*.

I will not say that the reformers expressly maintained that original justice was natural, though I believe they did, for their views on this, as on so many other points, were confused, unsettled, vague, uncertain, and variable; but their theory of original sin unquestionably required them to maintain it. I never find them asserting the necessity of the supernatural to elevate unfallen nature to the plane of its destiny, or of the end originally intended by the Creator; I never find them asserting the supernatural order as teleological, or as necessary to fulfil or perfect the natural or Adamic order, which is only initial or inchoate. They assert it only as remedial, or as necessary to repair what was lost by the fall. They recognize a *natura lapsa*, and, in some sense, a *natura reparata*, but never a *natura elevata*, as is evident from their denial of infused justice, and assertion of justification as forensic, not intrinsic, and thus disjoining it from sanctification. Not recognizing *natura elevata*, or the elevation of nature by infused grace to the plane of a supernatural beatitude, they could logically understand original sin only as a fall from *natura integra*, not from *natura elevata*, and therefore must regard it as depraving or corrupting man's whole nature, and involving the loss of reason and free will, or their total subjection to Satan and the law of the

members,—the law of sin and death. Not recognizing that man even in his integral state did not stand by his nature on the plane of his destiny, nor the necessity even in the plan of creation of the supernatural, the palingenesia, to perfect the natural, the Adamic, or the order of genesis, they were forced either to deny original sin altogether, as do a large proportion of their followers, or else to assert the total corruption of man's whole nature. Doing the latter, they could not do otherwise than denounce reason and deny free will in the unregenerate, and hence were forced to present revelation as antagonistic to unregenerate reason, and grace as opposed to unregenerate nature.

Here, then, in the doctrine of the reformers have you learned to regard the two orders, the natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, nature and grace, as mutually antagonistic, not in the teaching of the Catholic church or of her theologians. Its origin is in the Protestant doctrine of total depravity, or that man lost by original sin his reason and free will, or, as some Protestants explain it, his moral ability, prior to regeneration, to exercise them in accordance with the law of God; and in the Protestant denial, or, perhaps I should say, ignorance of the fact, that the supernatural order was necessary, even when man was in the state of integral nature, to elevate him to the plane of the end for which God made him; that the necessity of the new birth, palingenesia, as St. Paul calls it, or regeneration, the spiritural birth into the supernatural or teleological order, did not originate in the fall, and in some form, or by some means at least, would have been equally necessary in the divine plan of creation and glorification, if man had not sinned.

It is worthy of note, that your objections, as well as all those of modern unbelievers, are founded on the Protestant and Jansenistic presentment of Christianity, not on the Catholic presentment, which is obnoxious to none of them. The unbelievers take for granted that Protestants and Jansenists are the more intellectual, the more enlightened, and the better educated portion of the Christian world,—for so popular opinion just now asserts, though nothing is or can be more contrary to the fact;—and, therefore, that their presentation of Christianity must be the truest and the most authoritative, as well as the most coherent and the least repugnant to reason. Then, finding it as they present it, incoherent, illogical, unsystematic, consisting of disjointed dogmas and precepts which have no reason of being, and

hardly a glimmering of sense, they conclude at once against Christianity itself, as composed of absurd dogmas and impracticable precepts. As presented by the Protestant and Jansenistic heresies, their conclusion is logical and just; precisely what I myself maintain. These and all other heresies, if I may take an illustration from Milton, with a different application, deal with Christianity as the wicked Typhon and his companions, in Egyptian fable, dealt with the body of the good Osiris. They take it, hew it in pieces, and scatter its fragments up and down the earth, beyond the power of the weeping Isis to gather them up, and restore in its integrity the torn and mutilated body of her god. It is a grave mistake to suppose that heterodoxy is more logical, able to judge more candidly or more impartially, than is orthodoxy. Every heresy is essentially illogical, for it breaks the unity of doctrine, from which it chooses and rejects such dogmas as it pleases, without any regard to their logical relation to one another or to the whole, and in which alone they have their reason and significance; and is never able to defend itself without gross misrepresentation, calumny, petty cavils, and miserable sophisms.

In all these respects you will find the teaching of Protestants and all other separated bodies, contrasting strongly with that of the church. Christianity, as presented by the church, is at least logical, forming a dialectic whole, coherent in all its parts, and perfectly consistent with itself from first to last. It is the golden chain which, let down from heaven, binds to God man and nature, and in which, unlike Protestantism, no link is wanting, or needing to be supplied by a toggle. It suppresses neither reason nor revelation, neither nature nor grace, neither the natural order nor the supernatural, but accepts both, each in its place and office. Under it, man has all the reason and nature he would or could have, even if he had no divine revelation or grace. The natural order, to say the least, is all that it could be, if there were no supernatural order. Christianity accepts both series of terms, and binds them together in an all-comprehending and indissoluble synthesis. It brings in revelation only where reason fails, grace only where nature is insufficient. It aids and perfects reason and nature, but no more suppresses either than the telescope suppresses the eye that looks through it, and finds by its aid its range of vision immeasurably extended.

Christianity, as the church presents it, accepts nature

without mutilation or diminution of its strength, repairs the damage done to it by sin, whether original or actual, turns anew its face toward God as its final cause, lifts it above itself into the supernatural or teleological order, and enables it, with the concurrence of free will, to persevere in that order, and attain beatitude or glorification in the Word made flesh, for which it was originally created and intended. No injury is done to reason or nature; nothing is enjoined or demanded that nature does not need or the soul crave as her own fulfillment; or which reason, when once duly accredited to it as the word, the will, the mercy, and the bounty of God, does not approve and accept with joy unspeakable. Christianity embodied in the church, whose person is Christ, represented on earth by the pope, his vicar, is the teleological order, what we need to perfect our initial or Adamic existence, and is infinitely higher than the highest created reason, and infinitely better than the highest good the human heart is able to conceive of. Shall mortal man be so base as to spurn it, or even pronounce it unworthy of his attention?

You see then, that the moment you cease to look at Christianity through the distorting medium of Protestantism, or any general or particular heresy, and succeed in grasping it in its entireness, its unity and catholicity as presented in the teaching of the church, or every catechism which she requires her children to learn, your objections are irrelevant, and vanish in smoke. You can no longer ask me, if reason be infallible, what is the need of revelation? Such a question is pertinent only on the assumption, that reason and revelation cover the same ground or move in the same orbit; that the natural is independent of the supernatural and disconnected with it, and is sufficient for itself; or that man has his beatitude in the natural or created order; all of which are absolutely inadmissible.

Do our best, we can form no theory adverse to the doctrine of the church, with which reason herself can be satisfied, as is evident from the infinite variety of theories constructed every day outside of Catholic doctrine, and demolished as soon as constructed. What the church teaches is catholic, and must satisfy reason; for what is catholic is universal, and nothing can be universal but truth. Consider that the natural order, the order of generation, is initial, and that the supernatural order, the order of regeneration, is teleological, and completes, fulfils, perfects the

initial or inchoate, and the demands of reason are met and more than met. Say, the progenitor of the first is Adam, of the second is Christ the Lord from heaven, the incarnate Word, and what has reason to object? I do not say that God would have become incarnate if man had not sinned, for I do not know the resources of infinite wisdom, nor do I venture to say that God has only one possible way of effecting his gracious purposes; but I do say that, in *hac providentia*, the teleological order is founded by the Incarnation, and depends as creation itself on the creative act of God, on that stupendous fact, that tremendous mystery of the Word made flesh, which seems to exhaust the infinite wisdom, love, bounty, and power of the infinite Creator. If it had not been founded in that way, it must have been founded in some other way, for God cannot create without a purpose or final cause; and he can propose to himself no final cause distinct from himself, since, distinct from him, prior to creation, there is nothing.

You see now why I look upon infidelity with so much horror, and why I view heresy of every type as a deadly sin, and as one of the greatest evils, nay, *the* greatest evil, that can befall the individual or society. In matters of mere opinion, in respect to which the truth is unattainable either from reason or from revelation, the widest differences are to be tolerated; but faith is not opinion, it is the truth, the "substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen." Faith is not mere speculation; it is practical, fearfully practical, for "without faith it is impossible to please God;" but only those who have the infallible authority of the church and submit to it, have faith. You, who reject that authority, no matter for what reason, have no faith, have only opinions, and have no right to be intolerant towards any body, especially towards Catholics and the church. But what is your condition, and what is to become of you? I dread to think. May God help you!

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1874.]

This is a serious and an honest attempt to compose the quarrel between the scientists and the theologians, by a scientist of no mean pretentions; and, from the Protestant point of view, we presume, it will be regarded as decidedly successful. From the slight acquaintance we have had with the author we are disposed to think well of him as a man, and we feel quite sure that he has written his book with laudable intentions and a sincere desire to advance the cause of truth. But however great may be his attainments in the physical sciences, his knowledge of Christian theology is very superficial, and wholly inadequate to the task he has undertaken. We find much in his lectures that is true and happily expressed, but we find in them not the faintest conception of Christianity as the kingdom of mediatorial grace, or as presenting the end and the means of attaining it, in reference to which man and the universe are created and governed.

We do not question the author's intentions, but we do question his competency to treat the great subject he has chosen to discuss. He has not the knowledge, either of theology or philosophy, necessary for that. Religion is a subject of which it is safe to say he knows literally nothing. And though he professes to be a Christian, he has not the slightest conception of the essential principles of Christianity. He uses philosophical and theological terms without the least suspicion of their meaning as used by philosophers and theologians, and betrays an ignorance of the sense of the Christian doctrines which he professes to hold, and undertakes to harmonize with what he calls science, which would be hardly creditable to the youngest member of the lowest class in catechism in a really Christian Sunday-school. The habits of his mind generated by

*_Religion and Science._ A series of Sunday Lectures on the Relation of Natural and Revealed Religion, or the Truths revealed in Nature and Scripture. By Joseph Le Conte, Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. New York: 1874.

the exclusive study of the physical sciences blind him to spiritual truth, and render him incapable of grasping any really Christian or philosophical principle. Never before have we been so forcibly struck with the power of the so-called sciences to blunt and dwarf the intellect as we have been in reading these Lectures on Religion and Science. Here is a full-grown man, more intellectually imbecile than an infant.

The author defends what he calls the "Personality of the Deity," "Contrivance," and "the Trinity," "the Incarnation," "the Essential Attributes of Deity: Truth, Justice, Love, Holiness," and contends that they are revealed alike in the Holy Scriptures and in the book of nature, and that they are alike truths of religion and science; but he explains them in a sense in which no orthodox theologian ever understands them, and which a Huxley, a Herbert Spencer, or the editor of the *Popular Science Monthly*, would have no difficulty in accepting. We observe that he seldom uses the word God, but almost always uses the abstract term *Deity—deitas*, which shows that his assertion that Deity is revealed in Scripture and reason as *personal* has in his mind no distinct meaning, and that his Deity is an abstraction, and no real God at all. The heathen who recognized a plurality of Gods, might properly enough speak of the Deity as expressive of the nature common to them all; but it is not allowable to a Jew or a Christian, who believes in one only God, and that the one only God is real and necessary being. God is not an abstraction or a generalization, and only concrete not abstract terms are proper to be used in speaking of him. The author's constant use of the word *Deity* for God proves, supposing him to understand himself, which is very doubtful, that he does not recognize one only personal God. He says, p. 12, "Theism or a belief in God or gods, or in a supernatural *agency* of some kind controlling the phenomena around us, is the fudamental basis and condition of all religion, and is therefore necessary, universal, and intuitive." This is a specimen of the logic of scientists, which draws conclusions without any middle term expressed or understood. The definition is otherwise faulty. It does not include the creative act of God, and is as applicable to the heathen superstitions as to Christian theism, which alone is "the fundamental basis and condition of religion." "The supernatural agency" asserted, is asserted simply as "controlling the phenomena around us," which, for aught that appears, may

be a simple inherent natural force manifesting itself in them, and no supernatural agency at all.

The author asserts the personality of "Deity," and says the human mind and heart require a personal Deity, but he nowhere tells us what he means by the divine personality. He says "Theism neither requires nor admits of proof," p. 13, and seems to hold the same of the divine personality, though he infers it from what he calls "contrivances." He labors to prove that the "supernatural agency" he asserts reveals itself as intelligent, but both Plato and Aristotle held the divine power they asserted, to be mind or intelligence, and yet were not theists, but pantheists. Spinoza held thought or intelligence to be one of the essential attributes of the one only substance which he calls God. The constitutive element of personality is not intelligence alone, but reason, which includes both intelligence and free-will. Brutes are more or less intelligent, but they are not persons, for they have not reason, and act from instinct or the inherent laws of their own nature, not from free-will, just as the author makes God himself act; for he nowhere, that we have discovered, recognizes the free-will or liberty of God. He nowhere asserts God as a free actor, but maintains that he is subject, in all his operations, to invariable and inexorable laws, the law of his own being indeed, but still a law as necessary as his own eternal essence: which assumes that in all his works he is simply acting out his eternal and necessary nature, that is, acting from intrinsic necessity or the inherent laws of his own eternal and necessary being. God, of course, must act, if he acts at all, as God, but with him all things are possible, except to belie his own nature, or to annihilate himself; but he is free to create or not, and to create and govern as he pleases, and he has made man and the universe as they exist, not because he could not have made them otherwise, but because he did not choose to make them otherwise. The laws by which he sustains and governs them, and about which scientists babble so much nonsense, do not manifest or flow from his own eternal and immutable essence, but are his free acts, created and determined by his sovereign will, without his being obliged to impose them on his creatures by either external or internal necessity.

The author's universe consists, if we rightly apprehend his doctrine, of four terms, phenomena, laws, forces, and an omnipresent energy, which he calls Deity or God. The domain of science is all that lies between, and only what

lies between, the sensible phenomena and Deity. The phenomena are the materials, but not the subject of science, and Deity is above science, whence it follows that God, as Herbert Spencer maintains, is unknowable. He is an object of faith, but not of science or knowledge. Science groups the sensible phenomena under laws, resolves the laws into forces, and finally, as its proudest triumph, into the one omnipresent energy which is Deity or God, from which all flows or emanates. The author says:

"Nature reveals herself to us in sensuous phenomena, infinitely numerous and infinitely varied. These phenomena are not the subject of science; they are only the *object of sense.* They affect animals precisely as they do us. The first step in human reason, and therefore in science, is the grouping of these phenomena into *laws.* The next step is to rise higher, and group these laws under higher, fewer, and *more general laws.* We then, by a higher generalization, group these under still higher, fewer, and more general principles or *forces* of Nature. These are electricity, magnetism, heat, light, gravity, chemical affinity, vital force, and the like. For a long time the generalizing faculty of man paused just here. These forces seemed to be separate, independent principles or agents, controlling the phenomena of the universe; and all phenomena were grouped under these, producing the different departments of science. But it is the glory of modern science to have shown that these, again, may be *transmuted into each other;* that they are not independent principles, but are all only *different forms* of one universal, omnipresent energy, which is nothing less than the omnipresent energy of Deity himself. On a previous occasion I spoke of the fact that the realm or domain of human thought and human science is all that lies between the phenomenon, the *object of sense,* and the First Cause, the *object of faith.* Now, here you will observe that science has carried us up higher and higher until it brings us within sight of the splendors of "the great white throne," and of Him who sits thereon.

"Now, this last step in science has been justly regarded as the greatest triumph of human thought; but there is another generalization, of which we hear little talk, a generalization far grander because in a higher, viz., a moral field; a generalization not reached by human thought, but freely given by Divine revelation; a generalization not expressed in a scientific formula, but enunciated in simple language by Divine lips. Let us trace the process and the stages here also.

"Human duties or moral acts, like natural phenomena, are infinitely numerous and infinitely varied, ever changing with changing conditions. These are in the domain of the sensuous and phenomenal; they are not the subject but only the materials of philosophy. The first step in reason and philosophy, the first generalization, is grouping these under laws—laws of church, laws of state, laws or customs of society. The

next step is, again, grouping these under, or tracing these up to, ten grand moral principles. These are the ten commandments, from which, we all admit, flow all lower laws and duties. This was the generalization of the old dispensation, the Mosaic generalization, the grandeur of which it is difficult for us now to appreciate. For a long time the process of generalization again paused just here, until the coming of the Divine Master. Then these, again, by a higher generalization, are traced up to two grand principles, love to God, and love to man; and these are but two forms of one, viz., love, and God is love. And thus we are carried again up to God himself, the last term of human thought.

"Observe again: In *external* Nature all laws and all forces are but *modes* of the same omnipresent Divine energy; the form or mode varying according to the varying conditions under which the *one energy* operates. So, also, in *moral* Nature, all moral principles, all laws of church, of state, or society, in so far as they are true principles and laws, are but different *modes* of the *one omnipresent Divine moral energy*, love; the forms and modes varying according to the conditions under which the one energy operates. Such being the absolute unity of the physical forces of Nature, do you not perceive that it is impossible to destroy one force without destroying all? for all are different forms of the same; it is impossible to abrogate one law without destroying the whole system of laws. To break one law, is to break all; to keep one, is to keep all. So also is it in the moral world, and for the same reason: 'He who offends in one point is guilty of the whole.' To break one law, is to break all; to keep one, is to keep all, because all are one. Keeping or breaking any law is fulfilling or violating the one universal law of love.

"I recollect once hearing a pure-minded young lady say that she thought there was at least one commandment which she was unconscious of ever having broken. In some surprise I asked which it was. She answered, The third: '"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."' I believe many persons think they never break that law. On the contrary, we all fail to keep this law. To keep this law is to keep all the Divine laws. In its deep spiritual meaning, what is the third commandment? It is to rise to a just conception of Deity, and then to give all the honor and reverence due to that conception. Any thing short of this fails to fulfil the law of love and reverence embodied in the third commandment.

"Finally, let me draw your attention to the contrary process of Divine and human activity—Divine activity in revealing himself to man; and human activity in upreaching and apprehending Deity. Deity flows downward into Nature, first as the *one omnipresent energy;* but this is far above the reach of man. He then comes lower and nearer the apprehension of man by separating into the great principles or *forces* of Nature; then, again, these reveal themselves, and He through them reveals himself, and comes nearer the apprehension of

man, in *the laws* which *flow* from these forces, and so on until the last ramifications as *phenomena* reach and fix themselves in the sensuous nature of man.

"Man, on the contrary, commencing with these extreme ramifications, by a reverse process passes upward in thought, from phenomena to *laws*, from laws to *forces*, from forces to the one omnipresent energy, and so back again to God himself."

"So also is it in the moral world. Deity *flows* downward into the heart of man, and reveals himself there as *the universal energy*, love. But, alas! how little understood! It must come far lower and become far more manifold and concrete, before man can take hold and climb up. It divides, then, into two great principles—love to God and love to man—again into ten great moral principles, and again into laws religious, political, and social, and so downward into the daily duties of life which flow from these laws. This is the natural law of revelation, whether in the physical or the moral world—whether in external Nature or in the heart of man. Scriptural revelation is rather a Divine help to the human process. This human process is similar to what I have already described. Man, in thought, passes from daily duties to laws, then traces these laws to fewer moral principles, and these upward into the one general principle of love, and thus back again to God.

"The same two processes may be again otherwise illustrated: The essential nature of Deity—the absolute, the unconditioned—in the first step downward in the flow of revelation toward man, reveals itself in what we call the *essential* attributes. Downward again it flows, becoming more human, and nearer to the comprehension of man, and reveals itself in the *moral* attributes. Still downward it flows manward, and reveals itself in the individual, providential acts of Deity. Human thought, on the other hand, by a reverse process, ascends from Divine acts to moral attributes, from these to essential attributes, from these again to the absolute, the unconditioned.

"Thus, you perceive that the Divine activity in self-revelation is *descensive*, down-reaching toward man; while human activity, in apprehending, is up-reaching and *ascensive*. Again, the law of Divine self-revealing is not only descensive, but proceeds by successive *ramification*, successive *differentiation*, until the last ramifications take firm hold of and are deeply imbedded in the sensuous nature of man; while human activity, in apprehending Deity, takes hold of these last ramifications, and *ascends* by an inverse process of successive *integration* and *unification*, until it reaches the conception and the worship of the absolute unity of Deity."—Pp. 152-157.

There is no mistaking the author's doctrine as set forth in this chapter on *Love*. In both the physical world and the moral world, God is the universal energy, or one living force, of which all the laws and forces of the universe are

simply manifestations, phases, or modes, as held by Spinoza and all pantheists. God is not the creator, if the author is to be believed, but the energy of the universe, or the force that energizes in it. Energy is not a cause operating *ad extra*, or externally, but an internal force that operates within, the *anima mundi* of Aristotle, or the "Spiritus intus alit," or "mens agitat molem," which Virgil sings in the sixth Book of the Æneid. The author evidently holds the identity of all forces with the one universal force or energy, which he calls Deity, and which, as *intra*-cosmic, not *super*-cosmic, is no Deity or God at all. Indeed, he expressly calls the laws and forces, all that lies between the sensible phenomena and God, in both the physical world and the moral, *modes* of the divine being, or energy, and therefore resolves the categories into two: being and phenomenon, or substance and mode, which, we need not say, is pure pantheism.

The author, no doubt, is far from understanding the natural and necessary import of the language he uses, and he probably, in his profound ignorance of the science of theology, which for him is no science at all, really believes that he is decidedly a theist and no pantheist. We are far from accusing him of being knowingly and intentionally a pantheist, that is to say, an atheist. He does not appear to be at all aware that the reduction of the categories to being and phenomenon is pure pantheism, or the denial of creation and therefore of all distinction of substance between God and the universe. Yet such is the fact; for phenomena have in themselves no substance and are real only in the being of which they are the manifestation or appearance. They are shadows without substance. The scientists call sensible facts phenomena, and therefore deny all reality to the *mimesis*, as Plato calls it, that is, the individual and sensible; when, therefore, they identify the supersensible, or as they say, laws and forces with the one divine force, energy, being, or substance—Deity, in the language of the author—they necessarily deny all real distinction between God and the universe, and fall into pantheism, which, as we have elsewhere shown, is only a form of atheism. The fact is, Professor Le Conte, belongs, after all, to the Spencerian school, which it is not possible to reconcile with Christian theism or genuine philosophy, as we show in our *Refutation of Atheism*.

These criticisms are sufficient to show that the author's

assertion of a personal Deity or God, however true in itself, counts for nothing in his system, for his systematic conception of God is that, not of a blind force indeed, but nevertheless of an *impersonal* force or energy, of which the laws and forces of nature are the emanation or outflow, or simply modes or forms, as he expressly teaches in his Lecture on Love, one of the essential attributes of "Deity." We pass over what the author says of the attributes of God, with the simple remark that he appears not to be aware that there is no distinction *in re* in God between one attribute and another, between his attributes and his being, or between his *essentia* and his *esse*. God is one, in the language of the author, "absolute and unconditioned being." The distinction of attributes, of attributes and being, and of essence, *esse*, or concrete being, is simply a distinction in our apprehension, originating in the inadequacy of our faculties to take in, at one view, all that is cognizable of God, not a distinction in God himself, and no conclusions drawn from the assumption that it is a real distinction in him, and not simply a distinction imposed on our conception of him by the weakness of our faculties, are or can be valid. Essential attributes are identical with the essence which is not a mere substratum, or being abstracted from its attributes, but the being itself with all its attributes, since it is that which makes any thing what it is.

The author maintains that Deity is revealed in Scripture and nature, as Triune. That God is Trinity, three divine persons in one essence, we of course hold, but that he is revealed as three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in nature, or that he is clearly so revealed even in Scripture, is doubtful to us. Without supernatural revelation we could never find it in nature, and without the tradition of the church, Unitarians prove, that we could hardly find it in the Written Word. When we have the doctrine from revelation and the tradition of the church, the ground and pillar of the faith, we find confirmation of it in both Scripture and reason. But the Trinity Professor Le Conte asserts has no analogy with the Trinity of Christian tradition or theology, and at the most is only the Trinity of the Sabellian heresy. His Trinity, in the first place, is not a distinction of persons at all, and in the second place, is not a distinction *ad intra*, but simply a distinction *ad extra*. God is not Triune in himself, but simply in his external manifestations; he manifests himself externally under a

threefold aspect, in three modes, or in three relations to us. The author has the temerity to discuss the profoundest questions of theology without the slighest knowledge even of its terminology. A more inept or confused lecture we never met, and hope never to encounter, than his Lecture XII, on the Unity and Trinity of Deity. The author's ignorance of his subject is sublime. His utterances defy analysis, and it would be labor lost to attempt to reduce them to order, and to find in them an intelligible meaning.

The author finds, or thinks he finds, the mystery of the Incarnation in Scripture, and also in nature, but we somewhat doubt if he himself can say what he means by the Incarnation, or whether he attaches any distinct meaning to the mystery. As near as we can come to his meaning, what he understands by it is Deity revealing himself in a human or sensible form, since it is only through the sensible that we can rise to the conception of the spiritual. God is spirit, and it is only through the human that we can conceive or know the divine. Then prior to the assumption of flesh by the Word, men had no knowledge of God! The Incarnation, for the author, is not the assumption of human nature by the Son or Word to be the nature of God, as really and as truly as is the divine nature itself, and therefore uniting both natures without mixture or confusion, in the one divine person, in whom they are forever distinct, but simply the revelation of the identity of the divine and human natures, or the essential oneness of God and man. He apparently denies all difference of nature between us and God, except what in us is finite, in him is infinite. Carry up the attributes of the soul to infinity, and the soul would be identically God. God, then, in the Incarnation did not and could not assume human nature, for it was always one with his own divine nature. This follows necessarily from the author's pantheistic conception of God as the one omnipresent force or energy, from which all forces and laws flow, and which science traces back to him as their fountain.

It is quite unnecessary to follow the author further in his dogmatical discussions. His pretensions are great, but his ignorance of philosophy and theology, marvellous in any but a scientist, render his performance small. He says with commendable modesty in his Preface, p. 4, "My studies have been chiefly scientific, and not metaphysical, and yet I unavoidably touch on many metaphysical points. It may

be that to those profoundly versed in metaphysics, my handling of these subjects may seem crude, but I hope that this also may be compensated for by the fact that they are presented from a side not usually noticed by theological and metaphysical writers." The professor's handling not only seems crude, but really is so, and as far as we are able to judge, the crudeness is not compensated for by any novelty of the side on which he presents the questions he treats. He is too unfamiliar with the treatment they have usually received from theological and metaphysical writers, except such writers as Paley, Brougham, and the authors of the Bridgewater Treatises, who are, like himself, scientists rather than philosophers or theologians. He has, we dare affirm, never read a first-class theologian or philosopher in his life, and has presented the topics he treats under no aspect not familiar even to us. He evidently is not competent to say what side of these topics theological and metaphysical writers do or do not usually touch, and for him to pretend that he has presented a side of any important question which they fail to present, or at least to consider, is very presumptuous. As he was not obliged to publish his lectures, nothing can excuse him for having done so, while conscious of his ignorance of the metaphysical and theological points he must unavoidably touch. He should have waited till he had mastered them before rushing into print.

The author aims to show the revelations the scientist reads in nature, the field of his studies, and those which he reads in the Holy Scriptures are, if not identical, at least in strict accordance. No novel aim surely. But he has no certain measure or criterion by which to test his readings of either, and all he can do at the very best is to show that his readings for the time being of the one, are in strict accordance with his readings of the other. For him both science and faith are variable quantities, and he is very severe against the old writers who sought to stamp them with a fixed character. They are both progressive, and either may be modified to meet the demands of the other. The reconciliation aimed at between religion and science becomes, therefore, in his hands, a matter of no moment, because it would be only the harmonizing with one another of an individual's own opinions. The author is a genuine Protestant, and has an elastic yardstick, as President Grant would have an elastic currency, that elongates or contracts according to the quan-

tity to be measured. No one can read his book without being forcibly struck with the absurdity of the Protestantism which professes to make the Bible its rule of faith. Both science and religion are objectively fixed quantities, and the only variableness possible in them, is in our interpretations of them; but neither interprets itself, and the interpretation of either, by private reason or by each individual for himself, may vary with each individual interpreter. The Protestant rule gives, therefore, not the truth itself, but the interpreter's view of it, which may or may not be true, and which at best can give only an uncertain opinion, which is neither science nor faith.

The author, like most scientists, draws general conclusions from particular facts, which is not permissible. In every valid argument, the major premise must be a universal proposition, or a proposition that is universally true; but the scientists take a particular fact for their major, and not seldom dispense with both the major and the middle. From phenomena, the scientists conclude laws, from laws, forces, and from particular forces one universal force in which all particular forces are unified or integrated, perfectly unconscious that their conclusion is only a generalization or abstraction; and also perfectly unconscious that if the mind had not intuition of the universal principles on which the particular phenomena, laws, and forces depend, the conclusion would not only be invalid, but impossible. There are no people who have less science, as we understand science, than your thorough-bred scientists. Indeed, the author virtually denies all science, by making God, who is the first principle in science as well as in the real, an object of faith, not of science. He builds his science on faith, faith in the revelations of "Deity," in nature, and in Scripture, and either denies all real, actual knowledge in any order, or regards it as something very different from science.

The lecturer, though liberal in illustrations, many of which illustrate nothing to us, or serve only to divert the attention of the reader from the point under discussion, is very chary of definitions. He proposes to show the accordance of Religion and Science, but he nowhere defines what he means by either. He tells us, in a vague and uncertain way, what is the foundation and condition of religion, namely, "Theism or a belief in a God or gods, or in a supernatural agency of some kind controlling the phenomena around us," but not what religion is; he tells us, also, what is the domain of

science, namely what lies between the "sensuous (sensible) phenomena and the First Cause," but he does not condescend to define what science is. How are we then to decide whether he proves his thesis, the accordance of religion with science, or not? The object of science, we gather from putting various passages together, is not God, who, he maintains, is the object only of faith; nor is it the sensible phenomena themselves, but laws and forces. But science, as distinguished from simple cognition, is the science of principles, and the reduction of facts to the principle on which they depend. Hence, there is and can be no science without the recognition of God, the first principle of all, and from which all secondary principles proceed. To exclude God from the object of science is to deny all science; for without him there can be no laws and forces, as there can be no second causes without the first cause. Yet the author tells us science is restricted to second causes. But the scientist cannot know second causes, if ignorant that there is a first cause, nor treat what even he calls scientific questions without touching theology, which is the principle and basis of all science, or, as they said formerly, the queen of the sciences.

If the professor had begun by defining Religion and Science and by getting in his head a just conception of the real relation they bear to each other, he would have spared both himself and his readers the greater part of what he has written. There can be no discrepancy between religion and science, or between the teachings of nature and the teachings of revealed religion or Christianity, for the two not only proceed from the same author, but are simply two stages in one design, or two parts of one uniform whole. Nature is initial in the Creator's design; and the Christian order, the *palingenesia*, as St. Paul calls it, is teleological, and fulfils or completes the initial, or order of natural generation. There can be no discrepancy or antagonism, *in re*, between the two orders, and no opposition but that of the part to the whole, the initial to its fulfilment. Science is what we can know of the two parts of this one whole by reason or our natural faculties. Faith is what we know analogically of them, in so far as they transcend the reach of reason or the powers we hold from the order of generation, through the medium of supernatural revelation preserved in the written and unwritten tradition of the Word of God handed down to us by the church. It is a mistake to suppose that science

is restricted to the natural order alone, as it is to identify the initial and teleological with the natural and supernatural. Nature is supernatural in both its origin and end, and that it is so is scientifically demonstrable, as we think we have shown in our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism.* We can know by our natural faculties much that belongs to the supernatural, for the supernatural is to some extent intelligible, while we cannot know by our natural powers all that belongs to the natural order, no small part of which is not only supersensible, but superintelligible.

Evidently there can be no discrepancy between science and faith, objectively considered; for as God is supreme Logic, Logic itself—the Logos—he must be always consistent or in accord with himself, and therefore all his works, taken as a whole, must be supremely dialectic, without any jar or discord. Whatever apparent discrepancy we may discover between religion and science, must necessarily be subjective, in our views or theories of the one or the other, or of both, and grows out of the incompleteness of our views or of our rendering of them. What needs to be reconciled is never nature and revelation, but our interpretations of them, which often conflict with one another, and with the objective reality. But this is precisely what, though often attempted, no Protestant can do, for he has no certain criterion of the true sense of revelation. He undertakes to collect the teachings of revelation from the Holy Scriptures, when the main question turns on what is their true sense, or what are the teachings of revelation as recorded in them? This the Protestant has no certain or infallible means of determining, as he himself confesses—for he denies with indignation the infallibility of the church—and is clearly enough evinced by the fact that no two Protestants, where they depart from Catholic tradition, agree in their interpretations. Protestants, then, and scientists like our author, who adopt the Protestant rule of faith, have no certain means of knowing religion or the teachings of the Scriptures. How then know or prove the perfect accordance of science and religion?

But this is not all. The Christian order is teleological, and the teleological gives the law to the initial. The end governs, and it is God as final cause, not as first cause, that is supreme Lawgiver, since the end for which he creates is first in his design. Religion, which is teleological, gives the law to science. If then, we have no certain means

of knowing what is religion, or what revelation teaches, we have no certain means of determining whether our science really accords with religion, or not, and then no certain means of knowing whether our scientific inductions are or are not admissible. The Protestant can be certain neither of his science nor of his religion. The author proves it by making both religion and science variable quantities, not only subjectively but even objectively. Like most scientists he rejects final causes, and recognizes no teleological order. The universe for him flows out from God, and flows on and on forever, fulfilling no design, and reaching no end —forever beginning, never ending, always initial. For him, even Christianity is not final. It may pass away, and be superseded by another dispensation. It is the product of a certain stage of human or cosmic progress, and may be succeeded by another. He has not learned that there is and can be progress only in fulfilling the purpose of the Creator in creating, and therefore only in realizing the teleological order; for he has not even learned that there is a teleological order. He restricts the universe to the initial, the inchoate, and while he recognizes, or pretends to recognize, the procession of existences from God as first cause, he has no conception of their return in the palingenesia, or regeneration, by the election of grace, to him as their final cause, as their fulfilment, perfection, or beatitude. If he had any conception of the sort, he would understand that Christianity is final, and contains not only a revelation of the end but supplies the means of attaining it.

This shows the necessity of the Catholic church both to science and religion. Her infallible authority is necessary to declare the teachings of revelation, and to furnish a criterion by which to test our scientific theories, and to define the limits of so-called science. The church is also necessary to declare the teleological order, and to be the medium of the graces necessary to its fulfilment, since the law is prescribed by the end or teleological order. Any uncertainty as to the teachings of that order, or as to its requirements, is uncertainty as to the law itself; and as an uncertain law does not and cannot bind the conscience, without the infallible authority of the church we are left practically without law, and without any trustworthy guide to truth in either religion or science; for reason cannot suffice alone in any order for the perfect knowledge of the truth, far less supply the gracious assistance necessary for obedience to it.

The initial order is created by the supernatural, but the teleological order lies wholly in the supernatural, and is founded by the Incarnation or the Word made flesh, and it is only in accordance with the entire order, and therefore with the divine decree to create, that an infallible authority should be divinely instituted to declare and apply it. The whole order is supernatural, and nature could no more evolve it or attain to it by its own laws than it could create itself. We can enter that order and begin our teleological life only by the new birth, or new creation, as St. Paul calls it, and there would be something incongruous in founding that order, and making it obligatory on us to enter it, or salvation dependent on living its life, and then leaving it to our natural light and strength to find out what it is, what it demands, and to comply with it. It would be little better than mockery. God could not, consistently with his own nature, so treat us, especially as it would cost him no more to found and establish, supernaturally, to assist and protect a church, subsisting in all ages and nations, and competent to teach infallibly all truth pertaining to it, and to apply it to all men and nations, than it did to become incarnate in the womb of the Virgin, or to found the order itself. It is in the same line with it, and would seem to be its necessary pendant.

The Catholic scientist has, in the teachings of his church, an infallible criterion of religion, and as religion is the *lex suprema*, or supreme law, he knows that his scientific inductions must accord with the authoritative decisions of the church, and that, if they contradict them, they are false. The Spencerian doctrine of evolution, he knows beforehand is false, for it contradicts the dogma of creation; he rejects the Darwinian theory as to the origin of species, for it contradicts the revealed truth, that God creates all creatures after their kind; he rejects, also, the modern doctrine of progress as unscientific, and unchristian, for it denies the whole teleological order. We do not say that scientific theories or inductions incompatible with opinions held as opinions by theologians are necessarily false; but only such as are incompatible with the faith as the church herself holds and teaches it. The faith, as authoritatively held and defined or taught by her, is infallible, and nothing that contradicts it can be true. The Catholic scientist is therefore protected not only from error in faith, but also from all grave errors in science, and never is obliged to reconcile his

faith with his science. He receives from his faith the great and invariable principles which guide and enlighten him in all his scientific investigations, and which aid without embarrassing his reason.

The question which Professor Le Conte seeks to solve as to the accordance of religion and science, or of the teachings of nature and those of revelation, is a modern question, and was not raised by philosophers or theologians prior to the rise of Protestantism and its assertion of the Scriptures interpreted by private judgment as the rule of faith. This deprived revelation of its authority, and made faith a variable quantity. The sense of Scripture became uncertain, and the Protestant mind could find no certain and invariable standard of truth even in revelation. The Protestant had no higher authority in revelation interpreted by private judgment than he had in his science, perhaps not so high; and having no infallible criterion of truth in either, nothing was more natural than that he should find his renderings of the one not according with his renderings of the other. Hence arose the question how to reconcile religion and science—a question which neither the Protestant nor the non-Catholic scientist is ever able to answer. In the quarrel of the scientists and Protestant theologians, the scientists have carried the day, have for the most part emancipated themselves from theology, and proceed without attempting to reckon with theologians. They even make it a point to ignore them, and to treat their reclamations with silent contempt. The Protestant theologians, having no infallible authority for their theology, and unable to help themselves, gradually fall in with the scientists, adopt their theories, and try to explain the Scriptures so as to make them accord with their theories. Hence our author, while pretending to be an orthodox Protestant, explains his orthodoxy or the teachings of revelation, as he would fain persuade us, so as to harmonize with his pantheistic or rather atheistic science. His book appears to be received with favor by the Protestant community and held to be orthodox.

The great difficulty the Catholic theologian has in dealing with the scientists is that they take Protestant theology to be Christian theology, which they know only as represented by Protestants who have done nothing but corrupt, mutilate, or travesty it. The scientists suppose that the Catholic, if he allowed free scope to reason and scientific investigation, would find the same antagonism between

science and religion that the Protestant does. They do not see that the Catholic and Protestant differ not in detail only, but radically, fundamentally. They have not the same foundation, and Christianity, as held by a Protestant, has hardly a point of resemblance to Christianity as held by the church. That antagonism between science and revelation, reason and faith, we note in the Protestant mind, does not exist in the Catholic mind. It may, indeed, exist in the minds of some protestantized Catholics, but the Catholic who is instructed in the principles, as well as in the dogmas and precepts of his religion, knows that those principles are universal, and are the principles alike of all orders, of the natural and the supernatural, reason and faith, science and revelation, constituting the universe, the initial and the teleological, one dialectic whole. There is no place in his mind for the antagonism in question, not because he is unable or afraid to reason, but because he does reason, and has true and certain principles from which to reason.

Prior to the reformation so called, Catholic theologians did not labor to reconcile any supposed antagonism between reason and faith; they pressed reason into the service of faith, used it in explaining and vindicating the faith to Jews and gentiles, heretics and infidels; but we do not find them engaged, as Protestant theologians are, in endeavoring to reconcile faith and reason, for it does not appear to have ever entered their heads, that any Christian could for a moment imagine that there could be any discord between the principles of the one and the principles of the other. Their principles were catholic or universal, and catholic principles reconcile all opposites, and harmonize all discords in the mind that holds and understands them. Since the same so-called reformation many Catholic writers indeed, though holding fast the dogmas and precepts of the church, have in a measure lost sight of what we call catholic principles, the great universal principles which underlie, so to speak, the dogmas and precepts, and are at once the principles of science and of things, and have conceded too much to Protestants as well as borrowed too much from them. They have not dissembled their heresies or dogmatic errors, but they have been too ready to suppose them Catholic or Christian in principle. We think they have erred in this, and done a grave injury to both faith and science. Protestantism broke still more with the church in principle than in doctrine, and was from the

beginning decidedly antichristian, an undeniable apostasy from Christ in principle, as much so as gentilism was from the patriarchal religion, as its history proves.

But enough. We dismiss Professor Le Conte's book as one which in our judgment can do no good, but which may do much harm. It is not a Christian book, but really antichristian, while its orthodox pretensions will deceive some, and encourage and confirm many in their antichristian and pantheistic errors. A book openly pantheistic or atheistic would be far less dangerous, and much less acceptable to Satan.

SYNTHETIC THEOLOGY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1873.]

This is a work, so to speak, on the philosophy of Christianity, designed to present the three orders which, according to the author, it embraces,—the rational, the revealed or faith, and the palingenesiac,—in their dialectic principles and relations. It consists of three books, of which the first and part of the second are published in the three volumes before us. The remainder of the work, though completed, as we understand, is not yet published. We cannot better introduce the work to our readers, or more clearly state its purpose and method, than by translating and copying the author's preface.

"This little essay is not a scientific exposition, but a mere sketch of supernatural philosophy,—a simple attempt to reconcile Christianity in its several intellectual, moral, and eudæmonic elements, with civilization, *civiltà*. The chief problems relating to existence, science, liberty, and society, in their origin, progress, and palingenesia, are touched upon under their principal heads, and, perhaps, radically solved. The work is divided into three books, which are connected in the following manner :—

The first book, as introductory to the other two, sets forth the first principles of rational knowledge in their general relations with the revealed and palingenesiac orders. It takes the intelligence in its very

---

* *Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale.* Libri Tre. Genova: 1868—1872. (The reader is referred to volume II, p 271, for another article reviewing these volumes.—Ed.)

first and most evident principles, and conducts it, step by step, to the borders of the supernatural and revealed order, and shows successively in the rational, the possibility, accord, and necessity of these orders, and briefly delineates the generic ideal with its internal and external organization.

"Here the first book ends, and gives place to the second, which treats of revealed knowledge in its specific relations with the rational, on the one hand, and with the palingenesiac, on the other. It turns on the study of the supernatural and revealed elements which concrete the generic ideal of reason, and adumbrate its complete ultra-mundane actualization; and reaches at once a continuation and divine perfection of intellectual knowledge on the superintelligible side of reason, and gives a prelude and foretaste of the palingenesia. By its perception of the generic ideal order reason is rendered capable of receiving and recognizing the specific supernatural order, which is its divine elevation and complement. No sooner is this duly beheld by the light of faith, than its elements are seen to correspond to the generic ideal, and to concrete and fulfil it: whence its truth is recognized.

"But this revealed and specific type, while, in respect to the generic superintelligible of reason, it has the relation of complement or perfection, is only incipient or initial in regard to the palingenesia. The palingenesia, as the end and crown of the two antecedent orders, is in some manner brought down and reflected and incorporated in the revealed, and coming forth from its futurition it raises and exalts the rational, by removing its generality and vagueness. But the preëxistence and transparency of the palingenesiac order in the revealed are still only analogical relatively to cognition, and initial in respect to reality. Wherefore they do not satisfy either the mind or the heart, which tends and aspires to immediate and full possession. Reason, it is true, by the aid of the supernatural light of faith and reflected revelation, begins to preoccupy and to foretaste the palingenesiac world; but this enigmatical prelude and initial foretaste, not fully corresponding either to the nature of the tendencies of the soul or to the infinitude of its desires; do not extinguish their ardor, but still more inflame it, and make it rush forward with greater impetus to the ultra-mundane order, so as to grasp it in its immediate reality and concreteness.

"To these new aspirations (which, in the second book, are elevated and better determined) the third book, which develops the palingenesia in its relations to the natural and supernatural cosmic life, attempts to respond. In it are treated all the things which relate to the future state of man and the universe, in their relations with one another and with God as author of nature and of grace, in so far as the feeble lights of this present life permit. In it is shown that all the desires, wants, and tendencies of man find their full and perfect satisfaction in the palingenesia; that both the natural and the supernatural orders, with all their forces and virtues, combined and operating together, are only a grand progress

or sublime march toward the immortality of the life beyond the world; that this, in all its modes and evolutions, transitory as well as permanent, is nothing else than the final result and conclusion of the cosmic conditions and evolutions. Such are the beautiful and sublime questions which we shall find developed in this third book.

"The third book, as is seen, is only the continuation and complement of the second, as the second only continues and completes the first. The three orders treated are connected with one another, and are completed together. The first, without the second, would have no end nor means proportioned to an end, and would be unintelligible ; the second, without the first, would lack a basis on which to rest, and would be impossible ; the third, the palingenesia, which is the complete and final actualization of both the natural and the supernatural, cannot stand without them, nor they without it."—Vol. 1, pp. 7–11.

This the author understands of the real order, or reality, that is, as he adds in a note, contingent reality, which alone can be elevated from the natural order to the supernatural, and from the supernatural to the palingenesiac. What he says in respect to the order of reality, he contends must be said also in respect to the order of knowledge :—

"The three types which represent the supernatural order, or the rational type, the revealed, and the palingenesiac, are only the manifestation and reflection of the various movements of the same order in the mind. Whence, if the first is necessary to conceive the second, the second is needed to attain the third ; or, more clearly, as reason, through the perception of the superintelligible order, gives us the rational and generic type, by which, aided by grace—*gratia illuminans et gratia adjuvans*—we rise to the revealed and specific order, and recognize its truth; so faith, *mediante* the apprehension of the supernatural and revealed order, offers us the ideal and specific type, by which we apprehend the palingenesiac order, and are prepared to attain it. The three orders are therefore so connected among themselves, that the first demands the second as its complement, and the second, for the same reason, demands the third. Consequently, the reality and the truth of the first become determinate and concrete only in the second; and the reality and truth of the second are found full and complete only in the third, or palingenesia." *Ibid.* pp. 11, 12.

That is, the natural and rational order is fulfilled only in the supernatural and revealed order, and the supernatural and revealed order is fulfilled only in the palingenesiac order.

The principal novelty here, after the mode of connecting the rational with the revealed, or reason with revelation, is the author's terminology. All theology aims, for that is its essence, to show the relations between the order known by reason, and the order known only by revelation, or the order

of faith, and the order of palingenesia, that is, heaven or glory. That the first is fulfilled in the second, and the second in the third, which is the consummation and crown of the divine creative act, is taught us by all theologians of all schools. Theology is not a science yet to be created, is not a new science, nor a progressive science; but is a science, in substance, as old and as invariable as faith itself. Theologians cannot change the science from what it was in the hands of the great fathers and recognized doctors of the church, or carry it further. They may change their method of treating it, the mode of demonstrating it, the order in which they arrange it, and the terms in which they express it; but it must always be the same science as well as the same faith, for neither its subject-matter, nor its principles or data undergo any change.

Our author does not design to present a new science of faith, but aims to present the old science in some respects with a new face, and in a new dress, and after a manner and method of his own, which he holds to be better fitted to bring out and present Catholic truth in its unity and integrity to the wants, if not the intelligence, of our age. He uses, in some respects, an unfamiliar language, at least unfamiliar to us, where the old from long use has partially lost something of its freshness and vividness, and fails to express the truth with the fulness and force it did, when first used. *Palingenesia* is in itself no better nor more expressive than *regeneration;* but, being less a word of routine, its use may excite the mind to greater activity, and set it to inquiring into its full meaning, and be to us more expressive, in point of fact, for the very reason that it is less familiar.

We are not competent, for our theological knowledge is too limited for that, to judge whether the author has succeeded or failed in presenting theological science in its invariability, as taught by the fathers and mediæval doctors. Many of the problems he treats lie in those higher regions of philosophy and theology into which we have not penetrated, and into which none but philosophers and theologians of the first order can penetrate. We have even read only the first of his three books, and barely looked into a chapter here and there in his second book. We like his method, but we do not always like his terminology, nor greatly admire his style, perhaps because of our very imperfect knowledge of Italian. He evidently does not study

the graces and elegancies of diction; and his terminology, to our understanding, often wants precision and exactness, and seems not always to conform to his own system of thought, but to be borrowed from a school to which he does not belong. He has many sympathies with Gioberti, but studiously avoids Gioberti's terminology, even when he appears to agree with him in thought. This, we think, is a mistake; for Gioberti is a master of language, and his terms are always selected with great care and niceness, are always precise and exact, and can never be changed without disadvantage.

The author has been represented as a disciple of the Giobertian school, and has suffered somewhat in consequence; but he is an original and independent thinker, and has his own method and manner of considering and presenting the Christian theology. Only up to a certain point, however, can we regard it as no discredit to a philosopher or a theologian to agree with or to borrow from Gioberti, who, it cannot be denied, was a man of rare philosophical genius and learning. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find in those of his works finished and published during his life-time, except perhaps the last, a philosophical or theological proposition that a Catholic may not accept and defend. For a time, we confess, we were well-nigh mastered by him, and carried away in a direction that it is dangerous to follow: yet is there much in his writings that we highly prize, and we owe him not a little both in philosophy and theology; but, notwithstanding this, we regard the spirit and tendency of his writings as decidedly anticatholic, and have long since ceased to recommend or even to consult them. We may not accept, indeed do not accept, all the criticisms of some of the good fathers of the Society of Jesus on his writings, any more than we do his on them in his infamous *Gesuita Moderno*, for we do not understand him as they do, nor always agree with them in their own philosophy; but we object decidedly to his undeniable effort te press orthodoxy in philosophy and theology, if we may so speak, into the service of heterodoxy, and make it a tender to gentilism. To us, Gioberti is in spirit and tendency a great pagan, and his influence on his countrymen has been bad, very bad. What predominated in him was nationalism, only another name for gentilism, and he sought to make philosophy and Catholic theology subservient to his favorite dream of securing the moral and civil primacy of

the world to the Italian people, not by making them good papists, but by making the papacy thoroughly Italian. He aims to harmonize Catholicity and gentile civilization, by making Catholicity yield to and serve gentilism, not by making gentilism yield to and serve Catholicity. He would have the church devote all her divine powers to the work of civilization, and to the reproduction of a civilization of the Italo-Greek type, and leave the world to come to take care of itself.

The author of the work before us, as far as we have discovered, does not go so far in this direction as Gioberti went; but, from the design of his work, as stated in the preface we have cited, namely, to reconcile Christianity with civilization, we fear that he forgets, to some extent, the injunction of our Lord, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things [after which the heathen seek] shall be added unto you," St. Matt., vi, 33; and that, in some measure, he seeks the kingdon of God for the sake of the *adjicienda*. He certainly attaches more importance to direct labors for civilization than we do, and we confess that we are far from seeking to conciliate Christianity with *civiltà*, or civilization. Civilization is not something independent of Christianity, existing in accordance with, or in opposition to it. It is the creation of Christianity taken in the comprehensive sense in which the author takes it, as embracing the three orders of creation, the natural or rational, the supernatural or revealed, and the palingenesia or heaven, in their catholic principles, and in their unity and integrity; and whatever of civilization, properly so called, is found among the gentiles is derived from Christian principles retained by them, by way of tradition, from the primitive revelation, or from the natural law, which is included in the Christian law. The political and civil organization of society should never be sought for its own sake, for it depends on religion, and should be subordinated and referred to the ultimate end of man, and sought only in its relation to what the author calls the palingenesia. That Christianity is to be conciliated with civilization, is the error of Gioberti and the whole herd of liberal Catholics so called, and justly condemned in the *syllabus*; but civilization is to be conciliated with Christianity, in which are the principles and the law of all real civilization.

The fatal error of modern society is in detaching civiliza-

tion from Christianity and the church in which Christianity is concreted, not only to the peril of souls, but to the peril of civilization itself. The mechanical civilization which has taken the place of Christian civilization, and which is so loudly boasted by our socialists and frothy declaimers, does not deserve the name of civilization, for it only multiplies commodities for the body, enhances the expense of living, greatly to the damage of the poor, enfeebles intellect, neglects or denies the soul, abases character, and extinguishes the spiritual life. It effaces all true manhood, and under it masculinity becomes a myth, and the race is rapidly falling to the condition of the most degraded of savage tribes, in which the women bear rule, and children are named and inherit from the mother, not from the father. Such is the inevitable result, when civilization is detached from the church of God. If people could be induced to turn their back on civilization, fix their eyes on heaven, and live for the ultimate end of man alone, civilization might be left to itself. Religion is civilization; and no people that believes, understands, and practises the Christian religion with a view to eternal life alone, is or can be uncivilized, badly organized, or badly governed; and none can be well organized or well governed that rejects Christianity or the law of God, as proclaimed, declared, and applied by the Catholic church. All we need do is to return to the church which God himself has founded, and to which he has given authority to teach and govern in his name all men and nations. The civilization will follow as an inevitable consequence. Do our liberal Catholics forget the injunction of our Lord, which we have just cited, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things [after which the heathen seek] shall be added unto you"? Do not they think it Christian to seek the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of the *adjicienda*, that is, follow Christ for the loaves and fishes? Does not every Christian in baptism renounce the world and its pomps, as well as the devil and his works?

We are not quite certain of the author's explanation of the dialectic relation between the rational order and the revealed order, or of the capacity of reason to receive and recognize the revelation of the supernatural. He says reason is rendered capable of receiving and recognizing the truth of the supernatural and revealed order, *mediante* its apprehension of the *generic ideal* of reason, or the super-

intelligible, which the supernatural and revealed order specificates or determines. But the generic, without the specific and concrete, is an abstraction, a pure nullity, and, consequently, no object of apprehension. We doubt if we understand what the author means by the "generic ideal." What does it generate? or of what is it the genus? We have been accustomed to hold, though admitting the reality of genera and species, that the genus is apprehensible only in the species, and the species only in the individual. The author seems to us to be much more of a Rosminian than a Giobertian. Nothing is apprehensible *in abstracto*, for nothing exists *in abstracto;* and his generic ideal, like Rosmini's *ens in genere*, or *ens indeterminatum*, is an abstraction, and therefore inapprehensible.

Then, again, how can reason apprehend the superintelligible? We hold, as well as the author, that we have intuition, as the first principle alike of the real and the knowable, by the creative act of being, of *Ens creans*, *l'Ente creante*, therefore of God and his creative act, but only in the respect that God is intelligible to us, or faces the human intellect; that is, as the ideal, or the universal and necessary ideas, without which there is and can be no fact of experience. We have no intuitive knowledge of God in his superintelligible essence, and can have none till we have the happiness to see him, as he is in himself, by the light of glory. The ideal is not generic, general, indeterminate, but is real and necessary being, universal, eternal, and immutable. We therefore can recognize no generic ideal; and to assume that we apprehend the superintelligible as ideal, is a contradiction in terms, for it assumes that the superintelligible is not superintelligible, but intelligible, since intelligible and ideal say one and the same thing. The author claims to be an ontologist; but, to our understanding, he, like Rosmini, talks and reasons as a psychologist. He is no disciple of Gioberti.

The problem the author undertakes to solve,—the dialectic and, therefore, the real relation between our rational knowledge or apprehension, and the revelation of the supernatural order, or reason and faith,—is one of the mysteries of life that we do not find ourselves able to explain. Certain it is that reason cannot rise above the intelligible and grasp the superintelligible, otherwise the superintelligible would be intelligible; yet we all are certain that the limits of the intelligible are not the limits of the real, and that

there is more than we know, or by our natural powers can know; or that there is really existing what, for us, is superintelligible, what the cosmic philosophers term, less accurately, the unknowable. How do we know, not what the superintelligible is, but that it is? This is the problem.

Gioberti undertakes to solve it in his *Teorica del Sovranaturale*, the first and best of his works, by asserting for the soul what he calls the faculty of superintelligence, a subjective faculty, which does not attain to its object, but turns wholly in the sphere of the soul itself. But all faculties are powers, and take hold of their object. It is not, then, properly a faculty, and Gioberti himself describes it not as such, but as the soul's consciousness of her own impotence, or of her own capacity of being more than she is, that is, of progress to the infinite. But this is not very satisfactory; for it is not easy to understand how *impotenza* can be *potenza*, nor is it true that the soul is progressive, or has the capacity of progress to the infinite, for she is progressive only by the aid of grace, and attains to the infinite only in the divine person of the Word made flesh. The author rejects this solution, and holds that the soul has a generic apprehension of the superintelligible as well as of her own limitation in her intuition or perception of the infinite. It is her generic apprehension of the infinite, or the infinite as generic and indeterminate. But our difficulty here is that we have no such apprehension of the infinite or the superintelligible. The author holds that the real and the knowable are identical, and nothing really exists in general, or in a vague and indeterminate manner. There is infinite being, but no infinite existing or cogitable distinct from being which is infinite. The intuition of the infinite is the intuition of real concrete being in whom is no vagueness, no indeterminateness, nothing generic, abstract, or possible. God is, as say the theologians, most pure act, *actus purissimus*. He is, of course, incomprehensible, and he asserts himself intuitively only as the ideal or intelligible. We have intuition of him as the ideal, or universal and necessary ideas, which are the ideal or apodictic element of every fact of experience; but this intuition is not our act; it is the act of Being, presenting and affirming himself, and thereby creating or constituting the human intellect itself, and therefore must precede any act of apprehension by us. The author, affected by his psychologism, errs on this point, and seems to hold that the intuition is the act of the soul, and

then that the soul has immediate cognition of God by its own intellectual power, which we take it is what is censured in the first of the seven propositions of the Louvain professors, and certainly is not true.

We agree with the author, that the natural and rational order has a real or, as we say, a dialectic relation with the supernatural and revealed order, that they are conjoined by a real *nexus* in the divine plan of creation; but we do not think that it lies within the sphere of philosophy to say what that *nexus* or relation is, subjectively considered. That man is capable of receiving a supernatural revelation, we know, because he has received such revelation; but we regard his capacity or aptitude to receive, or to be the recipient of a divine revelation, as something negative rather than positive on his part, or the part of natural reason. Knowing that God is and is infinite, he cannot compare himself with the divine ideal, without feeling that he is finite, restricted in his powers, and insufficient for himself; or that he has wants that demand more than reason is able to give, and that God, who is infinite, is able to assist him, if such should be his will. We know by reason that the supernatural is, for we know that God is; and he is necessarily supernatural, since he is the author and end of nature. We know, then, that a supernatural revelation is possible, and needed for the complement and fulfilment of our reason. Made by him who is the Author of reason, and therefore, though above it, necessarily in harmony with it, there is no difficulty, when made and duly accredited, in believing it.

This, we are aware, is very commonplace, but we cannot see that either Gioberti or the Genoese professor tells us any thing more. Revelation brings its own solution with it, and we doubt, if men had never had a supernatural revelation, that they would ever have felt either its necessity, or seen its possibility. It is the fact of revelation that stimulates thought, quickens the faculties, and directs the mind to the facts which prove its necessity and possibility.

The point in the author's system we most value is not the subjective relation of reason to revelation, but the real relation of the rational order to the revealed order, as integral parts of the one divine creative act. It is this objective relation of the divine purpose and works, whether works of nature or of grace, as a uniform, consistent, and dialectic whole, that we regard as the chief value of his treatise on

the principles of supernatural philosophy, showing that the order of grace and the order of glory are not after-thoughts, but are included with the natural order in one and the same creative act, and rest on the same universal and invariable principles. We should not name the three orders as the author does: we should name them generation, regeneration, and glorification. Palingenesia is simply regeneration, into which we are introduced in this life by faith received in the sacrament of baptism. Glorification is the reward and crown of regeneration, not simply the palingenesia or regeneration itself; for only such as persevere to the end are crowned, rewarded, or glorified.

For ourselves, we prefer to regard the creation as included in two orders, rather than in three, with the author; that is, the initial and the teleological. Generation belongs to the initial order, or procession of existences by way of creation from God as first cause; and regeneration is the birth into the teleological order, the order of their return, without the absorption of their individuality or personality in him, to God as their final cause. The order into which regeneration introduces us is founded by the Incarnation or Word made flesh, or Christ the mediator of God and men, who is the progenitor by grace of the regenerated race, as Adam was by nature of the generated. We take Christianity distinctively as the order which originates in the incarnate Word, the order of grace, and therefore regard it as distinctively teleological. In the teleological, or Christian order, we recognize two moments with the author, the order of faith, and the order of glory, in which perfection, the end, is reached, and the initial is fulfilled, consummated. The author makes generation initial in relation to the order of faith, which he holds is its fulfilment; and the order of faith initial in relation to the palingenesia or glory, which is its fulfilment. Our objection is, as he himself shows in the passage cited from his preface, that faith does not fulfil the natural order, but simply initiates its fulfilment, while its complete fulfilment is reached only in glorification, which consummates the "new creation," as St. Paul calls it, or the teleological order.

The author calls the three orders Christianity, while we have been accustomed to restrict it to the teleological order, or new creation founded by Christ the incarnate Word, which, we think, is the case with theologians generally. But as all things are created *ad Verbum*, or for the honor

and glory of the *Son*, and therefore *ad Christum*, and as the fundamental principles of the three orders are the same, and as Christ the incarnate Word has given him all power in heaven and in earth, in both the initial and in the teleological orders, the author may, without any impropriety, embrace the three orders under the term Christianity; but, if he does so, he must not talk of conciliating Christianity with civilization, and must refuse to accept the modern doctrine of his country, or on which its government acts, of the independence of the secular order of the spiritual order, and reject the civil marriage act it has passed, and defend the authority of the vicar of Christ over temporal princes, whether Christian or non-Christian, which, if we are correctly informed, is somewhat more than he is inclined to do. For ourselves, we would as readily defend William of Occam as the theologian or priest that has any sympathy with the present so-called Italian government, which is far worse than that of Louis the Bavarian, who claimed, against the papal authority, to be emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the West, though we have been accustomed to confine the papal authority and discipline to those princes who profess, or are bound by the tenure of their crown to profess, the Christian religion.

Theology, as we have said, is not a new or a progressive science. As there can be no new faith, so can there be no new theology or science of faith, though theologians may differ among themselves by a more or less perfect knowledge of it. Theologians hold their principles from faith and reason, both of which are invariable, universal, and the same in all ages and nations. Reason was all in the first man that it is in us, or can be in his latest posterity, and there has never been but one revelation, according to St. Thomas, which was made in substance to our first parents in the garden, and hence, says St. Augustine, faith does not vary; as believed the fathers, so believe we, only they believed in Christ who was to come, and we believe in Christ who has come. Hence whatever is permanent, invarible, and universal in the various religions, superstitions, and mythologies of the heathen, is either the dictate of reason, or derived by tradition from the primitive revelation made to Adam and Eve before their expulsion from the garden. Our Lord did not come to make a new revelation, or to introduce a new faith, but to do and suffer those things which were promised and which were necessary to perfect the faith of the fathers;

for if he had not come, and done and suffered what he did, their faith would have been vain as also would be ours. Theology is the science of faith, or the revealed order, in its logical relations with the rational order, of its several parts with one another, and of all its parts with the whole, in which they are integrated, and, so to speak, consummated, or of which, in the divine plan of creation, they are constituent parts.

Now in constructing theology, or reproducing in our theological science the divine plan of creation, as made known to us by reason and revelation, we may adopt, with one class of theologians, the analytical method, and treat the subject-matter in its parts in distinct questions and articles, without special attention to the relations of the parts to the whole or to one another; or we may adopt the synthetic method of the early fathers and treat the parts in their dialectic relations with one another, and with the whole which integrates them. But, whichever method we adopt, it must be one and the same theological science we draw out and present. We must also bear in mind that neither of the two methods ever is or ever can be pursued by itself alone. Analysis presupposes synthesis, for we cannot analyze what is not presented *in globo* or as a whole; and synthesis presupposes analysis, for we cannot treat parts in relation to one another, or in relation to the whole which integrates them, unless we have analyzed them, so far at least as to know that they are parts. The difference of the two methods is that, in the one, synthesis predominates, in the other, analysis; or that in the one we seek to draw out and present the truth, or the real, in its dialectic relations; and in the other, we seek to study and present it in its analytic relations. The analytic theologian will, in treating of grace, treat it in its several divisions, as *gratia prævenions*, *gratia adjuvans*, *gratia sufficiens*, *gratia efficax*, *gratia habitualis*, *gratia actualis*, &c.; the synthetic theologian, without denying these distinctions, will consider these several graces in their unity, and in relation to the church, their medium; also the church in relation to the Incarnation, the source and fountain of all grace; and, still further, the Incarnation in relation, on the one hand, to the ineffable mystery of the Trinity, and on the other, in relation to the eternal decree of creation and the teleological order.

The author adopts the synthetic method and gives us the three orders according to him, the two according to our preference, in their grand synthesis, and the creation in all

its parts, orders, or moments, as an organic whole, which is what we call synthetic theology. St. Thomas and all theologians of the first order in reality do the same. The *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, if eminently analytic, is, to all who diligently study and understand it, also eminently synthetic, both in its philosophy and its theology. It is the very essence of theological science, as we have said above, to present the several mysteries, articles, dogmas, and propositions of faith in their synthetic or organic relations with one another, with the natural or rational order, and with the order of glory, as far as revealed. The orders are not all known in the same way. We know the natural or initial order by the light of reason; in the supernatural and revealed order we know analogically by the light of faith; in the final order, glorification or heaven, we know by the light of glory, or what the theologians call the *ens supernaturale;* but these several orders are one created reality in its relation through the creative act to God as first cause and as final cause; and these several lights are only different degrees of one and the same divine light consummated in glory, in which the glorified are made partakers of the divine nature, *divinæ consortes naturæ*, 2 Pet., i, 4. The design of all theology is to show this, and it is more especially the design of our author, and it is therefore that the author's design in the work before us must be cordially approved, though it is not for us to go beyond our competency and to attempt to decide as to the degree of success or failure with which he has executed it.

There is no doubt that some meticulous theologians, while composing their theology from definitions of the church, which are necessarily analytic, because made only on occasion of insurgent errors, and consequently propose the faith only so far as necessary to condemn them, and to put the faithful on their guard against them, have failed to grasp the grand synthesis revealed by faith, and taught in the catechism. Some have maintained that nothing is *de fide* till defined by the church, and hence have concocted a theory of development, and maintained that the volume of faith is increased with each new definition, forgetting that the church, since she is infallible, can define nothing to be *de fide* which has not been of faith from the beginning, always and everywhere. Unbelievers and Protestants, not conceiving Christian faith presents creation as an organic whole, are led to deny it altogether, or to deny such or such parts as

they may not happen to like. Heresy is choice, and accepts some articles or dogmas, and rejects others. Unbelievers reject the whole, or accept them only in a false sense. Pierre Leroux, one of the ablest anti-Catholic philosophers of our times, professes to accept, and perhaps believes he does accept all the articles, dogmas, and mysteries of Catholic faith; but explains them in his *L'Humanité* as symbols of facts and truths of the natural order only. The heterodox accept or profess to accept them or the chief portion of them, but only as isolated, detached, or mutually independent, or unrelated facts, or propositions, without any logical bond of connection, or relation with one another or with the real or ontological order, or as having any necessary bearing on practical life, and without any reason of being in the divine plan of creation as ascertainable by reason or made known by revelation. So far as reason is able to judge, the command to believe them is, on heterodox grounds, arbitrary, capricious, despotic, like the order said to have been issued by the Swiss governor, Gessler, that every one should bow to his hat which he had placed on a staff and set up in the market place. Thus Protestants have no science of faith, and have at best only a blind belief.

Against Pierre Leroux and the humanitarians, the author asserts the reality of the revealed and palingenesiac orders; each as real as the natural order itself, and without which the natural order could not exist, for it would have no meaning, and no reason of existence, no final cause. He asserts the supernatural as the origin, medium, and end of the natural, and the propositions, dogmas, articles, mysteries of faith, as the revelation, not simply of cosmological and humanitarian facts, but of the ontological principles and facts on which the entire real or created order depends for its existence, and for what it is, has, or can do. Against the heterodox, Protestants and all sectarians, he maintains that the Christian mysteries, the articles, dogmas, and propositions of faith, as well as the principles and dictates of reason, are all mutually related, dependent one on another, and in their dialectic union constitute a complete, uniform, and consistent organic whole, in relation to which every part has its logical place, purpose, and reason, so that the denial of any one mystery, article, dogma, or proposition, breaks the logical unity, or golden chain, and logically involves the denial of the whole, which has been so admirably shown by Möhler in his *Symbolik*. In other words, the learned and

philosophical professor maintains that Catholic faith represents the real order in its unity and integrity, and proves by it that the real or created order is in the plan of the creator or the divine decree a dialectic whole, not as Pope sings,

> "All are but parts of one stupendous whole
> Whose body nature is, and God the soul,"

which is pure pantheism; but parts of one *created* whole united to God, not as the body to the soul, but as the creature to the creator, by the creative act of God, distinguishable from God, as the act is from the actor.

God is infinite in his freedom, because infinite in his power, and is free to create or not to create as he wills; and if he wills to create, he is free to create what and as he wills. To the question, "Why has he created the universe as he has, or as it is," the only answer is, and it is sufficient, "Because he has so willed." The vessel has no right to say to the potter, "Why hast thou made me thus?" The creator is not responsible to his creatures, nor bound to give them a reason for creating them. But God, though he can do whatever he wills, cannot annihilate his own being, or contradict his own nature or essence, as the blessed apostle evidently implies when he says, "It is impossible for God to lie." In creating or willing, God must create or will according to his own intrinsic nature or essence. Since, then, God is, in his very essence, supremely logical, and creates all things by the Logos—logic in itself—who is God, all his works, his entire creation, are necessarily supremely logical; logical in all their parts and as a whole. Consequently, there must be always a reason in the created order for whatever exists in it. Every part must have its place and its *raison d'être*, and there can be in the universe no sophisms, no anomalies, no irregularities, no inconsistencies, no contradictions, or irreconcilable dualisms or opposites. So much follows necessarily from the revealed mystery of the Holy Trinity, and so much follows, also, from the character of God the creator, as cognizable by the light of nature.

The principle objections to Christianity, in our day at least, grow out of ignorance of this fact, and arise from the three orders being regarded as three distinct and mutually independent orders, and the mysteries, articles, and dogmas of faith being apprehended as isolated and unrelated facts or statements, independent one of another, without any logical connection between them as heterodoxy necessarily presents them, since heterodoxy is necessarily incomplete, illogical, or

sophistical. Heresy never hangs together; its several parts never cohere, and never constitute a complete or organic whole. Take any form of Protestantism you please, and you will find that the articles and dogmas it retains from orthodoxy are for it anomalies, and have no systematic place or significance. It asserts the supernatural, but it has no place, no necessity for it in its conception of creation, or of the divine decree to create; and there is in its system no reason why the natural order alone should not suffice for itself, and be at once initial and teleological, and the more logical among Protestants are constantly struggling against tradition and formal creeds, to eliminate the supernatural and to assert the sufficiency of the natural. In no Protestant system has the assertion of the mystery of the Trinity or the mystery of the Incarnation any necessity, or serves any purpose recognized by the system itself. There is nothing in the divine order as conceived and presented by Protestant theologians, that cannot be explained without as well as with the assertion of either mystery. The church, with Protestants, performs no office, has no function, no significance, and is either a self-constituted society, a voluntary association, or a state establishment. Even in the belief of Protestants themselves it is no essential medium of salvation or of the Christian life, and the most straight-laced among them hold practically that men can be saved without the church as well as with it,—if only distinguished for intellect or wealth; for we find them every day canonizing such, even before the last obsequies have been paid to their bodies. What better, according to the Protestant presentment of it, is Christianity than Greek and Roman philosophy? or why should sensible men trouble their heads about it, except to get rid of it?

Protestants, also, object to the church, her constitution, doctrines, and worship, for the same reason. Having and seeking no logic in their own system, and knowing that Christianity, as they hold it, is made up of disconnected particulars and isolated doctrines, they fail to perceive that Catholicity is an organic whole, in which all the parts cohere and have their reason. They reject the authority and office of the church, but only because they isolate her from the Incarnation, and the mediatorial kingdom of Christ. If they held, with St. Paul, that she is the body of Christ, in which he carries on his work of mediation, and understood that the Holy Ghost dwells in her, the Com-

forter, the Spirit of Truth, who leads her into all truth, they would see that they could object neither to her office nor her authority without objecting to the Incarnation and to the "man Christ Jesus, the mediator of God and men." Christianity is, as we have said more than once, concreted in the church, and without her would be to us only a naked and powerless idea, with which we could have no communion or relation. So as to the papal constitution, the church could have no unity or catholicity, no individuality, no visible personality, and therefore no visible existence without the pope. The pope, in the visible order, is the person of the church. To deny the visibility of the church is to deny the church herself; for the invisible church, or soul of the church, as some say, is simply Christ the Word incarnated by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the immaculate Virgin without any representation. They themselves have no church, for what they call their churches are not a living organism, but either state establishments or voluntary associations living no life but what is brought to the establishment or association by its members, or what it derives from the secular order. They are not joined to Christ by a living union, and living his life. They have nothing of Christ but the name. If we, like them, held the church disunited with Christ, and composed of frail and erring mortals, we could attach no more importance to her, than they do to their purely human associations; but taken, as Catholicity teaches, as growing out of the Incarnation, her constitution and office are integral in the Catholic faith and theology, strictly dialectic, and the denial of any part of her teaching from the supremacy and infallibility of the pope down to the virtue of holy water or the blessing of asses, would logically involve the denial of the whole, not only because the denial of any proposition carries with it the denial of the authority on which the whole rests, but also because it would break the internal chain which binds all the parts into one organic whole, as we have already shown. The denial of the papacy denies the church; the denial of the church denies the Incarnation; the denial of the Incarnation denies the teleological order; the denial of the teleological order denies finality, that is, God as final cause; and the denial of God as final cause, denies him as first cause, and effaces alike nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural, Christianity and creation, all being and existences.

Protestants object to the *cultus sanctorum* as authorized

by the church and practised by Catholics; but for a similar reason, because they do not see its dialectic relation to the Incarnation, to the mediatorial principle, and to the communion of saints, and therefore do not see that, to deny it, would be to deny the whole Christian order, nay, creation itself. The mediatorial principle is universal, and enters into the very being and essence of God himself, in whom is the prototype of all created things. The three Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity, indistinguishable from the divine being, are distinguished *inter se*, as principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Son, or Word, is medium, and the Holy Ghost, the end or consummator. In all acts, *ad extra*, of creation or of providence, the three Persons equally concur, but in diverse relations, the Father as principle, the Son, or Word, as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end or consummator. The Logos, or Word, is the medium of creation. Hence, St. John, i, 3, tells us, *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est:* "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing which was made." So again in the palingenesia, or "new creation," founded by the Incarnation, or Word made flesh, the three Persons also concur, but in the same diverse respects; the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as consummator or sanctifier. Hence the Son was incarnated, *Verbum caro factum est*, (ibid. 14), as "the one mediator of God and men," (1 Tim., ii, 5), not the Father nor the Holy Ghost. The Word, in the creation of the natural order, the cosmos, is the medium or mediator; and the Word incarnate, "the man Christ Jesus," in the palingenesia, or new creation, redemption and glorification, is the medium, the mediator of God and men. The principle of mediation is therefore universal, and at the foundation of all orders, natural and supernatural.

In the Incarnation, God assumes human nature to be his own nature, without parting with his divine nature. So that the two natures, remaining forever distinct, without confusion or intermixture, are forever hypostatically united in the one divine Person of the Word. This one Person, the Word, who was in the beginning with God, and who is God, in whom are the two natures, is the one Christ, the mediator of God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus. But the saints are his brethren, and partake of his divine nature as well as of his human nature, and hence are said to be deified. Gioberti says, in reference to the deification of

human nature through the Incarnation, man is an incipient God, or a God who begins; and insinuates that the devil told the truth when he said to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods," though not in the way or in the sense in which they understood him. But this we are not prepared to accept. Men, to be gods in any intelligible sense, must be so in their own human personality; which they are not, and never can be. Human nature, by the hypostatic union, is deified, as says Pope St. Leo Magnus, but in the divine personality of the Word, not in a human personality; and the blest in heaven, however closely united to God, retain for ever their human personality, which never becomes absorbed in the divine personality, as in the case of the human nature assumed by the Word.

Yet the saints are like unto Christ, as says the beloved apostle: "Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is." (1 John, iii, 2.) That is, the blest bear a higher likeness to God than that image and likeness to which Adam was created, or than that which is given us in the new birth even. They partake of the divine nature as well as of the human nature of their Lord, as St. Peter says: "He has given us very great and precious promises, that you may be partakers of the divine nature,—*divinæ consortes naturæ*." (2 Pet., i, 4.) If we are led by the spirit of God, we are the sons and heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ even before we are glorified with him, (Rom., viii, 14–17): but the saints are glorified and partake of the divine nature, which is only promised in this life and held by faith; they have become like him in that higher likeness of which St. John speaks. They have entered into the glory of their Lord, are sharers with him in the glory of his mediatorial kingdom. They have entered into their joint-inheritance, and must be regarded as co-workers with him. They are, in some sense, Christs, therefore mediators by participation of both his human and divine natures, though, of course, not of his divine personality.

Being thus exalted, deified in their nature through its assumption by the Word, and participating of the divine nature, the *cultus sanctorum* is strictly dialectic, and is only their due, and, in fact, is below their real worth. It detracts nothing from the worship due to God or to the man Christ Jesus, because it is through the mediation of the Word

made flesh that the saint acquires his worth, and becomes a co-worker with him in his mediatorial kingdom, or a mediator in a participated sense; and worth, acquired by grace or the gift of God, is as much the saint's own as if inherited from nature, or obtained by the sole exercise of his natural powers, and is equally entitled to be recognized and honored or worshipped. We did not understand this when in a former article we treated the question, and represented the *cultus sanctorum* as the worship of God in his works, and in his noblest works, the beatified saints. Such worship is proper, but it is the worship of God and honors God, but honors not the saint any more than it does any other creature of God. But, as here presented, we not only honor God in his saints, but we honor the saints themselves for what they are, for the virtues they possess through the gifts of grace. God, in rewarding the saints, rewards his own gifts; and so he would, were he to reward us for our natural virtues, since we are by nature his creatures, and have only what he gives us.

The worship of the Blessed Virgin as St. Mary rests on the same principle; and the higher worship we render her as Mother of God, called *hyperdulia*, rests on her relation to the Incarnation, her share therein, and the rank or position she necessarily holds in consequence. As St. Mary, she is surpassed or equalled by no saint in the calendar. Through the merits of Jesus Christ she was preserved in the first instant of her conception from all taint of original sin, and was never for one moment under the power of Satan; she was conceived and born without sin; she was full of grace, never in her whole life committed the slightest venial fault; she was all holy as all beautiful, and the model of every Christian grace and virtue. As mother of Christ, and therefore mother of God, she is blessed among women, above all women, and holds a rank which no other woman, nay, no other creature does or can hold. As Mother of God, she necessarily holds the highest rank that any creature, not hypostatically united to the divine Word, can hold, next below the eternal God himself, above all angels, archangels, cherubim, seraphim, thrones and dominations, principalities and powers, all created orders, and is rightly crowned Queen of heaven. The error of Nestorius, in refusing to recognize her as *Θεοτόκος*, *Dei Genitrix*, or mother of God, was in denying the hypostatic union, or dissolving Jesus, which made him Antichrist (1 John, iv, 2, 3); and in maintain-

ing, as do most Protestants, that only the humanity was born of Mary, not the humanity hypostatically, indissolubly, and for ever united to the divine person, or Word, who is God. The human nature of Christ has no human personality; its personality is the Word, or Son of God; and as the human nature taken from the Virgin must have been conceived and born a person, Mary is as truly the mother of the Person born of her, as any mother is of her son, and therefore strictly and truly the Mother of God.

Now, as Mary's relation to the incarnate Word is indissoluble and must ever remain, and as that relation places her in a position above all created orders next to the uncreated Trinity, simple logic suffices to show that the highest worship below the supreme worship, called the worship of *latria*, due to God alone, is her due, and cannot be witheld without injustice. The worship is strictly logical and cannot be denied, unless we deny the Incarnation and the catholic principle of mediation, the whole Christian order, indeed, the whole divine plan of creation as made known to us by reason and revelation. The charge of superstition against the *cultus sanctorum*, if we accept the apostolic doctrine of the communion of saints, the relation we have shown the saints bear to the Incarnate Word, and the position they hold as joint-heirs and coöperators with Christ in his mediatorial kingdom, is simply absurd. Spiritism, which evokes or consults the spirits supposed to hover over or around the graves of the dead, is superstition in the original sense and application of the term; but our invocation of saints has no affinity whatever with spiritism; for we do not evoke them, do not call upon them to appear, or to communicate to us the secrets of the past, the present, or the future. We give the saints no honor not their due, and ask of them only to aid and enlighten us by their prayers to God and intercession with him for us; and, therefore, nothing injurious to the sovereign majesty of God, or beyond their power.

The pretence that the worship we render to the Mother of God is idolatry, and the grave nonsense babbled about Mariolatry, must be ascribed to the lamentable fact that Protestants have no distinctively divine worship, and are able to offer no worship due to God alone; and therefore, because they see us offering to Mary as high a worship as they are able to offer to God himself, they conclude that we offer her supreme worship, and, of course, are idolaters. The distinctive act of supreme worship to God is sacrifice,

and Protestants have no sacrifice, no altar, no priest, no victim. They hold, indeed, that Christ once in the end of the world offered himself as a sacrifice for all; but they deny that he gives himself to men to be offered by them as an acceptable and all-sufficient sacrifice to God, and adequate to the debt we owe him. Christ not only offered himself once to God for the whole world, but he gives himself to us in the church to be offered up by us upon our altars in the sacrifice of the Mass, a clean and acceptable offering, as *our* offering through the priest, as our act of supreme worship to the ever-blessed Trinity. No creature, not all we have that is most precious, or that we hold most dear, not even our life can be a real sacrifice, or an adequate worship of God; for all creatures, the earth and the fulness t ereof are his already. Only God is an adequate offering to God; and this offering we can make, because God gives himself to us, and him we offer by the hands of the priest in the Eucharistic sacrifice, as *our* act of supreme worship. This worship we offer to God alone, never to a creature, not even to his ever-blessed and holy Mother.

Protestants, rejecting the Eucharistic sacrifice offered daily on our altars, have no distinctive religious worship, nothing to offer to God, which they may not and do not offer to creatures. Their worship consists simply of prayer and praise; but they pray to the king, the magistrate, the court, or the legislature; and they sing the praises of a distinguished beauty, an effective orator, an eminent statesman, a great poet, or the conquering hero. They may say with the Psalmist, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humble heart, O God, thou wilt not despise" (Ps. l, 18); but the Psalmist does not mean to assert that no other sacrifice is required; he would simply teach us that no sacrifice, without an afflicted spirit and a contrite and humble heart, can be acceptable from the worshipper; for he concludes by saying: "Then shalt thou accept the sacrifice of justice," [the sacrifices prescribed by the law,] "oblations and whole burnt-offerings; then shall they lay calves upon thy altar:" (ibid., 21). Now, having themselves no real objective worship or sacrifice to offer to God, expiatory, propitiatory, imprecatory, or eucharistic, and having nothing more in their external service than they see us offering to the Blessed Virgin, they very illogically and falsely conclude that we offer her the supreme worship due to God alone, and cry out most lustily "Mariolatry!" and

hold it the duty of the magistrate to extirpate us as idolaters. But they forget that, as St. Paul says, (Heb., xiii, 10), "we have an altar whereof they who serve the tabernacle have no power to eat." We have, in the sacrifice of the Mass, a true and adequate worship of God which they reject, and which we offer to God alone, never to a saint, not even to Blessed Mary, nor to any other creature. It is not that we offer undue honor to Mary and the saints, but that they offer no due honor to God; for the highest honor, short of the unbloody sacrifice, in our power to pay them, is far, far below their exalted worth, and below that which the eternal God himself bestows on them, which is greater than the human heart can conceive.

The invocation of saints, the frequent prayers we address to them, especially to Mary, holy Mother of God, are authorized by the mediatorial principle, and by the relation of Mary and the saints to the Incarnation. They are coworkers with Christ, and, being joined by a vital, we might say, an organic, union with him, participate in his mediatorial work. We ask of them neither grace nor pardon; we ask only the help of their prayers to their God and ours; therefore, as we have said, nothing beyond their power. They and we form one communion; only we are on the way, while they have already arrived at home, are *in patria*, and no longer pilgrims and sojourners in a foreign land. They are living, more living than we are, for they have entered into the fulness of life, life eternal. They can hear our prayers; and, being filled with love, and in living communion with us in this land of sorrows and vale of tears, they cannot be indisposed to listen to our prayers, and to join their own to ours. The objections of Protestants betray their ignorance of the principle on which the Christian order is founded, and betray a doubt of the efficacy of prayer, and also a doubt that the saints in glory retain their personality and are really living men, with all their human individuality and human faculties. In fact, to our non-Catholic world, there is a dark cloud hanging over the life beyond the grave, and even the blest seem to them pale and shadowy, unsubstantial, like shades of Hades in the belief of the gentiles; and, like the gentiles, they sit in the region and shadow of death, filled with doubt and uncertainty, anxiety and despair. Death is to them the gate that opens not to life and immortality, but to the dread unknown, perhaps, to the inane; and they banish

from their minds, as far as possible, the thought, by engrossing themselves in the pursuit of gain or in dissipation.

The same general principle shows that the respect we pay to pictures, images, and relics of holy persons, is dialectic, authorized by the Christian system, and is perfectly consistent with every other part of Christian faith or practice. We do not make them our gods, or worship them as such; nor do we suppose that they are inhabited by a numen, or a good or bad demon, as the heathen did. Pictures and images are to us symbols, and symbolical of real persons or real worth. To object to them, is to object to symbols or emblems as such; to object to them for this reason, is to object to visible nature which throughout is symbolic,—as Father Weninger so admirably shows in his recent work, *Photographic Views*,—to all parables, allegories, figures of speech, nay, to speech itself, which is symbolic of thought, not the thought itself. What, again, are letters but symbols of sounds? If Protestants, who see idolatry in the Catholic use of pictures and images, were consistent with themselves, they would be obliged, for fear of idolatry, not only to prohibit all the representative arts, but to forbid the opening of one's eyes to the beauties of nature or to any thing visible, the opening of one's mouth to speak, or one's ears to hear a single sound. A principle that involves so absurd, so impossible a consequence, is necessarily false. Relics of holy persons are symbolic, and serve as a medium to bring us into relation with the saint whose relics they are. They bring to mind his worth, which we should honor and strive to imitate.

These examples, which are very familiar, show that Catholicity is strictly logical, constituting an organic whole, and that the denial of any thing in it involves, logically, the denial of all the rest. They serve to show also, in showing this, that Catholicity is true, or the real order which God by his creative act has founded; for no system can be universally logical, and yet be false, since logic is a real, not a merely formal science. Hence Catholicity carries the evidence of its truth in itself, and has not to go out of itself to find proof that it is true. No human reason could have invented or constructed a theory so comprehensive, so perfect in all its parts, or so complete as a whole. Protestants regard themselves as the more enlightened portion of mankind, and we readily concede that, naturally, they are not inferior to Catholics. In natural reason they are our equals;

and yet, with three hundred years and over of incessant labor, aided by all the advantages of wealth, learning, power, and ample opportunity to do their best, they have not been able, the Bible in hand, to invent or construct any scheme of Christianity or of the universe that will hang together, in which all the parts cohere, in which there are no inconsistencies, anomalies, irregularities, nor contradictions,—a plain evidence that the human mind is not adequate to the invention or construction of Catholicity as set forth, say, in the catechism the church teaches even her little children.

The examples we have adduced show, especially in these times of the dislocation of men's minds, the value of the synthetic method of setting forth Catholic faith, and presenting the several mysteries, articles, and dogmas in their intrinsic relation to one another, and fixing the attention on the great principles on which rest all the orders or moments of creation, generation, regeneration, and glorification. The heterodoxy and infidelity of the age, aside from their moral causes, seem to us to grow out of the fact, that people are taught the mysteries, articles, and dogmas, without being duly shown the principles which underlie them, which are really catholic, and are the principles alike of the three stages of creation, or the entire created order. Not seeing this, or that there is in Catholicity a reason for every thing in it, the heterodox do not see why they may not choose among the doctrines the church teaches; why they may not choose this doctrine and reject that; why they may not hold the unity of God and reject the Trinity, the Humanity of our Lord without accepting his Divinity; why they may not accept the moral precepts of the Gospel without the mysteries and dogmas between which they see no logical or necessary relation. The present tendency of most Protestants is, to separate the rational order from the revealed, and to fall back on the natural without the supernatural. The common answer in regard to the supernatural order, that all the mysteries, articles, and dogmas rest on the same authority, and that authority, if sufficient for one, is sufficient for all, is a just and logically conclusive answer; but it seems to us desirable that people, as far as practicable, should be enabled to see that not only are all taught by the same divine authority, but that all are virtually connected one with another, and with the whole; that no one or a part can be detached and denied without logically denying all: as we

see exemplified in the more advanced Protestants. The moral precepts of the Gospel, and what is called the Christian life detached from faith, or the doctrines and mysteries of revelation, lose their Christian character, are reduced to the natural order, stand on the level of heathen morality, and are meritorious for this life only, not for the world to come.

No doubt, to instruct the mass of the people sufficiently to understand this, is difficult, impracticable even; the people must always be treated to a great extent as children, who are required to believe and obey because their father commands, being unable to see and understand the reason of what is commanded. We can never educate the people to be such thorough theologians that they will not need teachers, as well as priests to offer sacrifice and administer the sacraments. Perhaps the difficulty could in part be removed by giving a more extended course of theology in our seminaries for training candidates for the priesthood. We do not wish or mean to go beyond the province of a layman, and encroach on that of the bishops or pastors of the church, who know, far better than we do, what is needed to protect their flocks and to advance the interests of which they are the divinely appointed guardians; but, in the present state of the church in most countries, despoiled of her revenues, or, as with us, without revenues, and living on the alms of the faithful, there are some things which they cannot effect without the coöperation of the laity. Our theological seminaries receive but a meagre support; and such is the great want of priests to attend to the first spiritual necessities of the faithful, that our bishops have not the means to render the theological course longer and more thorough, and they feel that the spiritual wants of their respective dioceses are so great and so urgent, that they cannot afford to leave their young levites in the seminary any longer than is absolutely necessary. When once ordained and placed on the mission, what with church-building, establishing schools and erecting school-houses, looking after the poor, hearing confessions, attending sick calls, &c., the priest has little opportunity for study, and if he keeps up, in a missionary country like ours, what he acquired in the seminary, he does well; and it is a marvel to us how so many laborious, hard-working missionary priests, who can have hardly a moment unoccupied, not only keep up their seminary learning, but actually add to it, and keep them-

selves *au courant* of the literature, science, philosophy, and speculations of the age.

Yet the people, whatever nonsense to the contrary is babbled, need leaders, and are nothing without them; and they must be led to understand that their proper leaders in all that relates to the kingdom of God on earth or in heaven are the clergy, and that their education and training is a prime social necessity. "Educate the leaders," said the wise Jesuit Father Larkin,—God rest his soul! one of the dearest and best friends we ever had, and who for years was our spiritual director,—"Educate the leaders, the officers, the generals, colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants, and they will properly instruct and discipline the rank and file."—All that is good comes from above, and descends from high to low. God descends to man when he would redeem him and raise him to himself. The people must pray to our Lord to multiply vocations to the priesthood, and give liberally, of their substance, to their venerable and venerated bishops, the temporal means to afford the aspirants to the priesthood ample time and leisure for the best possible preparation. This much we may urge on our brethren of the laity, without transcending our province. Though, after all, when we read the life of the venerable curè d'Ars, that modern miracle of divine grace, we learn that the most effective instruments for the conversion of this proud and conceited age are those missionaries who are the humblest, the most disinterested, the most self-forgetting, and who never dream of attributing any of the glory of their success to themselves, to their own learning, ability, or virtue. St. Paul's words teach us the same lesson: "For see your vocation, brethren, that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble; but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong; and the mean things of the world, and the things that are contemptible, hath God chosen, and things that are not, that he might destroy the things that are, that no flesh might glory in his sight." (1 Cor., i, 26–29).

Yet St. Paul himself was a learned man, master of the sacred learning of the Hebrews, and of the profane literature, science, and philosophy of the Greeks; and yet none of the apostles labored more assiduously or successfully than he. St. Augustine, the great Doctor of the Western Church, was

versed in all the learning and science of his time both sacred and profane; as were St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Jerome, St. Gregory the Great, and St. Thomas, the Angel of the schools: and yet who have rendered greater services to the church? God can dispense with human ability and learning, or, rather, supply their defect, as intimated by the apostle when he says, (1 Cor., i, 30): "You are in Christ Jesus who is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption." Learning, science, even the science of sacred things, without humility, is worth nothing, or without that charity which makes the soul lose, as it were, itself in God. But humility is not always the accompaniment of ignorance or mental weakness, nor pride always the companion of learning and science. There is a science that puffs one up with vanity, and a philosophy that is vain; but real learning and ability are always modest, and the natural effect of the science of divine things is to make one humble. The greatest and the most learned in spiritual things or in the science of theology, are the least disposed to glory except in the Lord. St. Paul and with him the great doctors we have named, were not less humble, not less self-forgetting, not less disinterested, nor less ardent in their charity, than the humble curé of Ars. The seminarian course is intended to combine spiritual discipline with scientific culture, and, as far as training can do it, to make the candidates for the priesthood humble-minded Christians, holy and disinterested priests, as well as able and learned theologians. There can, then, be no danger in lengthening and enlarging the seminarian course. But, perhaps, we are already transcending our province, and forgetting that a reviewer is not a pastor of the church.

FAITH AND REASON, REVELATION AND SCIENCE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1863.]

It is not our intention, in citing the pamphlets placed at the head of this article, to take a formal part in the controversy now going on in Great Britain between certain English prelates and some of the writers in the late *Rambler* and present *Home and Foreign Review*. We are not in favor of either foreign intervention or foreign mediation, and think, as a rule, it is best, in a domestic quarrel, to let the original parties to it fight it out between themselves. Besides, our principles seldom allow us to take part with rebellious subjects against legitimate authority. Authority must forfeit its right, by the abuse of its powers, before we can take part against it. In the present case we can take part heartily with neither side. We like the free, independent spirit, and the bold utterance of the writers criticised, and we sympathize fully with them in their desire to enlist on the side of the church the literature and science of the age; but we accept neither their theological school nor their philosophical speculations, especially as represented by our highly esteemed friend, Mr. Simpson, in his papers on the *Forms of Intuition*.

Mr. Simpson, in his *Reply*, seems to us to have convicted his right reverend critic of having in most cases misunderstood, misapplied, misstated, or mutilated his meaning; but it is seldom that men in authority, when they suppose the interests committed to them are at stake, are over-scrupulous in their representations of the views and sentiments of those whom they deem it their duty to put down, or to prevent from doing mischief. They esteem it so important that the man they regard as dangerous should be deprived of influence and rendered impotent for evil, that they some-

---

* 1. *Bishop Ullathorne and the Rambler. Reply to criticisms contained in "A Letter on the Rambler and Home and Foreign Review, addressed to the clergy of the diocese of Birmingham, by the* Right Rev. Bishop Ullathorne." By Richard Simpson. London: 1862.

2. *Forms of Intuition. Papers from the Rambler.* By the same.

times forget that they are bound to treat him justly, and to take no undue or unfair advantage of him. Few men will avow the maxim, The end sanctifies the means; but a great many men, and otherwise worthy men too, may be found who will act on it. This is no doubt deplorable, but it is an infirmity of our nature.

Mr. Simpson makes it evident that the bishop ascribes to him views he does not entertain, and censures him for opinions he does not hold and has not expressed. But the bishop, we can easily believe, was unconscious of any unfairness, and had no intention of misrepresenting him. He, as we have found bishops sometimes doing, formed, we presume, his theory of the writer's doctrines and intentions from a hasty perusal of an expression here and an expression there, and afterwards read only to confirm his hastily formed theory. Then it must be borne in mind that no man ever in writing, or even in speaking, expresses or can express his whole thought to a mind totally unacquainted with it. He necessarily leaves much to be supplied by the activity and intelligence of the mind addressed; and that which is thus supplied may turn out to be a piece of old cloth inserted in a new garment. Most men's minds run in grooves, and after a certain age cannot easily get out of them. Few men have the power of leaving their own standpoint, and placing themselves in that of another. No man sees what lies out of the plane of his vision, or that which is invisible from his point of view. Not many men have learned that we never understand a doctrine till we have seen it in a light, or under an aspect, in which or under which it is true. You must see and understand a man's truth, before you can see and comprehend his error. Overlooking all considerations of this sort, controversialists do not read, at least do not note, *all* that the man they are controverting writes, and usually take what is intelligible to them from their point of view, either as confirming or as impugning their own convictions. What else is said or written counts for nothing. Having fixed in their minds what must be the meaning and purpose of an author, they treat all he says which is not conformable thereto, either as a self-contradiction or as so much mere verbiage. All men, except certain rare individuals to whom God gives the precious gift of real philosophical genius, are more or less guilty of this unfairness toward those who differ from them, and that, too, even without intending or suspecting it.

Bishop Ullathorne, we doubt not, criticised what he honestly believed to be Mr. Simpson's real meaning; and he no doubt considered his omissions of Mr. Simpson's words or mutilations of his text as in no way altering or impairing the sense,—as, in fact, only bringing out more clearly and distinctly his real thought. The mass of writers in our day write loosely, diffusely, and verbosely, and fail to attach any clear or definite meaning to one-half the words they use or periods they indite. The practice of loose writing generates a habit of loose and careless reading. It is seldom now-a-days one thinks of reading a whole book, a whole essay, a whole article even, in order to get at the writer's meaning. Most books, essays, articles written in our times, can be easily understood by reading the first sentence of each paragraph, and skipping all the rest. It is seldom we come across a writer who uses no superfluous word, and whose production, to be understood, must be read from the beginning to the end. Some such writers there are, even now, but they find few readers who read them with sufficient care and attention to master their whole and exact meaning. Perhaps among no class of readers are they less adequately understood than among those who have received a scholastic training, and had their minds formed after the dry analytic, scholastic method. The scholastic method always begins by asserting the thesis or proposition to be proved, demonstrated, or explained; and all that cultivated readers need do to understand a writing is to run the eye over the several propositions or theses enunciated. The better writers of modern times do not write after this method, which, with all its merit, is stiff and formal; but adopt what we call the synthetic method, and usually set out with a principle, proposition, or statement that needs, or is assumed to need, no proof or explanation, and proceed by way of deduction, induction, or rather production, from it to the principle, thesis, or proposition intended to be established or made clear and evident. The full meaning of these can be ascertained only by reading their whole production, skipping no sentence and no word. Our bishops and clergy, educated in Catholic colleges and seminaries, are trained in the scholastic or analytic method, and are by their habits of mind as unfitted as they well can be to do justice to those who have been trained in schools outside of the church, and think and write after the synthetic method, without much respect for scholastic formalities and technicalities. They are apt to interpret us in a too matter-of-fact way.

We have had some experience in this matter. We are generally allowed to write tolerably clear, plain, and forcible English, and yet we have rarely found our full and exact meaning reproduced by either a friendly or an unfriendly critic. We have been applauded for meanings we never dreamed of, and cried down for views we have never entertained, and which we hold in horror; and that, too, by men whose native and acquired ability we respect, and whose right feeling and honesty of purpose we cannot doubt. The fact is, people cannot know strangers by a merely nominal introduction, and do not always recognize even their friends in an unusual or an unfamiliar dress. From all this we should learn a lesson of mutual forbearance. The men of original thought, of bold and earnest spirit,—the prophets of their race, to whom God gives the mission of stirring up the thought of their age, reforming the prevailing philosophy or theology, and advancing religion and civilization,—must expect to be misunderstood and misrepresented. They must neither be angry nor cast down when they find themselves denounced as the enemies of the truth to which they are wedded for life or for death. "Lord," said Elijah, in a desponding moment, "they have digged down thy altars and slain thy prophets, and I alone am left, and they seek my life to take it." No. "I have reserved to myself seven thousand who have not bowed the knee to Baal." They never do well to be angry or faint-hearted. The misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and opposition are inevitable, and if we encountered them not we should have reason to distrust our mission, or at least our fidelity to it. We should expect nothing else. "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you." If you are sent to lift the world to a higher plane, you are not of the world, and the world knows you not. It takes you to be its enemies, and what wonder that it refuses to treat you as friends? But their ignorance rather than malice is the cause. Did the world understand you it would not oppose you. Keep up your hearts, keep burning the flame of your charity, and be sure that no true word is ever spoken that falls to the ground or fails of success. God, who is truth itself, is pledged to prosper it, and all that is mighty in heaven or generous and noble on earth is enlisted in your work. If the good work is done, what matters it whether we or another get from men the credit of doing it? Let no man flatter himself that he can do great or good things without disinterestedness, a forgetfulness of self.

On the other hand, those who are in high places, and occupy the chief seats in the synagogue, should have more confidence in truth, more confidence in divine providence, and not fancy the church is in danger, or the faith is likely to be upset, because some bold speculator questions opinions they have hitherto held, or arraigns the theological or philosophical school they have followed. Opinions may go and the faith remain; and many traditions of Catholics may be made away with, and Catholic tradition remain intact, perhaps in greater purity and vigor than before. Old Luis Vives tells a good story of a countryman and his ass. A countryman returning with his ass from market one bright moonlight evening, stopped by the way to give his ass a pail of water, in which he beheld a reflection of the moon. The ass was thirsty and drank up the water, and with the water the moon's reflection. Whereupon the countryman fell to beating his ass most unmercifully for drinking up the moon, when it was only the reflection of it at the bottom of the water-pail. These asses you beat for drinking up the moon, or the truth, only drink up the miserable reflection of it in your own water-pails. The truth shines as clear and as bright in the heavens as ever. You must not believe every spirit, for many false prophets have gone out into the world; but try the spirits, be patient with them, and give them a fair hearing. Be hospitable; refuse not to entertain strangers, for many have entertained angels unawares. The faith never varies, but there may be more in it than is reflected in your water-pails. Many a man who has unwittingly broached an error would correct it of himself if let alone, and rash denunciation did not come to enlist his pride or his self-love in its defence. We are to expect no new revelation, but there may be many new developments and applications of the old yet to be made, of which the wisest and best have not yet dreamed. These agitators, reformers, "prophets of the newness," as somebody calls them, may, after all, have a mission, and do a good work. At any rate, if you find them fallible, you must bear in mind that you are not infallible.

But leaving remarks of this sort, we may still take up and discuss the subject involved in the controversy between Mr. Simpson and his right reverend critic, for it is a subject as domestic in America as in Great Britain. That subject is the relation between faith and reason, revelation and science. The question as to this relation is, in one form or

another, the great question of our age, and a question which, whatever their reluctance to grapple with it, our theologians must meet fairly and squarely, and, as far as possible, dispose of once for all. Mr. Simpson, if we understand him, maintains that faith and reason accord, because faith is a function or an operation of reason; and that there is no discordance between revelation and science, because they deal with different matters, are concerned with different objects, lie in different spheres, and revolve in different orbits. Revelation belongs to a sphere above that of science, and turns on matters that either do not come within the sphere of science, or which, by their miraculous character, are withdrawn from its jurisdiction. Lying in different spheres, revolving in different orbits, each is free to follow its own laws, and can do so without any collision or interference with the other. The bishop, as we gather from Mr. Simpson's *Reply*, objects,—1. Faith, defined as a simple operation or function of reason—especially when, as Mr. Simpson teaches, reason cannot demonstrate the existence of God, and we are obliged to depend on revelation for that primal truth—is inadequate, and wants the essential mark or character of Catholic faith. 2. It is not true that revelation and science revolve in two totally distinct and independent spheres. Revelation, in many important particulars, touches the sphere of science, and deals with the same objects or matters; and where it does so, it, as the superior, gives the law to science, and has the right to control its speculations or inductions whenever they tend to impugn the revealed dogma. Mr. Simpson replies to the first objection, that he did not offer a definition of faith, but was merely describing it under that aspect in which it is undoubtedly a simple operation or function of reason. His purpose, at the time, was not to give a full and exact definition of the whole complex idea of faith, but to show that faith, generically considered, is a natural and normal exercise of the human mind. It was not necessary to his purpose to go further,—to distinguish between what theologians call human faith and divine faith, and to show on what conditions divine or Catholic faith is elicitable. To the second objection he replies by citing various authorities to prove that revelation deals principally with the invisible,—as we say, the superintelligible, which lies out of the range of reason; and by asserting that in the few instances in which it embraces facts of the visible order, they are,

by their miraculous character, removed from the jurisdiction of science.

Mr. Simpson unquestionably shows that the bishop, in numerous instances, misapprehended or perverted his meaning; but he must permit us to say that we are far from being satisfied with his own view of the great question at issue between Catholics and rationalists, or believers and unbelievers. We may not be prepared to accept all the statements of the bishop, far less the formal censure he pronounces against *The Rambler* and the *Home and Foreign Review;* but Mr. Simpson does not, to our understanding, meet and solve the real difficulty in the mind of the scientific rationalist. That faith or belief is an exercise, and a normal exercise, of our rational nature, we suppose no rationalist denies; and in proving it we do little to show the subjective harmony between reason and divine or Catholic faith, which not only embraces, as to its object, matters that transcend our intelligence, but is itself not elicitable without the elevation of the subject by grace to a higher than its natural power. Divine faith is supernatural as to its subject as well as its object, proceeds from a supernatural principle, and lays hold of a supernatural object with a supernatural grasp. In other words, faith is the gift of God, and the act of faith cannot possibly be elicited without the assistance of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ. The problem is not,—whether we are reasoning with rationalists or believers,—to show that faith, in a general sense, is a normal exercise of reason, but that in this specific sense, in the sense in which unassisted reason cannot elicit it, it accords with reason or science. How can it be shown that a faith not elicitable by the natural strength of reason can be asserted as essential to salvation, without disparaging reason? This is the problem; and to assign as a reason for not meeting it, the fact that we are reasoning with rationalists or non-believers, is unsatisfactory, because it is their precise difficulty, and the very point to be discussed in reasoning with them.

We are less satisfied with Mr. Simpson's reply on the other point. To place revelation and science in two distinct and independent spheres is not to harmonize them, to show a dialectic relation between them, but is to deny the possibility of all harmony or of a dialectic relation between them, and to defend in the most formal manner the fatal schism which exists between faith and reason, revelation and science, religion and civilization, the church and society, in our

modern world. Mr. Simpson's reply asserts, in even an exaggerated form, the very doctrine out of which that schism has grown, and confirms the very objection of rationalists. Their objection is precisely that theologians, by presenting revelation and science as revolving in distinct and independent orbits, render all concord between them impossible; and as science is evidently human, in the human sphere, revelation is either superfluous or inadmissible, since it does not and cannot come into relation with the human, and form an integral part of our ordinary life. They reject revelation as out of their sphere, and as having nothing to do with them, as they have nothing to do with it. At best, Mr. Simpson's doctrine denies all objective relation between the matter of revelation and the matter of science, and supposes the objective reality to be divided into two distinct and independent spheres,—parallel to each other, if you please, but, like two parallel lines, that may be extended to infinity without ever meeting. Whatever connection there may be between them is accidental, arbitrary, forced, without any basis in the real world, or in the original purpose and plan of the Creator. The objection is precisely the same with that which we brought some time since to the supposition of the *status naturæ puræ*, or the assertion that God could, had he chosen, have given us our beatitude in the natural or cosmic order, without the incarnation of the Word, and the supernatural elevation of man to union with himself. This asserts two orders, the natural and the supernatural, lying one above the other, and both created orders, and yet without any real or dialectic relation between them. They can be, as Dr. Nevin very well objected, only mechanically or magically related. There is no real *nexus* that unites them.

Rationalists object to revelation not only on the ground that faith, to be elicited, requires subjectively something more than our own native intellectual strength; but also, and chiefly, that it has objectively no real relation with the world of science. What the Catholic, in order to meet their objection, has to do, is to show the dialectic union and harmony of the matter of revelation with the matter of science; or that matters revealed or objects made known by supernatural revelation are really connected with the world of science, as integral parts of one indissoluble whole. Is the order of truth supernaturally revealed—what theologians term the *objectum materiale fidei*—really connected

with the order of truth cognizable by our natural faculties without supernatural revelation, so as in reality to form one truth with it? or is it distinct and separate from it, pertaining to a distinct and independent sphere? Is the so-called supernatural order the distinctively Christian order, a part, and the chief part, of one grand whole, dialectically united with the natural universe and completing it? or is it an order apart, only accidentally or arbitrarily connected with it? Here, as we understand it, is the real problem to be solved, and which must be solved before we can speak intelligibly of discord or concord between faith and reason, revelation and science, or attempt to bring our whole intellectual life into dialectic harmony, or establish the synthesis of nature and grace.

Mr. Simpson, if we understand him, assumes that the two orders, objectively considered, are unrelated,—two separate and independent orders of truth. Science has nothing to do with revelation, except to judge of the sufficiency of the signs or evidences by which it is accredited, and to determine whether what purports to be revealed does or does not contradict the innate laws of the human mind; and revelation has nothing to do with science, which it leaves to obey its own laws, and to follow its own speculations and inductions, without being under any obligation to consult any thing above or beyond them. Suppose science, in its investigations, should arrive at the denial of the unity of the human race; it would be at liberty to make that denial, notwithstanding the whole revealed dogma asserts or implies the contrary, and Original Sin, the Incarnation, Redemption, Regeneration, indeed all that has hitherto been regarded as distinctively Christian, would have no meaning if the unity of the human race were not a truth. He would conclude, not that revelation asserts any thing false, but that theologians had misunderstood it, encroached on the domain of science, and attempted to erect their miserable glosses into revealed dogmas. This would end practically in the baldest rationalism, and would be the conversion of Christianity to rationalism, not of rationalism to Christianity. It would, in effect, make science the touch-stone of revelation, and the measure of reason the measure of faith.

Mr. Simpson has, it seems to us, been misled by a certain school of theology which he exaggerates, and still more by his philosophy, which recognizes no God, and consequently no creative act. He, by a singular infatuation, fancies him-

self a profound metaphysician, and, in his papers on the *Forms of Intuition*, evidently persuades himself that he really has thrown a new and clear light on the chief problems of metaphysical science. But his philosophy is the subjectivism of Kant, with a few additions borrowed from Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, refuted time and again in the pages of this *Review*. With this subjective philosophy he cannot go out of himself, or attain to a real world outside of his own *Ich* or *Ego*. He makes the categories simply forms of the subject, and maintains that the forms of the object are determined by the subject, or rather imposed by the subject from its own inherent and innate forms. The ideas of force, will, understanding, are derived from the forms of our own minds, and have only a subjective value. Power, will, intelligence, are intuitive, that is, in his sense, innate forms of our understanding, and we *infer* that they exist outside of us; but whether united in one person, or polytheistically distributed, is more than we without revelation can know. Hence we can know neither intuitively nor discursively the existence of God. But how does he know there is any thing outside of us? He attempts, with Fichte, to prove something outside of us, by asserting that we find experimentally not only the limitation of our powers, but a positive resistance to them. That which resists cannot be that which is resisted. That which resists must be *not-me*, *non ego*, and consequently something besides me exists. All very fine. But he forgets that he has laid it down that the forms of our knowledge are derived from ourselves, and that we see things not as they are, or see things so and so not because they are so and so, but because we are so constituted. If we had been constituted differently we should see them differently. How then does he know that he finds real resistance, or that what he takes to be real resistance may, after all, not be the action of any external object, but the effect of his own internal constitution, of the innate laws and mechanism of his own mind? Has he not told us that the idea of force is supplied from within?

With a philosophy that really asserts for him no existence but his own, it were not possible for Mr. Simpson to grasp the idea of the essential dialectic unity and harmony of all the Creator's works,—to conceive the real difficulty of the rationalist, or to do any thing more than exaggerate and confirm that difficulty. That difficulty is removable only

by a higher order of philosophic thought than he evinces or recognizes. To remove it we must rise to that *theologia prima* which few in our days cultivate—to that higher region where faith and reason, revelation and science, meet, and fall into dialectic union. Père Gratry, in his *Connaissance de Dieu* and his *Logique*, has partially comprehended the problem and attempted its solution, but without success, principally because he mistook the question of method for the question of principles, and attempted to settle the question of principles by settling that of method,—not being aware that principles determine the method, not method the principles. It is a grave mistake to attempt to determine how we know, before determining what we know. Others have succeeded better, especially in Italy. But our English-speaking world, for the most part, turns away from the subject; is content to revolve in a lower orbit; and no Catholic is in a lower orbit than that in which Mr. Simpson himself complacently revolves, who, though he does not hesitate to accuse contemporary Catholic theologians, bishops, and priests, of being behind their age in science, is himself, in philosophical and theological thought, by no means up to the level of his age. He has not yet risen above Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel, and amuses us with elaborate papers to prove that the categories are forms of intuition, or rather innate and subjective forms of the understanding supplied by the mind from itself, not objective verities intuitively held by the understanding.

Mr. Simpson must pardon us if we tell him that we do not accept his doctrine, that the subject-matter of revelation and that of science belong to two distinct and independent spheres; and that we cannot concede that, however much churchmen may have abused their authority, science is independent of faith and revelation. The truth attained to by our natural faculties and that made known to us by supernatural revelation are not, as we hold, two orders of truth, having no dialectic union or relation, but simply different parts of one whole,—really one full, complete, and universal truth. God is one, and his creation is one,—made with one design, according to one plan,—and is one homogeneous whole. In the universe of God, understood as embracing all his works, in their principle, medium, and end, all the parts have a real dialectic relation to the whole, and the whole to each of the parts. Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your heavenly Father's notice, and all

the hairs of your head are numbered, and have their logical relation to the entire universe; for the universe itself is but the free expression *ad extra* of the Word, the eternal Logos, the supreme Logic itself in its eternal and immutable principle. God is supremely logical, and in the ever-blessed Trinity we have the type and source of all dialectic union. God may create or not, according to his own good pleasure; but he cannot create sophistically, or suffer a positive sophism to enter his creation. The dialectic harmony of the universe may not be apparent to our feeble vision, which can take in only a part; but the logical character of the whole must be asserted, and will be made manifest in the final conclusion or last Judgment, when all shall be consummated. What appears to us isolated, detached, unrelated, sophistical, so appears because we cannot see the whole, and take in at one view all its parts in their relations to the whole and to one another. It is not, as Mr. Simpson and his school contend, that we do not see things as they really are, or that our own intelligence is not true as far as it goes, but that we do not see all, and in fact see only a little, and hardly any thing in its real relations.

The Christian order, the supernatural order, or the order of grace, is not something not dialectically included in the original purpose or plan of creation, as is too often supposed,—as the unbeliever always supposes. It is not a foreign order, —not a subsequent introduction or appendix to the original text, not contemplated and provided for in the original creative act. If man had not sinned redemption would not have been necessary, and our Lord would not have suffered and died; but we are permitted to hold that even if Adam had not sinned, the Word would have been incarnated. It is not necessary to believe that the Word was made flesh, God became man, solely that he might suffer and die to repair man's fault, but also and primarily that man might become God. The Incarnation is the complement of the creative act, completing the cosmos by carrying the creative act to its apex, and initiating the second cycle of creation, or palingenesia, that is, regeneration, whose end is glorification. The supernatural, in whatever sense we take the term, is not disjoined, objectively or subjectively, from the natural. The term is usually taken to mean what transcends in the intellectual order our natural reason, and in the moral order our natural strength. We understand by it God, who is above nature and independent of nature, and whatever is

done immediately by him. Hence creation is a supernatural act, the Incarnation is a supernatural act, grace is a supernatural act, because an immediate act of God, not an act done by God, mediately, through the concreative act of second causes. But in this sense the natural and supernatural are dialectically united by the creative act of God, the *nexus* between the Creator and the creature. The fact of the supernatural in this sense is as certain to us as any natural fact, both because it passes directly and constantly before our eyes, and because without it no natural fact is conceivable or possible. The supernatural, God, is complete and self-sufficing in himself, and has no need to create in order to be, or to be being in its plenitude; but nature depends entirely on the supernatural, and can exist only as created, and as united to it by the creative act. All attempts to get a natural origin or cause of nature fail, and end only in the denial of nature. Creation, no doubt, is a mystery inexplicable by us or to us, but its certainty cannot be questioned without the grossest sophistry. It is as evident to us, as a fact, as our own existence, for in perceiving our own existence it is the creative act of God himself that we perceive. We are all in that act, and without it we are nothing, and therefore nothing to be perceived. God does not create us by one act and preserve us by another; for our continuous existence depends on the fact that the creative act is a continuous act; that God, so to speak, continuously creates us. The creative act is an ever-present act,—a continuous act. To suppose it suspended, is to suppose the existence it places to be annihilated; for creatures have no life or being in or from themselves. "In him we live, and move, and have our being."

No little of the difficulty we are grappling with, grows out of confounding the supernatural with the superintelligible. The supernatural is super-comprehensible to us, but not in all respects superintelligible. The supernatural is not explicable by natural laws, but may be known by natural reason. God is intelligible, infinitely intelligible, because infinitely intelligent, and is the intelligible and the ground of all intelligibility to us, though he surpasses our intelligence, and is to us in his essence superintelligible. But what in him is superintelligible to us is not disjoined from that which is intelligible, or really distinguishable from it, and, were our faculties great enough to grasp it, would be seen to be identically the same. So in the works of God.

The superintelligible is not necessarily supernatural, for our intelligence is not equal to the whole of nature. We can know the superintelligible only as supernaturally revealed, and grasp it only by faith, not by science; yet it may itself be as much nature as the intelligible or the sensible. Objectively considered, the superintelligible, which is the matter of revelation, does not lie in a separate sphere above that of science, as Mr. Simpson contends, but in the same objective sphere with science, though beyond the reach of our scientific faculties.

Distinguishing between the supernatural and the superintelligible, we can easily discern the basis of the harmony of faith and reason, revelation and science, without placing them in distinct, separate, and independent spheres. The whole world of reality, whether natural or supernatural, may be included, in relation to us, under three heads,—the sensible, the intelligible, and the superintelligible; to which in us correspond three faculties,—sensibility, intellect, and superintelligence; whence the objective and subjective conditions of sensible apprehension, and sentiment, thought or science, and faith—three terms which, under the point of view we are now considering them, exhaust both subject and object, that is, all reality. The faculty we call superintelligence is the subjective principle of faith, by which faith is connected on its subjective side with intelligence, and harmonized with our whole intellectual life, or, rather, made an integral part of it. The objective distinctions of visible, intelligible, and superintelligible, are not distinctions of three separate realities, worlds, or orders of being or existences, but distinctions in one and the same order, borrowed from our human faculties. The sensible does not exist without the intelligible, nor the intelligible without the superintelligible. In each case the lower has its root and source in the higher, the mimetic in the methexic. The sensible is capable of being thought only by virtue of the intelligible, and the intelligible demands for its basis the superintelligible. The doctrine of the Real Presence would not only be inexplicable, but false and unmeaning, if in the visible there were not the intelligible; for the visible body present is not the body of our Lord. But though the intelligible, what may be called the supersensible, is apprehensible by our noetic faculty, there is in all intelligibles even something which surpasses our intelligence. We never know the essences of things. We

may know their visible appearances, their external qualities and attributes, but the inner essence, the real *quidditas* of the thing, always escapes us, and is to us really superintelligible, alike in the natural and in the supernatural. God is intelligible, and even the invisible things of God, including his power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood by things that are made. We know he is, and even know his attributes, and without knowing so much we could know nothing; for he is himself the immediate object and light of intuition, in which, in its primary form, is contained all our knowledge; yet we know not his essence, what he is in himself, the real *quidditas Dei*. His essence escapes us, and is to us superintelligible. We can know it here only analogically through faith, for it is only hereafter, when united to him by what theologians call the *ens supernaturale*, that we can see and know him as he is. The beatific vision is the clear view of the essence of God; but till we are beatified in glory we can see only in part, and know only in part, through a glass darkly, or *per œnigmata*.

The faculty we call superintelligible, is not a faculty by which we positively seize the superintelligence, and know it as we know the intelligible; but the faculty which advertises us that the intelligible is not the whole thing,—that there is more to be known than we know, or in our present state can know. *Psychically* it is neither sense nor intelligence, for both sense and intelligence grasp and hold fast their objects, and for neither does there exist what it does not apprehend. Intelligence tells us what is known, what it knows; but it cannot advertise us that there is an unknown to which it has not penetrated, and to which it cannot penetrate. And yet there is nothing of which we are better assured than that beyond the known is the unknown and the unknowable, which we never do or can confound with the non-existent. We have a consciousness of our own impotence, and of the limitation of our own powers. We feel that we are bounded, shut up in a prison-house, and the soul continually, in her grief and vexation, beats her head against her dungeon walls. The wise man is elated never by what he knows, but is humbled and oppressed by the infinitely more there is to be known and which he cannot know, at least in his present state of existence. The soul has a consciousness of her own impotence, but at the same time a consciousness of her own potentiality —that there is more than she knows, and that she can be

more than she is. Whence comes all this, noted by philosophers in all ages, and which gives rise, under an intellectual point of view, to a thirst of knowing which can be satiated only with the infinite, and, under the moral point of view, to a craving for beatitude which can be satisfied only by union with God in glory? "I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness." We call it the faculty of superintelligence, and it is, as it were, an instinct of the soul directing it to the superintelligible, and presenting in the soul herself an aptitude to receive and credit a supernatural revelation of the superintelligible when made. It gives us as it were the instinct of faith, a certain *prolepsis* of revelation, a subjective capacity for it; for although it does not anticipate the revelation, it yet advertises that there is reality beyond what is intelligible to be revealed, if God chooses to reveal it. It is in us a certain presage of revelation, as the desire of beatitude is a certain presage or pledge of the beatific vision. It makes it that revelation comes to us rather as an expected guest than as a perfect stranger,—is a sort of presentiment of its coming. By virtue of it no violence is done to our nature in receiving revelation; no fitting up of a new apartment for its lodgment is required. Revelation thus finds an apartment already prepared for it, and it simply supplies a want painfully felt. The moment we recognize this faculty, revelation ceases to be antecedently improbable; there are no longer any *a priori* objections to it, and there becomes almost, in some sort, a natural presumption in its favor. It then requires only a degree of evidence demanded in the ordinary conduct of life for prudent action, to accredit it to the understanding. Here, then, is, at least on the subjective side, a real basis for the concord of faith and reason, revelation and science.

The superintelligible by revelation does not become intelligible; we do not hold it after revelation scientifically, or by direct science; nor yet do we remain wholly ignorant of it. We do not comprehend, but we apprehend it, and understand it analogically, by analogies borrowed from the intelligible. By means of its evidences it may be more certain than the speculations and inductions of science, but our knowledge of it is not full and direct. We know it only indirectly, and as we say analogically; yet in some sense we know it, and it coalesces with all else we know, and forms an integral and inseparable part of our intellectual life. We find in it the principles of our rational life itself,

the principles of the explication even of the intelligible; for the real explication of things is in their essence, in what to us is naturally superintelligible. It contains the principles and sanctions of duty, and no man can practically understand the system of the universe, the origin and end of things, without it. Without it religion and morality are theorems, not laws or axioms. Without it science itself fails; society, civilization fails; for the whole history of the world proves that nations become rude, ignorant, barbarous, savage, in proportion as they lose or pervert the tradition of revealed truth; as well they must, for the elements of all civilization, as well as of all religion, are derived by revelation from the superintelligible, in which is the type and essence of all things. Without revelation we may know that God is, and is the creator of all things, and therefore that in him is the archetype of every creature, as well as of the universe as a whole; but we cannot know what this archetype is, for it pertains to the very essence of God; and how without revelation could we know or suspect that God in his essence is triune, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost? The Trinity is the archetype of all existence, and is copied or imitated by every creature. Doubtless, a man may on many subjects reason logically without believing in the Trinity; but without a recognition of the Trinity he could never explain logic, for without the Trinity there would and could be no logic. There would and could be no dialectic type or principle. The origin of every judgment is in the triune essence of God, for being in itself is a complete and perfect judgment, containing the three terms, principle, medium, and conclusion or end, essential to every judgment. Without the revelation of the triune essence of God, the three eternal relations in their indissoluble unity of being, we could never conceive the mystery of creation, and could by no means explain the mystery of generation, far less that of regeneration. In other words, the revealed truth is necessary to the development and explication of the truth recognizable by our natural faculties.

There is a truth in traditionalism, though the traditionalists have failed to disengage it from error. Science is not founded on revelation, but revelation is necessary to the evolution and explication of natural truth. Nothing is further from the truth than the supposition that revelation and science revolve in two respectively independent spheres, —spheres that have no mutual relations or dependence.

The revealed mysteries of Original Sin, the Incarnation, Redemption, throw a flood of light on the highest and most difficult problems of philosophy. The dogma does not indeed control the facts or phenomena of the natural order, but it does control their explanation. Let a man who denies the reality of genera and species, and contends that the universals of the schoolmen are mere words or abstract mental conceptions, undertake to harmonize the dogma of original sin, the Incarnation, or Redemption, with his philosophy, and he will soon see that there is an intimate relation between philosophy and the revealed dogmas. The revealed dogmas are in direct conflict with the philosophical nominalism and conceptualism professed by Mr. Simpson, and hence both Rosceline and Abelard incurred the censure of the church; for the dogmas can be true only in case that genera and species, though not existing without individuals, do yet really exist, *a parte rei*, and generate or specificate the individual. Original sin in Adam was individual; in us it is the sin of the race, and participated in by us only in the respect that we participate in the race. All men fell in Adam because all were really in him as the race, though not as individuals. If the race, *humanitas*, be only an empty word, a mental conception, an abstraction or generalization, without existence *a parte rei*, the Incarnation would lose all its significance; for there could have been no assumption of its human nature by the Word, since, though human nature was individuated in Christ by the divine personality, the Word did not assume an individual man. The doctrine that he did is the heresy of the adoptionists, and virtually of the Nestorians. Moreover, if he had done so, he would not have elevated human nature to hypostatic union with God, or affected by his Incarnation any one except the individual assumed; neither would he by his passion and death have redeemed mankind. It is a grave mistake, then, to suppose that revelation and science are unrelated, and revolve in separate spheres.

Mr. Simpson seems to understand by science merely the knowledge of visible phenomena; but, if he had studied Plato as much as he appears to have studied Mansel and M'Cosh, he would have been aware that the visible, that is, the sensible, is never the object of science, but that the object of real science is the idea, or the intelligible, which, though intelligible, is never fully known without a knowledge of the essence, or the superintelligible. As the visible

is from the intelligible, and the intelligible from the super-intelligible, which last is the object of faith and the subject of revelation, so is there no real science without faith; and, without supernatural revelation, no real intellectual life and development. As a matter of fact, man has never for one moment existed without supernatural revelation. It was made to the race in Adam, infused into his intelligence along with language itself, and has been preserved in language, and diffused more or less perfectly through all nations, by tradition. It is not an accidental or transitory, but a permanent and essential fact in human history, in the moral and intellectual life of both the individual and the race. It is the necessary complement of the human understanding, without which the human understanding has never operated, and, as we maintain, never could operate. The gentile world, mutilating, perverting, or travestying the truths of revelation, lost the dogma of creation, the very conception of the creative act, and substituted for creation generation, formation, or emanation, and thus vitiated their whole philosophy. All gentile philosophy, even that of Plato, is pantheistic, and therefore sophistical. Having no conception of the creative act, the gentiles were unable to form a conception of the infinite: for the infinite they uniformly substitute the indefinite. Not recognizing the creative act, they could have no correct notions of space and time, especially of ideal space and time. They never could understand, and never did understand, any more than some moderns, that ideal space is the power of God to externize his own acts, and ideal time, his power to complete externally his acts by the concreative acts of creatures, or successive actualization of their potentialities,—whence generation, development, progress in created orders. If Hegel had better understood the revealed dogma of the Trinity, he never could have fallen into the absurdity of supposing that God actualizes himself, fills up the void in his own being, or realizes his own possibility, in creating, and that he progresses in the progression of existences, and arrives at self-consciousness first in man.

In the last century a large class of philosophers, scorning the revealed data, and rejecting the light thrown on the problems of natural science by supernatural revelation, undertook to reconstruct science by their natural light alone. They eliminated from their minds all that was due to revelation, and they lost, as is well known, not only the super-

intelligible, but even the intelligible itself, and recognized only visible or sensible phenomena. Under their manipulations man underwent strange transformations, lost all his distinctively human attributes, and came out with La Mettrie "a plant," and "a machine," and with Cabanis "a digestive tube open at both ends." Even now, with Mr. Simpson's friends, the naturalists, man in zoölogy and natural history is classed as an animal at the head of the order mammalia. The distribution of plants and animals into orders, genera, and species, by naturalists, is to a great extent an arbitrary, an artificial classification, founded on unimportant distinctions, not on the real generic and specific differences of nature: so true is it, that when revelation is discarded, or not taken into account, science declines and ultimately fails.

We repeat, revelation does not control facts, but it does control their explanation; and as science is not in the simple observation of facts, but in their explication, it controls science, gives the law to science, and consequently science does not and cannot pursue its own course independently of revelation. Even with revelation our science is not complete, for all not cognizable by natural reason is not revealed. Only so much is revealed as is necessary for our present state. The revealed dogmas in some sense, no doubt, cover all reality; but the human mind is not able to take in explicitly, even by faith, all the reality they cover. Revelation itself is imperfect, and can be completed only in the glorified state, when faith is lost in vision and hope is swallowed up in fruition. But what we here insist on is, that without the analogical knowledge of the truth supernaturally revealed, the human mind loses its grasp on the intelligible, the noetic world, both intellectually and morally. Hence the necessity of revelation to the preservation and progress of civilization, and the reason why there is a really progressive civilization only in Christian nations. The civilized nations of antiquity were precisely those nations among whom the primitive revelation was preserved in its greatest purity and vigor; and yet even in them we find little or no progress of civilization. Plato is great as a philosopher or as a moralist only when he is enlightened by catholic tradition, and conforms to the fragments of the primitive revelation retained from primitive times. The notion that the gentiles knew nothing of revelation, that they had only their unassisted natural reason, is a mistake, and worthy of no respect whatever. The human race has never been,

in any age or country, absolutely without revelation. As we have said, the human mind has never operated and never could operate without some revelation of the superintelligible; not because science is founded on faith, but because the truths of faith are necessary to the development and play of our scientific faculties, and to the right explanation of the facts disclosed by science.

To ask why God created us with faculties so imperfect that to their exercise supernatural revelation is necessary, is like asking why the baby is not born a full-grown man, in the full maturity of body and mind. We might as well ask why the Creator left his works to be developed and completed successively, or in time. Why did he not create at once all the individuals of a given race, instead of leaving them to be produced by generation? Or why were not all potentialities actualized at once? From the point of view of God himself, in his own decree to create the universe and to glorify man, all his works are complete, all potentialities are actualized, for with him there is no potentiality, no time, no succession. Time and space pertain only to creatures, and time marks in creatures only the successive realization of their potentiality; generation is the reduction to act of what is potential in the race, as growth from infancy to manhood is the actualization of what is potential in the individual. It has pleased the Creator to create existences with certain powers undeveloped, and to be matured only successively. Perhaps we might find a reason for it in his own eternal essence, in the eternal progression of his own being, demanding for its expression *ad extra* a progression in existences. But, be this as it may, the fact that supernatural revelation is necessary is no objection to any one who understands that creation itself is a supernatural fact, and that the natural itself derives from and intimately depends on the supernatural; for God himself, in whom we live and have our being, is supernatural. The light of reason is itself supernatural in its origin as well as the light of faith. The end of our existence is not in this life, and what objection is it to assert that we do not attain to full science before reaching our maturity in glory? We are never, in any sense whatever, independent, and were never intended to be independent of the supernatural; nay, God, with all his omnipotence, could not have made us independent of the supernatural, for he is supernatural, and he could not make any creature independent of himself, since every creature,

by the fact of being a creature, necessarily depends for its very existence, and for every moment of existence, on his creative act. We are embosomed, immersed, compenetrated, and upheld by the supernatural; we live and move and have our being in the supernatural, and we depend on the supernatural as much for our reason and sensibility as we do for revelation itself. Supernatural revelation is, on the side of God, as integral in his original plan of creation as are our natural faculties themselves. Supernatural revelation understood to be included in the original plan or purpose of creation, that part of our intellectual and moral life dependent on it becomes as normal, as little anomalous, and as unobjectionable as any other portion of that life.

The great objection of rationalists to Christianity is founded on their supposition that it is not included in the original design of creation; that it is an after-thought, an appendix, or an anomaly, that mars the order, symmetry, and beauty of the Creator's works, and, in fact, detracts from the perfection of the Creator himself. The answer to this objection is not precisely in showing the strength and completeness of the chain of external evidences by which the Christian revelation is accredited to reason, but in denying, point-blank, the supposition itself. It was the eternal Word himself that became incarnate, and all things were made by him and ordered for his glory. Christ is the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world; he was with the Father before the world was; and in him all creation is consummated, and attains its end. It was in reference to Christ that the world was created; and in the divine decree the Christian order, which looks to glorification, logically precedes the cosmos, as the end for which the cosmos exists, or was to be created. Christianity is thus a part, and the nobler part, of creation itself,—that in which all creation finds its consummation or glorification. It is no afterthought in the Creator's plan, no appendix to the creative order, but that in which creation is raised to infinite power and is fulfilled. It is no anomaly; it in no respect interferes with or mars the unity and symmetry of the Creator's design. It simply completes it. To attempt to sever the created universe from Christ and Christianity, were as idle as to attempt to sever the natural order from the Creator; and to attempt to judge it without Christianity, were simply to attempt to judge a part without the whole,—even to mistake the sketch for the finished picture. Genesis was

never intended to exist without palingenesis, or man without Christ. From the beginning man was designed to find his destiny in glorification with Christ, the God-man. The Word became man, that man might become God. So viewed, the formidable objection of rationalists to Christianity vanishes, for then it is seen that the two orders are identified and made one in the creative act.

Let it not be objected that the assertion of Christianity as included in the original design of the Creator excludes the idea of Christianity as an order of free grace. Its necessity to complete the cosmos does not deny it the character of grace, or imply that God was bound to become incarnate. He was only bound to become incarnate by his decree to carry his creation to its apex, and to raise the creature to infinite power. He was free so to decree or not, according to his own pleasure. Grace in the Gospel stands opposed to merit, and is always gratuitous. In this sense creation itself is a grace, for no creature ever merited to be created. Regeneration is a grace, because the grace of regeneration is not and cannot be merited by any thing man does or can do. It is a gift, not a reward. Redemption is a grace both as not being merited, and as not being any thing to which the Creator pledged himself in creating man. Surely the Creator can justly leave a man in the state into which he brings himself by his abuse of his liberty. In the sense in which grace stands opposed to works and merit, and in which it is mercy and pardon to the sinner, there is nothing in the view we take that excludes it. Grace, in the sense of giving man more, or raising him to an infinitely higher destiny than he could attain to by his natural powers, is not excluded or diminished by being regarded as included in the original plan of creation, in the original intention of the Creator in creating. There is no exclusion of grace, no denial that the whole Christian order is a system of pure grace, in maintaining that God in his creative act resolved to give man more, and raise him to a higher destiny, than he could attain to by the simple exercise of his natural powers; any more than there would be in maintaining that the intention of raising man to union with himself, through the Incarnation, was expressed in a subsequent decree and in a new creative act. All the acts of God on his side are eternal, and are one act. Time and multiplicity belong only to creatures.

There are, no doubt, some opinions entertained by very

respectable theologians not favored by this doctrine. We maintain that man never was and never could have been created for a natural destiny or a natural beatitude, and therefore do not concede the possibility of what theologians call the *status naturæ puræ*. That man has a natural desire to see God as he is in himself, or, in other words, to know the infinite, if we recollect aright, is maintained by St. Thomas; and certain it is, that the desire of every rational nature to know can be satisfied with nothing short of knowing God himself in his essence, as we have shown in our explanation of the faculty of superintelligence. Now all theologians agree, when treating the beatific vision, that God, by no natural faculties with which he could endow him, could enable a man to attain to this knowledge naturally, or otherwise than by elevating his nature to union with himself in his Incarnation. The same may be said of the desire of beatitude. This desire craves an unbounded good, and can be satisfied with no created good, and only in possession of the supernatural,—never possible except through identity of nature with the human nature assumed by our Lord in becoming incarnate. Perfect beatitude is not possible in the natural order, and what is called natural beatitude must be regarded as a fiction. The highest natural beatitude conceivable is to the Christian mind hell, as is the pagan heaven, and as this life would be to us all, if we were not sustained and relieved by the hope of another and a higher life. With all that nature can give, man remains infinitely below his destiny,—a mere inchoate or initial creature, wanting the complement of existence, or an object that can fill up the deep void he feels within.

We are aware that the opinion of a possible state of pure nature, and of a possible natural beatitude, is very generally asserted by the fathers of the illustrious Society of Jesus, and by those theologians not of the Society who take their theology from their school, and therefore that it is a free opinion in the church; but it is only a free opinion, not Catholic doctrine which every Catholic is obliged to hold; for it is comparatively a recent opinion, and is not held and never has been held everywhere and by all Catholics. We have not found it, or any traces of it, in the great Latin or Greek fathers of the church. The Augustinians have never held it, and even continue to controvert it; and its currency in modern times has been due in great measure to its convenience in combating

certain Jansenistic errors, and to the condemnation of the 55th proposition of Baius, namely, "God could not have created man from the beginning such as he is now born." But this proposition is not heretical or false in every sense, for man is now born with original sin and under its penalty, and God certainly could not have created man with original sin and under its penalty. The question then comes up, in what sense was the proposition condemned? St. Pius, in his bull condemning it, says he condemns it in the sense of the asserters, at the same time conceding that in some sense it may be true. In what sense then did Baius assert it? We maintain that Baius held that God could not have created man *ab initio* such as he is now born, that is, with a natural desire for a beatitude which he has no natural ability to attain to; whence he inferred, with Luther and Calvin, that man in a state of innocence had the natural ability to attain to beatitude, and that it was this ability that he lost by original sin. This is false, for man never had that natural ability, since the justice in which Adam was established, and which placed him on the plane of his destiny, was, as Catholic faith teaches, supernatural. God could not, indeed, have created man with a desire for a beatitude which there were no means, natural or supernatural, of satisfying; but he may have created him without the natural ability to satisfy it, having resolved to enable him to do it supernaturally. So the proposition of Baius is false, and rightly condemned. The fathers of the Society and their followers take a different view, and understand the condemnation of Baius to be a virtual assertion of the *status naturæ puræ*, and therefore of the possibility of natural beatitude. It is not for us to decide the question; and perhaps not even for them. We dislike the doctrine of natural beatitude because it recognizes the dualism in the Creator's works which we have felt it necessary to combat in Mr. Simpson, and because it undeniably favors the schism, so manifest and so destructive in our modern world, between the church and society, and religion and civilization. Under the general prevalence of the theological system of which this opinion is the basis, we have found, as a matter of fact, even Catholic nations, to a fearful extent, losing their faith, and a large share of their cultivated intelligence becoming rationalistic, and uncatholic, if not anti-catholic. Under the theological system we defend, the world became Catholic; under the one we oppose, it has lapsed, or is rapidly lapsing, into heathenism.

But whether the state of pure nature be possible or not,—whether God could have provided man with a natural beatitude, that is, satisfied him with a created good, or with any thing less than himself, or not,—this much is certain, that no such state has ever existed, and man never has had his destiny in the natural order. The system which the Creator actually adopted places man's destiny in the supernatural union of man with God, and therefore includes in it the order of grace, the incarnation, regeneration, and glorification. This follows from the conceded fact that Adam, in a state of innocence, could not by his natural powers attain to the end for which he was made; and that the justice or righteousness which placed him on the plane of his destiny, or entitled him to the rewards of heaven, was supernatural, not natural, and therefore the justice or righteousness of Christ, without which no man is or can be righteous before God. It is true that our Lord, except in the divine purpose and plan, was not then incarnated; the creation, as to time, was not yet completed, and the regeneration could not be entered into, except by faith and promise; for as to time, the things on which it depends were not yet done, as St. Paul teaches us, in the eleventh chapter of his epistle to the Hebrews; but Adam before the fall was placed on the plane of his destiny by the same Christ in whom we believe, and by whom we are placed on the plane of ours. The saints before the coming of Christ were saints on the same principle that men have become saints since, only their faith was faith in Christ to come, while ours is faith in Christ who has come. The faith itself has always been the same; the grace has always been the same in principle; only, in the case of those before our Lord's coming it was by anticipation of his merits, as in ours it is by actual participation in them; and ours is therefore more abundant. In them something was wanting to its perfection, namely, the actual fulfilment of the promise made to them, or the actual Incarnation in time, which they believed was to be effected. This grace was the grace that went before the coming of our Lord, but it proceeded from him just as much as the grace that comes after. The only difference is that it was less complete, less perfect; whence the just that fell asleep before the coming of our Lord, could not enter into heaven or their glorified state till he had himself come and preached to them, in the prison where they were detained.

The doctrine we defend, and which we believe is truly

Catholic, recognizes a dualism indeed, but it is the dualism of the Creator and his works, not a dualism in his works themselves. It unites in dialectic union Creator and creature, supernatural and natural, in the unity of the divine creative act. The system of the universe, in its principle, medium, and end, is one uniform and harmonious system. It is not, as a created system, divided into a natural system and a supernatural system. There is no supernatural creation, as there is no natural Creator. The created, as created, however high or however low, is natural, and the Creator is always supernatural. Nature is supernatural in its origin, in its medium, and in its end, for the creature originates in and is sustained by the immediate act of God, and finds its end in its return to and possession of God himself. All things are from him, by him, in him, for him, and to him. Grace is not a supernatural creation, but is the immediate act or operation of the Holy Ghost, completing or consummating creation. It is God himself acting immediately, not through the medium of natural agents or second causes. Hence the soul regenerated in Christ by the operation of divine grace is called by St. Paul "a new creature," or, "a new creation," and the regenerated are said to be "created anew in Christ Jesus." Grace, however, is in the last analysis only a higher or fuller manifestation of the divine creative act, which is a continuous, or rather an immanent act.

The difficulty of conciliating nature and grace grows out of the supposition that they are two separate creations, or two created systems, dependent on two distinct and separable creative acts of God. And this supposition grows out of another, namely, that the creative act is a transient act, by which God creates an existence and then leaves it to stand on its own feet, and to subsist and act of itself. But the existence, even when created, is not self-existent, for no existence,—no creature, we mean,—has its being in itself; and therefore every creature disjoined from God, who only hath being in himself, to whom it is united by the creative act, and by that act only, is nothing—is no creature, no existence at all. Hence we exist, even as nature, only by the immanent creative act of God, and therefore by the immanent act of the supernatural. The principle of nature and grace is therefore one and the same; grace regarded in its creations is nature, and nature regarded in its Creator is supernatural. There is, then, and there can be, no such

thing as two distinct created orders, one natural and the other supernatural. The supernatural in all orders is the Creator, and the created, in whatever order or degree, is natural. Nature and grace are conciliated and made one in the creative act, as are Creator and creature, being and existence. The grace is not outside of the creative act, but is included in it, only it is, as to us, a part of the act manifesting itself in time, and under the aspect of perfecting or completing rather than of originating our existence.

If we have succeeded in expressing our thought, we have shown that the dualism between faith and reason, revelation and science, that Mr. Simpson recognizes, is only the dualism which subsists between a part and the whole; that the two terms express only two parts or phases of one dialectic whole; and, consequently, that there is and can be no opposition between them. We have done more than this: we have shown that as revelation deals with the superintelligible,—that is to say, with the essences of things, on which the visible and the intelligible depend, and without which they would have no reality, be nothing at all,—revelation gives the law to science; and that it is for science to conform to faith, not for faith to conform to science. In this we only assert a simple dictate of reason, which makes faith the test of science, not science the test of faith. It is on this principle that we derive the law of civilization from religion, and maintain the dependence of civilization on Christianity; that we assert the supremacy of the spiritual order, and combat political atheism. Polities without religion is the state without God; and the assertion that science is independent of revelation is only another form of asserting that civilization is independent of religion,—is sufficient for itself, and can sustain itself and advance without God,—the real heresy of our age, especially of our country.

Mr. Simpson, however, is right in asserting the independence of science in the face of the *dicta* of theologians. Theology, though based on revealed as well as natural *data*, is itself a human science—as much so as geology, physiology, or chemistry. Theologians are not infallible, any more than are geologists, physiologists, or chemists; and the conclusions of theologians are never able, except by their superior reason, to override the conclusions of any other class of scientific men. In matters of faith, the church is infallible, —and she preserves in her language, her teachings and definitions, the revealed truth in its integrity and purity,—

and no scientific inductions can have sufficient certainty to set aside any thing she declares to be a revealed dogma; but theologians may not always give to her dogmas, in the world of science, their true application. Popes, bishops, priests, and even councils, when not defining the dogma under the gracious assistance of the Holy Ghost, or declaring what is and always has been the belief of the church, have not the prerogative of infallibilty, and follow ordinarily the philosophy, science, politics, and jurisprudence of their age, and are right when their age is right, and wrong when it is wrong. If the heliocentric hypothesis be the true one, as our age believes, the congregation that declared it a heresy, and condemned it as such, grossly erred; for nothing that is true can be heretical. They erred both as to science and as to the teachings of faith. They mistook the mathematical and astronomical system which they had been taught for the true or real system of nature,—the reflection of the moon in their water-pails for the moon herself,—and their own speculations for the supernatural revelation, or the revealed word of God. What has been done may be done, and scientific truths may be suppressed under pretence of maintaining the faith. Mr. Simpson does well to protest against that. But the church has authority not only to teach; she has also authority to govern, or authority in discipline. Her authority in teaching is infallible, for in teaching she has only to tell simply what she believes and always has believed. In discipline nobody pretends that she is infallible. She has power to excommunicate; but he would be a bold man who should undertake to maintain that her pontiffs had never abused that power. Innocent III. concedes that his predecessors had sometimes excommunicated persons unjustly, and theologians discuss the question, whether persons unjustly excommunicated are or are not still members of the church? The church has power to grant indulgences, but the holy council of Trent gives an admonition against its abuse. The church has no doubt the power to establish the congregation of the index for purposes of discipline, and the various other congregations we find at Rome, for the government or management of ecclesiastical affairs; but it would be idle to claim infallibility for any of these congregations. It is only in a loose way of speaking that we can say a book is condemned by the church because it has been placed on the index. The decisions of the Roman congregations are always respectable,

and, as far as they bear on discipline, to be obeyed; but so far as they touch on faith they are by no means to be confounded with the decisions of the church herself. In matters of science and philosophy they of course decide according to the systems they have been taught or have adopted, and they may condemn systems that are truer than their own. Yet, though it may happen that erroneous systems of science, philosophy, and theology find support, and scientific truth more or less discouragement, it is unquestionably better in the long run, for the interests of both truth and virtue, science and civilization, that discipline should be maintained, than that there should be no discipline. Faith needs to be protected, and should never, even in a single individual, be unnecessarily endangered. There should not only be great care bestowed on the inquiry after truth, but great prudence exercised in telling it. The upsetting of an old system rashly, without proper preparation for the introduction and reception of a new and better system, may do more harm than good. Reforms in science, as in institutions, rashly undertaken, prove to be destructions, not reforms, as we see in the reformation attempted by Luther and Calvin.

Yet prudence pushed to excess ceases to be prudence; and we think the tendency of ecclesiastical authorities is at present to push it further than need be, and, with the laudable intention of guarding against unsettling the convictions of the faithful, so far as really to repress the aspirations of genius, to check the growth of intelligence, and to hinder the progress of civilization. The fact is, most minds are already unsettled, and faith grows faint and feeble in the majority of those who are by no means prepared to reject it altogether. The danger has come, and it is too late to guard against it. We have a world to convert, rather than a world to protect, discipline, and govern. The prudential and repressive system now only tends to swell the numbers of the revolted, or of those who refuse to recognize the authority of the church. Prudence now, it seems to us, is not so much in guarding against error, as in stimulating free and vigorous thought, in lending our aid to truth, or in assisting the age to acquire what it lacks, not simply in preserving what it has. The age has lost nearly all it could lose, and is now in little danger of losing the faith, for men cannot lose what they have not. What it needs is, to acquire truth; and to this end, in our changed circumstances, it seems to us, discipline should be

directed. Here we meet and sympathize with Mr. Simpson, and his friends of *The Rambler* and *Home and Foreign Review*. We may not accept their theology or their philosophy. We believe they mistake, in some measure, the means to the end they seek; but as to the end itself, the recognition of the science and literature of the age, and the enlisting of both in the service of faith, we are with them, heart and soul.

The great thing now for Catholic publicists to aim at is to heal the fatal schism between the church and society, religion and civilization, and to bring back the modern world to the unity that has been lost. We can do this only by showing the age that the schism has no basis in the nature of things; that the two terms are not opposites without a middle term to unite them; that in the plan of the Creator they are dialectically one, and that it is only in our false or exaggerated systems that they are disunited and rendered sophistical. We must then endeavor to find a philosophy that conforms to the system of the universe, as it lies in the mind and decree of the Creator, made known to us by reason and revelation, not to an artificial and unreal system spun from our own brains. This done, we shall have brought the whole world of intellect into harmony with itself and with God. All prejudices against religion will be removed; all *a priori* objections to supernatural revelation will be precluded, and the positive evidences for it be allowed to have their due weight. Faith will then revive, and with it piety and holiness, science and virtue; and civilization and religion will embrace each other and advance together.

To this great work it is our consolation to feel that we have honestly devoted our best thoughts, and the best years of our life. Would that it had been with less infirmity and with more success. It is but little more that we can do, for our time is nearly up, perhaps quite up; but, happily, we are not alone—not the only one who sees the work and devotes himself to it. We are but one in a host, every day increasing, and the work is sure to go on. It is God's work, humanity's work, and heaven will not, and earth cannot, prevent its progress.

END OF VOLUME III.

3 5282 00007 2465

Date Due

Ja14'48

3 5282 00007 2465